KEM-based Authentication for EDHOC in Initiator-Known Responder (IKR) Scenarios
draft-pocero-authkem-ikr-edhoc-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
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|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Lidia Pocero Fraile , Christos Koulamas , Apostolos P. Fournaris , Evangelos Haleplidis | ||
| Last updated | 2026-01-08 (Latest revision 2025-07-07) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document specifies a more efficient variant of a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM)-based authentication method for the Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC) lightweight protocol, designed for the specific scenario in which the Initiator has prior knowledge of the Responder’s credentials, a case commonly found in constrained environments. Improving upon the approach described in KEM-based Authentication for EDHOC, this method uses only a mandatory three-message handshake to enable signature-free post-quantum authentication when PQC KEMs, such as the NIST-standardized ML-KEM, are employed, while still providing mutual authentication, forward secrecy, and a degree of identity protection.
Authors
Lidia Pocero Fraile
Christos Koulamas
Apostolos P. Fournaris
Evangelos Haleplidis
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)