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The Open Trust Protocol (OTrP)
draft-pei-opentrustprotocol-00

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Document	Type	This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Replaced".
	Authors	Mingliang Pei , Nick Cook , Minho Yoo , Andrew Atyeo , Hannes Tschofenig
	Last updated	2016-07-01
	Replaced by	draft-ietf-teep-opentrustprotocol
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draft-pei-opentrustprotocol-00

Internet Engineering Task Force M. Pei
Internet-Draft Symantec
Intended status: Informational N. Cook
Expires: January 2, 2017 Intercede
M. Yoo
Solacia
A. Atyeo
Intercede
H. Tschofenig
ARM Ltd.
July 2016

The Open Trust Protocol (OTrP)
draft-pei-opentrustprotocol-00.txt

Abstract

This document specifies the Open Trust Protocol (OTrP), a protocol to
install, update, and delete applications and to manage security
configuration in a Trust Execution Environment (TEE).

TEEs are used in environments where security services should be
isolated from a regular operating system (often called rich OS).
This form of compartmentlization grants a smaller codebase access to
security sensitive services and restricts communication from the rich
OS to those security services via mediated access.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on January 2, 2017.

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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. OTrP Entities and Trust Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. System Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Trusted Anchors in TEE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3. Trusted Anchors in TSM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.4. Keys and Cerificate Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Protocol Scope and Entity Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1. A Sample Device Setup Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2. Derived Keys in the Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.3. Security Domain Hierarchy and Ownership . . . . . . . . . 14
5.4. SD Owner Identification and TSM Certificate
Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.5. Service Provider Container . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. OTrP Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.1. Role of OTrP Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.2. OTrP Agent and Global Platform TEE Client API . . . . . . 17
6.3. OTrP Agent Implementation Consideration . . . . . . . . . 17
6.3.1. OTrP Agent Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.3.2. Number of OTrP Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.3.3. OTrP Android Service Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.4. OTrP Agent API for Client Applications . . . . . . . . . 18
6.4.1. API processMessage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.4.2. API getTAInformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.5. Sample End-to-End Client Application Flow . . . . . . . . 21
6.5.1. Case 1: A new Client App uses a TA . . . . . . . . . 21
6.5.2. Case 2: A previously installed Client Application
calls a TA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

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7. OTrP Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.1. Message Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.2. Message Naming Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.3. Request and Response Message Template . . . . . . . . . . 25
7.4. Signed Request and Response Message Structure . . . . . . 25
7.4.1. Identifying signing and Encryption keys for JWS/JWE
messaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
7.5. JSON Signing and Encryption Algorithms . . . . . . . . . 27
7.5.1. Supported JSON Signing Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . 29
7.5.2. Support JSON Encryption Algorithms . . . . . . . . . 29
7.6. Common Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7.7. OTrP Message List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7.8. OTrP Request Message Routing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.8.1. SP Anonymous Attestation Key (SP AIK) . . . . . . . . 31
8. Detailed Messages Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
8.1. GetDeviceState . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
8.1.1. GetDeviceStateRequest message . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
8.1.2. Request processing requirements at a TEE . . . . . . 33
8.1.3. Firmware signed data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.1.3.1. Supported Firmware Signature Methods . . . . . . 34
8.1.4. Post Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
8.1.5. GetDeviceStateResponse message . . . . . . . . . . . 35
8.1.6. Error Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8.1.7. TSM Processing Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.2. Security Domain Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8.2.1. CreateSD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8.2.1.1. CreateSDRequest Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8.2.1.2. Request processing requirements at a TEE . . . . 44
8.2.1.3. CreateSDResponse Message . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
8.2.1.4. Error Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.2.2. UpdateSD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.2.2.1. UpdateSDRequest Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.2.2.2. Request processing requirements at a TEE . . . . 50
8.2.2.3. UpdateSDResponse Message . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
8.2.2.4. Error Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
8.2.3. DeleteSD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
8.2.3.1. DeleteSDRequest Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
8.2.3.2. Request processing requirements at a TEE . . . . 55
8.2.3.3. DeleteSDResponse Message . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
8.2.3.4. Error Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
8.3. Trusted Application Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
8.3.1. InstallTA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
8.3.1.1. InstallTARequest Message . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
8.3.1.2. InstallTAResponse Message . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
8.3.1.3. Error Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
8.3.2. UpdateTA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
8.3.2.1. UpdateTARequest Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
8.3.2.2. UpdateTAResponse Message . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

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8.3.2.3. Error Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
8.3.3. DeleteTA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
8.3.3.1. DeleteTARequest Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
8.3.3.2. Request processing requirements at a TEE . . . . 70
8.3.3.3. DeleteTAResponse Message . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
8.3.3.4. Error Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
9. Response Messages a TSM May Expect . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
10. Attestation Implementation Consideration . . . . . . . . . . 73
10.1. OTrP Secure Boot Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
10.1.1. Attestation signer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
10.1.2. SBM initial requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
10.2. TEE Loading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
10.3. Attestation Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
10.3.1. Attestation hierarchy establishment: manufacture . . 75
10.3.2. Attestation hierarchy establishment: device boot . . 75
10.3.3. Attestation hierarchy establishment: TSM . . . . . . 76
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
12. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
13.1. Error Code List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
14. Security Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
14.1. Cryptographic strength implementation . . . . . . . . . 78
14.2. Message Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
14.3. TEE Attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
14.4. TA Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
14.5. TA Personalization data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
14.6. TA trust check at TEE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
14.7. One TA Multiple SP Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
14.8. OTrP Agent Trust Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
14.9. OCSP Stapling Data for TSM signed messages . . . . . . . 81
14.10. Data protection at TSM and TEE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
14.11. Privacy consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
14.12. Threat mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
14.13. Compromised CA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
14.14. Compromised TSM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
14.15. Certificate renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
15.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
15.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Appendix A. Sample Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
A.1. Sample Security Domain Management Messages . . . . . . . 84
A.1.1. Sample GetDeviceState . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
A.1.1.1. Sample GetDeviceStateRequest . . . . . . . . . . 84
A.1.1.2. Sample GetDeviceStateResponse . . . . . . . . . . 85
A.1.2. Sample CreateSD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
A.1.2.1. Sample CreateSDRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
A.1.2.2. Sample CreateSDResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
A.1.3. Sample UpdateSD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

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A.1.3.1. Sample UpdateSDRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
A.1.3.2. Sample UpdateSDResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
A.1.4. Sample DeleteSD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
A.1.4.1. Sample DeleteSDRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
A.1.4.2. Sample DeleteSDResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
A.2. Sample TA Management Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
A.2.1. Sample InstallTA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
A.2.1.1. Sample InstallTARequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
A.2.1.2. Sample InstallTAResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
A.2.2. Sample UpdateTA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
A.2.2.1. Sample UpdateTARequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
A.2.2.2. Sample UpdateTAResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
A.2.3. Sample DeleteTA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
A.2.3.1. Sample DeleteTARequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
A.2.3.2. Sample DeleteTAResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

1. Introduction

The Trust Execution Environment (TEE) concept has been designed and
used to increase security by separating regular operating systems,
also referred as Rich Execution Environment (REE), from security-
sensitive applications. In an TEE ecosystem, a Trust Service Manager
(TSM) is used to authorize manage keys and the Trusted Applications
(TA) that run in a device. Different device vendors may use
different TEE implementations. Different application providers may
use different TSM providers. There arises a need of an open
interoperable protocol that allows trustworthy TSM to manage security
domains and contents running in different Trust Execution Environment
(TEE) of various devices.

The Open Trust Protocol (OTrP) defines a protocol between a TSM and a
TEE and relies on IETF-defined end-to-end security mechanisms, namely
JSON Web Encryption (JWE), JSON Web Signature (JWS), and JSON Web Key
(JWK).

Some deployed TEE and TSM implementations use symmetric key
cryptography as the underlying security foundation and rely on a
centralized database that holds these keys for every device that uses
a TEE. This specification follows a different design approach and
makes use of public key cryptography at the expensive of slower
performance but improved security.

This specification assumes that a device that utilizes this
specification is equipped with a TEE and is pre-provisioned with a
device-unique public/private key pair, which is securely stored.
This key pair is referred as the 'root of trust'. A Service Provider
(SP) uses such a device to run Trusted Applications (TA).

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A security domain is defined as the TEE representation of a service
provider and is a logical space that contains the service provider's
trusted applications. Each security domain requires the management
operations of trusted applications (TAs) in the form of installation,
update and deletion.

The protocol builds on the following properties of the system:

1. The SP needs to determine security-relevant information of a
device before provisioning information to a TEE. Examples
include the verification of the root of trust, the type of
firmware installed, and the type of TEE included in a device.

2. A TEE in a device needs to determine whether a SP or the TSM is
authorized to manage applications in the TEE.

3. Secure Boot must be able to ensure a TEE is genuine.

This specification defines message payloads exchanged between devices
and a TSM but does not mandate a specific transport.

2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

3. Terminology

3.1. Definitions

The definitions provided below are defined as used in this document.
The same terms may be defined differently in other documents.

Client Application: An application running on a rich OS, such as an
Android, Windows, or iOS application, provided by a SP.

Device: A physical piece of hardware that hosts symmetric key
cryptographic modules

OTrP Agent: An application running in the rich OS allowing
communication with the TSM and the TEE.

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Rich Application: Alternative name of "Client Application". In this
document we may use these two terms interchangably.

Rich Execution Environment (REE) An environment that is provided and
governed by a rich OS, potentially in conjunction with other
supporting operating systems and hypervisors; it is outside of
the TEE. This environment and applications running on it are
considered un-trusted.

Secure Boot Module (SBM): A firmware in a device that delivers
secure boot functionality. It is also referred as Trusted
Firmware (TFW) in this document.

Trust Anchor: A root certificate that a module trusts. It is
usually embedded in one validating module, and used to validate
the trust of a remote entity's certificate.

Trusted Application (TA): Application that runs in TEE.

Trusted Execution Environment (TEE): An execution environment that
runs alongside but isolated from an REE. A TEE has security
capabilities and meets certain security-related requirements: It
protects TEE assets from general software attacks, defines rigid
safeguards as to data and functions that a program can access,
and resists a set of defined threats. There are multiple
technologies that can be used to implement a TEE, and the level
of security achieved varies accordingly.

3.2. Abbreviations

CA Certificate Authority

OTrP Open Trust Protocol

REE Rich Execution Environment

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SD Security Domain

SP Service Provider

SBM Secure Boot Module

TA Trusted Application

TEE Trusted Execution Environment

TFW Trusted Firmware

TSM Trusted Service Manager

4. OTrP Entities and Trust Model

4.1. System Components

There are the following main components in this OTrP system.

TSM - The TSM is responsible for originating and coordinating
lifecycle management activity on a particular TEE.

A Trust Service Manager (TSM) is at the core to the protocol that
manages device trust check on behalf of service providers for the
ecosystem scalability. In addition to its device trust
management for a service provider, the TSM provides Security
Domain management and TA management in a device, in particularly,
over-the-air update to keep Trusted Application up to date and
clean up when a version should be removed.

Certificate Authority (CA) - Mutual trust between a device and a
TSM as well as a Service Provider is based on certificates. A
device embeds a list of root certificates, called Trust Anchors,
from trusted Certificate Authorities that a TSM will be validated
against. A TSM will remotely attest a device by checking whether
a device comes with a certificate from a trusted CA.

TEE - The TEE resides in the device chip security zone and is
responsible for protecting applications from attack, enabling the
application to perform secure operations

REE - The REE, usually called device OS such as Android OS in a
phone device, is responsible for enabling off device
communications to be established between the TEE and TSM. OTrP
must not require the device OS to be secure.

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OTrP Agent - An application in the REE that can relay messages
between a Client Application and TEE.

Secure Boot - Secure boot (for the purposes of OTrP) must enable
authenticity checking of TEEs by the TSM.

The OTrP establishes appropriate trust anchors to enable TEE and TSMs
to communicate in a trusted way when performing lifecycle management
transactions. The main trust relationships between the components
are the following.

1. TSM must be able to ensure a TEE is genuine

2. TEE must be able to ensure a TSM is genuine

3. Secure Boot must be able to ensure a TEE is genuine

4.2. Trusted Anchors in TEE

The TEE in each device comes with a trust store that contains a
whitelist of TSM's root CA certificates, which are called Trust
Anchors. A TSM will be trusted to manage Security Domains and TAs in
a device only if its certificate is chained to one of the root CA
certificates in this trust store.

Such a list is typically embedded in TEE of a device, and the list
update is enabled and handled by device OEM provider.

4.3. Trusted Anchors in TSM

The Trust Anchor set in a TSM consists of a list of Certificate
Authority certificates that signs various device TEE certificates. A
TSM decides what TEE and TFW it will trust.

4.4. Keys and Cerificate Types

OTrP Protocol leverages the following list of trust anchors and
identities in generating signed and encrypted command messages that
are exchanged between a device with TEE and a TSM. With these
security artifacts, OTrP Messages are able to deliver end-to-end
security without relying on any transport security.

TBD - remove table to use hang list after further edit review.

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Table 1: Key and Certificate Types

******* TBD choose table or list view later *******

1. TFW keypair and Certificate: A key pair and certificate for
evidence of secure boot and trustworthy firmware in a device.

Location: Device secure storage

Supported Key Type: RSA and ECC

Issuer: OEM CA

Trust Implication: A white list of FW root CA trusted by TSMs

Cardinality: One per device

2. TEE keypair and Certificate: It is used for device attestation
to remote TSM and SP. A TEE certificate is expected to be long
lived that doesn't need to renew.

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This key pair is burned into the device at device manufacturer.
The key pair and its certificate are valid for the expected
lifetime of the device.

Location: Device TEE

Supported Key Type: RSA and ECC

Issuer: TEE CA that chains to a root CA

Trust Implication: A white list of TEE root CA trusted by TSMs

Cardinality: One per device

3. TSM keypair and Certificate: A TSM provider acquires a
certificate from a CA that a TEE trusts.

Location: TSM provider

Supported Key Type: RSA and ECC.

Supported Key Size: RSA 2048-bit, ECC P-256 and P-384.

Issuer: TSM CA that chains to a root CA

Trust Implication: A white list of TSM root CA embedded in TEE

Cardinality: One or multiple can be used by a TSM

4. SP keypair and Certificate: A SP uses its own key pair and
certificate to sign a TA.

Location: SP

Supported Key Type: RSA and ECC

Supported Key Size: RSA 2048-bit, ECC P-256 and P-384

Issuer: SP signer CA that chains to a root CA

Trust Implication: TSM manages SP. TA trust is delegated to
TSM. TEE trusts TSM to ensure that a TA is trustworthy.

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Cardinality: One or multiple can be used by a SP

5. Protocol Scope and Entity Relations

This document specifies the minimally required interoperable
artifacts to establish mutual trust between a TEE and TSM. The
protocol provides specifications for the following three entities:

1. Key and certificate types required for device firmware, TEE, TA,
SP, and TSM

2. Data message formats that should be exchanged between a TEE in a
device and a TSM

3. An OTrP Agent application in the REE that can relay messages
between a Client Application and TEE

Figure 1: Protocol Scope and Entity Relationship

PKI CA --CA CA--
| | |
| | |
| | |
Device | | ----OTrP Agent --- Rich App --- |
SW | | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
OTrP | -- TEE TSM-------
|
|
FW

Figure 2: OTrP System Diagram

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---OTrP Message Protocol--
| |
| |
-------------------- --------------- ----------
| REE | TEE | | TSM | | SP |
| --- | --- | | --- | | -- |
| | | | | | |
| Client | SD (TAs)| | SD / TA | | TA |
| Apps | | | Mgmt | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| OTrP | Trusted | | Trusted | | |
| Agent | CAs | | FW, TEE CAs | | |
| | | | | | |
| |TEE Key/ | | TSM Key/ | |SP Key/ |
| | Cert | | Cert | | Cert |
| | FW Key/ | | | | |
| | Cert | | | | |
------------------ --------------- ----------
| | |
| | |
-----------------------------------------
|
|
--------------
| CA |
--------------

In the previous diagram, different Certificate Authorities can be
used respectively for different types of certificates. OTrP Messages
are always signed, where the signer keys is the message creator's key
pair such as a FW key pair, TEE key pair or TSM key pair.

The main OTrP Protocol component is the set of standard JSON messages
created by TSM to deliver device SD and TA management commands to a
device, and device attestation and response messages created by TEE
to respond to TSM OTrP Messages.

The communication method of OTrP Messages between a TSM and TEE in a
device is left to TSM providers for maximal interoperability. A TSM
can work with its SP and Client Applications how it gets OTrP
Messages from a TSM. When a Client Application has had an OTrP
Message from its TSM, it is imperative to have an interoperable
interface to communicate with various TEE types. This is the OTrP
Agent interface that serves this purpose. The OTrP Agent doesn't
need to know the actual content of OTrP Messages except for the TEE
routing information.

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5.1. A Sample Device Setup Flow

TBD

5.2. Derived Keys in the Protocol

The protocol generates the following two key pairs in run time to
assist message communication and anonymous verification between TSM
and TEE.

1. TEE Anonymous Key (TEE AIK): one derived key pair per TEE in a
device

The purpose of the key pair is to sign data by a TEE without using
its TEE device key for anonymous attestation to a Client Application.
This key is generated in the first GetDeviceState query. The public
key of the key pair is returned to the caller Client Application for
future TEE returned data validation.

2. TEE SP AIK: one derived key per SP in a device

The purpose of this key pair is for a TSM to encrypt TA binary data
when it sends a TA to a device for installation. This key is
generated in the first SD creation for a SP. It is deleted when all
SDs are removed for a SP in a device.

With the presence of a TEE SP AIK, it isn't necessary to have a
shared SP independent TEE AIK. For the initial release, this
specification will not use TEE AIK.

5.3. Security Domain Hierarchy and Ownership

The primary job of a TSM is to help a SP to manage its trusted
applications. A TA is typically installed in a SD. A SD is commonly
created for a SP.

When a SP delegates its SD and TA management to a TSM, a SD is
created on behalf of a TSM in a TEE and the owner of the SD is
assigned to the TSM. A SD may be associated with a SP but the TSM
has full privilege to manage the SD for the SP.

Each SD for a SP is associated with only one TSM. When a SP changes
TSM, a new SP SD must be created to associate with the new TSM. TEE
will maintain a registry of TSM ID and SP SD ID mapping.

From a SD ownership perspective SD tree is flat and there is only one
level. A SD is associated with its owner. It is up to TEE's

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implementation how it maintains SD binding information for TSM and
different SPs under the same TSM.

It is an important decision in this protocol specification that a TEE
doesn't need to know whether a TSM is authorized to manage SD for a
SP. This authorization is implicitly triggered by a SP Client
Application, which instructs what TSM it wants to use. A SD is
always associated with a TSM in addition to its SP ID. A rogue TSM
isn't able to do anything on an unauthorized SP's SD managed by
another TSM.

Since a TSM may support multiple SPs, sharing the same SD name for
different SP creates a dependency in deleting a SD. A SD can be
deleted only after all TAs associated with this SD is deleted. A SP
cannot delete a Security Domain on its own with a TSM if a TSM
decides to introduce such sharing. There are cases where multiple
virtual SPs belong to the same organization, and a TSM chooses to use
the same SD name for those SPs. This is totally up to the TSM
implementation and out of scope of this specification.

5.4. SD Owner Identification and TSM Certificate Requirements

There is a need of cryptographically binding proof about the owner of
a SD in device. When a SD is created on behalf of a TSM, a future
request from the TSM must present itself as a way that the TEE can
verify it is the true owner. The certificate itself cannot reliably
used as the owner because TSM may change its certificate.

To this end, each TSM will be associated with a trusted identifier
defined as an attribute in the TSM certificate. This field is kept
the same when the TSM renew its certificates. A TSM CA is
responsible to vet the requested TSM attribute value.

This identifier value must not collide among different TSM providers,
and one TSM shouldn't be able to claim the identifier used by another
TSM provider.

The certificate extension name to carry the identifier can initially
use SubjectAltName:registeredID. A dedicated new extension name may
be registered later.

One common choice of the identifier value is the TSM's service URL.
A CA can verify the domain ownership of the URL with the TSM in the
certificate enrollment process.

TEE can assign this certificate attribute value as the TSM owner ID
for the SDs that are created for the TSM.

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An alternative way to represent a SD ownership by a TSM is to have a
unique secret key upon SD creation such that only the creator TSM is
able to produce a Proof-of-Possession (POP) data with the secret.

5.5. Service Provider Container

A sample Security Domain hierarchy for the TEE is shown below.

TBD diagram

The OTrP assumes that a SP managed by TSM1 cannot be managed by TSM2.
Explicit permission grant should happen. SP can authorize TSM.

6. OTrP Agent

OTrP Agent is an Rich Application or SDK that facilitates
communication between a TSM and TEE. It also provides interfaces for
TSM SDK or Client Applications to query and trigger TA installation
that the application needs to use.

This interface for Client Applications may be commonly an Android
service call. A Client Application interacts with a TSM, and turns
around to pass messages received from TSM to OTrP Agent.

In all cases, a Client Application needs to be able to identify an
OTrP Agent that it can use.

6.1. Role of OTrP Agent

OTrP Agent is responsible to communicate with TEE. It takes request
messages from an application. The input data is mostly from a TSM
that an application communicates. An application may also directly
call OTrP Agent for some TA query functions.

OTrP Agent may internally process a request from TSM. At least, it
needs to know where to route a message, e.g. TEE instance. It
doesn't need to process or verify message content.

OTrP Agent returns TEE / TFW generated response messages to the
caller. OTrP Agent isn't expected to handle any network connection
with an application or TSM.

OTrP Agent only needs to return an OTrP Agent error message if TEE
isn't reachable for some reason.

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6.2. OTrP Agent and Global Platform TEE Client API

A Client Application will rely on GP TEE API for TA communication.
OTrP may use GP TEE Client API but it is internal to OTrP
implementation that converts given messages from TSM.

6.3. OTrP Agent Implementation Consideration

A Provider should consider methods of distribution, scope and
concurrency on device and runtime options when implementing an OTrP
Agent. Several non-exhaustive options are discussed below.
Providers are encouraged to take advantage of the latest
communication and platform capabilities to offer the best user
experience.

6.3.1. OTrP Agent Distribution

OTrP Agent installation is commonly carried out at OEM time. A user
can dynamically download and install an OTrP Agent on-demand.

It is important to ensure a legitimate OTrP Agent is installed and
used. If an OTrP Agent is compromised it may send rogue messages to
TSM and TEE and introduce additional risks.

6.3.2. Number of OTrP Agent

We anticipate only one shared OTrP Agent instance in a device. The
device's TEE vendor will most probably supply one OTrP Agent.
Potentially we expect some open source.

With one shared OTrP Agent, the OTrP Agent provider is responsible to
allow multiple TSMs and TEE providers to achieve interoperability.
With a standard OTrP Agent interface, TSM can implement its own SDK
for its SP Client Applications to work with this OTrP Agent.

Multiple independent OTrP Agent providers can be used as long as they
have standard interface to a Client Application or TSM SDK. Only one
OTrP Agent is expected in a device.

OTrP Protocol MUST specify a standard way for applications to lookup
the active OTrP Agent instance in a device.

TSM providers are generally expected to provide SDK for SP
applications to interact with OTrP Agent for the TSM and TEE
interaction.

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6.3.3. OTrP Android Service Option

OTrP Agent can be a bound service in Android with a service
registration ID that a Client Application can use. This option
allows a Client Application not to depend on any OTrP Agent SDK or
provider.

An OTrP Agent is responsible to detect and work with more than one
TEE if a device has more than one. In this version, there is only
one active TEE such that an OTrP Agent only needs to handle the
active TEE.

6.4. OTrP Agent API for Client Applications

A Client Application may commonly used to include target TSM contact
information for the Trusted Applications it need to use. The
application will rely on some TSM provided functions to communicate
with its TSM.

OTrP Agent APIs are defined below. An OTrP Agent in the form of an
Android bound service can take this to be the functionality it
provides via service call.

If a failure is occured during calling API, an error message
described in "Common Errors" section (Section 7.6) will be returned.

interface IOTrPAgentService {
String processMessage(String tsmInMsg) throws OTrPAgentException;
String getTAInformation(String spid, String taid) throws OTrPAgentException;
}

public class OTrPAgentException extends Throwable {
private int errCode;
}

6.4.1. API processMessage

String processMessage(String tsmInMsg) throws OTrPAgentException;

Description

A Client Application will use this method of the OTrP Agent in a
device to pass OTrP messages from a TSM. The method is
responsible to interact with a TEE and forward the input message
to the TEE. It also returns TEE generated response message back
to the Client Application.

Input

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tsmInMsg - OTrP message generated in a TSM that is passed to this
method from a Client Application.

Output

A TEE generated OTrP message or an error message created by OTrP
Agent when it fails to interact with a TEE. This message is
forwarded to TSM.

6.4.2. API getTAInformation

String getTAInformation(String spid, String taid) throws OTrPAgentException;

Description

A Client Application calls this method to query a TA's
information. This method carries out locally by OTrP Agent
without relying on a TSM if it has had the TEE SP AIK.

Input

spid - SP identifier of the TA

taid - the identifier of the TA

Output

The API returns TA signer and TSM signer certificate along with
other metadata information about a TA.

The output is a JSON message that is generated by the TEE. It
contains the following information:

* TSMID

* SP ID

* TA signer certificate

* TSM certificate

The message is signed with TEE SP AIK private key.

The Client Application is expected to consume the response as
follows.

The Client Application gets signed TA metadata, in particularly,
the TA signer certificate. It is able to verify that the result

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is from device by checking signer against TEE SP AIK public key it
gets in some earlier interaction with TSM.

If this is a new Client Application in the device that hasn't had
TEE SP AIK public key for the response verification, the
application can contact TSM first to do GetDeviceState, and TSM
will return TEE SP AIK public key to the app for this operation to
proceed.

JSON Message

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{
"TAInformationTBS": {
"taid": "<TA Identifier from the input>",
"tsmid": "<TSM ID for the Security Domain where this TA
resides>",
"spid": "<The service provider identifier of this TA>",
"signercert": "<The BASE64 encoded certificate data of the TA
binary application's signer certificate>",
"signercacerts": [ // the full list of CA certificate chain
// including the root CA
"cacert": "<The BASE64 encoded CA certificate data of the TA
binary application's signer certificate>"
],
"tsmcert": "<The BASE64 encoded certificate data of the TSM that
manages this TA.>",
"tsmcacerts": [ // the full list of CA certificate chain
// including the root CA
"cacert":"<The BASE64 encoded CA certificate data of the TSM
that manages this TA>"
]
}
}

{
"TAInformation": {
"payload": "<BASE64URL encoding of the TAInformationTBS
JSON above>",
"protected": "<BASE64URL encoded signing algorithm>",
"header": {
"signer": {"<JWK definition of the TEE SP AIK public
key>"}
},
"signature": "<signature contents signed by TEE SP AIK private
key BASE64URL encoded>"
}
}

A sample JWK public key representation refers to an example in RFC
7517 [RFC7517] .

6.5. Sample End-to-End Client Application Flow

6.5.1. Case 1: A new Client App uses a TA

1. During the Client App installation time, the Client App calls
TSM to initialize device preparation

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A. The Client Application knows it wants to use a TA1 but the
application doesn'tknow whether TA1 has been installed or
not. It can use GP TEE Client API to check the existence of
TA1 first. If it doesn't exist, it will contact TSM to
initiate the TA1 installation. Note that TA1 could have
been installed that is triggered by other Client
Applications of the same service provider in the same
device.

B. The Client Application sends TSM the TA list that it depends
on. The TSM will query a device for the Security Domains
and TAs that have been installed, and instructs the device
to install any dependent TAs that have not been installed.

C. In general, TSM has the latest information of TA list and
their status in a device because all operations are
instructed by TSM. TSM has such visibility because all
Security Domain deletion and TA deletion are managed by TSM;
the TSM could have stored the state when a TA is installed,
updated and deleted. There is possibility that an update
command is carried out inside TEE but a response is never
received in TSM. There is also possibility that some manual
local reset is done in a device that the TSM isn't aware of
the changes.

2. TSM generates message: GetDeviceStateRequest

3. The Client Application passes the JSON message
GetDeviceStateRequest to OTrP Agent API processMessage. The
communication between a Client Application and OTrP Agent is up
to the implementation of OTrP Agent.

4. OTrP Agent routes the message to the active TEE. Multiple TEE
case: it is up to OTrP Agent to figure this out. This
specification limits the support to only one active TEE, which
is the typical case today.

5. The target active TEE processes the received OTrP message,
returns a JSON message GetDeviceStateResponse

6. The OTrP Agent passes the GetDeviceStateResponse to the Client
App

7. The Client Application sends GetDeviceStateResponse to TSM

8. TSM processes GetDeviceStateResponse

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A. Extract TEEspaik for the SP, signs TEEspaik with TSM signer
key

B. Examine SD list and TA list

9. TSM continues to carry out other actions basing on the need.
The next call could be instructing the device to install a
dependent TA.

A. Assume a dependent TA isn't in the device yet, the TSM may
do the following:

Create a SD to install the TA by sending a message
CreateSDRequest. The message is sent back to the Client
Application, and then OTrP Agent and TEE to process.

Install a TA with a message InstallTARequest.

C. If a Client Application depends on multiple TAs, the Client
Application should expect multiple round trips of the TA
installation message exchanges.

10. At the last TSM and TEE operation, TSM returns the signed TEE SP
AIK public key to the application

11. The Client Application shall store the TEEspaik for future
loaded TA trust check purpose.

12. Assume TSM finds that this is a fresh device that doesn't have
any SD for the SP yet. TSM may move on to create a SD for the
SP next.

13. During Client Application installation, the application checks
whether required Trusted Applications are already installed,
which may have been provided by TEE. If needed, it will contact
its TSM service to determine whether the device is ready or
install TA list that this application needs.

6.5.2. Case 2: A previously installed Client Application calls a TA

1. The Client Application checks the device readiness: (a) whether
it has a TEE; (b) whether it has TA that it depends. It may
happen that TSM has removed TA this application depends on.

2. The Client App calls OTrP Agent method "GetTAInformation"

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3. OTrP Agent queries the TEE to get TA information. If the given
TA doesn't exist, an error is returned

4. The Client App parses the TAInformation message.

5. If the TA doesn't exist, the Client App calls its TSM to install
the TA. If the TA exists, the Client App proceeds to call the
TA.

7. OTrP Messages

An OTrP Message is designed to provide end-to-end security. It
always signed by its creator. In addition, an OTrP Message is
typically encrypted such that only the targeted device TEE or TSM
provider is able to decrypt and view the actual content.

7.1. Message Format

OTrP Messages use JSON format for JSON's simple readability and
moderate data size in comparison with alternative TLV and XML
formats.

JSON Message security has developed JSON Web Signing and JSON Web
Encryption standard in the IETF Workgroup JOSE, see [JWS] and [JWE].
The OTrP Messages in this protocol will leverage the basic JWS and
JWE to handle JSON signing and encryption.

7.2. Message Naming Convention

For each TSM command "xyz"", OTrP Protocol use the following naming
convention to represent its raw message content and complete request
and response messages:

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7.3. Request and Response Message Template

An OTrP Request message uses the following format:

{
"<name>TBSRequest": {
<request message content>
}
}

A corresponding OTrP Response message will be as follows.

{
"<name>TBSResponse": {
<response message content>
}
}

7.4. Signed Request and Response Message Structure

A signed request message will generally include only one signature,
and uses the flattened JWS JSON Serialization Syntax, see
Section 7.2.2 in RFC7515 [RFC7515] .

A general JWS object looks like the following.

{
"payload": "<payload contents>",
"protected":"<integrity-protected header contents>",
"header": {
<non-integrity-protected header contents>,
},
"signature":"<signature contents>"
}

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OTrP signed messages only requires the signing algorithm as the
mandate header in the property "protected". The "non-integrity-
protected header contents" is optional.

OTrP signed message will be given an explicit Request or Response
property name. In other words, a signed Request or Response uses the
following template.

A general JWS object looks like the following.

{
"<name>[Request | Response]": {
<JWS Message of <name>TBS[Request | Response]
}
}

With the standard JWS message format, a signed OTrP Message looks
like the following.

{
"<name>[Request | Response]": {
"payload": "<payload contents of <name>TBS[Request | Response]>",
"protected":"<integrity-protected header contents>",
"header": <non-integrity-protected header contents>,
"signature":"<signature contents>"
}
}

The top element " <name>[Signed][Request | Response]" cannot be fully
trusted to match the content because it doesn't participate the
signature generation. However, a recipient can always match it with
the value associated with the property "payload". It purely serves
to provide a quick reference for reading and method invocation.

Furthermore, most properties in an unsigned OTrP messages are
encrypted to provide end-to-end confidentiality. Only OTrP Message
that isn't encrypted is the initial device query message that asks
for the device state information.

Thus a typical OTrP Message consists of an encrypted and then signed
JSON message. Some transaction data such as transaction ID and TEE
information may need to be exposed to OTrP Agent for routing purpose.
Such information is excluded from JSON encryption. The device's
signer certificate itself is encrypted. The overall final message is
a standard signed JSON message.

As required by JSW/JWE, those JWE and JWS related elements will be
BASE64URL encoded. Other binary data elements specific to the OTrP

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specification are BASE64 encoded. This specification will identify
elements that should be BASE64 and those elements that are to be
BASE64URL encoded.

7.4.1. Identifying signing and Encryption keys for JWS/JWE messaging

JWS and JWE messaging allow various options for identifying the
signing and encryption keys, for example, it allows optional elements
including "x5c", "x5t" and "kid" in the header to cover various
possibilities.

In order to protect privacy, it is important that the device's
certificate is released only to a trusted TSM, and that it is
encrypted. The TSM will need to know the device certificate, but
untrusted parties must not be able to get the device certificate.
All OTrP messaging conversations between a TSM and device begin with
GetDeviceStateRequest / GetDeviceStateResponse. These messages have
elements built into them to exchange signing certificates, described
in the "Detailed Message Specification" section. Any subsequent
messages in the conversation that follow on from this are implicitly
using the same certificates for signing/encryption, and as a result
the certificates or references to the certificates/signer may not be
exchanged in those subsequent messages.

In other words, the signing key identifier in the use of JWS and JWE
here may be absent in the subsequent messages after the initial
GetDeviceState query.

This has implication on the TEE and TSM implementation: they have to
cache the signer certificates for the subsequent message signature
validation in the session. It may be easier for a TSM service to
cache transaction session information but not so for a TEE in a
device. A TSM should check a device's capability to decide whether
it should include its TSM signer certificate and OCSP data in each
subsequent request message. The device's caching capability is
reported in GetDeviceStateResponse.

7.5. JSON Signing and Encryption Algorithms

The OTrP JSON signing algorithm shall use SHA256 or a stronger hash
method with respective key type. JSON Web Algorithm RS256 or ES256
shall be used respectively for RSA with SHA256 and ECDSA with SHA256.
If RSA with SHA256 is used, the JSON web algorithm representation is
as follows.

{"alg":"RS256"}

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The (BASE64URL encoded) "protected" header property in a signed
message looks like the following:

"protected":"eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9"

If ECSDA with P-256 curve and SHA256 are used for signing, the JSON
signing algorithm representation is as follows.

{"alg":"ES256"}

The value for the "protected" field will be the following.

eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9

Thus a common OTrP signed message with ES256 looks like the
following.

{
"payload": "<payload contents>",
"protected": "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9",
"signature":"<signature contents>"
}

The OTrP JSON message encryption algorithm should use one of the
supported algorithms defined in the later chapter of this document.
JSON encryption uses a symmetric key as its "Content Encryption Key
(CEK)". This CEK is encrypted or wrapped by a recipient's key. OTrP
recipient typically has an asymmetric key pair. Therefore CEK will
be encrypted by the recipient's public key.

Symmetric encryption shall use the following algorithm.

{"enc":"A128CBC-HS256"}

This algorithm represents encryption with AES 128 in CBC mode with
HMAC SHA 256 for integrity. The value of the property "protected" in
a JWE message will be

eyJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0

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An encrypted JSON message looks like the following.

{
"protected": "eyJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0",
"recipients": [
{
"header": {
"alg": "<RSA1_5 etc.>"
},
"encrypted_key": "<encrypted value of CEK>"
}
],
"iv": "<BASE64URL encoded IV data>",
"ciphertext": "<Encrypted data over the JSON plaintext
(BASE64URL)>",
"tag": "<JWE authentication tag (BASE64URL)>"
}

OTrP doesn't use JWE AAD (Additional Authenticated Data) because each
message is always signed after the message is encrypted.

7.5.1. Supported JSON Signing Algorithms

The following JSON signature algorithms are mandate support in TEE
and TSM.

o RS256

o ES256

7.5.2. Support JSON Encryption Algorithms

The following JSON authenticated encryption algorithms are mandate
support in TEE and TSM.

o A128CBC-HS256

o A256CBC-HS512

7.6. Common Errors

An OTrP Response message typically needs to report operation status
and error causes if an operation fails. The following JSON message
elements should be used across all OTrP Messages.

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"status": "pass | fail"

"reason": {
"error-code": "<error code if there is any>",
"error-message": "<error message>"
}
}

"ver": "<version string>"

7.7. OTrP Message List

The following table lists the OTrP commands and therefore
corresponding Request and Response messages defined in this
specification. Additional messages may be added in the future when
new task messages are needed.

GetDeviceState -
A TSM queries a device's current state with a message
GetDeviceStateRequest. A device TEE will report its version, its
FW version, and list of all SD and TA in the device that is
managed by the requesting TSM. TSM may determine whether the
device is trustworthy and decide to carry out additional commands
according to the response from this query.

CreateSD -
A TSM instructs a device TEE to create a SD for a SP. The
recipient TEE will check whether the requesting TSM is
trustworthy.

UpdateSD -
A TSM instructs a device TEE to update an existing SD. A typical
update need comes from SP certificate change, TSM certificate
change and so on. The recipient TEE will verify whether the TSM
is trustworthy and owns the SD.

DeleteSD -
A TSM instructs a device TEE to delete an existing SD. A TEE
conditionally deletes TAs loaded in the SD according to a request
parameter. A SD cannot be deleted until all TAs in this SD are
deleted. If this is the last SD for a SP, TEE can also delete
TEE SP AIK key for this SP.

InstallTA -
A TSM instructs a device to install a TA into a SD for a SP. TEE
in a device will check whether the TSM and TA are trustworthy.

UpdateTA -

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A TSM instructs a device to update a TA into a SD for a SP. The
change may commonly be bug fix for a previously installed TA.

DeleteTA -
A TSM instructs a device to delete a TA. TEE in a device will
check whether the TSM and TA are trustworthy.

7.8. OTrP Request Message Routing Rules

For each command that a TSM wants to send to a device, the TSM
generates a request message. This is typically triggered by a Client
Application that uses the TSM. The Client Application initiates
contact with the TSM and receives TSM OTrP Request messages according
to the TSM's implementation. The Client Application forwards the
OTrP message to an OTrP Agent in the device, which in turn sends the
message to the active TEE in the device.

The current version of specification assumes that each device has
only one active TEE, and OTrP Agent is responsible to connect to the
active TEE. This is the case today with devices in the market.

Upon TEE responding with a request, the OTrP Agent gets OTrP response
messages back to the Client Application that sends the request. In
case the target TEE fails to respond the request, the OTrP Agent will
be responsible to generate an error message to reply the Client
Application. The Client Application forwards any data it received to
its TSM.

7.8.1. SP Anonymous Attestation Key (SP AIK)

When the first new Security Domain is created in TEE for a SP, a new
key pair is generated and associated with this SP. This key pair is
used for future device attestation to the service provider instead of
using device's TEE key pair.

8. Detailed Messages Specification

For each message in the following sections all JSON elements are
mandatory if it isn't explicitly indicated as optional.

8.1. GetDeviceState

This is the first command that a TSM will query a device. This
command is triggered when a SP's Client Application contacts its TSM
to check whether the underlying device is ready for TA operations.

This command queries a device's current TEE state. A device TEE will
report its version, its FW version, and list of all SD and TA in the

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device that is managed by the requesting TSM. TSM may determine
whether the device is trustworthy and decide to carry out additional
commands according to the response from this query.

The request message of this command is signed by TSM. The response
message from TEE is encrypted. A random message encryption key (MK)
is generated by TEE, and this encrypted key is encrypted by the
receiving TSM public key such that only the TSM who sent the request
is able to decrypt and view the response message.

8.1.1. GetDeviceStateRequest message

{
"GetDeviceStateTBSRequest": {
"ver": "1.0",
"rid": "<Unique request ID>",
"tid": "<transaction ID>",
"ocspdat": "<OCSP stapling data of TSM certificate>",
"icaocspdat": "<OCSP stapling data for TSM CA certificates>",
"supportedsigalgs": "<comma separated signing algorithms>"
}
}

The request message consists of the following data elements:

ver - version of the message format

rid - a unique request ID generated by the TSM

tid - a unique transaction ID to trace request and response. This
can be from a prior transaction's tid field, and can be used in
the subsequent message exchanges in this TSM session. The
combination of rid and tid should be made unique.

ocspdat - OCSP stapling data for the TSM certificate. The TSM
provides OCSP data such that a recipient TEE can validate the
validity of the TSM certificate without making its own external
OCSP service call. This is a mandate field.

icaocspdat - OCSP stapling data for the intermediate CA
certificates of the TSM certificate up to the root. A TEE side
can cache CA OCSP data such that this value isn't needed in each
call.

supportedsigalgs - an optional property to list the signing
algorithms that TSM is able to support. A recipient TEE should
choose algorithm in this list to sign its response message if
this property is present in a request.

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The final request message is JSON signed message of the above raw
JSON data with TSM's certificate.

{
"GetDeviceStateRequest": {
"payload":"<BASE64URL encoding of the GetDeviceStateTBSRequest
JSON above>",
"protected": "<BASE64URL encoded signing algorithm>",
"header": {
"x5c": "<BASE64 encoded TSM certificate chain up to the
root CA certificate>"
},
"signature":"<signature contents signed by TSM private key>"
}
}

The signing algorithm should use SHA256 with respective key type.
The mandatory algorithm support is the RSA signing algorithm. The
signer header "x5c" is used to include the TSM signer certificate up
to the root CA certificate.

8.1.2. Request processing requirements at a TEE

Upon receiving a request message GetDeviceStateRequest at a TEE, the
TEE must validate a request:

1. Validate JSON message signing

2. Validate that the request TSM certificate is chained to a trusted
CA that the TEE embeds as its trust anchor.

* Cache the CA OCSP stapling data and certificate revocation
check status for other subsequent requests.

* A TEE can use its own clock time for the OCSP stapling data
validation.

3. Validate JSON message signing

4. Collect Firmware signed data

* This is a capability in ARM architecture that allows a TEE to
query Firmware to get FW signed data.

5. Collect SD information for the SD owned by this TSM

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8.1.3. Firmware signed data

Firmware isn't expected to process or produce JSON data. It is
expected to just sign some raw bytes of data.

The data to be signed by TFW key needs be some unique random data
each time. The (UTF-8 encoded) "tid" value from the
GetDeviceStateTBSRequest shall be signed by the firmware. TSM isn't
expected to parse TFW data except the signature validation and signer
trust path validation.

It is possible that a TEE can get some valid TFW signed data from
another device. This is part of the TEE trust assumption where TSM
will trust the TFW data supplied by the TEE. The TFW trust is more
concerned by TEE than a TSM where a TEE needs to ensure that the
underlying device firmware is trustworthy.

TfwData: {
"tbs": "<TFW to be signed data, BASE64 encoded>",
"cert": "<BASE64 encoded TFW certificate>",
"sigalg": "Signing method",
"sig": "<Tfw signed data, BASE64 encoded>"
}

It is expected that FW use a standard signature methods for maximal
interoperability with TSM providers. The mandatory support list of
signing algorithm is RSA with SHA256.

The JSON object above is constructed by TEE with data returned from
FW. It isn't a standard JSON signed object. The signer information
and data to be signed must be specially processed by TSM according to
definition given here. The data to be signed is the raw data.

8.1.3.1. Supported Firmware Signature Methods

TSM providers shall support the following signature methods. A
firmware provider can choose one of the methods in signature
generation.

o RSA with SHA256

o ECDSA with SHA 256

The value of "sigalg" in the TfwData JSON message should use one of
the following:

o RS256

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o ES256

8.1.4. Post Conditions

Upon successful request validation, the TEE information is collected.
There is no change in the TEE in the device.

The response message shall be encrypted where the encryption key
shall be a symmetric key that is wrapped by TSM's public key. The
JSON Content Encryption Key (CEK) is used for this purpose.

8.1.5. GetDeviceStateResponse message

The message has the following structure.

{
"GetDeviceTEEStateTBSResponse": {
"ver": "1.0",
"status": "pass | fail",
"rid": "<the request ID from the request message>",
"tid": "<the transaction ID from the request message>",
"signerreq": "true | false about whether TSM needs to send
signer data again in subsequent messages",
"edsi": "<Encrypted JSON dsi information>"
}
}

where

signerreq - true if the TSM should send its signer certificate and
OCSP data again in the subsequent messages. The value may be
"false" if the TEE caches the TSM's signer certificate and OCSP
status.

rid - the request ID from the request message

tid - the tid from the request message

edsi - the main data element whose value is JSON encrypted message
over the following Device State Information (DSI).

The Device State Information (DSI) message consists of the following.

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{
"dsi": {
"tfwdata": {
"tbs": "<TFW to be signed data is the tid>"
"cert": "<BASE64 encoded TFW certificate>",
"sigalg": "Signing method",
"sig": "<Tfw signed data, BASE64 encoded>"
},
"tee": {
"name": "<TEE name>",
"ver": "<TEE version>",
"cert": "<BASE64 encoded TEE cert>",
"cacert": "<JSON array value of CA certificates up to
the root CA>",
"sdlist": {
"cnt": "<Number of SD owned by this TSM>",
"sd": [
{
"name": "<SD name>",
"spid": "<SP owner ID of this SD>",
"talist": [
{
"taid": "<TA application identifier>",
"taname": "<TA application friendly
name>" // optional
}
]
}
]
},
"teeaiklist": [
{
"spaik": "<SP AIK public key, BASE64 encoded>",
"spaiktype": "<RSA | ECC>",
"spid": "<sp id>"
}
]
}
}
}

The encrypted JSON message looks like the following.

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{
"protected": "<BASE64URL encoding of encryption algorithm header
JSON data>",
"recipients": [
{
"header": {
"alg": "RSA1_5"
},
"encrypted_key": "<encrypted value of CEK>"
}
],
"iv": "<BASE64URL encoded IV data>",
"ciphertext": "<Encrypted data over the JSON object of dsi
(BASE64URL)>",
"tag": "<JWE authentication tag (BASE64URL)>"
}

Assume we encrypt plaintext with AES 128 in CBC mode with HMAC SHA
256 for integrity, the encryption algorithm header is:

{"enc":"A128CBC-HS256"}

The value of the property "protected" in the above JWE message will
be

eyJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0

In other words, the above message looks like the following:

{
"protected": "eyJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0",
"recipients": [
{
"header": {
"alg": "RSA1_5"
},
"encrypted_key": "<encrypted value of CEK>"
}
],
"iv": "<BASE64URL encoded IV data>",
"ciphertext": "<Encrypted data over the JSON object of dsi
(BASE64URL)>",
"tag": "<JWE authentication tag (BASE64URL)>"
}

The full response message looks like the following:

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{
"GetDeviceTEEStateTBSResponse": {
"ver": "1.0",
"status": "pass | fail",
"rid": "<the request ID from the request message>",
"tid": "<the transaction ID from the request message>",
"edsi": {
"protected": "<BASE64URL encoding of encryption algorithm
header JSON data>",
"recipients": [
{
"header": {
"alg": "RSA1_5"
},
"encrypted_key": "<encrypted value of CEK>"
}
],
"iv": "<BASE64URL encoded IV data>",
"ciphertext": "<Encrypted data over the JSON object of dsi
(BASE64URL)>",
"tag": "<JWE authentication tag (BASE64URL)>"
}
}
}

The CEK will be encrypted by the TSM public key in the device. The
TEE signed message has the following structure.

{
"GetDeviceTEEStateResponse": {
"payload": "<BASE64URL encoding of the JSON message
GetDeviceTEEStateTBSResponse>",
"protected": "<BASE64URL encoding of signing algorithm>",
"signature": "<BASE64URL encoding of the signature value>"
}
}

The signing algorithm shall use SHA256 with respective key type, see
Section Section 7.5.1.

The final response message GetDeviceStateResponse consists of array
of TEE response. A typical device will have only one active TEE. An
OTrP Agent is responsible to collect TEE response for all active TEEs
in the future.

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{
"GetDeviceStateResponse": [ // JSON array
{"GetDeviceTEEStateResponse": ...},
...
{"GetDeviceTEEStateResponse": ...}
]
}

8.1.6. Error Conditions

An error may occur if a request isn't valid or the TEE runs into some
error. The list of possible error conditions is the following.

ERR_REQUEST_INVALID The TEE meets the following conditions with a
request message: (1) The request from a TSM has an invalid message
structure; mandatory information is absent in the message.
undefined member or structure is included. (2) TEE fails to verify
signature of the message or fails to decrypt its contents. (3) etc.

ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION TEE receives the version of message that
TEE can't deal with.

ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CRYPTO_ALG TEE receives a request message encoded
with cryptographic algorithms that TEE doesn't support.

ERR_TFW_NOT_TRUSTED TEE may consider the underlying device firmware
be not trustworthy.

ERR_TSM_NOT_TRUSTED TEE needs to make sure whether the TSM is
trustworthy by checking the validity of TSM certificate and OCSP
stapling data and so on. If TEE finds TSM is not reliable, it may
return this error code.

ERR_TEE_FAIL TEE fails to respond to a TSM request. The OTrP Agent
will construct an error message in responding the TSM's request.
And also if TEE fails to process a request because of its internal
error, it will return this error code.

The response message will look like the following if the TEE signing
can work to sign the error response message.

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{
"GetDeviceTEEStateTBSResponse": {
"ver": "1.0",
"status": "fail",
"rid": "<the request ID from the request message>",
"tid": "<the transaction ID from the request message>",
"reason": {"error-code":"<error code>"}
"supportedsigalgs": "<signature algorithms TEE supports>"
}
}

where

supportedsigalgs - an optional property to list the signing
algorithms that the active TEE is able to support. When a TSM
sends a signed message that TEE isn't able to validate, it can
include signature algorithms that it is able to consume in this
status report. A TSM can generate a new request message to retry
the management task with a TEE supported signing algorithm.

If TEE isn't able to sign an error message, a general error message
should be returned.

8.1.7. TSM Processing Requirements

Upon receiving a message of the type GetDeviceStateResponse at a TSM,
the TSM should validate the following.

o Parse to get list of GetDeviceTEEStateResponse JSON object

o Parse the JSON "payload" property and decrypt the JSON element
"edsi"

o The decrypted message contains the TEE signer certificate

o Validate GetDeviceTEEStateResponse JSON signature. The signer
certificate is extracted from the decrypted message in the last
step.

o Extract TEE information and check it against its TEE acceptance
policy.

o Extract TFW signed element, and check the signer and data
integration against its TFW policy

o Check the SD list and TA list and prepare for a subsequent command
such as "CreateSD" if it needs to have a new SD for a SP.

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8.2. Security Domain Management

8.2.1. CreateSD

This command is typically preceded with GetDeviceState command that
has acquired the device information of the target device by the TSM.
TSM sends such a command to instruct a TEE to create a new Security
Domain for a SP.

A TSM sends an OTrP Request message CreateSDRequest to a device TEE
to create a Security Domain for a SP. Such a request is signed by
TSM where the TSM signer may or may not be the same as the SP's TA
signer certificate. The resulting SD is associated with two
identifiers for future management:

o TSM as the owner. The owner identifier is a registered unique TSM
ID that is stored in the TSM certificate.

o SP identified by its TA signer certificate as the authorization.
A TSM can add more than one SP certificates to a SD.

A Trusted Application that is signed by a matching SP signer
certificate for a SD is eligible to be installed into that SD. The
TA installation into a SD may be instructed from TSM or a Client
Application.

8.2.1.1. CreateSDRequest Message

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The request message for CreateSD has the following JSON format.

{
"CreateSDTBSRequest": {
"ver": "1.0",
"rid": "<unique request ID>",
"tid": "<transaction ID>", // this may be from prior message
"tee": "<TEE routing name from the DSI for the SD's target>",
"nextdsi": "true | false",
"dsihash": "<hash of DSI returned in the prior query>",
"content": ENCRYPTED { // this piece of JSON data will be
// encrypted
"spid": "<SP ID value>",
"sdname": "<SD name for the domain to be created>",
"spcert": "<BASE64 encoded SP certificate>",
"tsmid": "<An identifiable attribute of the TSM
certificate>",
"did": "<SHA256 hash of the TEE cert>"
}
}
}

In the message,

rid - A unique value to identify this request

tid - A unique value to identify this transaction. It can have the
same value for the tid in the preceding GetDeviceStateRequest.

tee - TEE ID returned from the previous response
GetDeviceStateResponse

nextdsi - Indicates whether the up to date Device State Information
(DSI) should be returned in the response to this request.

dsihash - The BASE64 encoded SHA256 hash value of the DSI data
returned in the prior TSM operation with this target TEE. This
value is always included such that a receiving TEE can check
whether the device state has changed since its last query. It
helps enforce SD update order in the right sequence without
accidently overwrite an update that was done simultaneously.

content - The "content" is a JSON encrypted message that includes
actual input for the SD creation. The encryption key is TSMmk that
is encrypted by the target TEE's public key. The entire message is
signed by the TSM private key TSMpriv. A separate TSMmk isn't used
in the latest specification because JSON encryption will use a
content encryption key for exactly the same purpose.

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spid - A unique id assigned by the TSM for its SP. It should be
unique within a TSM namespace.

sdname - a name unique to the SP. TSM should ensure it is unique
for each SP.

spcert - The SP's TA signer certificate is included in the request.
This certificate will be stored by the device TEE and uses it to
check against TA installation. Only if a TA is signed by a
matching spcert associated with a SD the TA will be installed into
the SD.

tsmid - SD owner claim by TSM - A SD owned by a TSM will be
associated with a trusted identifier defined as an attribute in the
signer TSM certificate. TEE will be responsible to assign this ID
to the SD. The TSM certificate attribute for this attribute TSMID
must be vetted by the TSM signer issuing CA. With this trusted
identifier, SD query at TEE can be fast upon TSM signer
verification.

did - The SHA256 hash of the device TEE certificate. The encryption
key CEK will be encrypted the recipient TEE's public key. This
hash value in the "did" property allows the recipient TEE to check
whether it is the expected target to receive such a request. If
this isn't given, an OTrP message for device 2 could be sent to
device 1. It is optional for TEE to check because the successful
decryption of the request message with this device's TEE private
key already proves it is the target. This explicit hash value
makes the protocol not dependent on message encryption method in
future.

Following is the OTrP message template, the full request is signed
message over the CreateSDTBSRequest as follows.

{
"CreateSDRequest": {
"payload":"<CreateSDTBSRequest JSON above>",
"protected":"<integrity-protected header contents>",
"header": <non-integrity-protected header contents>,
"signature":"<signature contents signed by TSM private key>"
}
}

TSM signer certificate is included in the "header" property.

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8.2.1.2. Request processing requirements at a TEE

Upon receiving a request message CreateSDRequest at a TEE, the TEE
must validate a request:

1. Validate the JSON request message

* Validate JSON message signing

* Validate that the request TSM certificate is chained to a
trusted CA that the TEE embeds as its trust anchor

* Compare dsihash with its current state to make sure nothing
has changed since this request was sent.

* Decrypt to get the plaintext of the content: (a) spid, (b) sd
name, (c) did

* Check that a SPID is supplied

* spcert check: check it is a valid certificate (signature and
format verification only)

* Check "did" is the SHA256 hash of its TEEcert BER raw binary
data

* Check whether the requested SD already exists for the SP

* Check TSMID in the request matches TSM certificate's TSM ID
attribute

2. Create action

* Create a SD for the SP with the given name

* Assign the TSMID from the TSMCert to this SD

* Assign the SPID and SPCert to this SD

* Check whether a TEE SP AIK keypair already exists for the
given SP ID

* Create TEE SP AIK keypair if it doesn't exist for the given SP
ID

* Generate new DSI data if the request asks for updated DSI

3. Construct CreateSDResponse message

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* Create raw content

+ Operation status +

+ "did" or full signer certificate information,

+ TEE SP AIK public key if DSI isn't going to be included

+ Updated DSI data if requested if the request asks for it

* The response message is encrypted with the same JWE CEK of the
request without recreating a new content encryption key.

* The encrypted message is signed with TEEpriv. The signer
information ("did" or TEEcert) is encrypted.

4. Deliver response message. (a) OTrP Agent returns this to the app;
(b) The app passes this back to TSM

5. TSM process. (a) TSM processes the response message; (b) TSM can
look up signer certificate from device ID "did".

If a request is illegitimate or signature doesn't pass, a "status"
property in the response will indicate the error code and cause.

8.2.1.3. CreateSDResponse Message

The response message for a CreateSDRequest contains the following
content.

{
"CreateSDTBSResponse": {
"ver": "1.0",
"status": "<operation result>",
"rid": "<the request ID received>",
"tid": "<the transaction ID received>",
"content": ENCRYPTED {
"reason":"<failure reason detail>", // optional
"did": "<the device id received from the request>",
"sdname": "<SD name for the domain created>",
"teespaik": "<TEE SP AIK public key, BASE64 encoded>",
"dsi": "<Updated TEE state, including all SD owned by
this TSM>"
}
}
}

In the response message, the following fields MUST be supplied.

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did - The SHA256 hash of the device TEE certificate. This shows
the device ID explicitly to the receiving TSM.

teespaik - The newly generated SP AIK public key for the given SP.
This is an optional value if the device has had another domain for
the SP that has triggered TEE SP AIK keypair for this specific SP.

There is possible extreme error case where TEE isn't reachable or the
TEE final response generation itself fails. In this case, TSM should
still receive a response from the OTrP Agent. OTrP Agent is able to
detect such error from TEE. In this case, a general error response
message should be returned, assuming OTrP Agent even doesn't know any
content and information about the request message.

In other words, TSM should expect receive a TEE successfully signed
JSON message, or a general "status" message.

{
"CreateSDResponse": {
"payload":"<CreateSDTBSResponse JSON above>",
"protected": {
"<BASE64URL of signing algorithm>"
},
"signature": "<signature contents signed by TEE device private
key (BASE64URL)>"
}
}

A response message type "status" will be returned when TEE totally
fails to respond. OTrP Agent is responsible to create this message.

{
"status": {
"result": "fail",
"error-code": "ERR_TEE_UNKNOWN",
"error-message": "TEE fails to respond"
}
}

8.2.1.4. Error Conditions

An error may occur if a request isn't valid or the TEE runs into some
error. The list of possible errors are the following. Refer to
section Error Code List (Section 13.1) for detail causes and actions.

ERR_REQUEST_INVALID

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ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION

ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CRYPTO_ALG

ERR_DEV_STATE_MISMATCH

ERR_SD_ALREADY_EXIST

ERR_SD_NOT_FOUND

ERR_SPCERT_INVALID

ERR_TEE_FAIL

ERR_TEE_UNKNOWN

ERR_TSM_NOT_AUTHORIZED

ERR_TSM_NOT_TRUSTED

8.2.2. UpdateSD

This TSM initiated command can update a SP's SD that it manages for
the following need. (a) Update SP signer certificate; (b) Add SP
signer certificate when a SP uses multiple to sign TA binary; (c)
Update SP ID.

The TSM presents the proof of the SD ownership to TEE, and includes
related information in its signed message. The entire request is
also encrypted for the end-to-end confidentiality.

8.2.2.1. UpdateSDRequest Message

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The request message for UpdateSD has the following JSON format.

{
"UpdateSDTBSRequest": {
"ver": "1.0",
"rid": "<unique request ID>",
"tid": "<transaction ID>", // this may be from prior message
"tee": "<TEE routing name from the DSI for the SD's target>",
"nextdsi": "true | false",
"dsihash": "<hash of DSI returned in the prior query>",
"content": ENCRYPTED { // this piece of JSON will be encrypted
"tsmid": "<TSMID associated with this SD>",
"spid": "<SP ID>",
"sdname": "<SD name for the domain to be updated>",
"changes": {
"newsdname": "<Change the SD name to this new name>", // Optional
"newspid": "<Change SP ID of the domain to this new value>", // Optional
"spcert": ["<BASE64 encoded new SP signer cert to be added>"], // Optional
"deloldspcert": ["<The SHA256 hex value of an old SP cert
assigned into this SD that should be deleted >"], // Optional
"renewteespaik": "true | false"
}
}
}
}

In the message,

rid - A unique value to identify this request

tid - A unique value to identify this transaction. It can have the
same value for the tid in the preceding GetDeviceStateRequest.

tee - TEE ID returned from the previous response
GetDeviceStateResponse

nextdsi - Indicates whether the up to date Device State Information
(DSI) should be returned in the response to this request.

content - The "content" is a JSON encrypted message that includes
actual input for the SD update. The standard JSON content

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encryption key (CEK) is used, and the CEK is encrypted by the
target TEE's public key.

tsmid - SD owner claim by TSM - A SD owned by a TSM will be
associated with a trusted identifier defined as an attribute in the
signer TSM certificate.

spid - the identifier of the SP whose SD will be updated. This
value is still needed because SD name is considered unique within a
SP only.

sdname - the name of the target SD to be updated.

changes - its content consists of changes that should be updated in
the given SD.

newsdname - the new name of the target SD to be assigned if this
value is present.

newspid - the new SP ID of the target SD to be assigned if this
value is present.

spcert - a new TA signer certificate of this SP to be added to the
SD if this is present.

deloldspcert - a SP certificate assigned into the SD should be
deleted if this is present. The value is the SHA256 fingerprint of
the old SP certificate.

renewteespaik - the value should be 'true' or 'false'. If it is
present and the value is 'true', TEE should regenerate TEE SP AIK
for this SD's owner SP. The newly generated TEE SP AIK for the SP
must be returned in the response message of this request. If there
are more than one SD for the SP, a new SPID for one of the domain
will always trigger a new teespaik generation as if a new SP is
introduced to the TEE.

Following the OTrP message template, the full request is signed
message over the UpdateSDTBSRequest as follows.

{
"UpdateSDRequest": {
"payload":"<UpdateSDTBSRequest JSON above>",
"protected":"<integrity-protected header contents>",
"header": <non-integrity-protected header contents>,
"signature":"<signature contents signed by TSM private key>"
}
}

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TSM signer certificate is included in the "header" property.

8.2.2.2. Request processing requirements at a TEE

Upon receiving a request message UpdateSDRequest at a TEE, the TEE
must validate a request:

1. Validate the JSON request message

* Validate JSON message signing

* Validate that the request TSM certificate is chained to a
trusted CA that the TEE embeds as its trust anchor. TSM
certificate status check is generally not needed anymore in
this request. The prior request should have validated the TSM
certificate's revocation status

* Compare dsihash with TEE cached last response DSI data to this
TSM

* Decrypt to get the plaintext of the content

* Check that the target SD name is supplied

* Check whether the requested SD exists

* Check that the TSM owns this TSM by verifying TSMID in the SD
matches TSM certificate's TSM ID attribute

* Now the TEE is ready to carry out update listed in the
"content" message

2. Update action

* If "newsdname" is given, replace the SD name for the SD to the
new value

* If "newspid" is given, replace the SP ID assigned to this SD
with the given new value

* If "spcert" is given, add this new SP certificate to the SD.

* If "deloldspcert" is present in the content, check previously
assigned SP certificates to this SD, and delete the one that
matches the given certificate hash value.

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* If "renewteespaik" is given and has a value as "true",
generate a new TEE SP AIK keypair, and replace the old one
with this.

* Generate new DSI data if the request asks for updated DSI

* Now the TEE is ready to construct the response message

3. Construct UpdateSDResponse message

* Create raw content

+ Operation status +

+ "did" or full signer certificate information,

+ TEE SP AIK public key if DSI isn't going to be included

+ Updated DSI data if requested if the request asks for it

* The response message is encrypted with the same JWE CEK of the
request without recreating a new content encryption key.

* The encrypted message is signed with TEEpriv. The signer
information ("did" or TEEcert) is encrypted.

4. Deliver response message. (a) OTrP Agent returns this to the app;
(b) The app passes this back to TSM

5. TSM process. (a) TSM processes the response message; (b) TSM can
look up signer certificate from device ID "did".

If a request is illegitimate or signature doesn't pass, a "status"
property in the response will indicate the error code and cause.

8.2.2.3. UpdateSDResponse Message

The response message for a UpdateSDRequest contains the following
content.

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{
"UpdateSDTBSResponse": {
"ver": "1.0",
"status": "<operation result>",
"rid": "<the request ID received>",
"tid": "<the transaction ID received>",
"content": ENCRYPTED {
"reason":"<failure reason detail>", // optional
"did": "<the device id hash>",
"cert": "<TEE certificate>", // optional
"teespaik": "<TEE SP AIK public key, BASE64 encoded>",
"teespaiktype": "<TEE SP AIK key type: RSA or ECC>",
"dsi": "<Updated TEE state, including all SD owned by
this TSM>"
}
}
}

In the response message, the following fields MUST be supplied.

did - The request should have known the signer certificate of this
device from a prior request. This hash value of the device TEE
certificate serves as a quick identifier only. Full device
certificate isn't necessary.

teespaik - the newly generated SP AIK public key for the given SP
if TEE SP AIK for the SP is asked to be renewed in the request.
This is an optional value if "dsi" is included in the response,
which will contain all up to date TEE SP AIK key pairs.

Similar to the similar template for the creation of encrypted and
signed CreateSDResponse, the final UpdateSDResponse looks like the
following.

{
"UpdateSDResponse": {
"payload":"<UpdateSDTBSResponse JSON above>",
"protected": {
"<BASE64URL of signing algorithm>"
},
"signature": "<signature contents signed by TEE device private
key (BASE64URL)>"
}
}

A response message type "status" will be returned when TEE totally
fails to respond. OTrP Agent is responsible to create this message.

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{
"status": {
"result": "fail",
"error-code": "ERR_TEE_UNKNOWN",
"error-message": "TEE fails to respond"
}
}

8.2.2.4. Error Conditions

ERR_REQUEST_INVALID

ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION

ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CRYPTO_ALG

ERR_DEV_STATE_MISMATCH

ERR_SD_NOT_FOUND

ERR_SDNAME_ALREADY_USED

ERR_SPCERT_INVALID

ERR_TEE_FAIL

ERR_TEE_UNKNOWN

ERR_TSM_NOT_AUTHORIZED

ERR_TSM_NOT_TRUSTED

8.2.3. DeleteSD

A TSM sends a DeleteSDRequest message to TEE to delete a specified SD
that it owns. A SD can be deleted only if there is no TA associated
with this SD in the device. The request message can contain a flag
to instruct TEE to delete all related TAs in a SD and then delete the
SD.

The target TEE will operate with the following logic.

1. Lookup given SD specified in the request message

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2. Check that the TSM owns the SD

3. Check that the device state hasn't changed since the last
operation

4. Check whether there are TAs in this SD

5. If TA exists in a SD, check whether the request instructs whether
TA should be deleted. If the request instructs TEE to delete
TAs, delete all TAs in this SD. If the request doesn't instruct
the TEE to delete TAs, return an error "ERR_SD_NOT_EMPTY".

6. Delete SD

7. If this is the last SD of this SP, delete TEE SP AIK key

8.2.3.1. DeleteSDRequest Message

The request message for DeleteSD has the following JSON format.

{
"DeleteSDTBSRequest": {
"ver": "1.0",
"rid": "<unique request ID>",
"tid": "<transaction ID>", // this may be from prior message
"tee": "<TEE routing name from the DSI for the SD's target>",
"nextdsi": "true | false",
"dsihash": "<hash of DSI returned in the prior query>",
"content": ENCRYPTED { // this piece of JSON will be encrypted
"tsmid": "<TSMID associated with this SD>",
"sdname": "<SD name for the domain to be updated>",
"deleteta": "true | false"
}
}
}

In the message,

rid - A unique value to identify this request

tid - A unique value to identify this transaction. It can have the
same value for the tid in the preceding GetDeviceStateRequest.

tee - TEE ID returned from the previous response
GetDeviceStateResponse

nextdsi - Indicates whether the up to date Device State Information
(DSI) should be returned in the response to this request.

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content - The "content" is a JSON encrypted message that includes
actual input for the SD update. The standard JSON content
encryption key (CEK) is used, and the CEK is encrypted by the
target TEE's public key.

tsmid - SD owner claim by TSM - A SD owned by a TSM will be
associated with a trusted identifier defined as an attribute in the
signer TSM certificate.

sdname - the name of the target SD to be updated.

deleteta - the value should be 'true' or 'false'. If it is present
and the value is 'true', TEE should delete all TAs associated with
the SD in the device.

Following the OTrP message template, the full request is signed
message over the DeleteSDTBSRequest as follows.

{
"DeleteSDRequest": {
"payload":"<DeleteSDTBSRequest JSON above>",
"protected":"<integrity-protected header contents>",
"header": <non-integrity-protected header contents>,
"signature":"<signature contents signed by TSM private key>"
}
}

TSM signer certificate is included in the "header" property.

8.2.3.2. Request processing requirements at a TEE

Upon receiving a request message DeleteSDRequest at a TEE, the TEE
must validate a request:

1. Validate the JSON request message

* Validate JSON message signing

* Validate that the request TSM certificate is chained to a
trusted CA that the TEE embeds as its trust anchor. TSM
certificate status check is generally not needed anymore in

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this request. The prior request should have validated the TSM
certificate's revocation status

* Compare dsihash with TEE cached last response DSI data to this
TSM

* Decrypt to get the plaintext of the content

* Check that the target SD name is supplied

* Check whether the requested SD exists

* Check that the TSM owns this TSM by verifying TSMID in the SD
matches TSM certificate's TSM ID attribute

* Now the TEE is ready to carry out update listed in the
"content" message

2. Deletion action

* Check TA existence in this SD

* If "deleteta" is "true", delete all TAs in this SD. If the
value of "deleteta" is "false" and some TA exists, return an
error "ERR_SD_NOT_EMPTY"

* Delete the SD

* Delete TEE SP AIK key pair if this SD is the last one for the
SP

* Now the TEE is ready to construct the response message

3. Construct DeleteSDResponse message

* Create response content

+ Operation status +

+ "did" or full signer certificate information,

+ Updated DSI data if requested if the request asks for it

* The response message is encrypted with the same JWE CEK of the
request without recreating a new content encryption key.

* The encrypted message is signed with TEEpriv. The signer
information ("did" or TEEcert) is encrypted.

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4. Deliver response message. (a) OTrP Agent returns this to the app;
(b) The app passes this back to TSM

5. TSM process. (a) TSM processes the response message; (b) TSM can
look up signer certificate from device ID "did".

If a request is illegitimate or signature doesn't pass, a "status"
property in the response will indicate the error code and cause.

8.2.3.3. DeleteSDResponse Message

The response message for a DeleteSDRequest contains the following
content.

{
"DeleteSDTBSResponse": {
"ver": "1.0",
"status": "<operation result>",
"rid": "<the request ID received>",
"tid": "<the transaction ID received>",
"content": ENCRYPTED {
"reason":"<failure reason detail>", // optional
"did": "<the device id hash>",
"dsi": "<Updated TEE state, including all SD owned by
this TSM>"
}
}
}

In the response message, the following fields MUST be supplied.

The final DeleteSDResponse looks like the following.

{
"DeleteSDResponse": {
"payload":"<DeleteSDTBSResponse JSON above>",
"protected": {
"<BASE64URL of signing algorithm>"
},
"signature": "<signature contents signed by TEE device
private key (BASE64URL)>"
}
}

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A response message type "status" will be returned when TEE totally
fails to respond. OTrP Agent is responsible to create this message.

{
"status": {
"result": "fail",
"error-code": "ERR_TEE_UNKNOWN",
"error-message": "TEE fails to respond"
}
}

8.2.3.4. Error Conditions

ERR_REQUEST_INVALID

ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION

ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CRYPTO_ALG

ERR_DEV_STATE_MISMATCH

ERR_SD_NOT_EMPTY

ERR_SD_NOT_FOUND

ERR_TEE_FAIL

ERR_TEE_UNKNOWN

ERR_TSM_NOT_AUTHORIZED

ERR_TSM_NOT_TRUSTED

8.3. Trusted Application Management

This protocol doesn't introduce a TA container concept. All the TA
authorization and management will be up to TEE implementation.

The following three TA management commands will be supported.

o InstallTA - provision a TA by TSM

o UpdateTA - update a TA by TSM

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o DeleteTA - remove TA registration information with a SD, remove TA
binary from TEE, remove all TA related data in TEE

8.3.1. InstallTA

TA binary data can be from two sources:

1. TSM supplies the signed TA binary

2. Client Application supplies the TA binary

This specification considers only the first case where TSM supplies
TA binary. When such a request is received by TEE, a SD is already
created and is ready to take TA installation.

A TSM sends the following information in message InstallTARequest to
a target TEE:

o The target SD information: SP ID and SD name

o Encrypted TA binary data. TA data is encrypted with TEE SP AIK.

o TA metadata. It is optional to include SP signer certificate for
the SD to add if the SP has changed signer since the SD was
created.

TEE processes command given by TSM to install TA into a SP's SD. It
does the following:

o Validation

* TEE validates TSM message authenticity

* Decrypt to get request content

* Lookup SD with SD name

* Checks that the TSM owns the SD

* Checks DSI hash matches that the device state hasn't changed

o TA validation

* Decrypt to get TA binary and any personalization data with "TEE
SP AIK private key"

* Check that SP ID is the one that is registered with the SP SD

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* TA signer is either the newly given SP certificate or the one
in SD. The TA signing method is specific to TEE. This
specification doesn't define how a TA should be signed.

* If a TA signer is given in the request, add this signer into
the SD.

o TA installation

* TEE re-encrypts TA binary and its personalization data with its
own method

* TEE enrolls and stores the TA onto TEE secure storage area.

o Construct a response message. This involves signing a encrypted
status information for the requesting TSM.

8.3.1.1. InstallTARequest Message

The request message for InstallTA has the following JSON format.

{
"InstallTATBSRequest": {
"ver": "1.0",
"rid": "<unique request ID>",
"tid": "<transaction ID>",
"tee": "<TEE routing name from the DSI for the SD's target>",
"nextdsi": "true | false",
"dsihash": "<hash of DSI returned in the prior query>",
"content": ENCRYPTED {
"tsmid": "<TSM ID previously assigned to the SD>",
"spid": "<SPID value>",
"sdname": "<SD name for the domain to install the TA>",
"spcert": "<BASE64 encoded SP certificate >", // optional
"taid": "<TA identifier>"
},
"encrypted_ta": {
"key": "<A 256-bit symmetric key encrypted by TEEspaik public
key>",
"iv": "<hex of 16 random bytes>",
"alg": "<encryption algoritm. AESCBC by default.",
"ciphertadata": "<BASE64 encoded encrypted TA binary data>",
"cipherpdata": "<BASE64 encoded encrypted TA personalization
data>"
}
}
}

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In the message,

rid - A unique value to identify this request

tid - A unique value to identify this transaction. It can have the
same value for the tid in the preceding GetDeviceStateRequest.

tee - TEE ID returned from the previous response
GetDeviceStateResponse

nextdsi - Indicates whether the up to date Device State Information
(DSI) should be returned in the response to this request.

tsmid - SD owner claim by TSM - A SD owned by a TSM will be
associated with a trusted identifier defined as an attribute in the
signer TSM certificate.

spid - SP identifier of the TA owner SP

spcert - an optional field to specify SP certificate that signed the
TA. This is sent if the SP has a new certificate that hasn't been
previously registered with the target SD where the TA should be
installed.

sdname - the name of the target SD where the TA should be installed

encrypted_ta - the message portion contains encrypted TA binary data
and personalization data. The TA data encryption key is placed in
"key", which is encrypted by the recipient's public key. The TA
data encryption uses symmetric key based encryption such as AESCBC.

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Following the OTrP message template, the full request is signed
message over the InstallTATBSRequest as follows.

{
"InstallTARequest": {
"payload":"<InstallTATBSRequest JSON above>",
"protected":"<integrity-protected header contents>",
"header": <non-integrity-protected header contents>,
"signature":"<signature contents signed by TSM private key>"
}
}

8.3.1.2. InstallTAResponse Message

The response message for a InstallTARequest contains the following
content.

{
"InstallTATBSResponse": {
"ver": "1.0",
"status": "<operation result>",
"rid": "<the request ID received>",
"tid": "<the transaction ID received>",
"content": ENCRYPTED {
"reason":"<failure reason detail>", // optional
"did": "<the device id hash>",
"dsi": "<Updated TEE state, including all SD owned by
this TSM>"
}
}
}

In the response message, the following fields MUST be supplied.

did - the SHA256 hash of the device TEE certificate. This shows
the device ID explicitly to the receiving TSM.

The final message InstallTAResponse looks like the following.

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{
"InstallTAResponse": {
"payload":"<InstallTATBSResponse JSON above>",
"protected": {
"<BASE64URL of signing algorithm>"
},
"signature": "<signature contents signed by TEE device
private key (BASE64URL)>"
}
}

A response message type "status" will be returned when TEE totally
fails to respond. OTrP Agent is responsible to create this message.

{
"status": {
"result": "fail",
"error-code": "ERR_TEE_UNKNOWN",
"error-message": "TEE fails to respond"
}
}

8.3.1.3. Error Conditions

ERR_REQUEST_INVALID

ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION

ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CRYPTO_ALG

ERR_DEV_STATE_MISMATCH

ERR_SD_NOT_FOUND

ERR_TA_INVALID

ERR_TA_ALREADY_INSTALLED

ERR_TEE_FAIL

ERR_TEE_UNKNOWN

ERR_TEE_RESOURCE_FULL

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ERR_TSM_NOT_AUTHORIZED

ERR_TSM_NOT_TRUSTED

8.3.2. UpdateTA

This TSM initiated command can update TA and its data in a SP's SD
that it manages for the following purposes.

1. Update TA binary

2. Update TA's personalization data

The TSM presents the proof of the SD ownership to TEE, and includes
related information in its signed message. The entire request is
also encrypted for the end-to-end confidentiality.

TEE processes command given by TSM to update TA of a SP SD. It does
the following:

o Validation

* TEE validates TSM message authenticity

* Decrypt to get request content

* Lookup SD with SD name

* Checks that the TSM owns the SD

* Checks DSI hash matches that the device state hasn't changed

o TA validation

* Both TA binary and personalization data are optional, but at
least one of them shall be present in the message

* Decrypt to get TA binary and any personalization data with "TEE
SP AIK private key"

* Check that SP ID is the one that is registered with the SP SD

* TA signer is either the newly given SP certificate or the one
in SD. The TA signing method is specific to TEE. This
specification doesn't define how a TA should be signed.

* If a TA signer is given in the request, add this signer into
the SD

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o TA update

* TEE re-encrypts TA binary and its personalization data with its
own method

* TEE replaces the existing TA binary and its personalization
data with the new binary and data.

o Construct a response message. This involves signing a encrypted
status information for the requesting TSM.

8.3.2.1. UpdateTARequest Message

The request message for UpdateTA has the following JSON format.

{
"UpdateTATBSRequest": {
"ver": "1.0",
"rid": "<unique request ID>",
"tid": "<transaction ID>",
"tee": "<TEE routing name from the DSI for the SD's target>",
"nextdsi": "true | false",
"dsihash": "<hash of DSI returned in the prior query>",
"content": ENCRYPTED {
"tsmid": "<TSM ID previously assigned to the SD>",
"spid": "<SPID value>",
"sdname": "<SD name for the domain to be created>",
"spcert": "<BASE64 encoded SP certificate >", // optional
"taid": "<TA identifier>"
},
"encrypted_ta": {
"key": "<A 256-bit symmetric key encrypted by TEEspaik public
key>",
"iv": "<hex of 16 random bytes>",
"alg": "<encryption algoritm. AESCBC by default.",
"ciphernewtadata": "<Change existing TA binary to this new TA
binary data(BASE64 encoded and encrypted)>",
"ciphernewpdata": "<Change the existing data to this new TA
personalization data(BASE64 encoded and encrypted)>"
// optional
}
}
}

In the message,

rid - A unique value to identify this request

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tid - A unique value to identify this transaction. It can have the
same value for the tid in the preceding GetDeviceStateRequest.

tee - TEE ID returned from the previous response
GetDeviceStateResponse

nextdsi - Indicates whether the up to date Device State Information
(DSI) should be returned in the response to this request.

tsmid - SD owner claim by TSM - A SD owned by a TSM will be
associated with a trusted identifier defined as an attribute in the
signer TSM certificate.

spid - SP identifier of the TA owner SP

sdname - the name of the target SD where the TA should be updated

taid - an identifier for the TA application to be updated

encrypted_ta - the message portion contains new encrypted TA binary
data and personalization data.

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Following the OTrP message template, the full request is signed
message over the UpdateTATBSRequest as follows.

{
"UpdateTARequest": {
"payload":"<UpdateTATBSRequest JSON above>",
"protected":"<integrity-protected header contents>",
"header": <non-integrity-protected header contents>,
"signature":"<signature contents signed by TSM private key>"
}
}

8.3.2.2. UpdateTAResponse Message

The response message for a UpdateTARequest contains the following
content.

{
"UpdateTATBSResponse": {
"ver": "1.0",
"status": "<operation result>",
"rid": "<the request ID received>",
"tid": "<the transaction ID received>",
"content": ENCRYPTED {
"reason":"<failure reason detail>", // optional
"did": "<the device id hash>",
"dsi": "<Updated TEE state, including all SD owned by
this TSM>"
}
}
}

In the response message, the following fields MUST be supplied.

did - the SHA256 hash of the device TEE certificate. This shows
the device ID explicitly to the receiving TSM.

The final message UpdateTAResponse looks like the following.

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{
"UpdateTAResponse": {
"payload":"<UpdateTATBSResponse JSON above>",
"protected": {
"<BASE64URL of signing algorithm>"
},
"signature": "<signature contents signed by TEE device
private key (BASE64URL)>"
}
}

A response message type "status" will be returned when TEE totally
fails to respond. OTrP Agent is responsible to create this message.

{
"status": {
"result": "fail",
"error-code": "ERR_TEE_UNKNOWN",
"error-message": "TEE fails to respond"
}
}

8.3.2.3. Error Conditions

ERR_REQUEST_INVALID

ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION

ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CRYPTO_ALG

ERR_DEV_STATE_MISMATCH

ERR_SD_NOT_FOUND

ERR_TA_INVALID

ERR_TA_NOT_FOUND

ERR_TEE_FAIL

ERR_TEE_UNKNOWN

ERR_TSM_NOT_AUTHORIZED

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ERR_TSM_NOT_TRUSTED

8.3.3. DeleteTA

This operation defines OTrP messages that allow a TSM instruct a TEE
to delete a TA for a SP in a given SD. A TEE will delete a TA from a
SD and also TA data in the TEE. A Client Application cannot directly
access TEE or OTrP Agent to delete a TA.

8.3.3.1. DeleteTARequest Message

The request message for DeleteTA has the following JSON format.

{
"DeleteTATBSRequest": {
"ver": "1.0",
"rid": "<unique request ID>",
"tid": "<transaction ID>",
"tee": "<TEE routing name from the DSI for the SD's target>",
"nextdsi": "true | false",
"dsihash": "<hash of DSI returned in the prior query>",
"content": ENCRYPTED {
"tsmid": "<TSM ID previously assigned to the SD>",
"sdname": "<SD name of the TA>",
"taid": "<the identifier of the TA to be deleted from the
specified SD>"
}
}
}

In the message,

rid - A unique value to identify this request

tid - A unique value to identify this transaction. It can have the
same value for the tid in the preceding GetDeviceStateRequest.

tee - TEE ID returned from the previous response
GetDeviceStateResponse

nextdsi - Indicates whether the up to date Device State Information
(DSI) should be returned in the response to this request.

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helps enforce SD update order in the right sequence without
accidently overwrite an update that was done simultaneously.

tsmid - SD owner claim by TSM - A SD owned by a TSM will be
associated with a trusted identifier defined as an attribute in the
signer TSM certificate.

sdname - the name of the target SD where the TA is installed

taid - an identifier for the TA application to be deleted

Following the OTrP message template, the full request is signed
message over the DeleteTATBSRequest as follows.

{
"DeleteTARequest": {
"payload":"<DeleteTATBSRequest JSON above>",
"protected":"<integrity-protected header contents>",
"header": <non-integrity-protected header contents>,
"signature":"<signature contents signed by TSM
private key>"
}
}

8.3.3.2. Request processing requirements at a TEE

TEE processes command given by TSM to delete a TA of a SP SD. It
does the following:

1. Validate the JSON request message

* TEE validates TSM message authenticity

* Decrypt to get request content

* Lookup the SD and the TA with the given SD name and TA ID

* Checks that the TSM owns the SD, and TA is installed in the SD

* Checks DSI hash matches that the device state hasn't changed

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2. Deletion action

* If all the above validation points pass, the TEE deletes the
TA from the SD

* The TEE may also delete all personalization data for the TA

3. Construct DeleteTAResponse message.

If a request is illegitimate or signature doesn't pass, a "status"
property in the response will indicate the error code and cause.

8.3.3.3. DeleteTAResponse Message

The response message for a DeleteTARequest contains the following
content.

{
"DeleteTATBSResponse": {
"ver": "1.0",
"status": "<operation result>",
"rid": "<the request ID received>",
"tid": "<the transaction ID received>",
"content": ENCRYPTED {
"reason":"<failure reason detail>", // optional
"did": "<the device id hash>",
"dsi": "<Updated TEE state, including all SD owned by
this TSM>"
}
}
}

In the response message, the following fields MUST be supplied.

did - the SHA256 hash of the device TEE certificate. This shows
the device ID explicitly to the receiving TSM.

The final message DeleteTAResponse looks like the following.

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{
"DeleteTAResponse": {
"payload":"<DeleteTATBSResponse JSON above>",
"protected": {
"<BASE64URL of signing algorithm>"
},
"signature": "<signature contents signed by TEE device
private key (BASE64URL)>"
}
}

A response message type "status" will be returned when TEE totally
fails to respond. OTrP Agent is responsible to create this message.

{
"status": {
"result": "fail",
"error-code": "ERR_TEE_UNKNOWN",
"error-message": "TEE fails to respond"
}
}

8.3.3.4. Error Conditions

ERR_REQUEST_INVALID

ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION

ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CRYPTO_ALG

ERR_DEV_STATE_MISMATCH

ERR_SD_NOT_FOUND

ERR_TA_NOT_FOUND

ERR_TEE_FAIL

ERR_TEE_UNKNOWN

ERR_TSM_NOT_AUTHORIZED

ERR_TSM_NOT_TRUSTED

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9. Response Messages a TSM May Expect

A TSM expects some feedback from a remote device when a request
message is delivered to a device. The following three types of
responses SHOULD be supplied.

Type 1: Expect a valid TEE generated response message

A valid TEE signed response may contain errors detected by TEE,
e.g. TSM is trusted but TSM supplied data is missing, for
example, SP ID doesn't exist. TEE MUST be able to sign and
encrypt.

If TEE isn't able to sign a response, TEE should returns an error
to OTrP Agent without giving any other internal information.
OTrP Agent will be generating the response.

Type 2: OTrP Agent generated error message when TEE fails. OTrP
Agent errors will be defined in this document.

A Type 2 message has the following format.

{
"OTrPAgentError": {
"ver": "1.0",
"rid": "",
"tid": "",
"errcode": "ERR_TEE_FAIL | ERR_TEE_BUSY"
}
}

Type 3: OTrP Agent itself isn't reachable or fails. A Client
Application is responsible to handle error and response TSM in
its own way. This is out of scope for this specification.

10. Attestation Implementation Consideration

It is important to know that the state of a device is appropriate
before trusting that a device is what it says it is. The attestation
scheme for OTrP must also be able to cope with different TEEs, those
that are OTrP compliant and those that use another mechanism. In the
initial version, only one active TEE is assumed.

It is out of scope about how TSM and device implement the trust
hierarchy verification. However, it is helpful to understand what
each system provider should do in order to properly implement OTrP
trust hierarchy.

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In this section, we provide some implementation reference
consideration.

10.1. OTrP Secure Boot Module

10.1.1. Attestation signer

It is proposed that attestation for OTrP is based on the SBM secure
boot layer, and that further attestation is not performed within the
TEE itself during security domain operations. The rationale is that
the device boot process will be defined to start with a secure boot
approach that, using eFuse, only releases attestation signing
capabilities into the SBM once a secure boot has been established.
In this way the release of the attestation signer can be considered
the first "platform configuration metric", using TCG terminology.

10.1.2. SBM initial requirements

R1 SBM must be possible to load securely into the secure boot flow

R2 SBM must allow a public / private key pair to be generated during
device manufacture

R3 The public key and certificate must be possible to store securely
from tamper

R4 The private key must be possible to store encrypted at rest

R5 The private key must only be visible to the SBM when it is
decrypted

R6 The SBM must be able to read a list of root and intermediate
certificates that it can use to check certificate chains with.
The list must be stored such that it cannot be tampered with

R7 Possible need to allow a TEE to access its unique TEE specific
private key

10.2. TEE Loading

During boot SBM is required to start all of the ROOT TEEs. Before
loading them the SBM must first determine whether the code sign
signature of the TEE is valid. If TEE integrity is confirmed it may
be started. The SBM must then be able to receive the identity
certificate from the TEE (if that TEE is OTrP compliant). The
identity certificate and keys will need to be baked into the TEE
image, and therefore also covered by the code signer hash during the
manufacture process. The private key for the identity certificate

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must be securely protected. The private key for a TEE identity must
never be released no matter how the public key and certificate are
released to the SBM.

Once the SBM has successfully booted a TEE and retrieved the identity
certificate it will commit this to the platform configuration
register (PCR) set, for later use during attestation. As a minimum
the following data must be committed to the PCR for each TEE:

1. Public key and certificate for the TEE

2. TEE reference that can be used later by a TSM to identify this
TEE

10.3. Attestation Hierarchy

The attestation hierarchy and seed required for TSM protocol
operation must be built into the device at manufacture. Additional
TEEs can be added post manufacture using the scheme proposed however
it is outside of the current scope of this document to detail that.

It should be noted that the attestation scheme described is based on
signatures. The only encryption that takes place is with eFuse to
release the SBM signing key and later during protocol lifecycle
management interchange with the TSM.

10.3.1. Attestation hierarchy establishment: manufacture

During manufacture the following steps are required:

1. Device specific TFW key pair and certificate burnt into device,
encrypted by eFuse. This key pair will be used for signing
operations performed by SBM.

2. TEE images are loaded and include a TEE instance specific key
pair and certificate. The key pair and certificate are included
in the image and covered by the code signing hash.

3. The process for TEE images is repeated for any subordinate TEEs

10.3.2. Attestation hierarchy establishment: device boot

During device boot the following steps are required:

1. Secure boot releases TFW private key by decrypting with eFuse

2. SBM verifies the code-signing signature of the active TEE and
places its TEE public key into a signing buffer, along with their

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reference for later access. For non-OTrP TEE, the SBM leaves the
TEE public key field blank.

3. SBM signs the signing buffer with TFW private key

4. Each active TEE performs the same operation as SBM, building up
their own signed buffer containing subordinate TEE information.

10.3.3. Attestation hierarchy establishment: TSM

Before a TSM can begin operation in the marketplace it must obtain a
TSM key pair and certificate (TSMpub, TSMpriv) from a CA that is
registered in the trust store of the TEE. In this way, the TEE can
check the intermediate and root CA and verify that it trusts this TSM
to perform operations on the TEE.

11. Acknowledgements

We thank Alin Mutu for his contribution to many discussion that
helped to design the trust flow mechanisms, and the creation of the
flow diagrams. Alin has contributed the context diagram and brought
good point in trust establishment.

We also thank the following people for their input, review, and
discussions that have greatly helped to shape the document: Sangsu
Baek, Marc Canel, Roger Casals, Rob Coombs, Lubna Dajani, and Richard
Parris.

12. Contributors

Brian Witten
Symantec
900 Corporate Pointe
Culver City, CA 90230
USA

Email: brian_witten@symantec.com

Tyler Kim
Solacia
5F, Daerung Post Tower 2, 306 Digital-ro
Seoul 152-790
Korea

Email: tkkim@sola-cia.com

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13. IANA Considerations

The error code listed in the next section will be registered.

13.1. Error Code List

This section lists error codes that could be reported by a TA or TEE
in a device in responding a TSM request.

ERR_DEV_STATE_MISMATCH - TEE will return this error code if DSI hash
value from TSM doesn't match with that of device's current DSI.

ERR_SD_ALREADY_EXIST - This error will occur if SD to be created
already exist in the TEE.

ERR_SD_NOT_EMPTY - This is reported if a target SD isn't empty.

ERR_SDNAME_ALREADY_USED TEE will return this error code if new SD
name already exists in the namespace of TSM in the TEE.

ERR_REQUEST_INVALID - This error will occur if the TEE meets the
following conditions with a request message: (1) The request from a
TSM has an invalid message structure; mandatory information is
absent in the message. undefined member or structure is included.
(2) TEE fails to verify signature of the message or fails to
decrypt its contents. (3) etc.

ERR_SPCERT_INVALID - If new SP certificate for the SD to be updated
is not valid, then TEE will return this error code.

ERR_TA_ALREADY_INSTALLED - while installing TA, TEE will return this
error if the TA already has been installed in the SD.

ERR_TA_INVALID - This error will occur when TEE meets any of
following conditions while checking validity of TA: (1) TA binary
has a format that TEE can't recognize. (2) TEE fails to decrypt the
encoding of TA binary and personalization data. (3) If SP isn't
registered with the SP SD where TA will be installed. (4) etc.

ERR_TA_NOT_FOUND - This error will occurs when target TA doesn't
exist in the SD.

ERR_TEE_BUSY - The device TEE is busy. The request should be
generally sent later to retry.

ERR_TEE_FAIL - TEE fails to respond to a TSM request. The OTrP
Agent will construct an error message in responding the TSM's

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request. And also if TEE fails to process a request because of its
internal error, it will return this error code.

ERR_TEE_RESOURCE_FULL - This error is reported when a device
resource isn't available anymore such as storage space is full.

ERR_TEE_UNKNOWN - This error will occur if the receiver TEE is not
supposed to receive the request. That will be determined by
checking TEE name or device id in the request message.

ERR_TFW_NOT_TRUSTED - TEE may concern the underlying device firmware
is trustworthy. If TEE determines TFW is not trustworthy, then
this error will occur.

ERR_TSM_NOT_TRUSTED - Before processing a request, TEE needs to make
sure whether the sender TSM is trustworthy by checking the validity
of TSM certificate etc. If TEE finds TSM is not reliable, then it
will return this error code.

ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CRYPTO_ALG - This error will occur if TEE receives a
request message encoded with cryptographic algorithms that TEE
doesn't support.

ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION - This error will occur if TEE receives
the version of message that TEE can't deal with.

14. Security Consideration

14.1. Cryptographic strength implementation

The strength of the cryptographic algorithms, using the measure of
'bits of security' defined in NIST SP800-57 allowed for the OTrP
protocol is:

o At a minimum, 112 bits of security. The limiting factor for this
is the RSA2048 algorithm, which is measured as 112 bits of
security in sp800-57. It is important that RSA is supported in
order to enhance the interoperability of the protocol.

o The option exists to choose algorithms providing 128 bits of
security. This does require using TEE devices that support ECC
P256.

The available algorithms and key sizes specified for the OTrP
document, defined in this document are based on industry standards.
Over time the recommended or allowed cryptographic algorithms may
change. It is important that the OTrP protocol allows for this.

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14.2. Message Security

OTrP messages between the TSM and TEE are protected by message
security using JWS and JWE. The 'Basic protocol profile' section of
this document describes the algorithms used for this. All OTrP TEE
devices and OTrP TSMs must meet the requirements of the basic
profile. In the future additional 'profiles' can be added.

PKI is used to ensure that the TEE will only communicate with a
trusted TSM, and to ensure that the TSM will only communicate with a
trusted TEE.

14.3. TEE Attestation

It is important that the TSM trusts that that it is talking to a
trusted TEE. This is achieved through attestation. The TEE has a
private key and certificate built into it at manufacture, which is
used to sign data supplied by the TSM. This allows the TSM to verify
that the TEE is trusted.

It is also important that the TFW (trusted firmware) can be checked.
The TFW has a private key and certificate built into it at
manufacturer, which allows the TEE to check that that the TFW is
trusted.

The GetDeviceState message therefore allows the TSM to check that it
trusts the TEE, and the TEE at this point will check whether it
trusts the TFW.

14.4. TA Protection

TA will be delivered in an encrypted form. This encryption is an
additional layer within the message encryption described in the
'Basic protocol profile' section of this document. The TA binary is
encrypted for each target device with the device's TEE SP AIK public
key. A TSM may do this encryption or provides the TEE SP AIK public
key to a SP such that the SP encrypts the encrypted TA to TSM for
distribution to TEE.

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The encryption algorithm can use a randomly AES 256 key "taek" with a
16 byte random IV, and the "taek" is encrypted by the "TEE SP AIK
public key". The following encrypted TA data structure is expected
by TEE:

"encrypted_ta_bin": {
"key": "<A 256-bit symmetric key encrypted by TEE SP AIK public
key>",
"iv": <hex of 16 random bytes>",
"alg": "AESCBC",
"cipherdata": "<BASE64 encoded encrypted TA binary data>"
}

14.5. TA Personalization data

A SP or TSM can supply personalization data for a TA to initialize
for a device. Such data is passed through InstallTA command from
TSM. The personalization data itself is opaque to TEE. The data can
be from SP without revealing to TSM. The data is sent in encrypted
manner in a request to a device such that only the device can
decrypt. A device's TEE SP AIK public key for a SP is used to
encrypt the data.

"encrypted_ta_data": { // "TA personalization data"
"key": "<A 256-bit symmetric key encrypted by TEE SP AIK public
key>",
"iv": "<hex of 16 random bytes>",
"alg": "AESCBC",
"cipherdata": "<BASE64 encoded encrypted TA personalization
data>"
}

14.6. TA trust check at TEE

A TA binary is signed by a TA signer certificate. This TA signing
certificate/private key belongs to the SP, and may be self-signed
(i.e. it need not participate in a trust hierarchy). It is the
responsibility of the TSM to only allow verified TAs from trusted SPs
into the system. Delivery of that TA to the TEE is then the
responsibility of the TEE, using the security mechanisms provided by
the OTrP protocol.

We allow a way for application to check trustworthy of a TA. OTrP
Agent will have a function to allow an application query the metadata
of a TA.

An application in the Rich O/S may perform verification of the TA by
verifying the signature of the TA. The

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OTRPService.getTAInformation() function is available to return TEE
supplied TA signer and TSM signer information to the application. An
application can do additional trust check on the certificate returned
for this TA. It may trust TSM, or require additional SP signer trust
chaining.

14.7. One TA Multiple SP Case

A TA for different SP must have different identifier. A TA will be
installed in different SD for the respective SP.

14.8. OTrP Agent Trust Model

An OTrP Agent could be malware in the vulnerable Android OS. A
Client Application will connect its TSM provider for required TA
installation. It gets command messages from TSM, and passes the
message to the OTrP Agent.

The OTrP protocol is a conduit for enabling the TSM to communicate
with the device's TEE to manage SDs and TAs. All TSM messages are
signed and sensitive data is encrypted such that the OTrP Agent
cannot modify or capture sensitive data.

14.9. OCSP Stapling Data for TSM signed messages

The GetDeviceStateRequest message from TSM to TEE shall include OCSP
stapling data for the TSM's signer certificate and that for
intermediate CA certificates up to the root certificate so that the
TEE side can verify the signer certificate's revocation status.

Certificate revocation status check on a TA signer certificate is
optional by a TEE. A TSM is generally expected to do proper TA
application vetting and its SP signer trust validation. A TEE will
trust a TA signer certificate's validation status done by a TSM when
it trusts the TSM.

14.10. Data protection at TSM and TEE

The TEE implementation provides protection of data on the device. It
is the responsibility of the TSM to protect data on its servers.

14.11. Privacy consideration

Devices are issued with a unique TEE certificate to attest a device
validity. This uniqueness also creates a privacy and tracking risk
that must be mitigated.

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The TEE will only release the TEE certificate to a trusted TSM (it
must verify the TSM certificate before proceeding). The OTrP
protocol is designed such that only the TSM can obtain the TEE device
certificate and firmware certificate - the GetDeviceState message
requires signature checks to validate the TSM is trusted, and then
delivers the device's certificate(s) encrypted such that only that
TSM may decrypt the response. A Client Application will never see
device certificate.

A SP specific TEE SP AIK (TEE SP Anonymous Key) is generated by the
protocol for Client Applications. This provides a way for the Client
Application to validate data sent from the TEE without requiring the
TEE device certificate to be released to the client device rich O/S ,
and to optionally allow as SP to encrypt a TA for a target device
without the SP needing to be supplied the TEE device certificate.

14.12. Threat mitigation

A rogue application may perform excessive TA loading. OTrP Agent
implementation should protect against excessive calls.

Rogue applications may request excessive SD creation request. The
TSM is responsible to ensure this is properly guarded against.

Rogue OTrP Agent could replay or send TSM messages out of
sequence:e.g. TSM sends update1 and update2. OTrP Agent replays
update2 and update1 again, create unexpected result that client
wants. "dsihash" is used to mitigate this. The TEE MUST make sure
it stores DSI state and checks DSI state matches before it does
another update.

Concurrent calls from TSM to TEE should be handled properly by a TEE.
It is up to the device to manage concurrency to the TEE. If multiple
concurrent TSM operations take place these could fail due "dsihash"
being modified by another concurrent operation. If locking is
implemented on the client, this must be done in such a way that one
application cannot lock other applications from using the TEE, except
for a short term duration of the TSM operation taking place. For
example, an OTrP operation that starts but never completes (e.g. loss
of connectivity) must not prevent subsequent OTrP messages from being
executed.

14.13. Compromised CA

If a root CA for TSM certificates is found compromised, some TEE
trust anchor update mechanism should be devised. A compromised
intermediate CA is covered by OCSP stapling and OCSP validation check

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in the protocol. A TEE should validate certificate revocation about
a TSM certificate chain.

If the root CA of some TEE device certificates is compromised, these
devices might be rejected by TSM, which is a decision of TSM
implementation and policy choice. Any intermediate CA for TEE device
certificates should be validated by TSM with common CRL or OCSP
method.

14.14. Compromised TSM

The TEE should use validation of the supplied TSM certificates and
OCSP stapled data to validate that the TSM is trustworthy.

Since PKI is used, the integrity of the clock within the TEE
determines the ability of the TEE to reject an expired TSM
certificate, or revoked TSM certificate. Since OCSP stapling
includes signature generation time, certificate validity dates are
compared to the current time.

14.15. Certificate renewal

TFW and TEE device certificates are expected to long lived as the
lifetime of a device. A TSM certificate usually has a moderate
lifetime such as 2 to 5 years. TSM should get renewed certificates.
The root CA certificates for TSM, which is embedded into the trust
anchor store in a device, should have long lifetime that don't
require device trust anchor update. On the other hand, it is
imperative that OEM or device providers plan for support of trust
anchor update in their shipped devices.

15. References

15.1. Normative References

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.

[RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.

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[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.

[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.

15.2. Informative References

[GPTEE] Global Platform, "Global Platform, GlobalPlatform Device
Technology: TEE System Architecture, v1.0", 2013.

Appendix A. Sample Messages

A.1. Sample Security Domain Management Messages

A.1.1. Sample GetDeviceState

A.1.1.1. Sample GetDeviceStateRequest

TSM builds a "GetDeviceStateTBSRequest" message.

{
"GetDeviceStateTBSRequest": {
"ver": "1.0",
"rid": "8C6F9DBB-FC39-435c-BC89-4D3614DA2F0B"
"tid": "4F454A7F-002D-4157-884E-B0DD1A06A8AE",
"ocspdat": "c2FtcGxlIG9jc3BkYXQgQjY0IGVuY29kZWQgQVNOMQ==",
"icaocspdat":
"...c2FtcGxlIGljYW9jc3BkYXQgQjY0IGVuY29kZWQgQVNOMQ==...",
"supportedsigalgs": "RS256"
}
}

TSM signs "GetDeviceStateTBSRequest", creating
"GetDeviceStateRequest"

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{
"GetDeviceStateRequest": {
"payload":"
ewoJIkdldERldmljZVN0YXRlVEJTUmVxdWVzdCI6IHsKCQkidmVyIjogIjEuMCIsCgkJ
InJpZCI6IHs4QzZGOURCQi1GQzM5LTQzNWMtQkM4OS00RDM2MTREQTJGMEJ9LAoJCSJ0
aWQiOiAiezRGNDU0QTdGLTAwMkQtNDE1Ny04ODRFLUIwREQxQTA2QThBRX0iLAoJCSJv
Y3NwZGF0IjogImMyRnRjR3hsSUc5amMzQmtZWFFnUWpZMElHVnVZMjlrWldRZ1FWTk9N
UT09IiwKCQkiaWNhb2NzcGRhdCI6ICJjMkZ0Y0d4bElHbGpZVzlqYzNCa1lYUWdRalkw
SUdWdVkyOWtaV1FnUVZOT01RPT0iLAoJCSJzdXBwb3J0ZWRzaWdhbGdzIjogIlJTMjU2
IgoJfQp9",
"protected": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9",
"header": {
"signer": "ZXhhbXBsZSBBU04xIHNpZ25lciBjZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZQ=="
},
"signature":"c2FtcGxlIHNpZ25hdHVyZQ"
}
}

A.1.1.2. Sample GetDeviceStateResponse

TSM sends "GetDeviceStateRequest" to OTrP Agent

OTrP Agent obtains "dsi" from each TEE. (in this example there is a
single TEE).

TEE obtains signed "fwdata" from firmware

TEE builds "dsi" - summarizing device state of TEE

{
"dsi": {
"fwdata": {
"tbs": "ezRGNDU0QTdGLTAwMkQtNDE1Ny04ODRFLUIwREQxQTA2QThBRX0="
"cert": "ZXhhbXBsZSBGVyBjZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZQ==",
"sigalg": "UlMyNTY=",
"sig": "c2FtcGxlIEZXIHNpZ25hdHVyZQ=="
},
"tee": {
"name": "Primary TEE",
"ver": "1.0",
"cert": "c2FtcGxlIFRFRSBjZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZQ==",
"cacert": [
"c2FtcGxlIENBIGNlcnRpZmljYXRlIDE=",
"c2FtcGxlIENBIGNlcnRpZmljYXRlIDI="
]
"sdlist": {
"cnt": "1",
"sd": [

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{
"name": "default.acmebank.com",
"spid": "acmebank.com",
"talist": [
{
"taid": "acmebank.secure.banking",
"taname": "Acme secure banking app"
},
{
"taid": "acmebank.loyalty.rewards",
"taname": "Acme loyalty rewards app"
}
]
}
],
}
"teeaiklist": [
{
"spaik": "c2FtcGxlIEFTTjEgZW5jb2RlZCBQS0NTMSBwdWJsaWNrZXk=",
"spaiktype": "RSA"
"spid": "acmebank.com"
}
]
}
}
}

<t>TEE encrypts "dsi", and embeds into
"GetDeviceTEEStateTBSResponse" message</t>

<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
{
"GetDeviceTEEStateTBSResponse": {
"ver": "1.0",
"status": "pass",
"rid": {8C6F9DBB-FC39-435c-BC89-4D3614DA2F0B},
"tid": "{4F454A7F-002D-4157-884E-B0DD1A06A8AE}",
"edsi": {
"protected": "eyJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0K",
"recipients": [
{
"header": {
"alg": "RSA1_5"
},
"encrypted_key":
"
QUVTMTI4IChDRUspIGtleSwgZW5jcnlwdGVkIHdpdGggVFNNIFJTQSBwdWJsaWMg

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a2V5LCB1c2luZyBSU0ExXzUgcGFkZGluZw"
}
],
"iv": "OTdCQTdGNDA5MkYyQjk2MTdGQUQ0MDdGRkI0NUM3MUY",
"ciphertext":
"
c2FtcGxlIGRzaSBkYXRhIGVuY3J5cHRlZCB3aXRoIEFFUzEyOCBrZXkgZnJvbSByZW
NpcGllbnRzLmVuY3J5cHRlZF9rZXk",
"tag": "c2FtcGxlIGF1dGhlbnRpY2F0aW9uIHRhZw"
}
}
}

TEE signs "GetDeviceTEEStateTBSResponse" and returns to OTrP Agent.
OTrP Agent encodes "GetDeviceTEEStateResponse" into an array to form
"GetDeviceStateResponse"

{
"GetDeviceStateResponse": [
{
"GetDeviceTEEStateResponse": {
"payload":
"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",
"protected": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9",
"signature": "c2FtcGxlIHNpZ25hdHVyZQ"
}
}
]
}

TEE returns "GetDeviceStateResponse" back to OTrP Agent, which
returns message back to TSM.

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A.1.2. Sample CreateSD

A.1.2.1. Sample CreateSDRequest

{
"CreateSDTBSRequest": {
"ver":"1.0",
"rid":"req-01",
"tid":"tran-01",
"tee":"SecuriTEE",
"nextdsi":"false",
"dsihash":"Iu-c0-fGrpMmzbbtiWI1U8u7wMJE7IK8wkJpsVuf2js",
"content":{
"spid":"bank.com",
"sdname":"sd.bank.com",
"spcert":"MIIDFjCCAn-
gAwIBAgIJAIk0Tat0tquDMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMGwxCzAJBgNVBAYTAktSMQ4wD
AYDVQQIDAVTZW91bDESMBAGA1UEBwwJR3Vyby1kb25nMRAwDgYDVQQKDAdTb2xhY2l
hMRAwDgYDVQQLDAdTb2xhY2lhMRUwEwYDVQQDDAxTb2xhLWNpYS5jb20wHhcNMTUwN
zAyMDg1MTU3WhcNMjAwNjMwMDg1MTU3WjBsMQswCQYDVQQGEwJLUjEOMAwGA1UECAw
FU2VvdWwxEjAQBgNVBAcMCUd1cm8tZG9uZzEQMA4GA1UECgwHU29sYWNpYTEQMA4GA
1UECwwHU29sYWNpYTEVMBMGA1UEAwwMU29sYS1jaWEuY29tMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQE
BAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDYWLrFf2OFMEciwSYsyhaLY4kslaWcXA0hCWJRaFzt5mU-
lpSJ4jeu92inBbsXcI8PfRbaItsgW1TD1Wg4gQH4MX_YtaBoOepE--
3JoZZyPyCWS3AaLYWrDmqFXdbzaO1i8GxB7zz0gWw55bZ9jyzcl5gQzWSqMRpx_dca
d2SP2wIDAQABo4G_MIG8MIGGBgNVHSMEfzB9oXCkbjBsMQswCQYDVQQGEwJLUjEOMA
wGA1UECAwFU2VvdWwxEjAQBgNVBAcMCUd1cm8tZG9uZzEQMA4GA1UECgwHU29sYWNp
YTEQMA4GA1UECwwHU29sYWNpYTEVMBMGA1UEAwwMU29sYS1jaWEuY29tggkAiTRNq3
S2q4MwCQYDVR0TBAIwADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCBsAwFgYDVR0lAQH_BAwwCgYIKwYB
BQUHAwMwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADgYEAEFMhRwEQ-
LDa9O7P1N0mcLORpo6fW3QuJfuXbRQRQGoXddXMKazI4VjbGaXhey7Bzvk6TZYDa-
GRiZby1J47UPaDQR3UiDzVvXwCOU6S5yUhNJsW_BeMViYj4lssX28iPpNwLUCVm1QV
THILI6afLCRWXXclc1L5KGY290OwIdQ",
"tsmid":"tsm_x.acme.com",
"did":"zAHkb0-SQh9U_OT8mR5dB-tygcqpUJ9_x07pIiw8WoM"
}
}
}

Here is a sample message after the content is encrypted and encoded

{
"CreateSDRequest": {
"payload":"
eyJDcmVhdGVTRFRCU1JlcXVlc3QiOnsidmVyIjoiMS4wIiwicmlkIjoicmVxLTAxIiwidG
lkIjoidHJhbi0wMSIsInRlZSI6IlNlY3VyaVRFRSIsIm5leHRkc2kiOiJmYWxzZSIsImRz
aWhhc2giOiIyMmVmOWNkM2U3YzZhZTkzMjZjZGI2ZWQ4OTYyMzU1M2NiYmJjMGMyNDRlYz
gyYmNjMjQyNjliMTViOWZkYTNiIiwiY29udGVudCI6eyJwcm90ZWN0ZWQiOiJlLUtBbkdW

Pei, et al. Expires January 2, 2017 [Page 88]
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dVktS0FuVHJpZ0p4Qk1USTRRMEpETFVoVE1qVTI0b0NkZlEiLCJyZWNpcGllbnRzIjpbey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",
"protected":"e-KAnGFsZ-KAnTrigJxSUzI1NuKAnX0", //RSAwithSHA256
"header": {
"kid":"e9bc097a-ce51-4036-9562-d2ade882db0d",
"signer":"

Pei, et al. Expires January 2, 2017 [Page 89]
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MIIC3zCCAkigAwIBAgIJAJf2fFkE1BYOMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMFoxCzAJBgNVBA
YTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMRMwEQYDVQQHDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMSEw
HwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5ldCBXaWRnaXRzIFB0eSBMdGQwHhcNMTUwNzAyMDkwMTE4Wh
cNMjAwNjMwMDkwMTE4WjBaMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5p
YTETMBEGA1UEBwwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEhMB8GA1UECgwYSW50ZXJuZXQgV2lkZ2l0cy
BQdHkgTHRkMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC8ZtxM1bYickpgSVG-
meHInI3f_chlMBdL8l7daOEztSs_a6GLqmvSu-
AoDpTsfEd4EazdMBp5fmgLRGdCYMcI6bgpO94h5CCnlj8xFKPq7qGixdwGUA6b_ZI3
c4cZ8eu73VMNrrn_z3WTZlExlpT9XVj-
ivhfJ4a6T20EtMM5qwIDAQABo4GsMIGpMHQGA1UdIwRtMGuhXqRcMFoxCzAJBgNVBA
YTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMRMwEQYDVQQHDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMSEw
HwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5ldCBXaWRnaXRzIFB0eSBMdGSCCQCX9nxZBNQWDjAJBgNVHR
MEAjAAMA4GA1UdDwEB_wQEAwIGwDAWBgNVHSUBAf8EDDAKBggrBgEFBQcDAzANBgkq
hkiG9w0BAQUFAAOBgQAGkz9QpoxghZUWT4ivem4cIckfxzTBBiPHCjrrjB2X8Ktn8G
SZ1MdyIZV8fwdEmD90IvtMHgtzK-
9wo6Aibj_rVIpxGb7trP82uzc2X8VwYnQbuqQyzofQvcwZHLYplvi95pZ5fVrJvnYA
UBFyfrdT5GjqL1nqH3a_Y3QPscuCjg"
},
"signature":"nuQUsCTEBLeaRzuwd7q1iPIYEJ2eJfurO5sT5Y-
N03zFRcv1jvrqMHtx_pw0Y9YWjmpoWfpfelhwGEko9SgeeBnznmkZbp7kjS6MmX4CKz
9OApe3-VI7yL9Yp0WNdRh3425eYfuapCy3lcXFln5JBAUnU_OzUg3RWxcU_yGnFsw"
}
}

A.1.2.2. Sample CreateSDResponse

{
"CreateSDTBSResponse": {
"ver":"1.0",
"status":"pass",
"rid":"req-01",
"tid":"tran-01",
"content":{
"did":"zAHkb0-SQh9U_OT8mR5dB-tygcqpUJ9_x07pIiw8WoM",
"sdname":"sd.bank.com",
"teespaik":"AQABjY9KiwH3hkMmSAAN6CLXot525U85WNlWKAQz5TOdfe_CM8h-
X6_EHX1gOXoyRXaBiKMqWb0YZLCABTw1ytdXy2kWa525imRho8Vqn6HDGsJDZPDru9
GnZR8pZX5ge_dWXB_uljMvDttc5iAWEJ8ZgcpLGtBTGLZnQoQbjtn1lIE",
}
}
}

Here is the response message after the content is encrypted and
encoded.

{
"CreateSDResponse": {
"payload":"

Pei, et al. Expires January 2, 2017 [Page 90]
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eyJDcmVhdGVTRFRCU1Jlc3BvbnNlIjp7InZlciI6IjEuMCIsInN0YXR1cyI6InBhc3Mi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",
"protected": "e-KAnGFsZ-KAnTrigJxSUzI1NuKAnX0",
"header": {
"kid":"e9bc097a-ce51-4036-9562-d2ade882db0d",
"signer":"
MIIC3zCCAkigAwIBAgIJAJf2fFkE1BYOMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMFoxCzAJ
BgNVBAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMRMwEQYDVQQHDApDYWxp
Zm9ybmlhMSEwHwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5ldCBXaWRnaXRzIFB0eSBMdGQwHhcN
MTUwNzAyMDkwMTE4WhcNMjAwNjMwMDkwMTE4WjBaMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzET
MBEGA1UECAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTETMBEGA1UEBwwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEhMB8G
A1UECgwYSW50ZXJuZXQgV2lkZ2l0cyBQdHkgTHRkMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB
AQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC8ZtxM1bYickpgSVG-
meHInI3f_chlMBdL8l7daOEztSs_a6GLqmvSu-
AoDpTsfEd4EazdMBp5fmgLRGdCYMcI6bgpO94h5CCnlj8xFKPq7qGixdwGUA
6b_ZI3c4cZ8eu73VMNrrn_z3WTZlExlpT9XVj-
ivhfJ4a6T20EtMM5qwIDAQABo4GsMIGpMHQGA1UdIwRtMGuhXqRcMFoxCzAJ
BgNVBAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMRMwEQYDVQQHDApDYWxp
Zm9ybmlhMSEwHwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5ldCBXaWRnaXRzIFB0eSBMdGSCCQCX
9nxZBNQWDjAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMA4GA1UdDwEB_wQEAwIGwDAWBgNVHSUBAf8E
DDAKBggrBgEFBQcDAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOBgQAGkz9QpoxghZUWT4iv
em4cIckfxzTBBiPHCjrrjB2X8Ktn8GSZ1MdyIZV8fwdEmD90IvtMHgtzK-
9wo6Aibj_rVIpxGb7trP82uzc2X8VwYnQbuqQyzofQvcwZHLYplvi95pZ5fV
rJvnYAUBFyfrdT5GjqL1nqH3a_Y3QPscuCjg"
},
"signature":"jnJtaB0vFFwrE-qKOR3Pu9pf2gNoI1s67GgPCTq0U-
qrz97svKpuh32WgCP2MWCoQPEswsEX-nxhIx_siTe4zIPO1nBYn-
R7b25rQaF87O8uAOOnBN5Yl2Jk3laIbs-
hGE32aRZDhrVoyEdSvIFrT6AQqD20bIAZGqTR-zA-900"
}
}

Pei, et al. Expires January 2, 2017 [Page 91]
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A.1.3. Sample UpdateSD

A.1.3.1. Sample UpdateSDRequest

Pei, et al. Expires January 2, 2017 [Page 92]
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{
"UpdateSDTBSRequest": {
"ver": "1.0",
"rid": "1222DA7D-8993-41A4-AC02-8A2807B31A3A",
"tid": "4F454A7F-002D-4157-884E-B0DD1A06A8AE",
"tee": "Primary TEE ABC",
"nextdsi": "false",
"dsihash":
"
IsOvwpzDk8Onw4bCrsKTJsONwrbDrcKJYjVTw4vCu8OAw4JEw6zCgsK8w4JCacKxW8Kf
w5o7",
"content": { // NEEDS to BE ENCRYPTED
"tsmid": "id1.tsmxyz.com",
"spid": "com.acmebank.spid1",
"sdname": "com.acmebank.sdname1",
"changes": {
"newsdname": "com.acmebank.sdname2",
"newspid": "com.acquirer.spid1",
"spcert":
"MIIDFjCCAn-
gAwIBAgIJAIk0Tat0tquDMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMGwxCzAJBgNVBAYTAktSMQ4
wDAYDVQQIDAVTZW91bDESMBAGA1UEBwwJR3Vyby1kb25nMRAwDgYDVQQKDAdTb2x
hY2lhMRAwDgYDVQQLDAdTb2xhY2lhMRUwEwYDVQQDDAxTb2xhLWNpYS5jb20wHhc
NMTUwNzAyMDg1MTU3WhcNMjAwNjMwMDg1MTU3WjBsMQswCQYDVQQGEwJLUjEOMAw
GA1UECAwFU2VvdWwxEjAQBgNVBAcMCUd1cm8tZG9uZzEQMA4GA1UECgwHU29sYWN
pYTEQMA4GA1UECwwHU29sYWNpYTEVMBMGA1UEAwwMU29sYS1jaWEuY29tMIGfMA0
GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDYWLrFf2OFMEciwSYsyhaLY4kslaWcXA0
hCWJRaFzt5mU-
lpSJ4jeu92inBbsXcI8PfRbaItsgW1TD1Wg4gQH4MX_YtaBoOepE--
3JoZZyPyCWS3AaLYWrDmqFXdbzaO1i8GxB7zz0gWw55bZ9jyzcl5gQzWSqMRpx_d
cad2SP2wIDAQABo4G_MIG8MIGGBgNVHSMEfzB9oXCkbjBsMQswCQYDVQQGEwJLUj
EOMAwGA1UECAwFU2VvdWwxEjAQBgNVBAcMCUd1cm8tZG9uZzEQMA4GA1UECgwHU2
9sYWNpYTEQMA4GA1UECwwHU29sYWNpYTEVMBMGA1UEAwwMU29sYS1jaWEuY29tgg
kAiTRNq3S2q4MwCQYDVR0TBAIwADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCBsAwFgYDVR0lAQH_BA
wwCgYIKwYBBQUHAwMwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADgYEAEFMhRwEQ-
LDa9O7P1N0mcLORpo6fW3QuJfuXbRQRQGoXddXMKazI4VjbGaXhey7Bzvk6TZYDa
-
GRiZby1J47UPaDQR3UiDzVvXwCOU6S5yUhNJsW_BeMViYj4lssX28iPpNwLUCVm1
QVTHILI6afLCRWXXclc1L5KGY290OwIdQ",
"renewteespaik": "0"
}
}
}
}

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A.1.3.2. Sample UpdateSDResponse

{
"UpdateSDTBSResponse": {
"ver": "1.0",
"status": "pass",
"rid": "1222DA7D-8993-41A4-AC02-8A2807B31A3A",
"tid": "4F454A7F-002D-4157-884E-B0DD1A06A8AE",
"content": {
"did": "MTZENTE5Qzc0Qzk0NkUxMzYxNzk0NjY4NTc3OTY4NTI=",
"teespaik":
"AQABjY9KiwH3hkMmSAAN6CLXot525U85WNlWKAQz5TOdfe_CM8h-
X6_EHX1gOXoyRXaBiKMqWb0YZLCABTw1ytdXy2kWa525imRho8Vqn6HDGsJDZPDru9
GnZR8pZX5ge_dWXB_uljMvDttc5iAWEJ8ZgcpLGtBTGLZnQoQbjtn1lIE",
"teespaiktype": "RSA"
}
}
}

A.1.4. Sample DeleteSD

A.1.4.1. Sample DeleteSDRequest

TSM encrypts the "content".

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{
"DeleteSDTBSRequest": {
"ver": "1.0",
"rid": "{712551F5-DFB3-43f0-9A63-663440B91D49}",
"tid": "{4F454A7F-002D-4157-884E-B0DD1A06A8AE}",
"tee": "Primary TEE",
"nextdsi": "true",
"dsihash": "AAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODwABAgMEBQYHCAkKCwwNDg8=",
"content": ENCRYPTED {
"protected": "eyJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0",
"recipients": [
{
"header": {
"alg": "RSA1_5"
},
"encrypted_key":
"
QUVTMTI4IChDRUspIGtleSwgZW5jcnlwdGVkIHdpdGggVFNNIFJTQSBwdWJsaWMga2
V5LCB1c2luZyBSU0ExXzUgcGFkZGluZw"
}
],
"iv": "OTdCQTdGNDA5MkYyQjk2MTdGQUQ0MDdGRkI0NUM3MUY",
"ciphertext":
"
c2FtcGxlIGRzaSBkYXRhIGVuY3J5cHRlZCB3aXRoIEFFUzEyOCBrZXkgZnJvbSByZWNp
cGllbnRzLmVuY3J5cHRlZF9rZXk"
"tag": "c2FtcGxlIGF1dGhlbnRpY2F0aW9uIHRhZw"
}
}
}

TSM signs "DeleteSDTBSRequest" to form "DeleteSDRequest"

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{
"DeleteSDRequest": {
"payload":"
ewoJIkRlbGV0ZVNEVEJTUmVxdWVzdCI6IHsKCQkidmVyIjogIjEuMCIsCgkJInJpZCI6
ICJ7NzEyNTUxRjUtREZCMy00M2YwLTlBNjMtNjYzNDQwQjkxRDQ5fSIsCgkJInRpZCI6
ICJ7NEY0NTRBN0YtMDAyRC00MTU3LTg4NEUtQjBERDFBMDZBOEFFfSIsCgkJInRlZSI6
ICJQcmltYXJ5IFRFRSIsCgkJIm5leHRkc2kiOiAidHJ1ZSIsCgkJImRzaWhhc2giOiAi
QUFFQ0F3UUZCZ2NJQ1FvTERBME9Ed0FCQWdNRUJRWUhDQWtLQ3d3TkRnOD0iLCAKCQki
Y29udGVudCI6IEVOQ1JZUFRFRCB7CgkJInByb3RlY3RlZCI6ICJleUpsYm1NaU9pSkJN
VEk0UTBKRExVaFRNalUySW4wIiwKCQkicmVjaXBpZW50cyI6IFsKCQkJewoJCQkJImhl
YWRlciI6IHsKCQkJCQkiYWxnIjogIlJTQTFfNSIKCQkJCX0sCgkJCSJlbmNyeXB0ZWRf
a2V5IjogIlFVVlRNVEk0SUNoRFJVc3BJR3RsZVN3Z1pXNWpjbmx3ZEdWa0lIZHBkR2dn
VkZOTklGSlRRU0J3ZFdKc2FXTWdhMlY1TENCMWMybHVaeUJTVTBFeFh6VWdjR0ZrWkds
dVp3IgoJCQl9CgkJXSwKCQkiaXYiOiAiT1RkQ1FUZEdOREE1TWtZeVFqazJNVGRHUVVR
ME1EZEdSa0kwTlVNM01VWSIsCgkJImNpcGhlcnRleHQiOiAiYzJGdGNHeGxJR1J6YVNC
a1lYUmhJR1Z1WTNKNWNIUmxaQ0IzYVhSb0lFRkZVekV5T0NCclpYa2dabkp2YlNCeVpX
TnBjR2xsYm5SekxtVnVZM0o1Y0hSbFpGOXJaWGsiCgkJInRhZyI6ICJjMkZ0Y0d4bElH
RjFkR2hsYm5ScFkyRjBhVzl1SUhSaFp3IgoJCX0KCX0KfQ",
"protected":"eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9",
"header": {"alg": "RSA1_5"},
"signature":"c2FtcGxlIHNpZ25hdHVyZQ"
}
}

A.1.4.2. Sample DeleteSDResponse

TEE creates "DeleteSDTBSResponse" to respond to the "DeleteSDRequest"
message from the TSM.

{
"DeleteSDTBSResponse": {
"ver": "1.0",
"status": "pass",
"rid": "{712551F5-DFB3-43f0-9A63-663440B91D49}",
"tid": "{4F454A7F-002D-4157-884E-B0DD1A06A8AE}",
"content": ENCRYPTED {
"did": "MTZENTE5Qzc0Qzk0NkUxMzYxNzk0NjY4NTc3OTY4NTI=",
"dsi": "/wECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODwABAgMEBQYHCAkKCwwNDg8="
}
}
}

TEE signs "DeleteSDTBSResponse" to form "DeleteSDResponse"

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{
"DeleteSDResponse": {
"payload":"
ewoJIkRlbGV0ZVNEVEJTUmVzcG9uc2UiOiB7CgkJInZlciI6ICIxLjAiLAoJCSJzdGF0
dXMiOiAicGFzcyIsCgkJInJpZCI6ICJ7NzEyNTUxRjUtREZCMy00M2YwLTlBNjMtNjYz
NDQwQjkxRDQ5fSIsCgkJInRpZCI6ICJ7NEY0NTRBN0YtMDAyRC00MTU3LTg4NEUtQjBE
RDFBMDZBOEFFfSIsCgkJImNvbnRlbnQiOiBFTkNSWVBURUQgewoJCQkiZGlkIjogIk1U
WkVOVEU1UXpjMFF6azBOa1V4TXpZeE56azBOalk0TlRjM09UWTROVEk9IiwgCgkJCSJk
c2kiOiAiL3dFQ0F3UUZCZ2NJQ1FvTERBME9Ed0FCQWdNRUJRWUhDQWtLQ3d3TkRnOD0i
CgkJfQoJfQp9",
"protected": {
"eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9"
},
"signature":"c2FtcGxlIHNpZ25hdHVyZQ"
}
}

TEE returns "DeleteSDResponse" back to OTrP Agent, which returns
message back to TSM.

A.2. Sample TA Management Messages

A.2.1. Sample InstallTA

A.2.1.1. Sample InstallTARequest

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{
"InstallTATBSRequest": {
"ver": "1.0",
"rid": "24BEB059-0AED-42A6-A381-817DFB7A1207",
"tid": "4F454A7F-002D-4157-884E-B0DD1A06A8AE",
"tee": "Primary TEE ABC",
"nextdsi": "true",
"dsihash":
"
IsOvwpzDk8Onw4bCrsKTJsONwrbDrcKJYjVTw4vCu8OAw4JEw6zCgsK8w4JCacKxW8Kf
w5o7",
"content": {
"tsmid": "id1.tsmxyz.com",
"spid": "com.acmebank.spid1",
"sdname": "com.acmebank.sdname1",
"taid": "com.acmebank.taid.banking"
},
"encrypted_ta": {
"key":
"mLBjodcE4j36y64nC/nEs694P3XrLAOokjisXIGfs0H7lOEmT5FtaNDYEMcg9RnE
ftlJGHO7N0lgcNcjoXBmeuY9VI8xzrsZM9gzH6VBKtVONSx0aw5IAFkNcyPZwDdZ
MLwhvrzPJ9Fg+bZtrCoJz18PUz+5aNl/dj8+NM85LCXXcBlZF74btJer1Mw6ffzT
/grPiEQTeJ1nEm9F3tyRsvcTInsnPJ3dEXv7sJXMrhRKAeZsqKzGX4eiZ3rEY+FQ
6nXULC8cAj5XTKpQ/EkZ/iGgS0zcXR7KUJv3wFEmtBtPD/+ze08NILLmxM8olQFj
//Lq0gGtq8vPC8r0oOfmbQ==",
"iv": "4F5472504973426F726E496E32303135",
"alg": "AESCBC",
"ciphertadata":
"......0x/5KGCXWfg1Vrjm7zPVZqtYZ2EovBow+7EmfOJ1tbk......=",
"cipherpdata": "0x/5KGCXWfg1Vrjm7zPVZqtYZ2EovBow+7EmfOJ1tbk="
}
}
}

A.2.1.2. Sample InstallTAResponse

A sample to-be-signed response of InstallTA looks as follows.

{
"InstallTATBSResponse": {
"ver": "1.0",
"status": "pass",
"rid": "24BEB059-0AED-42A6-A381-817DFB7A1207",
"tid": "4F454A7F-002D-4157-884E-B0DD1A06A8AE",
"content": {
"did": "MTZENTE5Qzc0Qzk0NkUxMzYxNzk0NjY4NTc3OTY4NTI=",
"dsi": {
"tfwdata": {

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"tbs": "ezRGNDU0QTdGLTAwMkQtNDE1Ny04ODRFLUIwREQxQTA2QThBRX0="
"cert": "ZXhhbXBsZSBGVyBjZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZQ==",
"sigalg": "UlMyNTY=",
"sig": "c2FtcGxlIEZXIHNpZ25hdHVyZQ=="
},
"tee": {
"name": "Primary TEE",
"ver": "1.0",
"cert": "c2FtcGxlIFRFRSBjZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZQ==",
"cacert": [
"c2FtcGxlIENBIGNlcnRpZmljYXRlIDE=",
"c2FtcGxlIENBIGNlcnRpZmljYXRlIDI="
],
"sdlist": {
"cnt": "1",
"sd": [
{
"name": "com.acmebank.sdname1",
"spid": "com.acmebank.spid1",
"talist": [
{
"taid": "com.acmebank.taid.banking",
"taname": "Acme secure banking app"
},
{
"taid": "acom.acmebank.taid.loyalty.rewards",
"taname": "Acme loyalty rewards app"
}
]
}
]
},
"teeaiklist": [
{
"spaik":
"c2FtcGxlIEFTTjEgZW5jb2RlZCBQS0NTMSBwdWJsaWNrZXk=",
"spaiktype": "RSA"
"spid": "acmebank.com"
}
]
}
}
}
}
}

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A.2.2. Sample UpdateTA

A.2.2.1. Sample UpdateTARequest

{
"UpdateTATBSRequest": {
"ver": "1.0",
"rid": "req-2",
"tid": "tran-01",
"tee": "SecuriTEE",
"nextdsi": " false",
"dsihash": "gwjul_9MZks3pqUSN1-eL1aViwGXNAxk0AIKW79dn4U",
"content": {
"tsmid": "tsm1.acme.com",
"spid": "bank.com",
"sdname": "sd.bank.com",
"taid": "sd.bank.com.ta"
},
"encrypted_ta": {
"key":
"
XzmAn_RDVk3IozMwNWhiB6fmZlIs1YUvMKlQAv_UDoZ1fvGGsRGo9bT0A440aYMgLt
GilKypoJjCgijdaHgamaJgRSc4Je2otpnEEagsahvDNoarMCC5nGQdkRxW7Vo2NKgL
A892HGeHkJVshYm1cUlFQ-BhiJ4NAykFwlqC_oc",
"iv": "AxY8DCtDaGlsbGljb3RoZQ",
"alg": "AESCBC",
"ciphernewtadata":
"KHqOxGn7ib1F_14PG4_UX9DBjOcWkiAZhVE-U-
67NsKryHGokeWr2spRWfdU2KWaaNncHoYGwEtbCH7XyNbOFh28nzwUmstep4nHWbAl
XZYTNkENcABPpuw_G3I3HADo"
}
}
}

{
"UpdateTARequest": {
"payload" :
"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SF9IdkZtazl5SGtoVV91bk1OLWc1T3BqLWF1NGFUb2lxWklMYzVzYTdENnZZSjF6eW04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",
"protected": " eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9",
"header": {
"kid":"e9bc097a-ce51-4036-9562-d2ade882db0d",
"signer":"
MIIC3zCCAkigAwIBAgIJAJf2fFkE1BYOMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMFoxCzAJBgNVBA
YTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMRMwEQYDVQQHDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMSEw
HwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5ldCBXaWRnaXRzIFB0eSBMdGQwHhcNMTUwNzAyMDkwMTE4Wh
cNMjAwNjMwMDkwMTE4WjBaMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5p
YTETMBEGA1UEBwwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEhMB8GA1UECgwYSW50ZXJuZXQgV2lkZ2l0cy
BQdHkgTHRkMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC8ZtxM1bYickpgSVG-
meHInI3f_chlMBdL8l7daOEztSs_a6GLqmvSu-
AoDpTsfEd4EazdMBp5fmgLRGdCYMcI6bgpO94h5CCnlj8xFKPq7qGixdwGUA6b_ZI3
c4cZ8eu73VMNrrn_z3WTZlExlpT9XVj-
ivhfJ4a6T20EtMM5qwIDAQABo4GsMIGpMHQGA1UdIwRtMGuhXqRcMFoxCzAJBgNVBA
YTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMRMwEQYDVQQHDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMSEw
HwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5ldCBXaWRnaXRzIFB0eSBMdGSCCQCX9nxZBNQWDjAJBgNVHR
MEAjAAMA4GA1UdDwEB_wQEAwIGwDAWBgNVHSUBAf8EDDAKBggrBgEFBQcDAzANBgkq
hkiG9w0BAQUFAAOBgQAGkz9QpoxghZUWT4ivem4cIckfxzTBBiPHCjrrjB2X8Ktn8G
SZ1MdyIZV8fwdEmD90IvtMHgtzK-
9wo6Aibj_rVIpxGb7trP82uzc2X8VwYnQbuqQyzofQvcwZHLYplvi95pZ5fVrJvnYA
UBFyfrdT5GjqL1nqH3a_Y3QPscuCjg"
},
"signature":"inB1K6G3EAhF-
FbID83UI25R5Ao8MI4qfrbrmf0UQhjM3O7_g3l6XxN_JkHrGQaZr-
myOkGPVM8BzbUZW5GqxNZwFXwMeaoCjDKc4Apv4WZkD1qKJxkg1k5jaUCfJz1Jmw_XtX
6MHhrLh9ov03S9PtuT1VAQ0FVUB3qFIvjSnNU"
}
}

A.2.2.2. Sample UpdateTAResponse

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{
"UpdateTATBSResponse": {
"ver": "1.0",
"status": "pass",
"rid": "req-2",
"tid": "tran-01",
"content": {
"did": "zAHkb0-SQh9U_OT8mR5dB-tygcqpUJ9_x07pIiw8WoM"
}
}
}

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{
"UpdateTAResponse":{
"payload":"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",
"protected":"eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9",
"header": {
"kid":"e9bc097a-ce51-4036-9562-d2ade882db0d",
"signer":"
MIIC3zCCAkigAwIBAgIJAJf2fFkE1BYOMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMFoxCzAJBgNVBA
YTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMRMwEQYDVQQHDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMSEw
HwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5ldCBXaWRnaXRzIFB0eSBMdGQwHhcNMTUwNzAyMDkwMTE4Wh
cNMjAwNjMwMDkwMTE4WjBaMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5p
YTETMBEGA1UEBwwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEhMB8GA1UECgwYSW50ZXJuZXQgV2lkZ2l0cy
BQdHkgTHRkMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC8ZtxM1bYickpgSVG-
meHInI3f_chlMBdL8l7daOEztSs_a6GLqmvSu-
AoDpTsfEd4EazdMBp5fmgLRGdCYMcI6bgpO94h5CCnlj8xFKPq7qGixdwGUA6b_ZI3
c4cZ8eu73VMNrrn_z3WTZlExlpT9XVj-
ivhfJ4a6T20EtMM5qwIDAQABo4GsMIGpMHQGA1UdIwRtMGuhXqRcMFoxCzAJBgNVBA
YTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMRMwEQYDVQQHDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMSEw
HwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5ldCBXaWRnaXRzIFB0eSBMdGSCCQCX9nxZBNQWDjAJBgNVHR
MEAjAAMA4GA1UdDwEB_wQEAwIGwDAWBgNVHSUBAf8EDDAKBggrBgEFBQcDAzANBgkq
hkiG9w0BAQUFAAOBgQAGkz9QpoxghZUWT4ivem4cIckfxzTBBiPHCjrrjB2X8Ktn8G
SZ1MdyIZV8fwdEmD90IvtMHgtzK-
9wo6Aibj_rVIpxGb7trP82uzc2X8VwYnQbuqQyzofQvcwZHLYplvi95pZ5fVrJvnYA
UBFyfrdT5GjqL1nqH3a_Y3QPscuCjg"
},
"signature":"
Twajmt_BBLIMcNrDsjqr8lI7O7lEQxXZNhlUOtFkOMMqf37wOPKtp_99LoS82CVmdpCo
PLaws8zzh-SNIQ42-
9GYO8_9BaEGCiCwyl8YgWP9fWNfNv2gR2fl2DK4uknkYu1EMBW4YfP81n_pGpb4Gm-
nMk14grVZygwAPej3ZZk"
}
}

Pei, et al. Expires January 2, 2017 [Page 103]
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A.2.3. Sample DeleteTA

A.2.3.1. Sample DeleteTARequest

{
"DeleteTATBSRequest": {
"ver": "1.0",
"rid": "req-2",
"tid": "tran-01",
"tee": "SecuriTEE",
"nextdsi": "false",
"dsihash": "gwjul_9MZks3pqUSN1-eL1aViwGXNAxk0AIKW79dn4U",
"content": {
"tsmid": "tsm1.acme.com",
"sdname": "sd.bank.com",
"taid": "sd.bank.com.ta"
}
}
}

Pei, et al. Expires January 2, 2017 [Page 104]
Internet-Draft OTrP July 2016

{
"DeleteTARequest": {
"payload":
"
eyJEZWxldGVUQVRCU1JlcXVlc3QiOnsidmVyIjoiMS4wIiwicmlkIjoicmVxLTIiLCJ0
aWQiOiJ0cmFuLTAxIiwidGVlIjoiU2VjdXJpVEVFIiwibmV4dGRzaSI6ImZhbHNlIiwi
ZHNpaGFzaCI6Imd3anVsXzlNWmtzM3BxVVNOMS1lTDFhVml3R1hOQXhrMEFJS1c3OWRu
NFUiLCJjb250ZW50Ijp7InByb3RlY3RlZCI6eyJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0s
InJlY2lwaWVudHMiOlt7ImhlYWRlciI6eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUifSwiZW5jcnlwdGVk
X2tleSI6ImtyaGs0d2dpY0RlX3d0VXQyTW4tSUJsdUtvX0JkeXpNY2p1cVlBenBPYnRS
TG9MZzQ0QkFLN2tRVWE1YTg0TEVJRGEzaHNtWDIxdldNZFJLczN4MTJsOUh5VFdfLUNS
WmZtcUx2bEh1LV9MSVdvc1ZyRTZVMlJqUnRndllVOWliUkVLczkzRDRHWm4xVHFuZG9n
d0tXRF9jdG1nWG1sbzZZVXpCWDZhR1dZMCJ9XSwiaXYiOiJBeFk4REN0RGFHbHNiR2xq
YjNSb1pRIiwiY2lwaGVydGV4dCI6IkhhNzBVdFlUS1ZCa1dEUm4yLTBIX1BGa19yQnpQ
dGJHdzhSNktlMXotdklNeFBSY0Nxa1puZmwyTjRjUTZPSTZCSHZJUUFoM2Jic0l0dHlR
bXhDTE5Nbm8wejBrYm9TdkIyVXlxWExpeGVZIiwidGFnIjoidEtUbFRLdlR2LTRtVVlG
Y1dYWnZMMVlhQnRGNloxVlNxOTMzVmI2UEpmcyJ9fX0",
"protected" : "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9",
"header": {
"kid":"e9bc097a-ce51-4036-9562-d2ade882db0d",
"signer":"
MIIC3zCCAkigAwIBAgIJAJf2fFkE1BYOMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMFoxCzAJBgNVBA
YTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMRMwEQYDVQQHDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMSEw
HwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5ldCBXaWRnaXRzIFB0eSBMdGQwHhcNMTUwNzAyMDkwMTE4Wh
cNMjAwNjMwMDkwMTE4WjBaMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5p
YTETMBEGA1UEBwwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEhMB8GA1UECgwYSW50ZXJuZXQgV2lkZ2l0cy
BQdHkgTHRkMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC8ZtxM1bYickpgSVG-
meHInI3f_chlMBdL8l7daOEztSs_a6GLqmvSu-
AoDpTsfEd4EazdMBp5fmgLRGdCYMcI6bgpO94h5CCnlj8xFKPq7qGixdwGUA6b_ZI3
c4cZ8eu73VMNrrn_z3WTZlExlpT9XVj-
ivhfJ4a6T20EtMM5qwIDAQABo4GsMIGpMHQGA1UdIwRtMGuhXqRcMFoxCzAJBgNVBA
YTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMRMwEQYDVQQHDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMSEw
HwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5ldCBXaWRnaXRzIFB0eSBMdGSCCQCX9nxZBNQWDjAJBgNVHR
MEAjAAMA4GA1UdDwEB_wQEAwIGwDAWBgNVHSUBAf8EDDAKBggrBgEFBQcDAzANBgkq
hkiG9w0BAQUFAAOBgQAGkz9QpoxghZUWT4ivem4cIckfxzTBBiPHCjrrjB2X8Ktn8G
SZ1MdyIZV8fwdEmD90IvtMHgtzK-
9wo6Aibj_rVIpxGb7trP82uzc2X8VwYnQbuqQyzofQvcwZHLYplvi95pZ5fVrJvnYA
UBFyfrdT5GjqL1nqH3a_Y3QPscuCjg"
},
"signature" :
"
BZS0_Ab6pqvGNXe5lqT4Sc3jakyWQeiK9KlVSnimwWnjCCyMtyB9bwvlbILZba3IJiFe
_3F9bIQpSytGS0f2TQrPTKC7pSjwDw-3kH7HkHcPPJd-
PpMMfQvRx7AIV8vBqO9MijIC62iN0V2se5z2v8VFjGSoRGgq225w7FvrnWE"
}
}

Pei, et al. Expires January 2, 2017 [Page 105]
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A.2.3.2. Sample DeleteTAResponse

{
"DeleteTATBSResponse": {
"ver": "1.0",
"status": "pass",
"rid": "req-2",
"tid": "tran-01",
"content": {
"did": "zAHkb0-SQh9U_OT8mR5dB-tygcqpUJ9_x07pIiw8WoM"
}
}
}

Pei, et al. Expires January 2, 2017 [Page 106]
Internet-Draft OTrP July 2016

{
"DeleteTAResponse":{
"payload":"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",
"protected": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9",
"header": {
"kid":"e9bc097a-ce51-4036-9562-d2ade882db0d",
"signer":"
MIIC3zCCAkigAwIBAgIJAJf2fFkE1BYOMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMFoxCzAJ
BgNVBAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMRMwEQYDVQQHDApDYWxp
Zm9ybmlhMSEwHwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5ldCBXaWRnaXRzIFB0eSBMdGQwHhcN
MTUwNzAyMDkwMTE4WhcNMjAwNjMwMDkwMTE4WjBaMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzET
MBEGA1UECAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTETMBEGA1UEBwwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEhMB8G
A1UECgwYSW50ZXJuZXQgV2lkZ2l0cyBQdHkgTHRkMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB
AQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC8ZtxM1bYickpgSVG-
meHInI3f_chlMBdL8l7daOEztSs_a6GLqmvSu-
AoDpTsfEd4EazdMBp5fmgLRGdCYMcI6bgpO94h5CCnlj8xFKPq7qGixdwGUA
6b_ZI3c4cZ8eu73VMNrrn_z3WTZlExlpT9XVj-
ivhfJ4a6T20EtMM5qwIDAQABo4GsMIGpMHQGA1UdIwRtMGuhXqRcMFoxCzAJ
BgNVBAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMRMwEQYDVQQHDApDYWxp
Zm9ybmlhMSEwHwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5ldCBXaWRnaXRzIFB0eSBMdGSCCQCX
9nxZBNQWDjAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMA4GA1UdDwEB_wQEAwIGwDAWBgNVHSUBAf8E
DDAKBggrBgEFBQcDAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOBgQAGkz9QpoxghZUWT4iv
em4cIckfxzTBBiPHCjrrjB2X8Ktn8GSZ1MdyIZV8fwdEmD90IvtMHgtzK-
9wo6Aibj_rVIpxGb7trP82uzc2X8VwYnQbuqQyzofQvcwZHLYplvi95pZ5fV
rJvnYAUBFyfrdT5GjqL1nqH3a_Y3QPscuCjg"
},
"signature":"
DfoBOetNelKsnAe_m4Z9K5UbihgWNYZsp5jVybiI05sOagDzv6R4do9npaAlAvpNK8HJ
CxD6D22J8GDUExlIhSR1aDuDCQm6QzmjdkFdxAz5TRYl6zpPCZqgSToN_g1TZxqxEv6V
Ob5fies4g6MHvCH-Il_-KbHq5YpwGxEEFdg"
}
}

Pei, et al. Expires January 2, 2017 [Page 107]
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Authors' Addresses

Mingliang Pei
Symantec
350 Ellis St
Mountain View, CA 94043
USA

Email: mpei@yahoo.com

Nick Cook
Intercede
St. Mary's Road, Lutterworth
Leicestershire, LE17 4PS
Great Britain

Email: nick.cook@intercede.com

Minho Yoo
Solacia
5F, Daerung Post Tower 2, 306 Digital-ro
Seoul 152-790
Korea

Email: paromix@sola-cia.com

Andrew Atyeo
Intercede
St. Mary's Road, Lutterworth
Leicestershire, LE17 4PS
Great Britain

Email: andrew.atyeo@intercede.com

Hannes Tschofenig
ARM Ltd.
110 Fulbourn Rd
Cambridge, CB1 9NJ
Great Britain

Email: Hannes.tschofenig@arm.com

Pei, et al. Expires January 2, 2017 [Page 108]

The Open Trust Protocol (OTrP) draft-pei-opentrustprotocol-00

The Open Trust Protocol (OTrP)
draft-pei-opentrustprotocol-00