Skip to main content

Secure hybrid network monitoring - Problem statement
draft-oiwa-secure-hybrid-network-03

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Yutaka Oiwa , Satoru Kanno , Yumi Sakemi
Last updated 2026-07-05
RFC stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
draft-oiwa-secure-hybrid-network-03
Network Working Group                                            Y. OIWA
Internet-Draft                                                AIST Japan
Intended status: Informational                                  S. Kanno
Expires: 7 January 2027                                        Y. Sakemi
                                                             GMO CONNECT
                                                             6 July 2026

          Secure hybrid network monitoring - Problem statement
                  draft-oiwa-secure-hybrid-network-03

Abstract

   This document presents a problem statement and gap analysis for
   ensuring and monitoring the security status of networks operating in
   complex environments, such as hybrid and multi-cloud systems.  It
   identifies a missing capability: verifying the path and security
   properties of communications across multiple administrative domains
   while preserving each provider's confidentiality and local policy
   boundaries.  The document also outlines, non-normatively, potential
   solution directions.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 7 January 2027.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights

OIWA, et al.             Expires 7 January 2027                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft           SHNM Problem statement                July 2026

   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Background  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Multi-cloud and Hybrid Cloud Systems  . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Security Implications of Hybrid Clouds  . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  The Nature of Multiple Operators/Stakeholders . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Determination of the "Correct" States . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.3.  Shared Infrastructure and Information Leakage . . . . . .   5
     3.4.  Virtualized Infrastructure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.5.  Risks Beyond Network Layers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Security Risks in Hybrid Cloud Environments . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  Invisible Attack Vectors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Compromised Trust Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.3.  Persistent Security Degradation . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.4.  Amplified Attack Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Introduction

   Virtualized resources such as cloud computing infrastructure are
   increasingly replacing traditional network and computing environments
   such as local servers and on-premises clusters.  In such
   infrastructure, the details of physical resources -- servers, local
   networks, routers, and so on -- are hidden from users in exchange for
   flexibility, service redundancy, and lower cost.  Cryptographic
   protocols such as TLS and IPsec are typically used to protect
   communication into and out of these systems against eavesdropping and
   tampering.

   However, there are many use cases where service still depends on the
   security nature of underlying physical resources, instead of just
   encrypting the communication:

   *  Traffic analysis on encrypted communication may reveal partial
      information of the payload;

OIWA, et al.             Expires 7 January 2027                 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft           SHNM Problem statement                July 2026

   *  Legal or jurisdictional requirements (such as personal data
      protection) demand that specific properties (such as governing
      laws, geographic locations, or operators) be checked;

   *  Denial-of-service and several other attacks may not be prevented
      by encryption only.

   Such high-security applications need a technical means to
   continuously check the properties and status of the underlying
   network and its intermediate nodes.  In a non-virtualized, self-
   managed setting, several existing technologies (e.g., NETCONF and
   path validation) can obtain this status.  However, they are not
   sufficient for the virtualized, multi-stakeholder setting of modern
   cloud infrastructure.

   This document presents a first-stage problem analysis for ensuring
   and monitoring the security status of networks operating in complex
   environments such as hybrid and multi-cloud deployments.

   This document provides (1) a problem statement and gap analysis, and
   (2) a non-normative outline of potential solution directions.  It
   does not define protocol requirements.  A companion document, the
   Path Characteristics Service [I-D.oiwa-path-characteristics-service],
   elaborates one such solution direction in detail.

2.  Background

2.1.  Multi-cloud and Hybrid Cloud Systems

   The concepts of multi-cloud and hybrid cloud are defined in
   [ISO-IEC-5140].  In short, a multi-cloud system implements a single
   service using two or more independently operated cloud services.  A
   hybrid cloud system combines two or more computing environments that
   differ in their operation, security level, or other aspects, at least
   one of which is typically a public cloud service.  Often, subsystems
   on a privately operated cloud, on-premises, or edge networks are
   connected to public cloud infrastructure over a network to form a
   single hybrid cloud system.

   A hybrid cloud is generally adopted when the security or other
   provisions of a public cloud are not sufficient for some part of the
   data or for a subsystem component (otherwise, a simple public or
   multi-cloud environment would suffice).  At the same time, the
   benefits of public cloud systems -- scalability, cost, resilience,
   maintainability, and so on -- are often still desired (otherwise, a
   simple on-premises deployment would be enough).  These mixed and
   seemingly conflicting requirements make it difficult to ensure and
   monitor the security of hybrid cloud systems.

OIWA, et al.             Expires 7 January 2027                 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft           SHNM Problem statement                July 2026

2.2.  Security Implications of Hybrid Clouds

   Multi-cloud and hybrid cloud systems require internal communications
   that flow beyond the boundary of a single cloud.  In the simplest
   case, this can be implemented using authenticated TLS or HTTPS over
   the public Internet.  For high-security systems, it is often
   implemented using dedicated communication channels, such as VPNs,
   private peering, or even dedicated optical fiber.  To maintain the
   security of the whole system, monitoring the integrity of these
   dedicated channels is essential.

   Furthermore, IP-based software systems depend on many additional
   components to keep such communication secure, which also widens the
   attack surface.  For example, if a DNS record is tampered with or
   misconfigured, traffic intended for a secure channel might instead be
   routed over public channels; a routing misconfiguration can have the
   same effect.  Standardized network telemetry [RFC9232] provides
   building blocks for collecting such operational status, but
   systematically enumerating these dependencies and assessing their
   security impact across administrative boundaries remains difficult
   today.

3.  Problem Statement

   Several existing technologies address related aspects of this
   problem.

   *  SAVNET (Source Address Validation in Intra-domain and Inter-domain
      Networks) [SAVNET-CHARTER] develops mechanisms for source address
      validation, helping detect and discard packets that carry spoofed
      source addresses.

   *  SRv6 network programming [RFC8986] lets a source encode an
      intended packet-processing path as a sequence of segments,
      enabling per-packet steering within SRv6-enabled domains.

   *  RPKI [RFC6480] provides trust anchors and a public-key
      infrastructure for validating the authorization of route
      originations in inter-domain routing.

   These technologies each address part of the picture, but none
   provides what hybrid cloud security most needs: a common, privacy-
   preserving way to verify the path and security properties of a
   communication across multiple administrative domains -- confirming,
   for example, the jurisdictions traversed, the operators involved, and
   the protection applied -- without forcing any provider to disclose
   its internal topology or violate its local policy boundaries.  A
   privacy-preserving path-characteristics verification service (see

OIWA, et al.             Expires 7 January 2027                 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft           SHNM Problem statement                July 2026

   [I-D.oiwa-path-characteristics-service]) is one solution direction
   for this gap.  The following aspects, in particular, remain
   insufficiently addressed.

3.1.  The Nature of Multiple Operators/Stakeholders

   Hybrid cloud systems depend on many resources that are not under the
   control of the application operator.  Public clouds (both IaaS and
   SaaS) are run by external service providers, each with its own
   operational policies and its own decisions about maintaining or
   replacing the hardware and software it provides, as long as its
   service-level agreements (SLAs) are met.

   This makes it undesirable to expose information about every
   intermediate network node to the application operator.  First,
   detailed design and implementation information about the cloud
   infrastructure is confidential and a competitive asset of the cloud
   provider.  Moreover, a degree of independence between application
   operators and cloud service providers is important for the cost-
   effectiveness, maintainability, and security of the cloud services.

3.2.  Determination of the "Correct" States

   In a small, hand-crafted network, determining whether the current
   running state is the intended one is relatively straightforward.  In
   a complex multi-cloud system, however, this is very hard or even
   impossible -- even if one could observe every detail of the running
   state of the entire global network.  Making that determination also
   requires knowing the design principles and implicit assumptions
   behind the operation of each constituent network.

3.3.  Shared Infrastructure and Information Leakage

   Cloud infrastructure is deeply shared among many clients.  Although
   some information about the cloud-side operational status is needed to
   assess the reliability of a client's applications, exposing raw
   operational parameters to one client may reveal security-critical
   information about others.  Before any cloud-side status is exposed,
   it must be processed and filtered so that only the information
   relevant to that specific client is included.

OIWA, et al.             Expires 7 January 2027                 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft           SHNM Problem statement                July 2026

3.4.  Virtualized Infrastructure

   Many cloud resources -- not only compute nodes but also routers,
   switches, and VPN endpoints -- are virtualized and provisioned
   through infrastructure-as-code (IaC) systems.  Unlike physical
   routers and switches, identifying a virtual intermediate node on a
   traffic path reveals nothing about its physical location, physical
   properties, or security characteristics.  (Consider, for example, how
   little can be inferred from a traceroute or ICMP ping that traverses
   a virtual private network.)

   Where virtual nodes are present, the physical properties of the
   underlying infrastructure may need to be traced and verified to
   ensure security and integrity.  This requires cooperation from the
   virtual-resource or cloud providers and integration with their
   infrastructure management systems.

3.5.  Risks Beyond Network Layers

   Today, many networks are operated through complex management systems.
   As a result, any compromise of the IT-side assets of those management
   systems poses serious risks to the network layer.  Such assets
   include, but are not limited to, software asset management, software
   vulnerability management, and identity management.

   To correctly evaluate the risks to overall network operation, the
   risks associated with these management systems must also be taken
   into account.

4.  Security Risks in Hybrid Cloud Environments

   Because there is no common, privacy-preserving way to verify the path
   and security properties of communications across administrative
   domains, hybrid cloud environments are exposed to the classes of risk
   below.  Each is, at its core, a consequence of insufficient cross-
   domain visibility and verification:

4.1.  Invisible Attack Vectors

   Current hybrid cloud deployments create numerous blind spots where
   malicious activities can occur undetected:

   *  *Traffic Misdirection*: DNS tampering or routing misconfigurations
      can redirect secure traffic through compromised or unintended
      paths without detection

OIWA, et al.             Expires 7 January 2027                 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft           SHNM Problem statement                July 2026

   *  *Virtual Infrastructure Exploitation*: Attacks targeting
      hypervisors or virtual network components remain invisible to
      traditional network monitoring

   *  *Cross-Tenant Information Leakage*: Shared infrastructure may
      enable side-channel attacks or resource-based information
      disclosure between different cloud tenants

4.2.  Compromised Trust Assumptions

   The multi-stakeholder nature of hybrid clouds breaks traditional
   security perimeters:

   *  *Fragmented Visibility*: No single entity has complete visibility
      into the security posture, creating gaps that attackers can
      exploit

   *  *Unclear Responsibility Boundaries*: Security incidents may go
      undetected when responsibilities are unclear between cloud
      providers and users

   *  *Unverifiable Provider Dependencies*: Dependencies on multiple
      cloud providers expand the attack surface, yet there is no common
      way to verify that each provider continues to meet the security
      properties an application relies on

4.3.  Persistent Security Degradation

   Without proper monitoring capabilities, security posture deteriorates
   over time:

   *  *Configuration Drift*: Gradual misconfigurations accumulate,
      creating vulnerabilities that remain undetected

   *  *Stale Security Policies*: Security rules become outdated as
      infrastructure evolves, but changes go unnoticed

   *  *Delayed Incident Response*: Without a way to verify path and
      security properties on demand, security incidents can remain
      undetected for extended periods, allowing attackers to establish
      persistence

4.4.  Amplified Attack Impact

   The interconnected nature of hybrid clouds amplifies the impact of
   successful attacks, and the absence of cross-domain verification
   makes that impact harder to bound:

OIWA, et al.             Expires 7 January 2027                 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft           SHNM Problem statement                July 2026

   *  *Undetected Lateral Movement*: Without cross-domain visibility
      into path and operator properties, compromised components can
      serve as stepping stones into other parts of the hybrid
      infrastructure unnoticed

   *  *Unattributed Propagation*: When responsibility for each path
      segment cannot be verified, an incident in one provider can
      propagate to other components of the hybrid system without clear
      attribution

   *  *Undetected Exfiltration*: Sensitive data may traverse multiple
      untrusted networks because the path and its security properties
      cannot be independently verified

   Any solution addressing these problems must carefully balance
   security monitoring requirements with the protection of sensitive
   infrastructure information and the preservation of multi-stakeholder
   operational independence.

5.  Security Considerations

   This document is a problem statement and does not define a protocol;
   the considerations below apply to the class of monitoring and
   verification mechanisms it motivates (see
   [I-D.oiwa-path-characteristics-service] for one such mechanism).

   *  Information disclosure: A monitoring or verification capability
      necessarily handles sensitive operational data.  It needs to avoid
      becoming a new disclosure channel for provider topology, tenant
      identities, or other confidential details, and is expected to
      return only the minimum information needed (for example, a
      conformance result rather than raw state).

   *  Probing and reconnaissance: An interface that answers questions
      about path or security properties can be abused to map otherwise-
      hidden infrastructure.  Such a mechanism ought to constrain its
      responses to a pre-agreed scope and to resist systematic probing.

   *  False assurance: A positive verification result that is stale,
      incomplete, or derived from untrustworthy inputs can give
      operators unwarranted confidence.  Carrying provenance and
      freshness metadata helps consumers judge how far a result can be
      relied upon.

   *  Stale telemetry: Underlying telemetry may lag the actual network
      state.  The trustworthiness of any assurance depends on the
      timeliness of its inputs, which needs to be made explicit.

OIWA, et al.             Expires 7 January 2027                 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft           SHNM Problem statement                July 2026

   *  Accountability boundaries: In a multi-stakeholder setting,
      responsibility for each assertion needs to be attributable to a
      specific operator within its own scope, so that an incorrect or
      compromised assertion can be localized.

   *  Over-reliance on opaque provider assertions: When a provider
      asserts a property without exposing the underlying evidence,
      consumers depend on that provider's trustworthiness.  Representing
      the degree of verifiability of each assertion explicitly, rather
      than assuming it, reduces this risk.

6.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

7.  Informative References

   [RFC6480]  Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
              Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
              February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6480>.

   [RFC9232]  Song, H., Qin, F., Martinez-Julia, P., Ciavaglia, L., and
              A. Wang, "Network Telemetry Framework", RFC 9232,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9232, May 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9232>.

   [RFC8986]  Filsfils, C., Ed., Camarillo, P., Ed., Leddy, J., Voyer,
              D., Matsushima, S., and Z. Li, "Segment Routing over IPv6
              (SRv6) Network Programming", RFC 8986,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8986, February 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8986>.

   [I-D.oiwa-path-characteristics-service]
              Oiwa, Y., Kanno, S., and Y. Sakemi, "Secure Hybrid Network
              Monitoring - Path Characteristics Service", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-oiwa-path-characteristics-
              service-00, 7 October 2025,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-oiwa-path-
              characteristics-service-00>.

   [ISO-IEC-5140]
              ISO/IEC, "Information technology - Cloud computing -
              Multi-cloud and hybrid cloud vocabulary", ISO/
              IEC 5140:2024, 2024.

OIWA, et al.             Expires 7 January 2027                 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft           SHNM Problem statement                July 2026

   [SAVNET-CHARTER]
              "Source Address Validation in Intra-domain and Inter-
              domain Networks (SAVNET) Charter", n.d.,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/savnet/about/>.

Acknowledgments

   This work is based on results obtained from a project JPNP23013
   commissioned by the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development
   Organization (NEDO).

Authors' Addresses

   Yutaka OIWA
   National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST)
   Email: y.oiwa@aist.go.jp

   Satoru Kanno
   GMO CONNECT Inc.
   Email: kanno@gmo-connect.jp

   Yumi Sakemi
   GMO CONNECT Inc.
   Email: sakemi-yumi@gmo-connect.jp

OIWA, et al.             Expires 7 January 2027                [Page 10]