Security Considerations for Networks Using SRv6
draft-perkins-sr-security-00

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spring                                                        C. Perkins
Internet-Draft                                                 Futurewei
Intended status: Standards Track                            July 1, 2019
Expires: January 2, 2020

            Security Considerations for Networks Using SRv6
                      draft-perkins-sr-security-00

Abstract

   This document identifies various threats to networks employing
   segment routing over an IPv6 transport.  Segment Routing inherits
   potential security vulnerabilities from source routing in general,
   and from label-switching approaches such as MPLS.  The document
   discusses how common security vulnerabilities may be present in SRv6
   networks, depending on the security policies that are imposed.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 2, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

Perkins                  Expires January 2, 2020                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                 SR-security                     July 2019

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Types of Vulnerabilities in SR Networks . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  Loss of Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Tampering with Packet Data  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.3.  Loss of Connectivity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.4.  Identity Theft  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.5.  Hijacking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.6.  Denial of Origination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.7.  Packet/Segment Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.8.  Distributed DoS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.9.  Malicious Packet Data in SR Networks  . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Mechanisms for Misuse of Source Routed Networks . . . . . . .   7
     5.1.  SR insertion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.2.  SR deletion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.3.  SR swapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.4.  SID tampering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Effects of the above on SR Use Cases  . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.1.  Threats to SRv6 in the Small Office . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.2.  Threats to SRv6 in the Access Network . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.3.  Threats to SRv6 in Data Center  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.4.  Threats to SRv6 in Content Delivery Networks  . . . . . .  10
     6.5.  Threats to SRv6 in Core Networks  . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.6.  Threats to SRv6 in Mobile User Plane  . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  Some Trust Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     7.1.  Trusted Domain  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     7.2.  Closed Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     7.3.  Ingress Domain  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   9.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Appendix A.  Ameliorations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
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