Improve TCP Handling of Out-of-Window Packets to Mitigate Ghost ACKs
draft-pan-tcpm-tcp-ghost-acks-00
| Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Yepeng Pan | ||
| Last updated | 2024-07-08 | ||
| Replaced by | draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-ghost-acks | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-ghost-acks | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Historically, TCP as specified in RFC 793 was threatened by the blind data injection attack because of the loose acceptable ACK value validation, where the ACK value of a data segment is considered valid as long as it does not acknowledge data ahead of the next segment to send. RFC 5961 improved the defect by shrinking the range of acceptable ACK values in a data segment. Later, RFC 9293 involved the updates proposed by RFC 5961 as a TCP stack implementation option. However, an endpoint that follows the RFC 9293 specifications can still accept a data segment containing an ACK value acknowledging data that the endpoint has never sent. This document specifies small modifications to the way TCP verifies incoming data segments' ACK value to prevent TCP from accepting invalid ACK values.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)