Securing the MultiPath TCP handshake with external keys
draft-paasch-mptcp-ssl-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Christoph Paasch , Olivier Bonaventure | ||
| Last updated | 2013-04-18 (Latest revision 2012-10-15) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Multipath TCP currently relies on the exchange of keys in clear during the initial handshake to authenticate the establishment of additional subflows. This document proposes a variant of the Multipath TCP handshake that allows Multipath TCP to reuse keys negotiated by the Application layer protocol above it such as SSL/TLS to authenticate the establishment of additional subflows.
Authors
Christoph Paasch
Olivier Bonaventure
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)