Strong Password-Based Credentials Download Using Pseudorandom Moduli
draft-perlman-strong-cred-00
| Document | Type | Expired Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Radia Perlman , Charlie W. Kaufman , Eric Rescorla | ||
| Last updated | 2000-11-21 | ||
| Stream | (None) | ||
| Formats |
Expired & archived
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| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-perlman-strong-cred-00.txt
Abstract
In a strong password-based protocol, the only thing the client needs to know is the user's password, and an eavesdropper, or someone impersonating either end, cannot do off-line password-guessing attacks. This sort of protocol can be used for credentials download, or for mutual authentication. Although password-based mutual authentication protocols can be used for credentials download, they are designed with some properties (such as not storing a password- equivalent at the server) that are not important in a credentials- download protocol. Therefore, a protocol designed specifically for credentials download can be fewer messages, higher performance at the server, and allow the server to operate in a stateless manner. Therefore it is possible, even likely, that different protocols might be preferable in one case (credentials download) than another.
Authors
Radia Perlman
Charlie W. Kaufman
Eric Rescorla
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)