Securing MIPv6 Binding Updates Using Address Based Keys (ABKs)
draft-okazaki-mobileip-abk-01
| Document | Type | Expired Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Satomi Okazaki | ||
| Last updated | 2002-10-04 | ||
| Stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats |
Expired & archived
plain text
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bibtex
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| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-okazaki-mobileip-abk-01.txt
Abstract
This document outlines a method for authenticating and authorizing Mobile IPv6 [MIPv6] Binding Updates between a Correspondent Node and a Mobile Node where there exists no pre-established direct or indirect security relationship between those two entities. The method uses a new security technique called Address Based Keys. Address Based Keys are an alternative to other cryptographic address mechanisms for optimizing Binding Update security to avoid the need for Return Routability checks on each binding update. Address Based Keys use some mathematical results in identity based cryptosystems that have been known to cryptographers for some time, but have not been widely discussed in the network security community.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)