Generating Password-Based Keys Using the GOST Algorithms
RFC 9337
| Document | Type |
RFC
- Informational
(December 2022)
Was
draft-pkcs5-gost
(individual)
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Karelina Ekaterina | ||
| Last updated | 2022-12-09 | ||
| RFC stream | Independent Submission | ||
| Formats | |||
| IESG | Responsible AD | (None) | |
| Send notices to | (None) |
RFC 9337
Independent Submission E. Karelina, Ed.
Request for Comments: 9337 InfoTeCS
Category: Informational December 2022
ISSN: 2070-1721
Generating Password-Based Keys Using the GOST Algorithms
Abstract
This document specifies how to use "PKCS #5: Password-Based
Cryptography Specification Version 2.1" (RFC 8018) to generate a
symmetric key from a password in conjunction with the Russian
national standard GOST algorithms.
PKCS #5 applies a Pseudorandom Function (PRF) -- a cryptographic
hash, cipher, or Hash-Based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) -- to
the input password along with a salt value and repeats the process
many times to produce a derived key.
This specification has been developed outside the IETF. The purpose
of publication being to facilitate interoperable implementations that
wish to support the GOST algorithms. This document does not imply
IETF endorsement of the cryptographic algorithms used here.
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for informational purposes.
This is a contribution to the RFC Series, independently of any other
RFC stream. The RFC Editor has chosen to publish this document at
its discretion and makes no statement about its value for
implementation or deployment. Documents approved for publication by
the RFC Editor are not candidates for any level of Internet Standard;
see Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9337.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Conventions Used in This Document
3. Basic Terms and Definitions
4. Algorithm for Generating a Key from a Password
5. Data Encryption
5.1. GOST R 34.12-2015 Data Encryption
5.1.1. Encryption
5.1.2. Decryption
6. Message Authentication
6.1. MAC Generation
6.2. MAC Verification
7. Identifiers and Parameters
7.1. PBKDF2
7.2. PBES2
7.3. Identifier and Parameters of Gost34.12-2015 Encryption
Scheme
7.4. PBMAC1
8. Security Considerations
9. IANA Considerations
10. References
10.1. Normative References
10.2. Informative References
Appendix A. PBKDF2 HMAC_GOSTR3411 Test Vectors
Acknowledgments
Author's Address
1. Introduction
This document provides a specification of usage of GOST R 34.12-2015
encryption algorithms and the GOST R 34.11-2012 hashing functions
with PKCS #5. The methods described in this document are designed to
generate key information using the user's password and to protect
information using the generated keys.
2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Basic Terms and Definitions
Throughout this document, the following notation is used:
+==========+====================================================+
| Notation | Definition |
+==========+====================================================+
| P | a password encoded as a Unicode UTF-8 string |
+----------+----------------------------------------------------+
| S | a random initializing value |
+----------+----------------------------------------------------+
| c | a number of iterations of algorithm, a positive |
| | integer |
+----------+----------------------------------------------------+
| dkLen | a length in octets of derived key, a positive |
| | integer |
+----------+----------------------------------------------------+
| DK | a derived key of length dkLen |
+----------+----------------------------------------------------+
| B_n | a set of all octet strings of length n, n >= 0; if |
| | n = 0, then the set B_n consists of an empty |
| | string of length 0 |
+----------+----------------------------------------------------+
| A||C | a concatenation of two octet strings A, C, i.e., a |
| | vector from B_(|A|+|C|), where the left subvector |
| | from B_(|A|) is equal to the vector A and the |
| | right subvector from B_(|C|) is equal to the |
| | vector C: A = (a_(n_1),...,a_1) in B_(n_1) and C = |
| | (c_(n_2),..., c_1) in B_(n_2), res = |
| | (a_(n_1),...,a_1,c_(n_2),..., c_1) in B_(n_1+n_2)) |
+----------+----------------------------------------------------+
| \xor | a bit-wise exclusive-or of two octet strings of |
| | the same length |
+----------+----------------------------------------------------+
| MSB^n_r: | a truncating of an octet string to size r by |
| B_n -> | removing the least significant n-r octets: |
| B_r | MSB^n_r(a_n,...,a_(n-r+1),a_(n-r),...,a_1) |
| | =(a_n,...,a_(n-r+1)) |
+----------+----------------------------------------------------+
| LSB^n_r: | a truncating of an octet string to size r by |
| B_n -> | removing the most significant n-r octets: |
| B_r | LSB^n_r(a_n,...,a_(n-r+1),a_(n-r),...,a_1) |
| | =(a_r,...,a_1) |
+----------+----------------------------------------------------+
| Int(i) | a four-octet encoding of the integer i =< 2^32: |
| | (i_1, i_2, i_3, i_4) in B_4, i = i_1 + 2^8 * i_2 + |
| | 2^16 * i_3 + 2^24 * i_4 |
+----------+----------------------------------------------------+
| b[i, j] | a substring extraction operator, extracts octets i |
| | through j, 0 =< i =< j |
+----------+----------------------------------------------------+
| CEIL(x) | the smallest integer greater than or equal to x |
+----------+----------------------------------------------------+
Table 1: Terms and Definitions
This document uses the following abbreviations and symbols:
+================+===============================================+
| Abbreviations | Definition |
| and Symbols | |
+================+===============================================+
| HMAC_GOSTR3411 | Hashed-Based Message Authentication Code. A |
| | function for calculating a Message |
| | Authentication Code (MAC) based on the GOST R |
| | 34.11-2012 hash function (see [RFC6986]) with |
| | 512-bit output in accordance with [RFC2104]. |
+----------------+-----------------------------------------------+
Table 2: Abbreviations and Symbols
4. Algorithm for Generating a Key from a Password
The DK is calculated by means of a key derivation function PBKDF2 (P,
S, c, dkLen) (see [RFC8018], Section 5.2) using the HMAC_GOSTR3411
function as the PRF:
DK = PBKDF2 (P, S, c, dkLen).
The PBKDF2 function is defined as the following algorithm:
1. If dkLen > (2^32 - 1) * 64, output "derived key too long" and
stop.
2. Calculate n = CEIL (dkLen / 64).
3. Calculate a set of values for each i from 1 to n:
U_1(i) = HMAC_GOSTR3411 (P, S || INT (i)),
U_2(i) = HMAC_GOSTR3411 (P, U_1(i)),
...
U_c(i) = HMAC_GOSTR3411 (P, U_(c-1)(i)),
T(i) = U_1(i) \xor U_2(i) \xor ... \xor U_c(i).
4. Concatenate the octet strings T(i) and extract the first dkLen
octets to produce a derived key DK:
* DK = MSB^(n * 64)_dkLen(T(1)||T(2)||...||T(n))
5. Data Encryption
5.1. GOST R 34.12-2015 Data Encryption
Data encryption using the DK is carried out in accordance with the
PBES2 scheme (see [RFC8018], Section 6.2) using GOST R 34.12-2015 in
CTR_ACPKM mode (see [RFC8645]).
5.1.1. Encryption
The encryption process for PBES2 consists of the following steps:
1. Select the random value S of a length from 8 to 32 octets.
2. Select the iteration count c depending on the conditions of use
(see [GostPkcs5]). The minimum allowable value for the parameter
is 1000.
3. Set the value dkLen = 32.
4. Apply the key derivation function to the password P, the random
value S, and the iteration count c to produce a derived key DK of
length dkLen octets in accordance with the algorithm from
Section 4. Generate the sequence T(1) and truncate it to 32
octets, i.e.,
DK = PBKDF2 (P, S, c, 32) = MSB^64_32(T(1)).
5. Generate the random value ukm of size n, where n takes a value of
12 or 16 octets depending on the selected encryption algorithm:
* GOST R 34.12-2015 "Kuznyechik" n = 16 (see [RFC7801])
* GOST R 34.12-2015 "Magma" n = 12 (see [RFC8891])
6. Set the value S' = ukm[1..n-8].
7. For the id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm and id-gostr3412-2015-
kuznyechik-ctracpkm algorithms (see Section 7.3), encrypt the
message M with the GOST R 34.12-2015 algorithm with the derived
key DK and the random value S' to produce a ciphertext C.
8. For the id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm-omac and id-
gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-ctracpkm-omac algorithms (see
Section 7.3), encrypt the message M with the GOST R 34.12-2015
algorithm with the derived key DK and the ukm in accordance with
the following steps:
* Generate two keys from the derived key DK using the
KDF_TREE_GOSTR3411_2012_256 algorithm (see [RFC7836]):
encryption key K(1)
MAC key K(2)
Input parameters for the KDF_TREE_GOSTR3411_2012_256 algorithm
take the following values:
K_in = DK
label = "kdf tree" (8 octets)
seed = ukm[n-7..n]
R = 1
The input string label above is encoded using ASCII (see
[RFC0020]).
* Compute the MAC for the message M using the K(2) key in
accordance with the GOST R 34.12-2015 algorithm. Append the
computed MAC value to the message M: M||MAC.
* Encrypt the resulting octet string with MAC with the GOST R
34.12-2015 algorithm with the derived key K(1) and the random
value S' to produce a ciphertext C.
9. Serialize the parameters S, c, and ukm as algorithm parameters in
accordance with Section 7.2.
5.1.2. Decryption
The decryption process for PBES2 consists of the following steps:
1. Set the value dkLen = 32.
2. Apply the key derivation function PBKDF2 to the password P, the
random value S, and the iteration count c to produce a derived
key DK of length dkLen octets in accordance with the algorithm
from Section 4. Generate the sequence T(1) and truncate it to 32
octets, i.e., DK = PBKFD2 (P, S, c, 32) = MSB^64_32(T(1)).
3. Set the value S' = ukm[1..n-8], where n is the size of ukm in
octets.
4. For the id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm and id-gostr3412-2015-
kuznyechik-ctracpkm algorithms (see Section 7.3), decrypt the
ciphertext C with the GOST R 34.12-2015 algorithm with the
derived key DK and the random value S' to produce the message M.
5. For id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm-omac and id-gostr3412-2015-
kuznyechik-ctracpkm-omac algorithms (see Section 7.3), decrypt
the ciphertext C with the GOST R 34.12-2015 algorithm with the
derived key DK and the ukm in accordance with the following
steps:
* Generate two keys from the derived key DK using the
KDF_TREE_GOSTR3411_2012_256 algorithm:
encryption key K(1)
MAC key K(2)
Input parameters for the KDF_TREE_GOSTR3411_2012_256 algorithm
take the following values:
K_in = DK
label = "kdf tree" (8 octets)
seed = ukm[n-7..n]
R = 1
The input string label above is encoded using ASCII (see
[RFC0020]).
* Decrypt the ciphertext C with the GOST R 34.12-2015 algorithm
with the derived key K(1) and the random value S' to produce
the plaintext. The last k octets of the text are the MAC,
where k depends on the selected encryption algorithm.
* Compute the MAC for the text[1..m - k] using the K(2) key in
accordance with GOST R 34.12-2015 algorithm, where m is the
size of text.
* Compare the computing MAC and the receiving MAC. If the sizes
or values do not match, the message is distorted.
6. Message Authentication
The PBMAC1 scheme is used for message authentication (see [RFC8018],
Section 7.1). This scheme is based on the HMAC_GOSTR3411 function.
6.1. MAC Generation
The MAC generation operation for PBMAC1 consists of the following
steps:
1. Select the random value S of a length from 8 to 32 octets.
2. Select the iteration count c depending on the conditions of use
(see [GostPkcs5]). The minimum allowable value for the parameter
is 1000.
3. Set the dkLen to at least 32 octets. The number of octets
depends on previous parameter values.
4. Apply the key derivation function to the password P, the random
value S, and the iteration count c to generate a sequence K of
length dkLen octets in accordance with the algorithm from
Section 4.
5. Truncate the sequence K to 32 octets to get the derived key DK,
i.e., DK = LSB^dkLen_32(K).
6. Process the message M with the underlying message authentication
scheme with the derived key DK to generate a message
authentication code T.
7. Save the parameters S and c as algorithm parameters in accordance
with Section 7.4.
6.2. MAC Verification
The MAC verification operation for PBMAC1 consists of the following
steps:
1. Set the dkLen to at least 32 octets. The number of octets
depends on previous parameter values.
2. Apply the key derivation function to the password P, the random
value S, and the iteration count c to generate a sequence K of
length dkLen octets in accordance with the algorithm from
Section 4.
3. Truncate the sequence K to 32 octets to get the derived key DK,
i.e., DK = LSB^dkLen_32(K).
4. Process the message M with the underlying message authentication
scheme with the derived key DK to generate a MAC.
5. Compare the computing MAC and the receiving MAC. If the sizes or
values do not match, the message is distorted.
7. Identifiers and Parameters
This section defines the ASN.1 syntax for the key derivation
functions, the encryption schemes, the message authentication scheme,
and supporting techniques (see [RFC8018]).
rsadsi OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) 113549 }
pkcs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { rsadsi 1 }
pkcs-5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs 5 }
7.1. PBKDF2
The Object Identifier (OID) id-PBKDF2 identifies the PBKDF2 key
derivation function:
id-PBKDF2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-5 12 }
The parameters field associated with this OID in an
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL have type PBKDF2-params:
PBKDF2-params ::= SEQUENCE
{
salt CHOICE
{
specified OCTET STRING,
otherSource AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBKDF2-SaltSources}}
},
iterationCount INTEGER (1000..MAX),
keyLength INTEGER (32..MAX) OPTIONAL,
prf AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBKDF2-PRFs}}
}
The fields of type PBKDF2-params have the following meanings:
* salt contains the random value S in OCTET STRING.
* iterationCount specifies the iteration count c.
* keyLength is the length of the derived key in octets. It is an
optional field for the PBES2 scheme since it is always 32 octets.
It MUST be present for the PBMAC1 scheme and MUST be at least 32
octets since the HMAC_GOSTR3411 function has a variable key size.
* prf identifies the pseudorandom function. The identifier value
MUST be id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-12-512 and the parameters value
must be NULL:
id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-12-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{
iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) reg7(7)
tk26(1) algorithms(1) hmac(4) 512(2)
}
7.2. PBES2
The OID id-PBES2 identifies the PBES2 encryption scheme:
id-PBES2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-5 13 }
The parameters field associated with this OID in an
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL have type PBES2-params:
PBES2-params ::= SEQUENCE
{
keyDerivationFunc AlgorithmIdentifier { { PBES2-KDFs } },
encryptionScheme AlgorithmIdentifier { { PBES2-Encs } }
}
The fields of type PBES2-params have the following meanings:
* keyDerivationFunc identifies the key derivation function in
accordance with Section 7.1.
* encryptionScheme identifies the encryption scheme in accordance
with Section 7.3.
7.3. Identifier and Parameters of Gost34.12-2015 Encryption Scheme
The Gost34.12-2015 encryption algorithm identifier SHALL take one of
the following values:
id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{
iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7)
tc26(1) algorithms(1) cipher(5)
gostr3412-2015-magma(1) mode-ctracpkm(1)
}
When the id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm identifier is used, the
data is encrypted by the GOST R 34.12-2015 Magma cipher in CTR_ACPKM
mode in accordance with [RFC8645]. The block size is 64 bits and the
section size is fixed within a specific protocol based on the
requirements of the system capacity and the key lifetime.
id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm-omac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{
iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7)
tc26(1) algorithms(1) cipher(5)
gostr3412-2015-magma(1) mode-ctracpkm-omac(2)
}
When the id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm-omac identifier is used,
the data is encrypted by the GOST R 34.12-2015 Magma cipher in
CTR_ACPKM mode in accordance with [RFC8645] and the MAC is computed
by the GOST R 34.12-2015 Magma cipher in MAC mode (MAC size is 64
bits). The block size is 64 bits and the section size is fixed
within a specific protocol based on the requirements of the system
capacity and the key lifetime.
id-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-ctracpkm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{
iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7)
tc26(1) algorithms(1) cipher(5)
gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik(2) mode-ctracpkm(1)
}
When the id-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-ctracpkm identifier is used,
the data is encrypted by the GOST R 34.12-2015 Kuznyechik cipher in
CTR_ACPKM mode in accordance with [RFC8645]. The block size is 128
bits and the section size is fixed within a specific protocol based
on the requirements of the system capacity and the key lifetime.
id-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-ctracpkm-omac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{
iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7)
tc26(1) algorithms(1) cipher(5)
gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik(2) mode-ctracpkm-omac(2)
}
When the id-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-ctracpkm-omac identifier is
used, the data is encrypted by the GOST R 34.12-2015 Kuznyechik
cipher in CTR_ACPKM mode in accordance with [RFC8645] and MAC is
computed by the GOST R 34.12-2015 Kuznyechik cipher in MAC mode (MAC
size is 128 bits). The block size is 128 bits and the section size
is fixed within a specific protocol based on the requirements of the
system capacity and the key lifetime.
The parameters field in an AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL have type
Gost3412-15-Encryption-Parameters:
Gost3412-15-Encryption-Parameters ::= SEQUENCE
{
ukm OCTET STRING
}
The field of type Gost3412-15-Encryption-Parameters have the
following meanings:
* ukm MUST be present and MUST contain n octets. Its value depends
on the selected encryption algorithm:
- GOST R 34.12-2015 "Kuznyechik" n = 16 (see [RFC7801])
- GOST R 34.12-2015 "Magma" n = 12 (see [RFC8891])
7.4. PBMAC1
The OID id-PBMAC1 identifies the PBMAC1 message authentication
scheme:
id-PBMAC1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-5 14 }
The parameters field associated with this OID in an
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL have type PBMAC1-params:
PBMAC1-params ::= SEQUENCE
{
keyDerivationFunc AlgorithmIdentifier { { PBMAC1-KDFs } },
messageAuthScheme AlgorithmIdentifier { { PBMAC1-MACs } }
}
The fields of type PBMAC1-params have the following meanings:
* keyDerivationFunc is the identifier and parameters of key
derivation function in accordance with Section 7.1.
* messageAuthScheme is the identifier and parameters of the
HMAC_GOSTR3411 algorithm.
8. Security Considerations
For information on security considerations for password-based
cryptography, see [RFC8018].
Conforming applications MUST use unique values for ukm and S in order
to avoid the encryption of different data on the same keys with the
same initialization vector.
It is RECOMMENDED that parameter S consist of at least 32 octets of
pseudorandom data in order to reduce the probability of collisions of
keys generated from the same password.
9. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[GostPkcs5]
Potashnikov, A., Karelina, E., Pianov, S., and A.
Naumenko, "Information technology. Cryptographic Data
Security. Password-based key security.",
R 1323565.1.040-2022. Federal Agency on Technical
Regulating and Metrology (In Russian).
[RFC0020] Cerf, V., "ASCII format for network interchange", STD 80,
RFC 20, DOI 10.17487/RFC0020, October 1969,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc20>.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6986] Dolmatov, V., Ed. and A. Degtyarev, "GOST R 34.11-2012:
Hash Function", RFC 6986, DOI 10.17487/RFC6986, August
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6986>.
[RFC7801] Dolmatov, V., Ed., "GOST R 34.12-2015: Block Cipher
"Kuznyechik"", RFC 7801, DOI 10.17487/RFC7801, March 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7801>.
[RFC7836] Smyshlyaev, S., Ed., Alekseev, E., Oshkin, I., Popov, V.,
Leontiev, S., Podobaev, V., and D. Belyavsky, "Guidelines
on the Cryptographic Algorithms to Accompany the Usage of
Standards GOST R 34.10-2012 and GOST R 34.11-2012",
RFC 7836, DOI 10.17487/RFC7836, March 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7836>.
[RFC8018] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., and A. Rusch, "PKCS #5:
Password-Based Cryptography Specification Version 2.1",
RFC 8018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8018, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8018>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8645] Smyshlyaev, S., Ed., "Re-keying Mechanisms for Symmetric
Keys", RFC 8645, DOI 10.17487/RFC8645, August 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8645>.
[RFC8891] Dolmatov, V., Ed. and D. Baryshkov, "GOST R 34.12-2015:
Block Cipher "Magma"", RFC 8891, DOI 10.17487/RFC8891,
September 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8891>.
10.2. Informative References
[RFC6070] Josefsson, S., "PKCS #5: Password-Based Key Derivation
Function 2 (PBKDF2) Test Vectors", RFC 6070,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6070, January 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6070>.
Appendix A. PBKDF2 HMAC_GOSTR3411 Test Vectors
These test vectors are formed by analogy with test vectors from
[RFC6070]. The input strings below are encoded using ASCII (see
[RFC0020]). The sequence "\0" (without quotation marks) means a
literal ASCII NULL value (1 octet). "DK" refers to the derived key.
Input:
P = "password" (8 octets)
S = "salt" (4 octets)
c = 1
dkLen = 64
Output:
DK = 64 77 0a f7 f7 48 c3 b1 c9 ac 83 1d bc fd 85 c2
61 11 b3 0a 8a 65 7d dc 30 56 b8 0c a7 3e 04 0d
28 54 fd 36 81 1f 6d 82 5c c4 ab 66 ec 0a 68 a4
90 a9 e5 cf 51 56 b3 a2 b7 ee cd db f9 a1 6b 47
Input:
P = "password" (8 octets)
S = "salt" (4 octets)
c = 2
dkLen = 64
Output:
DK = 5a 58 5b af df bb 6e 88 30 d6 d6 8a a3 b4 3a c0
0d 2e 4a eb ce 01 c9 b3 1c 2c ae d5 6f 02 36 d4
d3 4b 2b 8f bd 2c 4e 89 d5 4d 46 f5 0e 47 d4 5b
ba c3 01 57 17 43 11 9e 8d 3c 42 ba 66 d3 48 de
Input:
P = "password" (8 octets)
S = "salt" (4 octets)
c = 4096
dkLen = 64
Output:
DK = e5 2d eb 9a 2d 2a af f4 e2 ac 9d 47 a4 1f 34 c2
03 76 59 1c 67 80 7f 04 77 e3 25 49 dc 34 1b c7
86 7c 09 84 1b 6d 58 e2 9d 03 47 c9 96 30 1d 55
df 0d 34 e4 7c f6 8f 4e 3c 2c da f1 d9 ab 86 c3
Input:
P = "password" (8 octets)
S = "salt" (4 octets)
c = 16777216
dkLen = 64
Output:
DK = 49 e4 84 3b ba 76 e3 00 af e2 4c 4d 23 dc 73 92
de f1 2f 2c 0e 24 41 72 36 7c d7 0a 89 82 ac 36
1a db 60 1c 7e 2a 31 4e 8c b7 b1 e9 df 84 0e 36
ab 56 15 be 5d 74 2b 6c f2 03 fb 55 fd c4 80 71
Input:
P = "passwordPASSWORDpassword" (24 octets)
S = "saltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsalt" (36 octets)
c = 4096
dkLen = 100
Output:
DK = b2 d8 f1 24 5f c4 d2 92 74 80 20 57 e4 b5 4e 0a
07 53 aa 22 fc 53 76 0b 30 1c f0 08 67 9e 58 fe
4b ee 9a dd ca e9 9b a2 b0 b2 0f 43 1a 9c 5e 50
f3 95 c8 93 87 d0 94 5a ed ec a6 eb 40 15 df c2
bd 24 21 ee 9b b7 11 83 ba 88 2c ee bf ef 25 9f
33 f9 e2 7d c6 17 8c b8 9d c3 74 28 cf 9c c5 2a
2b aa 2d 3a
Input:
P = "pass\0word" (9 octets)
S = "sa\0lt" (5 octets)
c = 4096
dkLen = 64
Output:
DK = 50 df 06 28 85 b6 98 01 a3 c1 02 48 eb 0a 27 ab
6e 52 2f fe b2 0c 99 1c 66 0f 00 14 75 d7 3a 4e
16 7f 78 2c 18 e9 7e 92 97 6d 9c 1d 97 08 31 ea
78 cc b8 79 f6 70 68 cd ac 19 10 74 08 44 e8 30
Acknowledgments
The author thanks Potashnikov Alexander, Pianov Semen, Davletshina
Alexandra, Belyavsky Dmitry, and Smyslov Valery for their careful
readings and useful comments.
Author's Address
Ekaterina Karelina (editor)
InfoTeCS
2B stroenie 1, ul. Otradnaya
Moscow
127273
Russian Federation
Email: Ekaterina.Karelina@infotecs.ru