Composite Keys and Signatures For Use In Internet PKI
draft-ounsworth-pq-composite-sigs-03

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LAMPS                                              M. Ounsworth (Editor)
Internet-Draft                                          Entrust Datacard
Intended status: Standards Track                                 M. Pala
Expires: January 29, 2021                                      CableLabs
                                                           July 28, 2020

         Composite Keys and Signatures For Use In Internet PKI
                  draft-ounsworth-pq-composite-sigs-03

Abstract

   With the widespread adoption of post-quantum cryptography will come
   the need for an entity to possess multiple public keys on different
   cryptographic algorithms.  Since the trustworthiness of individual
   post-quantum algorithms is at question, a multi-key cryptographic
   operation will need to be performed in such a way that breaking it
   requires breaking each of the component algorithms individually.
   This requires defining new structures for holding composite public
   keys and composite signature data.

   This document defines the structures CompositePublicKey,
   CompositeSignatureValue, and CompositeParams, which are sequences of
   the respective structure for each component algorithm.  This document
   also defines algorithms for generating and verifying composite
   signatures.  This document makes no assumptions about what the
   component algorithms are, provided that their algorithm identifiers
   and signature generation and verification algorithms are defined.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 29, 2021.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Composite Structures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Algorithm Identifier  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Composite Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.2.1.  Key Usage Bits  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.3.  Composite Public Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.4.  Composite Private Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.5.  Composite Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.6.  Encoding Rules  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   3.  Composite Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.1.  Composite Signature Generation  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.  Composite Signature Verification  . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  In Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.1.  PEM Storage of Composite Private Keys . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.2.  Asymmetric Key Packages (CMS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.3.  Cryptographic protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.1.  Policy for Deprecated and Acceptable Algorithms . . . . .  13
     6.2.  Protection of Private Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.3.  Checking for Compromised Key Reuse  . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.4.  Composite Encryption and KEMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   7.  Appendices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     7.1.  ASN.1 Module  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     7.2.  Intellectual Property Considerations  . . . . . . . . . .  16
   8.  Contributors and Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18

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1.  Introduction

   During the transition to post-quantum cryptography, there will be
   uncertainty as to the strength of cryptographic algorithms; we will
   no longer fully trust traditional cryptography such as RSA, Diffie-
   Hellman, DSA and their elliptic curve variants, but we will also not
   fully trust their post-quantum replacements until they have had
   sufficient scrutiny.  Unlike previous cryptographic algorithm
   migrations, the choice of when to migrate and which algorithms to
   migrate to, is not so clear.  Even after the migration period, it may
   be advantageous for an entity's cryptographic identity to be composed
   of multiple public-key algorithms.

   The deployment of composite public keys and composite signatures
   using post-quantum algorithms will face two challenges

   o  Algorithm strength uncertainty: During the transition period, some
      post-quantum signature and encryption algorithms will not be fully
      trusted, while also the trust in legacy public key algorithms will
      start to erode.  A relying party may learn some time after
      deployment that a public key algorithm has become untrustworthy,
      but in the interim, they may not know which algorithm an adversary
      has compromised.

   o  Backwards compatibility: During the transition period, post-
      quantum algorithms will not be supported by all clients.

   This document provides a mechanism to address algorithm strength
   uncertainty by providing formats for encoding multiple public keys,
   private keys and signature values into existing public key and
   signature fields, as well as an algorithm for validating a composite
   signature.  The issue of backwards compatibility is left open to be
   addressed in separate draft(s).

   This document is intended for general applicability anywhere that
   public key structures or digital signatures are used within PKIX
   structures.  While the CompositePublicKey structure defined herein is
   equally applicable to asymmetric encryption keys, this document is
   intentionally restricted to signatures.

1.1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

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   The following terms are used in this document:

   ALGORITHM: An information object class for identifying the type of
   cryptographic operation to be performed.  This document is primarily
   concerned with algorithms for producing digital signatures, though
   the public key structure could just as easily hold encryption keys.

   BER: Basic Encoding Rules (BER) as defined in [X.690].

   COMPONENT ALGORITHM: A single basic algorithm which is contained
   within a composite algorithm.

   COMPOSITE ALGORITHM: An algorithm which is a sequence of one or more
   component algorithms, as defined in Section 2.

   DER: Distinguished Encoding Rules as defined in [X.690].

   PUBLIC / PRIVATE KEY: The public and private portion of an asymmetric
   cryptographic key, making no assumptions about which algorithm.

   PRIMITIVE PUBLIC KEY / SIGNATURE: A public key or signature object of
   a non-composite algorithm type.

   SIGNATURE: A digital cryptographic signature, making no assumptions
   about which algorithm.

2.  Composite Structures

   In order for public keys and signatures to be composed of multiple
   algorithms, we define encodings consisting of a sequence of public
   key and signature primitives (aka "component algorithms") such that
   these structures can be used as a drop-in replacement for existing
   public key or signature fields such as those found in PKCS#10
   [RFC2986], CMP [RFC4210], X.509 [RFC5280], CMS [RFC5652].

   This section defines the following structures:

   o  The id-alg-composite is an OID identifying a composite public key
      or signature object.

   o  The CompositePublicKey carries all the public keys associated with
      an identity within a single public key structure.

   o  The CompositePrivateKey carries all the private keys associated
      with an identity within a single private key structure.

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   o  The CompositeSignatureValue, carries a sequence of signatures that
      are generated by a CompositePrivateKey, and can be verified with
      the corresponding CompositePublicKey.

   EDNOTE 2: the choice to define composite algorithm parameters as a
   sequence inside the existing fields avoids the exponential
   proliferation of OIDs that are needed for each combination of
   signature algorithms in other schemes for achieving multi-key
   certificates.  This scheme also naturally extends from 2-keypair to
   n-keypair keys and certificates.

2.1.  Algorithm Identifier

   The same algorithm identifier is used for identifying a public key, a
   private key, and a signature.  Additional encoding information is
   provided below for each of these objects.

   id-alg-composite OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
       iso(1)  identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) private(4)
       enterprise(1) OpenCA(18227) Algorithms(2) id-alg-composite(1) }

   EDNOTE 3: this is a temporary OID for the purposes of prototyping.
   We are requesting IANA to assign a permanent OID, see Section 5.

2.2.  Composite Keys

   A composite key is a single key object that performs an atomic
   signature or verification operation, using its encapsulated sequence
   of component keys.

   The ASN.1 algorithm object for composite public and private keys is:

   pk-Composite PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-alg-composite
       KEY CompositePublicKey
       PARAMS ARE absent
       CERT-KEY-USAGE
           { digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign }
       PRIVATE-KEY CompositePrivateKey
   }

   EDNOTE 4: the authors are currently unsure whether the params should
   be absent (ie this structure simply says "I am a composite
   algorithm"), or used to duplicate some amount of information about
   what the component algoritms are.  See Section 2.3 for a longer
   ENDOTE on this.

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2.2.1.  Key Usage Bits

   The intended application for the key is indicated in the keyUsage
   certificate extension and defined in the CERT-KEY-USAGE field of pk-
   Composite.

   If the keyUsage extension is present in an end-entity certificate
   that indicates id-alg-composite, then the keyUsage extension MUST
   contain one or both of the following values:

       nonRepudiation; and
       digitalSignature.

   If the keyUsage extension is present in a certification authority
   certificate that indicates id-alg-composite, then the keyUsage
   extension MUST contain one or more of the following values:

       nonRepudiation;
       digitalSignature;
       keyCertSign; and
       cRLSign.

   As this draft only covers composite signatures, the key usage bits
   specified here apply to all component keys within a composite key.

2.3.  Composite Public Key

   Composite public key data is represented by the following structure:

   CompositePublicKey ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SubjectPublicKeyInfo

   The corresponding AlgorithmIdentifier for a composite public key MUST
   use the id-alg-composite object identifier, defined in Section 2.1,
   and the parameters field MUST be absent.

   A composite public key MUST contain at least one component public
   key.

   A CompositePublicKey MUST NOT contain a component public key which
   itself describes a composite key; ie recursive CompositePublicKeys
   are not allowed

   Each element of a CompositePublicKey is a SubjectPublicKeyInfo object
   one of the component public keys.  When the CompositePublicKey must
   be provided in octet string or bit string format, the data structure
   is encoded as specified in Section 2.6.

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2.4.  Composite Private Key

   The composite private key data is represented by the following
   structure:

   CompositePrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF OneAsymmetricKey

   Each element is a OneAsymmetricKey [RFC5958] object for a component
   private key.

   The corresponding AlgorithmIdentifier for a composite private key
   MUST use the id-alg-composite object identifier, and the parameters
   field MUST be absent.

   A CompositePrivateKey MUST contain at least one component private
   key, and they MUST be in the same order as in the corresponding
   CompositePublicKey.

2.5.  Composite Signature

   The ASN.1 algorithm object for a composite signature is:

   sa-CompositeSignature SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-alg-composite
       VALUE CompositeSignatureValue
       PARAMS TYPE CompositeParams ARE required
       PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-Composite }
       SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-alg-composite } }
   }

   The id-alg-composite object identifier MUST be used to identify when
   a signature has been created by a CompositePrivateKey and following
   algorithm parameters MUST be included:

   CompositeParams ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AlgorithmIdentifier

   The signature's CompositeParams sequence MUST contain the same
   component algorithms listed in the same order as in the associated
   CompositePrivateKey and CompositePublicKey.

   The output of the composite signature algorithm is the DER encoding
   of the following structure:

   CompositeSignatureValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BIT STRING

   Where each BIT STRING within the SEQUENCE is a signature value
   produced by one of the component keys.  It MUST contain one signature

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   value produced by each component algorithm, and in the same order as
   in the associated CompositeParams object.

   The choice of "SEQUENCE OF BIT STRING", rather than for example a
   single BIT STRING containing the concatenated signature values, is to
   gracefully handle variable-length signature values by taking
   advantage of ASN.1's build-in length fields.

2.6.  Encoding Rules

   Many protocol specifications will require that the composite public
   key, composite private key, and composite signature data structures
   be represented by an octet string or bit string.

   When an octet string is required, the DER encoding of the composite
   data structure SHALL be used directly.

   When a bit string is required, the octets of the DER encoded
   composite data structure SHALL be used as the bits of the bit string,
   with the most significant bit of the first octet becoming the first
   bit, and so on, ending with the least significant bit of the last
   octet becoming the last bit of the bit string.

   In the interests of simplicity and avoiding compatibility issues,
   implementations that parse these structures MAY accept both BER and
   DER.

3.  Composite Signature Algorithm

   This section specifies the algorithms for generating and verifying
   composite signatures.

   This algorithm addresses algorithm strength uncertainty by providing
   the verifier with parallel signatures from all the component
   signature algorithms; thus breaking the composite signature would
   require breaking all of the component signatures.

3.1.  Composite Signature Generation

   Generation of a composite signature involves applying each component
   algorithm's signature routine to the input message according to its
   specification, and then placing each component signature value into
   the CompositeSignatureValue structure defined in Section 2.5.

   The following algorithm is used to generate composite signature
   values.

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  Input:
       K1, K2, .., Kn     Private keys for the n component signature
                          algorithms, a CompositePrivateKey
       M                  Message to be signed, an octet string

  Output:
       S                  The signatures, a CompositeSignatureValue

  Signature Generation Procedure:
     1. Generate the n component signatures independently,
        according to their algorithm specifications.

          for i := 1 to n
              Si := Sign( Ki, M )

     2. Encode each component signature S1, S2, .., Sn into a BIT STRING
        according to its algorithm specification.2020-01-21g

          S ::= Sequence { S1, S2, .., Sn }

     3. Output S

   Since recursive composite public keys are disallowed in Section 2.3,
   no component signature may itself be a composite; ie the signature
   generation routine MUST fail if one of the private keys K1, K2, ..,
   Kn is a composite with the OID id-alg-composite.

   A composite signature MUST produce and include in the output a
   signature value for every component key in the corresponding
   CompositePrivateKey.  While it may be tempting to allow a signer to
   produce a signature with a subset of their keys, the complexity of
   securely verifying such a "subset signature" is high and out of scope
   for this document.

3.2.  Composite Signature Verification

   Verification of a composite signature involves applying each
   component algorithm's verification routine according to its
   specification.

   In the absence of an application profile specifying otherwise,
   compliant applications MUST output "Valid signature" (true) if and
   only if all component signatures were successfully validated, and
   "Invalid signature" (false) otherwise.

   The following algorithm is used to perform this verification.

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Input:
     P    Signer's composite public key
     M    Message whose signature is to be verified, an octet string
     S    Composite Signature to be verified
     A    Composite Algorithm identifier

Output:
    Validity      "Valid signature" (true) if the composite signature
                  is valid, "Invalid signature" (false) otherwise.

Signature Verification Procedure::
   1. Parse P, S, A into the component public keys, signatures,
      and algorithm identifiers

      P1, P2, .., Pn := Desequence( P )
      S1, S2, .., Sn := Desequence( S )
      A1, A2, .., An := Desequence( A )

    If Error during Desequencing, or the three sequences have
    different numbers of elements, or any of the public keys P1, P2, .., Pn or
    algorithm identifiers A1, A2, .., An are composite with the OID
    id-alg-composite then output "Invalid signature" and stop.

   2. Check each component signature individually, according to its
       algorithm specification.
       If any fail, then the entire signature validation fails.

     for i := 1 to n
          if not verify( Pi, M, Si ), then
            output "Invalid signature"

      if all succeeded, then
        output "Valid signature"

   Since recursive composite public keys are disallowed in Section 2.3,
   no component signature may be composite; ie the signature
   verification procedure MUST fail if any of the public keys P1, P2,
   .., Pn or algorithm identifiers A1, A2, .., An are composite with the
   OID id-alg-composite.

   It is expected that some use-cases for algorithm migration or high
   performance will require verifiers to succeed when only a subset of
   the component algorithms have been verified.  Defining this
   verification behaviour is out of scope for this document, and falls
   to an application profile.

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4.  In Practice

   This section addresses practical issues of how this draft affects
   other protocols and standards.

   ~~~ BEGIN EDNOTE 10~~~

   EDNOTE 10: Possible topics to address:

   o  The size of these certs and cert chains.

   o  In particular, implications for (large) composite keys /
      signatures / certs on the handshake stages of TLS and IKEv2.

   o  If a cert in the chain is a composite cert then does the whole
      chain need to be of composite Certs?

   o  We could also explain that the root CA cert does not have to be of
      the same algorithms.  The root cert SHOULD NOT be transferred in
      the authentication exchange to save transport overhead and thus it
      can be different than the intermediate and leaf certs.

   o  We could talk about overhead (size and processing).

   o  We could also discuss backwards compatibility.

   o  We could include a subsection about implementation considerations.

   ~~~ END EDNOTE 10~~~

4.1.  PEM Storage of Composite Private Keys

   CompositePrivateKeys can be encoded to the PEM format by placing a
   CompositePrivateKey into the privateKey field of a PrivateKeyInfo or
   OneAsymmetricKey object, and then applying the PEM encoding rules as
   defined in [RFC7468] section 10 and 11 for plaintext and encrypted
   private keys, respectively.

4.2.  Asymmetric Key Packages (CMS)

   The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS), as defined in [RFC5652], can
   be used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt the
   asymmetric key format content type.

   When encoding composite private keys, the privateKeyAlgorithm in the
   OneAsymmetricKey SHALL be set to id-alg-composite.

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   The parameters of the privateKeyAlgorithm SHALL be a sequence of
   AlgorithmIdentifier objects, each of which are encoded according to
   the rules defined for each of the different keys in the composite
   private key.

   The value of the privateKey field in the OneAsymmetricKey SHALL be
   set to the DER encoding of the SEQUENCE of private key values that
   make up the composite key.  The number and order of elements in the
   sequence SHALL be the same as identified in the sequence of
   parameters in the privateKeyAlgorithm.

   The value of the publicKey (if present) SHALL be set to the DER
   encoding of the corresponding CompositePublicKey.  If this field is
   present, the number and order of component keys MUST be the same as
   identified in the sequence of parameters in the privateKeyAlgorithm.

   The value of the attributes is encoded as usual.

4.3.  Cryptographic protocols

   This section talks about how protocols like (D)TLS and IKEv2 are
   affected by this specifications.  It will not attempt to solve all
   these problems, but it will explain the rationale, how things will
   work and what open problems need to be solved.  Obvious issues that
   need to be discussed.

   o  How does the protocol declare support for composite signatures?
      TLS has hooks for declaring support for specific signature
      algorithms, however it would need to be extended, because the
      client would need to declare support for both the composite
      infrastructure, as well as for the various component signature
      algorithms.

   o  How does the protocol use the multiple keys.  The obvious way
      would be to have the server sign using its composite public key;
      is this sufficient.

   o  Overhead; including certificate size, signature processing time,
      and size of the signature.

   o  How to deal with crypto protocols that use public key encryption
      algorithms; this document only lists how to work with signature
      algorithms.  Encoding composite public keys is straightforward;
      encoding composite ciphertexts is less so - we decided to put that
      off to another draft.

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5.  IANA Considerations

   The ASN.1 module OID is TBD.  The id-alg-composite OID is to be
   assigned by IANA.  The authors suggest that IANA assign an OID on the
   id-pkix arc:

   id-alg-composite OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
       iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) composite(??) }

6.  Security Considerations

6.1.  Policy for Deprecated and Acceptable Algorithms

   Traditionally, a public key, certificate, or signature contains a
   single cryptographic algorithm.  If and when an algorithm becomes
   deprecated (for example, RSA-512, or SHA1), it is obvious that
   structures using that algorithm are implicitly revoked.

   In the composite model this is less obvious since a single public
   key, certificate, or signature may contain a mixture of deprecated
   and non-deprecated algorithms.  Moreover, implementers may decide
   that certain cryptographic algorithms have complementary security
   properties and are acceptable in combination even though neither
   algorithm is acceptable by itself.

   Specifying a modified verification algorithm to handle these
   situations is beyond the scope of this draft, but could be desirable
   as the subject of an application profile document, or to be up to the
   discretion of implementers.

   2. Check policy to see whether A1, A2, ..., An constitutes a valid
      combination of algorithms.

      if not checkPolicy(A1, A2, ..., An), then
        output "Invalid signature"

   While intentionally not specified in this document, implementors
   should put careful thought into implementing a meaningfull policy
   mechinism within the context of their signature verification engines,
   for example only algorithms that provide similar security levels
   should be combined together.

6.2.  Protection of Private Keys

   Structures described in this document do not protect private keys in
   any way unless combined with a security protocol or encryption

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   properties of the objects (if any) where the CompositePrivateKey is
   used (see next Section).

   Protection of the private keys is vital to public key cryptography.
   The consequences of disclosure depend on the purpose of the private
   key.  If a private key is used for signature, then the disclosure
   allows unauthorized signing.  If a private key is used for key
   management, then disclosure allows unauthorized parties to access the
   managed keying material.  The encryption algorithm used in the
   encryption process must be at least as 'strong' as the key it is
   protecting.

6.3.  Checking for Compromised Key Reuse

   CA implementations need to be careful when checking for compromised
   key reuse, for example as required by WebTrust regulations; when
   checking for compromised keys, you MUST unpack the CompositePublicKey
   structure and compare individual component keys.  In other words,
   when marking a key as revoked for key compromise, the individual
   component keys should be marked, not the composite key as a whole.

6.4.  Composite Encryption and KEMs

   This document deals only with signature keys.  While the
   CompositePublicKey and CompositePrivateKey structures could equally
   be used to hold encryption or KEM keys, the authors warn that there
   are non-trivial design decisions to be made when constructing a
   multi-key public key encryption or KEM algorithm.  Some of these
   design and implementation decisions, if done incorrectly will result
   in a catastrophic loss of security.  We leave it to the community to
   standardize analogous composite encryption and KEM schemes.

7.  Appendices

7.1.  ASN.1 Module

   <CODE STARTS>

   Composite-Signatures-2019
     { TBD }

   DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN

   EXPORTS ALL;

   IMPORTS
     PUBLIC-KEY, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM
       FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009  -- RFC 5912 [X509ASN1]

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         { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
           security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
           id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }

     SubjectPublicKeyInfo
       FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009
         { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
           security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
           id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) }

     OneAsymmetricKey
       FROM AsymmetricKeyPackageModuleV1
         { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
           pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0)
           id-mod-asymmetricKeyPkgV1(50) } ;

   --
   -- Object Identifiers
   --

   id-alg-composite OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }

   --
   -- Public Key
   --

   pk-Composite PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-alg-composite
       KEY CompositePublicKey
       PARAMS ARE absent
       CERT-KEY-USAGE
           { digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign }
       PRIVATE-KEY CompositePrivateKey
   }

   CompositePublicKey ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SubjectPublicKeyInfo

   CompositePrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF OneAsymmetricKey

   --
   -- Signature Algorithm
   --

   sa-CompositeSignature SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-alg-composite
       VALUE CompositeSignatureValue
       PARAMS TYPE CompositeParams ARE required
       PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-Composite }

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       SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-alg-composite } }

   CompositeParams ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AlgorithmIdentifier

   CompositeSignatureValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BIT STRING

   END

   <CODE ENDS>

7.2.  Intellectual Property Considerations

   The following IPR Disclosure relates to this draft:

   https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/3588/

8.  Contributors and Acknowledgements

   This document incorporates contributions and comments from a large
   group of experts.  The Editors would especially like to acknowledge
   the expertise and tireless dedication of the following people, who
   attended many long meetings and generated millions of bytes of
   electronic mail and VOIP traffic over the past year in pursuit of
   this document:

   John Gray (Entrust Datacard), Serge Mister (Entrust Datacard), Scott
   Fluhrer (Cisco Systems), Panos Kampanakis (Cisco Systems), Daniel Van
   Geest (ISARA), and Tim Hollebeek (Digicert).

   We are grateful to all, including any contributors who may have been
   inadvertently omitted from this list.

   This document borrows text from similar documents, including those
   referenced below.  Thanks go to the authors of those documents.
   "Copying always makes things easier and less error prone" -
   [RFC8411].

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC1421]  Linn, J., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic
              Mail: Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication
              Procedures", RFC 1421, DOI 10.17487/RFC1421, February
              1993, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1421>.

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   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2986]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
              Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.

   [RFC4210]  Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen,
              "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
              Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4210, September 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4210>.

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.

   [RFC5958]  Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.

   [RFC7468]  Josefsson, S. and S. Leonard, "Textual Encodings of PKIX,
              PKCS, and CMS Structures", RFC 7468, DOI 10.17487/RFC7468,
              April 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7468>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8411]  Schaad, J. and R. Andrews, "IANA Registration for the
              Cryptographic Algorithm Object Identifier Range",
              RFC 8411, DOI 10.17487/RFC8411, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8411>.

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   [X.690]    ITU-T, "Information technology - ASN.1 encoding Rules:
              Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
              Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
              (DER)", ISO/IEC 8825-1:2015, November 2015.

9.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.pala-composite-crypto]
              Pala, M., "Composite Public Keys and Signatures", draft-
              pala-composite-crypto-00 (work in progress), February
              2019.

   [I-D.truskovsky-lamps-pq-hybrid-x509]
              Truskovsky, A., Geest, D., Fluhrer, S., Kampanakis, P.,
              Ounsworth, M., and S. Mister, "Multiple Public-Key
              Algorithm X.509 Certificates", draft-truskovsky-lamps-pq-
              hybrid-x509-01 (work in progress), August 2018.

Authors' Addresses

   Mike Ounsworth
   Entrust Datacard Limited
   1000 Innovation Drive
   Ottawa, Ontario  K2K 1E3
   Canada

   Email: mike.ounsworth@entrustdatacard.com

   Massimiliano Pala
   CableLabs

   Email: director@openca.org

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