The OAuth 2.0 Risk notification and Token Revocation from Resource Server
draft-park-oauth-revoke-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | ddukki86@ssu.ac.kr , Minho Park , Souhwan Jung | ||
| Last updated | 2016-01-01 (Latest revision 2015-06-30) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document proposes the revocation of an access token in the case that a client uses the access token illegally or maliciously. Contrast to the existing revocation defined in RFC7009, the proposed revocation is initiated by a resource server when the abnormal behaviors of a client such as too many DB queries are detected. The revocation process after revocation initiation is based on RFC7009.
Authors
ddukki86@ssu.ac.kr
Minho Park
Souhwan Jung
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)