An EAT Profile for Trustworthy Device Assignment
draft-poirier-rats-eat-da-05
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Mathieu Poirier , Thomas Fossati | ||
| Last updated | 2026-01-21 | ||
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| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
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draft-poirier-rats-eat-da-05
Remote ATtestation ProcedureS M. Poirier
Internet-Draft T. Fossati
Intended status: Informational Linaro
Expires: 25 July 2026 21 January 2026
An EAT Profile for Trustworthy Device Assignment
draft-poirier-rats-eat-da-05
Abstract
In confidential computing, device assignment (DA) is the method by
which a device (e.g., network adapter, GPU), whether on-chip or
behind a PCIe Root Port, is assigned to a Trusted Virtual Machine
(TVM). For the TVM to trust an assigned device, the device must
provide the TVM with attestation Evidence confirming its identity and
the state of its firmware and configuration.
Since Evidence claims can be processed by 3rd party entities (e.g.,
Verifiers, Relying Parties) external to the TVM, there is a need to
standardize the representation of DA-related information in Evidence
to ensure interoperability. This document defines an attestation
Evidence format for DA as an EAT (Entity Attestation Token) profile.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://rats-
device-attestation.github.io/draft-poirier-rats-eat-da/draft-poirier-
rats-eat-da.html. Status information for this document may be found
at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-poirier-rats-eat-da/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the Remote ATtestation
ProcedureS Working Group mailing list (mailto:rats@ietf.org), which
is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/rats/.
Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/rats-device-attestation/draft-poirier-rats-eat-da.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Device Assignment Token (DAT) Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. SPDM Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.1. Measurements Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.2. Certificate Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.3. Negotiated State Preamble (Version, Capabilities and
Algorithms) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1.4. Submodule Naming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. PCIe Legacy Device Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2.1. Submodule Naming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Collated CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.1. New CWT Claims Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.1.1. SPDM Measurements Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.1.2. SPDM Certificates Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.1.3. SPDM VCA Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.1.4. PCIe Legacy Device Text Claim . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.1.5. PCIe Legacy Device Binary Claim . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Introduction
In confidential computing, device assignment (DA) is the method by
which a device (e.g., network adapter, GPU), whether on-chip or
behind a PCIe Root Port, is assigned to a Trusted Virtual Machine
(TVM). Most confidential computing platforms (e.g., Arm CCA, AMD
SEV-SNP, Intel TDX) provide DA capabilities. Such capabilities
prevent execution environments or software components that are
untrusted by the TVM (including other TVMs and the host hypervisor)
from accessing or controlling a device that has been assigned to the
TVM. This includes, for example, protection of device MMIO
interfaces and device caches. From a trust perspective, DA allows a
device to be included in the TVM's Trusted Computing Base (TCB). For
the TVM to trust the device, the device must provide the TVM with
attestation Evidence confirming its identity and the state of its
firmware and configuration.
This document defines an attestation Evidence format for DA as an EAT
[RFC9711] profile. The format is designed to be generic, extensible
and architecture-agnostic. Ongoing work on DA concentrates on PCIe
devices that support the SPDM protocol [SPDM], but other bus
architectures and protocols are expected to be supported as the
technology gains wider adoption. As such, this document focuses on
the formalization of an Evidence format for SPDM-compliant devices
while leaving room for the definition of other Evidence formats such
as Compute Express Link (CXL) and the Coherent Hub Interface (CHI).
This list is by no means exhaustive and is expected to expand.
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Device Assignment Token (DAT) Claims
The Device Assignment Token (DAT) is the encompassing envelope for
the individual device claims to be presented. A DAT can be used as a
standalone entity but can also be embedded in a larger, platform-
specific attestation token. A DAT consists of an EAT profile
identifier, a nonce and an EAT submodule (Section 4.2.18 of
[RFC9711]) that contains any number of individual device claims.
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Each individual device claim is the combination of a device name and
a standard claims format based on the bus or protocol the device
supports. The syntax of the device name depends on the type of bus
or protocol used. Each name consists of two parts joined by a
semicolon: a namespace and a bus-specific name. See Section 3.1.4
for SPDM devices, and Section 3.2.1 for legacy PCIe devices. As
previously mentioned, this draft currently defines the claims set for
SPDM compliant devices and PCIe legacy devices that do not support
the SPDM protocol. Careful condideration was also given to the
overall design in order to leave room for future expansion.
dat = {
&(eat_profile: 265) => "tag:linaro.org,2025:device#1.0.0"
&(eat_nonce: 10) => bytes .size 64 ; same as realm nonce
&(eat_submods: 266) => {
+ device-name => $device-claims-set
}
}
device-name = text .regexp "(legacy-pcie|spdm):.+"
$device-claims-set /= spdm-claims
$device-claims-set /= cxl-claims
$device-claims-set /= chi-claims
$device-claims-set /= pcie-legacy-claims
3.1. SPDM Claims
A SPDM claim instance is expected to be present for each SPDM
compatible device to be attested. Each instance consists of either a
measurements section or a certificates section, or both. Optionally,
the Negotiated State preamble (version, capabilities and algorithms)
bytes can be included to present the full negotiated state between
the SPDM requester and responder.
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spdm-claims = {
&(eat_profile: 265) => "tag:linaro.org,2025:device-spdm#1.0.0"
spdm-artefacts
? &(vca: 3804) => bytes
}
spdm-artefacts //= (
&(measurements: 3802) => spdm-measurements
&(certificates: 3803) => spdm-certificates
)
spdm-artefacts //= (
&(measurements: 3802) => spdm-measurements
)
spdm-artefacts //= (
&(certificates: 3803) => spdm-certificates
)
3.1.1. Measurements Claim
There can be up to 239 measurements per device with the entire
measurement log optionally signed by the certificate populated in one
of the 8 certificate slots. It should be noted that measurements
formalized herein follow the DMTF measurement specification.
spdm-measurements = {
+ block-id => spdm-measurement
? "signature" => spdm-measurement-blocks-signature
}
block-id = 1..239
3.1.1.1. Measurement
SPDM measurements start with a component type that reflects one of
the 10 categories defined by the SPDM specification. Following is
the measurement itself represented by either a raw bitstream or a
digest. The size of the digest value is derived from the measurement
hash algorithm conveyed by the SPDM ALGORITHMS message response.
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spdm-measurement = {
&(component-type: 1) => component-type
measurement
}
measurement //= ( &(digest-measurement: 2) => digest-measurement )
measurement //= ( &(raw-measurement: 3) => raw-measurement )
component-type /= &(immutable-rom: 0)
component-type /= &(mutable-firmware: 1)
component-type /= &(hardware-config: 2)
component-type /= &(firmware-config: 3)
component-type /= &(freeform-measurement-manifest: 4)
component-type /= &(device-mode: 5)
component-type /= &(mutable-firmware-version: 6)
component-type /= &(mutable-firmware-svn: 7)
component-type /= &(hash-extend-measurement: 8)
component-type /= &(informational: 9)
component-type /= &(structured-measurement-manifest: 10)
raw-measurement = bytes
digest-measurement = digest
digest = [
alg: uint / text
val: bytes
]
3.1.1.2. Measurements Signature
SPDM compliant devices can optionally support the capability to sign
measurements. Included in the measurement claim signature are all
the elements needed by a third party entity to reconstruct the
original measurement log signed by the device. Those elements
include L1 (see CDDL below), the combined SPDM prefix, the hash
algorithm used to generate a digest of the measurement log and nonces
provided by the requester and responder. The slot number of the leaf
certificate used to sign the measurement log is also provided.
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;
; What follows is based on SPDM v1.3.2 (DSP0274_1.3.2.pdf)
;
;
; Algorithms currently supported by SPDM.
; See "MeasurementHashAlgo", table 21, page 79.
;
hash-algorithm-type /= &(tpm_alg_sha_256: 0)
hash-algorithm-type /= &(tpm_alg_sha_384: 2)
hash-algorithm-type /= &(tpm_alg_sha_512: 4)
hash-algorithm-type /= &(tpm_alg_sha3_256: 8)
hash-algorithm-type /= &(tpm_alg_sha3_384: 16)
hash-algorithm-type /= &(tpm_alg_sha3_512: 32)
hash-algorithm-type /= &(tpm_alg_sm3_256: 64)
;
; See signature generation and verification algorithms for
; MEASUREMENTS messages on page 126.
;
; L1 = Concatenate(VCA, GET_MEASUREMENTS_REQUEST1,
; MEASUREMENTS_RESPONSE1, ...,
; GET_MEASUREMENTS_REQUESTn-1,
; MEASUREMENTS_RESPONSEn-1,
; GET_MEASUREMENTS_REQUESTn, MEASUREMENTS_RESPONSEn)
;
spdm-measurement-blocks-signature = {
&(slot: 1) => 0..7, ; Slot of the certificate chain used to
; authenticate the measurement. Default
; should be 0.
&(requester-nonce: 2) => bytes .size 32,
&(responder-nonce: 3) => bytes .size 32,
&(combined-spdm-prefix: 4) => bytes .size 100,
&(IL1: 5) => bytes, ; L1 (see comment above)
&(base-hash-algo: 6) => hash-algorithm-type,
&(signature: 7) => bytes
}
3.1.2. Certificate Claims
According to the specification, SPDM compliant devices should support
at most 8 slots, with slot 0 populated by default. Slot 0 SHALL
contain a certificate chain that follows the Device certificate model
or the Alias certificate model. Regardless of the certificate model
used, a certificate chain comprises one or more DER-encoded X.509 v3
certificates [RFC5280]. The certificates MUST be concatenated with
no intermediate padding.
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spdm-certificates = {
default-cert-slot => cert-chain
? aux-cert-slots => cert-chain
}
; ASN.1 DER-encoded certificates concatenated with no intermediate
; padding.
cert-chain = bytes
default-cert-slot = 0
aux-cert-slots = 1..7
3.1.3. Negotiated State Preamble (Version, Capabilities and Algorithms)
The Negotiated State Preamble (i.e., vca) claim contains the
concatenation of messages GET_VERSION, VERSION, GET_CAPABILITIES,
CAPABILITIES, NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS, and ALGORITHMS last exchanged
between the SPDM Requester and Responder.
3.1.4. Submodule Naming
The namespace used for SPDM submodules is "spdm".
The name associated with an SPDM submodule is extracted from the leaf
certificate of the relevant device.
* If the leaf certificate contains a Subject Alternative Name of
type DMTFOtherName, the submodule name is the value contained in
ub-DMTF-device-info. For example: "spdm:ACME:WIDGET:0123456789".
* Otherwise, the submod name is the string representation of the
certificate Subject, as described in [RFC4514]. For example:
"spdm:C=CA,O=ACME,OU=Widget,CN=0123456789".
3.2. PCIe Legacy Device Claims
The definition of a device claims set for PCIe legacy devices that do
not implement the extensions needed to attest for their provenance
and configuration is provided, making it is possible to keep using
current assets as secures ones are being provisioned. This legacy
device claims set simply mirrors the type 0/1 common registers of the
PCIe configuration space, mandating only that the vendor and device
identification code be provided. Other fields of the configuration
space header may optionally be included should they add value. A
binary format of the PCIe configuration space is made available for
processing by existing PCIe configuration space tools. Implementers
may optionally choose to include both text and binary versions should
there be a use case to support this representation.
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=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
pcie-legacy-claims = {
&(eat_profile: 265) => "tag:linaro.org,2025:device-pcie-legacy#1.0\
.0"
pcie-legacy-artefacts
? $$pcie-legacy-claim-extension
}
pcie-legacy-artefacts //= (
&(artefacts-text: 3805) => pcie-type-0-1-config-space-text
&(artefacts-bytes: 3806) => pcie-type-0-1-config-space-bytes
)
pcie-legacy-artefacts //= (
&(artefacts-text: 3805) => pcie-type-0-1-config-space-text
)
pcie-legacy-artefacts //= (
&(artefacts-bytes: 3806) => pcie-type-0-1-config-space-bytes
)
pcie-type-0-1-config-space-bytes = bytes .size 256
pcie-type-0-1-config-space-text = {
&(vendorID: 1) => bytes .size 2
&(deviceID: 2) => bytes .size 2
? &(command: 3) => bytes .size 2
? &(status: 4) => bytes .size 2
? &(revisionID: 5) => bytes .size 1
? &(classCode: 6) => bytes .size 3
? &(cacheLineSize: 7) => bytes .size 1
? &(latencyTimer: 8) => bytes .size 1
? &(headerType: 9) => bytes .size 1
? &(BITS: 10) => bytes .size 1
}
3.2.1. Submodule Naming
The namespace used for legacy PCIe submodules is "legacy-pcie".
The name is any arbitrary string chosen by the implementation. For
example, "legacy-pcie:0000:01:02.0" where "0000" is the domain, "01"
the PCI bus id, "02" the device on the bus and "0" the device
function.
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4. Collated CDDL
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
dat = {
&(eat_profile: 265) => "tag:linaro.org,2025:device#1.0.0",
&(eat_nonce: 10) => bytes .size 64,
&(eat_submods: 266) => {+ device-name => $device-claims-set},
}
device-name = text .regexp "(legacy-pcie|spdm):.+"
$device-claims-set /= spdm-claims / cxl-claims / chi-claims / pcie-\
legacy-claims
spdm-claims = {
&(eat_profile: 265) => "tag:linaro.org,2025:device-spdm#1.0.0",
spdm-artefacts,
? &(vca: 3804) => bytes,
}
spdm-artefacts //= ((
&(measurements: 3802) => spdm-measurements,
&(certificates: 3803) => spdm-certificates,
) // &(measurements: 3802) => spdm-measurements // &(\
certificates: 3803) => spdm-certificates)
spdm-measurement = {
&(component-type: 1) => component-type,
measurement,
}
measurement //= (&(digest-measurement: 2) => digest-measurement // &\
(raw-measurement: 3) => raw-measurement)
component-type /= &(immutable-rom: 0) / &(mutable-firmware: 1) / &(\
hardware-config: 2) / &(firmware-config: 3) / &(freeform-measurement\
-manifest: 4) / &(device-mode: 5) / &(mutable-firmware-version: 6) \
/ &(mutable-firmware-svn: 7) / &(hash-extend-measurement: 8) / &(\
informational: 9) / &(structured-measurement-manifest: 10)
raw-measurement = bytes
digest-measurement = digest
digest = [
alg: uint / text,
val: bytes,
]
spdm-certificates = {
default-cert-slot => cert-chain,
? aux-cert-slots => cert-chain,
}
cert-chain = bytes
default-cert-slot = 0
aux-cert-slots = 1 .. 7
spdm-measurements = {
+ block-id => spdm-measurement,
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? "signature" => spdm-measurement-blocks-signature,
}
block-id = 1 .. 239
hash-algorithm-type /= &(tpm_alg_sha_256: 0) / &(tpm_alg_sha_384: 2\
) / &(tpm_alg_sha_512: 4) / &(tpm_alg_sha3_256: 8) / &(\
tpm_alg_sha3_384: 16) / &(tpm_alg_sha3_512: 32) / &(tpm_alg_sm3_256\
: 64)
spdm-measurement-blocks-signature = {
&(slot: 1) => 0 .. 7,
&(requester-nonce: 2) => bytes .size 32,
&(responder-nonce: 3) => bytes .size 32,
&(combined-spdm-prefix: 4) => bytes .size 100,
&(IL1: 5) => bytes,
&(base-hash-algo: 6) => hash-algorithm-type,
&(signature: 7) => bytes,
}
cxl-claims = {&(eat_profile: 265) => "tag:linaro.org,2025:device-cxl\
#1.0.0"}
chi-claims = {&(eat_profile: 265) => "tag:linaro.org,2025:device-chi\
#1.0.0"}
pcie-legacy-claims = {
&(eat_profile: 265) => "tag:linaro.org,2025:device-pcie-legacy#1.0\
.0",
pcie-legacy-artefacts,
? $$pcie-legacy-claim-extension,
}
pcie-legacy-artefacts //= ((
&(artefacts-text: 3805) => pcie-type-0-1-config-space-text,
&(artefacts-bytes: 3806) => pcie-type-0-1-config-space-bytes,
) // &(artefacts-text: 3805) => pcie-type-0-1-config-space-\
text // &(artefacts-bytes: 3806) => pcie-type-0-1-config-space-bytes)
pcie-type-0-1-config-space-bytes = bytes .size 256
pcie-type-0-1-config-space-text = {
&(vendorID: 1) => bytes .size 2,
&(deviceID: 2) => bytes .size 2,
? &(command: 3) => bytes .size 2,
? &(status: 4) => bytes .size 2,
? &(revisionID: 5) => bytes .size 1,
? &(classCode: 6) => bytes .size 3,
? &(cacheLineSize: 7) => bytes .size 1,
? &(latencyTimer: 8) => bytes .size 1,
? &(headerType: 9) => bytes .size 1,
? &(BITS: 10) => bytes .size 1,
}
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5. Security Considerations
TODO Security
6. IANA Considerations
6.1. New CWT Claims Registrations
IANA is requested to register the following claims in the "CBOR Web
Token (CWT) Claims" registry [IANA.cwt].
6.1.1. SPDM Measurements Claim
* Claim Name: spdm-measurements
* Claim Description: SPDM Measurements
* JWT Claim Name: N/A
* Claim Key: 3802
* Claim Value Type(s): map
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 3.1.1 of RFCthis
6.1.2. SPDM Certificates Claim
* Claim Name: spdm-certificates
* Claim Description: SPDM Certificates
* JWT Claim Name: N/A
* Claim Key: 3803
* Claim Value Type(s): map
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 3.1.2 of RFCthis
6.1.3. SPDM VCA Claim
* Claim Name: spdm-vca
* Claim Description: SPDM Version, Capabilities and Algorithms
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* JWT Claim Name: N/A
* Claim Key: 3804
* Claim Value Type(s): bytes
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 3.1.3 of RFCthis
6.1.4. PCIe Legacy Device Text Claim
* Claim Name: pcie-legacy-device-text
* Claim Description: PCIe Legacy Device Textual Representation
* JWT Claim Name: N/A
* Claim Key: 3805
* Claim Value Type(s): map
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of RFCthis
6.1.5. PCIe Legacy Device Binary Claim
* Claim Name: pcie-legacy-device-binary
* Claim Description: PCIe Legacy Device Binary Representation
* JWT Claim Name: N/A
* Claim Key: 3806
* Claim Value Type(s): bytes
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of RFCthis
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[IANA.cwt] IANA, "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt>.
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[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names",
RFC 4514, DOI 10.17487/RFC4514, June 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4514>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC9711] Lundblade, L., Mandyam, G., O'Donoghue, J., and C.
Wallace, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", RFC 9711,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9711, April 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9711>.
7.2. Informative References
[SPDM] DMTF, "Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM)
Specification Version: 1.3.2", 21 August 2024,
<https://www.dmtf.org/sites/default/files/standards/
documents/DSP0274_1.3.2.pdf>.
Appendix A. Examples
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=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
{
/ profile / 265: "tag:linaro.org,2025:device#1.0.0",
/ nonce / 10: h'\
f9efc3341597f75f8d94432ad39566a8c5704b2004ba001c094f475bfc057f9f25d7\
aa40cd86cd30ebaae746fb19f008c1e6a1f23ad6a178e18dceda918f7f6e',
/ submods / 266: {
"spdm:ACME:WIDGET-A:0123456789": {
/ profile / 265: "tag:linaro.org,2025:device-spdm#1.0.0",
/ measurements / 0x0eda: {
1: {
/ component-type / 1: 2, / hardware config /
/ raw-measurement / 3: h'4f6d616861'
}
},
/ certificates / 0x0edb: {
/ device certs / 0: h'\
676f616e6e61747261646974696f6e6d6f6e676572'
/ no aux certs /
}
},
"spdm:C=CA,O=ACME,OU=Widget-B,CN=9876543210": {
/ profile / 265: "tag:linaro.org,2025:device-spdm#1.0.0",
/ measurements / 0x0eda: {
1: {
/ component-type / 1: 1, / mutable firmware /
/ digest-measurement / 2: [
/ alg / 1,
/ val / h'6b656e6e656c6c79'
]
},
6: {
/ component-type / 1: 2, / hardware config /
/ digest measurement / 2: [
/ alg / 0,
/ val / h'756e646572637279'
]
}
},
/ certificates / 0x0edb: {
/ device certs / 0: h'61746865697A656178696C6C6172',
/ aux certs (slot=2) / 2: h'23451576923AE99106783948598A'
}
}
}
}
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Acknowledgments
Thank you Basma El Gaabouri, Henk Birkholz, James Bottomley, Lukas
Wunner, Simon Frost and Yousuf Sait for your comments and
suggestions.
Authors' Addresses
Mathieu Poirier
Linaro
Email: mathieu.poirier@linaro.org
Thomas Fossati
Linaro
Email: thomas.fossati@linaro.org
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