Composite Public Keys and Signatures
draft-pala-composite-crypto-00

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Network Working Group                                            M. Pala
Internet-Draft                                                 CableLabs
Intended status: Experimental                           February 5, 2019
Expires: August 9, 2019

                  Composite Public Keys and Signatures
                     draft-pala-composite-crypto-00

Abstract

   PKIs are used to provide scalability and ease key management.  One
   type of PKIs that is predominant for securing communications and data
   is based on the X.509 standard.  Since the security of PKIs,
   ultimately, depends on the security of the cryptographic building
   blocks that are used for authentication and encryption, the standards
   community made algorithm agility a priority.  Algorithm agility, in
   particular, enables upgrading to newly available algorithms when
   needed.

   The CompositeCrypto (i.e., CompositeKey and CompositeSignature
   structures) described in this document provides an additional tool
   that enables the use of multiple algorithms to authenticate data
   without the need to use multiple certificates and more complex data
   structures.

   This document provide the description of the definition and encoding
   rules for CompositeKey and CompositeSignature.  A description of how
   to use these structures in main PKIX objects (e.g., X.509
   certificates, CRLs, OCSP responses, etc.) is also provided.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 9, 2019.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Introduction and Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Composite Cryptography  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Composite Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.2.  Composite Private Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.2.1.  Encoding Rules  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.2.2.  Encrypted and Un-encrypted Local Storage  . . . . . .   4
       3.2.3.  Asymmetric Key Packages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.3.  Composite Signatures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Use of Composite Crypto in PKIX structures  . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  Use in X.509 Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  Use in X.509 CRLs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.3.  Use in X.509 OCSP Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.4.  Use in PKCS#7 Structures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.5.  Use in CMS Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.6.  Use in PKCS#1 Structures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.7.  Use in PKCS#8 Structures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.8.  Use in PKCS#12 Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   8.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6

1.  Requirements notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

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