Requirements for Assured End-to-End Signaling Security within the Session Initiation Protocol
draft-polk-sipping-e2e-sec-assurance-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | James Polk | ||
| Last updated | 2005-07-13 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) has existing mechanisms for securing its signaling messages. SIP has several transport layers it works across: TCP, UDP, SCTP, and TLS over TCP. There currently is no mechanism to ensure that if TLS over TCP is chosen by the originating UAC, the messaging will remain encrypted on a hop-by-hop basis to the destination UAS. This document discusses this scenario, providing the requirements for such to exist, and offering pieces of a possible solution for this set of requirements.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)