Secure hybrid network monitoring - Problem statement
draft-oiwa-secure-hybrid-network-03
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Yutaka Oiwa , Satoru Kanno , Yumi Sakemi | ||
| Last updated | 2026-07-05 | ||
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| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
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draft-oiwa-secure-hybrid-network-03
Network Working Group Y. OIWA
Internet-Draft AIST Japan
Intended status: Informational S. Kanno
Expires: 7 January 2027 Y. Sakemi
GMO CONNECT
6 July 2026
Secure hybrid network monitoring - Problem statement
draft-oiwa-secure-hybrid-network-03
Abstract
This document presents a problem statement and gap analysis for
ensuring and monitoring the security status of networks operating in
complex environments, such as hybrid and multi-cloud systems. It
identifies a missing capability: verifying the path and security
properties of communications across multiple administrative domains
while preserving each provider's confidentiality and local policy
boundaries. The document also outlines, non-normatively, potential
solution directions.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 7 January 2027.
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Multi-cloud and Hybrid Cloud Systems . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Security Implications of Hybrid Clouds . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. The Nature of Multiple Operators/Stakeholders . . . . . . 5
3.2. Determination of the "Correct" States . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Shared Infrastructure and Information Leakage . . . . . . 5
3.4. Virtualized Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.5. Risks Beyond Network Layers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Security Risks in Hybrid Cloud Environments . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Invisible Attack Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Compromised Trust Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. Persistent Security Degradation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.4. Amplified Attack Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction
Virtualized resources such as cloud computing infrastructure are
increasingly replacing traditional network and computing environments
such as local servers and on-premises clusters. In such
infrastructure, the details of physical resources -- servers, local
networks, routers, and so on -- are hidden from users in exchange for
flexibility, service redundancy, and lower cost. Cryptographic
protocols such as TLS and IPsec are typically used to protect
communication into and out of these systems against eavesdropping and
tampering.
However, there are many use cases where service still depends on the
security nature of underlying physical resources, instead of just
encrypting the communication:
* Traffic analysis on encrypted communication may reveal partial
information of the payload;
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* Legal or jurisdictional requirements (such as personal data
protection) demand that specific properties (such as governing
laws, geographic locations, or operators) be checked;
* Denial-of-service and several other attacks may not be prevented
by encryption only.
Such high-security applications need a technical means to
continuously check the properties and status of the underlying
network and its intermediate nodes. In a non-virtualized, self-
managed setting, several existing technologies (e.g., NETCONF and
path validation) can obtain this status. However, they are not
sufficient for the virtualized, multi-stakeholder setting of modern
cloud infrastructure.
This document presents a first-stage problem analysis for ensuring
and monitoring the security status of networks operating in complex
environments such as hybrid and multi-cloud deployments.
This document provides (1) a problem statement and gap analysis, and
(2) a non-normative outline of potential solution directions. It
does not define protocol requirements. A companion document, the
Path Characteristics Service [I-D.oiwa-path-characteristics-service],
elaborates one such solution direction in detail.
2. Background
2.1. Multi-cloud and Hybrid Cloud Systems
The concepts of multi-cloud and hybrid cloud are defined in
[ISO-IEC-5140]. In short, a multi-cloud system implements a single
service using two or more independently operated cloud services. A
hybrid cloud system combines two or more computing environments that
differ in their operation, security level, or other aspects, at least
one of which is typically a public cloud service. Often, subsystems
on a privately operated cloud, on-premises, or edge networks are
connected to public cloud infrastructure over a network to form a
single hybrid cloud system.
A hybrid cloud is generally adopted when the security or other
provisions of a public cloud are not sufficient for some part of the
data or for a subsystem component (otherwise, a simple public or
multi-cloud environment would suffice). At the same time, the
benefits of public cloud systems -- scalability, cost, resilience,
maintainability, and so on -- are often still desired (otherwise, a
simple on-premises deployment would be enough). These mixed and
seemingly conflicting requirements make it difficult to ensure and
monitor the security of hybrid cloud systems.
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2.2. Security Implications of Hybrid Clouds
Multi-cloud and hybrid cloud systems require internal communications
that flow beyond the boundary of a single cloud. In the simplest
case, this can be implemented using authenticated TLS or HTTPS over
the public Internet. For high-security systems, it is often
implemented using dedicated communication channels, such as VPNs,
private peering, or even dedicated optical fiber. To maintain the
security of the whole system, monitoring the integrity of these
dedicated channels is essential.
Furthermore, IP-based software systems depend on many additional
components to keep such communication secure, which also widens the
attack surface. For example, if a DNS record is tampered with or
misconfigured, traffic intended for a secure channel might instead be
routed over public channels; a routing misconfiguration can have the
same effect. Standardized network telemetry [RFC9232] provides
building blocks for collecting such operational status, but
systematically enumerating these dependencies and assessing their
security impact across administrative boundaries remains difficult
today.
3. Problem Statement
Several existing technologies address related aspects of this
problem.
* SAVNET (Source Address Validation in Intra-domain and Inter-domain
Networks) [SAVNET-CHARTER] develops mechanisms for source address
validation, helping detect and discard packets that carry spoofed
source addresses.
* SRv6 network programming [RFC8986] lets a source encode an
intended packet-processing path as a sequence of segments,
enabling per-packet steering within SRv6-enabled domains.
* RPKI [RFC6480] provides trust anchors and a public-key
infrastructure for validating the authorization of route
originations in inter-domain routing.
These technologies each address part of the picture, but none
provides what hybrid cloud security most needs: a common, privacy-
preserving way to verify the path and security properties of a
communication across multiple administrative domains -- confirming,
for example, the jurisdictions traversed, the operators involved, and
the protection applied -- without forcing any provider to disclose
its internal topology or violate its local policy boundaries. A
privacy-preserving path-characteristics verification service (see
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[I-D.oiwa-path-characteristics-service]) is one solution direction
for this gap. The following aspects, in particular, remain
insufficiently addressed.
3.1. The Nature of Multiple Operators/Stakeholders
Hybrid cloud systems depend on many resources that are not under the
control of the application operator. Public clouds (both IaaS and
SaaS) are run by external service providers, each with its own
operational policies and its own decisions about maintaining or
replacing the hardware and software it provides, as long as its
service-level agreements (SLAs) are met.
This makes it undesirable to expose information about every
intermediate network node to the application operator. First,
detailed design and implementation information about the cloud
infrastructure is confidential and a competitive asset of the cloud
provider. Moreover, a degree of independence between application
operators and cloud service providers is important for the cost-
effectiveness, maintainability, and security of the cloud services.
3.2. Determination of the "Correct" States
In a small, hand-crafted network, determining whether the current
running state is the intended one is relatively straightforward. In
a complex multi-cloud system, however, this is very hard or even
impossible -- even if one could observe every detail of the running
state of the entire global network. Making that determination also
requires knowing the design principles and implicit assumptions
behind the operation of each constituent network.
3.3. Shared Infrastructure and Information Leakage
Cloud infrastructure is deeply shared among many clients. Although
some information about the cloud-side operational status is needed to
assess the reliability of a client's applications, exposing raw
operational parameters to one client may reveal security-critical
information about others. Before any cloud-side status is exposed,
it must be processed and filtered so that only the information
relevant to that specific client is included.
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3.4. Virtualized Infrastructure
Many cloud resources -- not only compute nodes but also routers,
switches, and VPN endpoints -- are virtualized and provisioned
through infrastructure-as-code (IaC) systems. Unlike physical
routers and switches, identifying a virtual intermediate node on a
traffic path reveals nothing about its physical location, physical
properties, or security characteristics. (Consider, for example, how
little can be inferred from a traceroute or ICMP ping that traverses
a virtual private network.)
Where virtual nodes are present, the physical properties of the
underlying infrastructure may need to be traced and verified to
ensure security and integrity. This requires cooperation from the
virtual-resource or cloud providers and integration with their
infrastructure management systems.
3.5. Risks Beyond Network Layers
Today, many networks are operated through complex management systems.
As a result, any compromise of the IT-side assets of those management
systems poses serious risks to the network layer. Such assets
include, but are not limited to, software asset management, software
vulnerability management, and identity management.
To correctly evaluate the risks to overall network operation, the
risks associated with these management systems must also be taken
into account.
4. Security Risks in Hybrid Cloud Environments
Because there is no common, privacy-preserving way to verify the path
and security properties of communications across administrative
domains, hybrid cloud environments are exposed to the classes of risk
below. Each is, at its core, a consequence of insufficient cross-
domain visibility and verification:
4.1. Invisible Attack Vectors
Current hybrid cloud deployments create numerous blind spots where
malicious activities can occur undetected:
* *Traffic Misdirection*: DNS tampering or routing misconfigurations
can redirect secure traffic through compromised or unintended
paths without detection
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* *Virtual Infrastructure Exploitation*: Attacks targeting
hypervisors or virtual network components remain invisible to
traditional network monitoring
* *Cross-Tenant Information Leakage*: Shared infrastructure may
enable side-channel attacks or resource-based information
disclosure between different cloud tenants
4.2. Compromised Trust Assumptions
The multi-stakeholder nature of hybrid clouds breaks traditional
security perimeters:
* *Fragmented Visibility*: No single entity has complete visibility
into the security posture, creating gaps that attackers can
exploit
* *Unclear Responsibility Boundaries*: Security incidents may go
undetected when responsibilities are unclear between cloud
providers and users
* *Unverifiable Provider Dependencies*: Dependencies on multiple
cloud providers expand the attack surface, yet there is no common
way to verify that each provider continues to meet the security
properties an application relies on
4.3. Persistent Security Degradation
Without proper monitoring capabilities, security posture deteriorates
over time:
* *Configuration Drift*: Gradual misconfigurations accumulate,
creating vulnerabilities that remain undetected
* *Stale Security Policies*: Security rules become outdated as
infrastructure evolves, but changes go unnoticed
* *Delayed Incident Response*: Without a way to verify path and
security properties on demand, security incidents can remain
undetected for extended periods, allowing attackers to establish
persistence
4.4. Amplified Attack Impact
The interconnected nature of hybrid clouds amplifies the impact of
successful attacks, and the absence of cross-domain verification
makes that impact harder to bound:
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* *Undetected Lateral Movement*: Without cross-domain visibility
into path and operator properties, compromised components can
serve as stepping stones into other parts of the hybrid
infrastructure unnoticed
* *Unattributed Propagation*: When responsibility for each path
segment cannot be verified, an incident in one provider can
propagate to other components of the hybrid system without clear
attribution
* *Undetected Exfiltration*: Sensitive data may traverse multiple
untrusted networks because the path and its security properties
cannot be independently verified
Any solution addressing these problems must carefully balance
security monitoring requirements with the protection of sensitive
infrastructure information and the preservation of multi-stakeholder
operational independence.
5. Security Considerations
This document is a problem statement and does not define a protocol;
the considerations below apply to the class of monitoring and
verification mechanisms it motivates (see
[I-D.oiwa-path-characteristics-service] for one such mechanism).
* Information disclosure: A monitoring or verification capability
necessarily handles sensitive operational data. It needs to avoid
becoming a new disclosure channel for provider topology, tenant
identities, or other confidential details, and is expected to
return only the minimum information needed (for example, a
conformance result rather than raw state).
* Probing and reconnaissance: An interface that answers questions
about path or security properties can be abused to map otherwise-
hidden infrastructure. Such a mechanism ought to constrain its
responses to a pre-agreed scope and to resist systematic probing.
* False assurance: A positive verification result that is stale,
incomplete, or derived from untrustworthy inputs can give
operators unwarranted confidence. Carrying provenance and
freshness metadata helps consumers judge how far a result can be
relied upon.
* Stale telemetry: Underlying telemetry may lag the actual network
state. The trustworthiness of any assurance depends on the
timeliness of its inputs, which needs to be made explicit.
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* Accountability boundaries: In a multi-stakeholder setting,
responsibility for each assertion needs to be attributable to a
specific operator within its own scope, so that an incorrect or
compromised assertion can be localized.
* Over-reliance on opaque provider assertions: When a provider
asserts a property without exposing the underlying evidence,
consumers depend on that provider's trustworthiness. Representing
the degree of verifiability of each assertion explicitly, rather
than assuming it, reduces this risk.
6. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
7. Informative References
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6480>.
[RFC9232] Song, H., Qin, F., Martinez-Julia, P., Ciavaglia, L., and
A. Wang, "Network Telemetry Framework", RFC 9232,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9232, May 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9232>.
[RFC8986] Filsfils, C., Ed., Camarillo, P., Ed., Leddy, J., Voyer,
D., Matsushima, S., and Z. Li, "Segment Routing over IPv6
(SRv6) Network Programming", RFC 8986,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8986, February 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8986>.
[I-D.oiwa-path-characteristics-service]
Oiwa, Y., Kanno, S., and Y. Sakemi, "Secure Hybrid Network
Monitoring - Path Characteristics Service", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-oiwa-path-characteristics-
service-00, 7 October 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-oiwa-path-
characteristics-service-00>.
[ISO-IEC-5140]
ISO/IEC, "Information technology - Cloud computing -
Multi-cloud and hybrid cloud vocabulary", ISO/
IEC 5140:2024, 2024.
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[SAVNET-CHARTER]
"Source Address Validation in Intra-domain and Inter-
domain Networks (SAVNET) Charter", n.d.,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/savnet/about/>.
Acknowledgments
This work is based on results obtained from a project JPNP23013
commissioned by the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development
Organization (NEDO).
Authors' Addresses
Yutaka OIWA
National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST)
Email: y.oiwa@aist.go.jp
Satoru Kanno
GMO CONNECT Inc.
Email: kanno@gmo-connect.jp
Yumi Sakemi
GMO CONNECT Inc.
Email: sakemi-yumi@gmo-connect.jp
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