Skip to main content

Improve TCP Handling of Out-of-Window Packets to Mitigate Ghost ACKs
draft-pan-tcpm-tcp-ghost-acks-00

Document Type Replaced Internet-Draft (individual)
Expired & archived
Author Yepeng Pan
Last updated 2024-07-08
Replaced by draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-ghost-acks
RFC stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state Replaced by draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-ghost-acks
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)

This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:

Abstract

Historically, TCP as specified in RFC 793 was threatened by the blind data injection attack because of the loose acceptable ACK value validation, where the ACK value of a data segment is considered valid as long as it does not acknowledge data ahead of the next segment to send. RFC 5961 improved the defect by shrinking the range of acceptable ACK values in a data segment. Later, RFC 9293 involved the updates proposed by RFC 5961 as a TCP stack implementation option. However, an endpoint that follows the RFC 9293 specifications can still accept a data segment containing an ACK value acknowledging data that the endpoint has never sent. This document specifies small modifications to the way TCP verifies incoming data segments' ACK value to prevent TCP from accepting invalid ACK values.

Authors

Yepeng Pan

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)