SOCKS Protocol Version 6
draft-olteanu-intarea-socks-6-02
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|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Vladimir Olteanu , Dragos Niculescu | ||
| Last updated | 2018-03-05 | ||
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draft-olteanu-intarea-socks-6-02
Internet Area Working Group V. Olteanu
Internet-Draft D. Niculescu
Intended status: Experimental University Politehnica of Bucharest
Expires: September 6, 2018 March 05, 2018
SOCKS Protocol Version 6
draft-olteanu-intarea-socks-6-02
Abstract
The SOCKS protocol is used primarily to proxy TCP connections to
arbitrary destinations via the use of a proxy server. Under the
latest version of the protocol (version 5), it takes 2 RTTs (or 3, if
authentication is used) before data can flow between the client and
the server.
This memo proposes SOCKS version 6, which reduces the number of RTTs
used, takes full advantage of TCP Fast Open, and adds support for
0-RTT authentication.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 6, 2018.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Revision log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Requirements language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Mode of operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Connection Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Version Mismatch Replies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Authentication Replies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Operation Replies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.1. Handling CONNECT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.2. Handling BIND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.3. Handling UDP ASSOCIATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. SOCKS Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1. Socket options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1.1. TFO options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.1.2. Multipath TCP options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.1.3. MPTCP Scheduler options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.2. Authentication Method options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.3. Authentication Data options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8.4. Idempotence options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8.4.1. Requesting a fresh token window . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8.4.2. Spending a token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8.4.3. Handling Token Window Advertisements . . . . . . . . 19
8.5. Salt options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9. Username/Password Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
10.1. Large requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
10.2. Replay attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
10.3. Identical request profiling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1. Introduction
Versions 4 and 5 [RFC1928] of the SOCKS protocol were developed two
decades ago and are in widespread use for circuit level gateways or
as circumvention tools, and enjoy wide support and usage from various
software, such as web browsers, SSH clients, and proxifiers.
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However, their design needs an update in order to take advantage of
the new features of transport protocols, such as TCP Fast Open
[RFC7413], or to better assist newer transport protocols, such as
MPTCP [RFC6824].
One of the main issues faced by SOCKS version 5 is that, when taking
into account the TCP handshake, method negotiation, authentication,
connection request and grant, it may take up to 5 RTTs for a data
exchange to take place at the application layer. This is especially
costly in networks with a large delay at the access layer, such as
3G, 4G, or satelite.
The desire to reduce the number of RTTs manifests itself in the
design of newer security protocols. TLS version 1.3
[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] defines a zero round trip (0-RTT) handshake mode
for connections if the client and server had previously communicated.
TCP Fast Open [RFC7413] is a TCP option that allows TCP to send data
in the SYN and receive a response in the first ACK, and aims at
obtaining a data response in one RTT. The SOCKS protocol needs to
concern itself with at least two TFO deployment scenarios: First,
when TFO is available end-to-end (at the client, at the proxy, and at
the server); second, when TFO is active between the client and the
proxy, but not at the server.
This document describes the SOCKS protocol version 6. The key
improvements over SOCKS version 5 are:
o The client sends as much information upfront as possible, and does
not wait for the authentication process to conclude before
requesting the creation of a socket.
o The connection request also mimics the semantics of TCP Fast Open
[RFC7413]. As part of the connection request, the client can
supply the potential payload for the initial SYN that is sent out
to the server.
o The protocol can be extended via options without breaking
backward-compatibility.
o The protocol can leverage the aforementioned options to support
0-RTT authentication schemes.
1.1. Revision log
Typos and minor clarifications are not listed.
draft-02
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o Made support for Idempotence options mandatory for proxies.
o Clarified what happens when proxies can not or will not issue
tokens.
o Limited token windows to 2^31 - 1.
o Fixed definition of "less than" for tokens.
o NOOP commands now trigger Operation Replies.
o Renamed Authentication options to Authentication Data options.
o Authentication Data options are no longer mandatory.
o Authentication methods are now advertised via options.
o Shifted some Request fields.
o Option range for vendor-specific options.
o Socket options.
o Password authentication.
o Salt options.
draft-01
o Added this section.
o Support for idempotent commands.
o Removed version numbers from operation replies.
o Request port number for SOCKS over TLS. Deprecate encryption/
encapsulation within SOCKS.
o Added Version Mismatch Replies.
o Renamed the AUTH command to NOOP.
o Shifted some fields to make requests and operation replies easier
to parse.
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2. Requirements language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Mode of operation
CLIENT PROXY
+------------------------+
| Authentication methods | Request
--------> Command code +------------------------------>
| Address |
| Port |
| Options |
| Initial data |
+------------------------+
+-----------------------+
Authentication reply | Type |
<----------------------------------+ Method <-----
| Options |
+-----------------------+
<-------------------(Authentication protocol)------------------>
+-----------------------+
Operation reply | Reply code |
<--------------------+ Bind address <------------------
| Bind port |
| Options |
| Initial data offset |
+-----------------------+
Figure 1: The SOCKS version 6 protocol message exchange
When a TCP-based client wishes to establish a connection to a server,
it must open a TCP connection to the appropriate SOCKS port on the
SOCKS proxy. The client then enters a negotiation phase, by sending
the request in figure Figure 1, that contains, in addition to fields
present in SOCKS 5 [RFC1928], fields that facilitate low RTT usage
and faster authentication negotiation.
Next, the server sends an authentication reply. If the request did
not contain the necessary authentication information, the proxy
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indicates an authentication method that must proceed. This may
trigger a longer authentication sequence that could include tokens
for ulterior faster authentications. The part labeled
"Authentication protocol" is specific to the authentication method
employed and is not expected to be employed for every connection
between a client and its proxy server. The authentication protocol
typically takes up 1 RTT or more.
If the authentication is successful, an operation reply is generated
by the proxy. It indicates whether the proxy was successful in
creating the requested socket or not.
In the fast case, when authentication is properly set up, the proxy
attempts to create the socket immediately after the receipt of the
request, thus achieving an operational conection in one RTT (provided
TFO functionality is available at the client, proxy, and server).
4. Connection Requests
The client starts by sending a request to the proxy.
+---------------+---------+------+---------+----------+
| Version | Command | Port | Address | Address |
| Major | Minor | Code | | Type | |
+-------+-------+---------+------+---------+----------+
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | Variable |
+-------+-------+---------+------+---------+----------+
+-----------+----------+--------------+--------------+
| Number of | Options | Initial Data | Initial Data |
| Options | | Size | |
+-----------+----------+--------------+--------------+
| 1 | Variable | 2 | Variable |
+-----------+----------+--------------+--------------+
Figure 2: SOCKS 6 Request
o Version: The major byte MUST be set to 0x06, and the minor byte
MUST be set to 0x00.
o Command Code:
* 0x00 NOOP: authenticate the client and do nothing.
* 0x01 CONNECT: requests the establishment of a TCP connection.
* 0x02 BIND: requests the establishment of a TCP port binding.
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* 0x03 UDP ASSOCIATE: requests a UDP port association.
o Address Type:
* 0x01: IPv4
* 0x03: Domain Name
* 0x04: IPv6
o Address: this field's format depends on the address type:
* IPv4: a 4-byte IPv4 address
* Domain Name: one byte that contains the length of the FQDN,
followed by the FQDN itself. The string is not NUL-terminated.
* IPv6: a 16-byte IPv6 address
o Port: the port in network byte order.
o Number of Options: the number of SOCKS options that appear in the
Options field.
o Options: see Section 8.
o Initial Data Size: A two-byte number in network byte order. In
case of NOOP, BIND or UDP ASSOCIATE, this field MUST be set to 0.
In case of CONNECT, this is the number of bytes of initial data
that are supplied in the following field.
o Initial Data: The first octets of the data stream.
Clients can advertise their supported authentication methods by
including an Authentication Method option (see Section 8.2).
The server MAY truncate the initial data to an arbitrary size and
disregard the rest. This is will be communicated later to the
client, should the authentication process be successful (see
Section 7). As such, server implementations do not have to buffer
the initial data while waiting for the (potentially malicious) client
to authenticate.
5. Version Mismatch Replies
Upon receipt of a request starting with a version number other than
6.0, the proxy sends the following response:
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+---------------+
| Version |
| Major | Minor |
+-------+-------+
| 1 | 1 |
+-------+-------+
Figure 3: SOCKS 6 Version Mismatch Reply
o Version: The major byte MUST be set to 0x06, and the minor byte
MUST be set to 0x00.
A client MUST close the connection after receiving such a reply.
6. Authentication Replies
Upon receipt of a valid request, the proxy sends an Authentication
Reply:
+---------------+------+--------+-----------+----------+
| Version | Type | Method | Number of | Options |
| Major | Minor | | | Options | |
+-------+-------+------+--------+-----------+----------+
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Variable |
+-------+-------+------+--------+-----------+----------+
Figure 4: SOCKS 6 Authentication Reply
o Version: The major byte MUST be set to 0x06, and the minor byte
MUST be set to 0x00.
o Type:
* 0x00: authentication successful.
* 0x01: further authentication needed.
o Method: The chosen authentication method.
o Number of Options: the number of SOCKS options that appear in the
Options field.
o Options: see Section 8.
Multihomed clients SHOULD cache the chosen method on a per-interface
basis and SHOULD NOT include Authentication Data options related to
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any other methods in further requests originating from the same
interface.
If the server signals that further authentication is needed and
selects "No Acceptable Methods", the client MUST close the
connection.
The client and proxy begin a method-specific negotiation. During
such negotiations, the proxy MAY supply information that allows the
client to authenticate a future request using an Authentication Data
option. The client and proxy SHOULD NOT negotiate the encryption of
the application data. Descriptions of such negotiations are beyond
the scope of this memo.
7. Operation Replies
After the authentication negotiations are complete, the server sends
an Operation Reply:
+-------+---------+------+----------+--------------+
| Reply | Address | Bind | Bind | Initial Data |
| Code | Type | Port | Address | Offset |
+-------+---------+------+----------+--------------+
| 1 | 1 | 2 | Variable | 2 |
+-------+---------+------+----------+--------------+
+-----------+----------+
| Number of | Options |
| Options | |
+-----------+----------+
| 1 | Variable |
+-----------+----------+
Figure 5: SOCKS 6 Operation Reply
o Reply Code:
* 0x00: Succes
* 0x01: General SOCKS server failure
* 0x02: Connection not allowed by ruleset
* 0x03: Network unreachable
* 0x04: Host unreachable
* 0x05: Connection refused
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* 0x06: TTL expired
* 0x07: Command not supported
* 0x08: Address type not supported
o Address Type:
* 0x01: IPv4
* 0x03: Domain Name
* 0x04: IPv6
o Bind Address: the proxy bound address in the following format:
* IPv4: a 4-byte IPv4 address
* Domain Name: one byte that contains the length of the FQDN,
followed by the FQDN itself. The string is not NUL-terminated.
* IPv6: a 16-byte IPv6 address
o Bind Port: the proxy bound port in network byte order.
o Number of Options: the number of SOCKS options that appear in the
Options field.
o Options: see Section 8.
o Initial Data Offset: A two-byte number in network byte order. In
case of BIND or UDP ASSOCIATE, this field MUST be set to 0. In
case of CONNECT, it represents the offset in the plain data stream
from which the client is expected to continue sending data.
If the proxy returns a reply code other than "Success", the client
MUST close the connection.
If the client issued an NOOP command, the client MUST close the
connection after receiving the Operation Reply.
7.1. Handling CONNECT
In case the client has issued a CONNECT request, data can now pass.
The client MUST resume the data stream at the offset indicated by the
Initial Data Offset field.
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7.2. Handling BIND
In case the client has issued a BIND request, it must wait for a
second Operation reply from the proxy, which signifies that a host
has connected to the bound port. The Bind Address and Bind Port
fields contain the address and port of the connecting host.
Afterwards, application data may pass.
7.3. Handling UDP ASSOCIATE
The relay of UDP packets is handled exactly as in SOCKS 5 [RFC1928].
8. SOCKS Options
SOCKS options have the following format:
+---------------+-------------+
| Kind | Length | Option Data |
+------+--------+-------------+
| 1 | 1 | Variable |
+------+--------+-------------+
Figure 6: SOCKS 6 Option
o Kind: MUST be allocated by IANA. (See Section 11.)
o Length: The length of the option.
o Option Data: The contents are specific to each option kind.
8.1. Socket options
Socket options are be used by clients to alter the behavior of the
sockets created by the proxy. A socket option can affect either the
proxy's socket on the client-proxy leg or on the proxy-server leg.
Clients can only place Socket options inside SOCKS Requests.
Proxies MAY include Socket options in their Operation Replies to
signal their sockets' behavior. Said options MAY be unsolicited, i.
e. the proxy MAY send them to signal behaviour that was not
explicitly requested by the client.
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+---------------+--------+--------+------+----------+
| Kind | Length | Leg | Level | Code | Data |
+------+--------+--------+--------+------+----------+
| 1 | 1 | 2 bits | 6 bits | 1 | Variable |
+------+--------+--------+--------+------+----------+
Figure 7: Socket Option
o Kind: MUST be allocated by IANA. (See Section 11.)
o Length: The length of the option.
o Leg:
* 0x1: Client-Proxy Leg
* 0x2: Proxy-Server Leg
* 0x3: Both Legs
o Level:
* 0x01: Socket
* 0x02: IPv4
* 0x03: IPv6
* 0x04: TCP
* 0x05: UDP
o Code: Option code
o Data: Option-specific data
8.1.1. TFO options
+---------------+--------+--------+------+
| Kind | Length | Leg | Level | Code |
+------+--------+--------+--------+------+
| 1 | 1 | 2 bits | 6 bits | 1 |
+------+--------+--------+--------+------+
Figure 8: TFO Option
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o Kind: MUST be allocated by IANA. (See Section 11.)
o Length: MUST be 4.
o Leg: MUST be 0x2 (Proxy-Server Leg).
o Level: 0x04 (TCP).
o Code: 0x17
If a SOCKS Request contains a TFO option, the proxy SHOULD attempt to
use TFO in case of a CONNECT command, or accept TFO in case of a BIND
command. Otherwise, the proxy MUST NOT attempt to use TFO in case of
a CONNECT command, or accept TFO in case of a BIND command.
In case of a CONNECT command, the proxy MAY include a TFO option in
the Operation reply if TFO was attempted, the operation succeded and
the remote server supports TFO. In case of a BIND command, the proxy
MAY include a TFO option in the first Operation reply to signal that
it will accept an incoming TFO connection.
8.1.2. Multipath TCP options
In case of a CONNECT command, the proxy can inform the client that
the connection to the server is an MPTCP connection.
+---------------+--------+--------+------+
| Kind | Length | Leg | Level | Code |
+------+--------+--------+--------+------+
| 1 | 1 | 2 bits | 6 bits | 1 |
+------+--------+--------+--------+------+
Figure 9: Multipath TCP Option
o Kind: MUST be allocated by IANA. (See Section 11.)
o Length: 4.
o Leg: MUST be 0x2 (Proxy-Server Leg).
o Level: 0x04 (TCP).
o Code: 0x2a
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8.1.3. MPTCP Scheduler options
In case of a CONNECT or BIND command, a client can use an MPTCP
Scheduler option to indicate its preferred scheduler for the
connection.
A proxy can use an MPTCP Scheduler option to inform the client about
what scheduler is in use.
+---------------+--------+--------+------+-----------+
| Kind | Length | Leg | Level | Code | Scheduler |
+------+--------+--------+--------+------+-----------+
| 1 | 1 | 2 bits | 6 bits | 1 | 1 |
+------+--------+--------+--------+------+-----------+
Figure 10: MPTCP Scheduler Option
o Kind: MUST be allocated by IANA. (See Section 11.)
o Length: MUST be 5.
o Leg: Either 0x01, 0x02, or 0x03 (Client-Proxy, Proxy-Client or
Both legs).
o Level: 0x04 (TCP).
o Code: 0x2b
o Scheduler:
* 0x00: Default
* 0x01: Round-Robin
* 0x02: Redundant
8.2. Authentication Method options
Authentication Method options are used by clients to advertise
supported authentication methods. They can be part of SOCKS
Requests.
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+---------------+----------+
| Kind | Length | Methods |
+------+--------+----------+
| 1 | 1 | Variable |
+------+--------+----------+
Figure 11: Authentication Method Option
o Kind: MUST be allocated by IANA. (See Section 11.)
o Length: The length of the option.
o Methods: One byte per advertised method. Method numbers are
assigned by IANA.
Clients MUST support the "No authentication required" method.
Clients MAY omit advertising the "No authentication required" option.
8.3. Authentication Data options
Authentication Data options carry method-specific authentication
data. They can be part of SOCKS Requests and Authentication Replies.
Authentication Data options have the following format:
+---------------+--------+---------------------+
| Kind | Length | Method | Authentication Data |
+------+--------+--------+---------------------+
| 1 | 1 | 1 | Variable |
+------+--------+--------+---------------------+
Figure 12: Authentication Data Option
o Kind: MUST be allocated by IANA. (See Section 11.)
o Length: The length of the option.
o Method: The number of the authentication method. These numbers
are assigned by IANA.
o Authentication Data: The contents are specific to each method.
Clients MAY omit advertising authentication methods for which they
have included at least an Authentication Data option.
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8.4. Idempotence options
To protect against duplicate SOCKS Requests, authenticated clients
can request, and then spend, idempotence tokens. A token can only be
spent on a single SOCKS request.
Tokens are 4-byte unsigned integers in a modular 4-byte space.
Therefore, if x and y are tokens, x is less than y if 0 < (y - x) <
2^31 in unsigned 32-bit arithmetic.
Proxies grant contiguous ranges of tokens called token windows.
Token windows are defined by their base (the first token in the
range) and size. Windows can be shifted (i. e. have their base
increased, while retaining their size) unilaterally by the proxy.
Requesting and spending tokens is done via Idempotence options:
+---------------+------+-------------+
| Kind | Length | Type | Option Data |
+------+--------+------+-------------+
| 1 | 1 | 1 | Variable |
+------+--------+------+-------------+
Figure 13: Idempotence Option
o Kind: MUST be allocated by IANA. (See Section 11.)
o Length: The length of the option.
o Type:
* 0x00: Token Request
* 0x01: Token Window Advertisement
* 0x02: Token Expenditure
* 0x03: Token Expenditure Reply
o Option Data: The contents are specific to each type.
All proxy implementations MUST support Idempotetence options, even if
they do not issue token windows.
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8.4.1. Requesting a fresh token window
A client can obtain a fresh window of tokens by sending a Token
Request option as part of a SOCKS Request:
+---------------+------+-------------+
| Kind | Length | Type | Window Size |
+------+--------+------+-------------+
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
+------+--------+------+-------------+
Figure 14: Token Request
o Kind: MUST be allocated by IANA. (See Section 11.)
o Length: 7
o Type: 0x00 (Token Request)
o Window Size: The requested window size.
If a token window is issued, the proxy then includes a Token Window
Advertisement option in the corresponding Operation Reply:
+---------------+------+-------------+-------------+
| Kind | Length | Type | Window Base | Window Size |
+------+--------+------+-------------+-------------+
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 4 |
+------+--------+------+-------------+-------------+
Figure 15: Token Window Advertisement
o Kind: MUST be allocated by IANA. (See Section 11.)
o Length: 11
o Type: 0x01 (Token Grant)
o Window Base: The first token in the window.
o Window Size: The window size. This value SHOULD be lower or equal
to the requested window size. Window sizes MUST be less than
2^31.
If no token window is issued, the proxy MUST silently ignore the
Token Request.
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8.4.2. Spending a token
The client can attempt to spend a token by including a Token
Expenditure option in its SOCKS request:
+---------------+------+-------+
| Kind | Length | Type | Token |
+------+--------+------+-------+
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
+------+--------+------+-------+
Figure 16: Token Expenditure
o Kind: MUST be allocated by IANA. (See Section 11.)
o Length: 7
o Type: 0x02 (Token Expenditure)
o Token: The token being spent.
Clients SHOULD prioritize spending the smaller tokens.
The server responds by sending a Token Expenditure Reply option as
part of the Operation Reply:
+---------------+------+---------------+
| Kind | Length | Type | Response Code |
+------+--------+------+---------------+
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
+------+--------+------+---------------+
Figure 17: Token Expenditure Response
o Kind: MUST be allocated by IANA. (See Section 11.)
o Length: 4
o Type: 0x03 (Token Expenditure Response)
o Response Code:
* 0x00: Success: The token was spent successfully.
* 0x01: No Window: The proxy does not have a token window
associated with the client.
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* 0x02: Out of Window: The token is not within the window.
* 0x03: Duplicate: The token has already been spent.
If eligible, the token is spent as soon as the client authenticates.
If the token is not eligible for spending, the proxy MUST NOT attempt
to honor the client's SOCKS Request; further, it MUST indicate a
General SOCKS server failure in the Operation Reply.
Proxy implementations SHOULD also send a Token Window Advertisement
if:
o the token is out of window, or
o by the proxy's internal logic, successfully spending the token
caused the window to shift.
Proxy implementations SHOULD NOT shift the window's base beyond the
highest unspent token.
Proxy implementations MAY include a Token Window Advertisement in any
Operation Reply.
8.4.3. Handling Token Window Advertisements
Even though the proxy increases the window's base monotonically,
there is no mechanism whereby a SOCKS client can receive the Token
Window Advertisements in order. As such, clients SHOULD disregard
unsollicited Token Window Advertisements with a Window Base less than
the previously known value.
8.5. Salt options
Clients can use Salt options so that otherwise identical requests are
unique. (See Section 10.3.)
+---------------+------+
| Kind | Length | Salt |
+------+--------+------+
| 1 | 1 | 4 |
+------+--------+------+
Figure 18: Salt Option
o Kind: MUST be allocated by IANA. (See Section 11.)
o Length: 6
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o Salt: An arbitrary value.
Proxies MUST silently ignore Salt options.
9. Username/Password Authentication
Username/Password authentication is carried out as in [RFC1929].
Clients can also attempt to authenticate by placing the Username/
Password request in an Authentication Data Option, provided that it
is no longer than 252 bytes.
+---------------+--------+---------------------------+
| Kind | Length | Method | Username/Password request |
+------+--------+--------+---------------------------+
| 1 | 1 | 1 | Variable |
+------+--------+--------+---------------------------+
Figure 19: Password authentication via a SOCKS Option
o Kind: MUST be allocated by IANA. (See Section 11.)
o Length: The length of the option.
o Method: 0x02 (Username/Password).
o Username/Password request: The Username/Password request, as
described in [RFC1929].
10. Security Considerations
10.1. Large requests
Given the format of the request message, a malicious client could
craft a request that is in excess of 100 KB and proxies could be
prone to DDoS attacks.
To mitigate such attacks, proxy implementations SHOULD be able to
incrementally parse the requests. Proxies MAY close the connection
to the client if:
o the request is not fully received after a certain timeout, or
o the number of options exceeds an imposed hard cap, or
o the total size of the options exceeds an imposed hard cap, or
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o the size of the initial data excedes a hard cap.
Further, the server MAY choose not to buffer any initial data beyond
what would be expected to fit in a TFO SYN's payload.
10.2. Replay attacks
In TLS 1.3, early data (which is likely to contain a full SOCKS
request) is prone to replay attacks.
While Token Expenditure options can be used to mitigate replay
attacks, the initial Token Request is still vulnerable. As such,
client implementations SHOULD NOT make use of TLS early data when
sending a Token Request.
10.3. Identical request profiling
If sent via TLS early data, identical SOCKS requests can also be
identical on the wire. An attacker with the capability to capture a
client's SOCKS traffic can attempt to profile it by identifying
identical requests.
A client can use Salt options to make all of its requests unique.
11. IANA Considerations
This document requests that IANA allocate 1-byte option codes for
SOCKS 6 options. Further, this document requests option codes for:
o Socket options
o Authentication Method options
o Authentication Data options
o Idempotence options
o Salt options
o Vendor-specific options
This document also requests that IANA allocate a port for SOCKS over
TLS.
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12. Acknowledgements
The protocol described in this draft builds upon and is a direct
continuation of SOCKS 5 [RFC1928].
13. References
13.1. Normative References
[RFC1929] Leech, M., "Username/Password Authentication for SOCKS
V5", RFC 1929, DOI 10.17487/RFC1929, March 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1929>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
13.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 (work in progress),
March 2018.
[RFC1928] Leech, M., Ganis, M., Lee, Y., Kuris, R., Koblas, D., and
L. Jones, "SOCKS Protocol Version 5", RFC 1928,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1928, March 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1928>.
[RFC6824] Ford, A., Raiciu, C., Handley, M., and O. Bonaventure,
"TCP Extensions for Multipath Operation with Multiple
Addresses", RFC 6824, DOI 10.17487/RFC6824, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6824>.
[RFC7413] Cheng, Y., Chu, J., Radhakrishnan, S., and A. Jain, "TCP
Fast Open", RFC 7413, DOI 10.17487/RFC7413, December 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7413>.
Authors' Addresses
Vladimir Olteanu
University Politehnica of Bucharest
Email: vladimir.olteanu@cs.pub.ro
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Dragos Niculescu
University Politehnica of Bucharest
Email: dragos.niculescu@cs.pub.ro
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