Recursive to Authoritative DNS with Opportunistic Encryption
draft-pp-recursive-authoritative-opportunistic-04
Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(dprive WG)
Expired & archived
|
|
---|---|---|---|
Author | Paul E. Hoffman | ||
Last updated | 2021-02-13 (Latest revision 2021-01-13) | ||
Replaced by | draft-ietf-dprive-opportunistic-adotq | ||
RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
Stream | WG state | Adopted by a WG | |
Document shepherd | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-dprive-opportunistic-adotq | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document describes a use case and a method for a DNS recursive resolver to use opportunistic encryption (that is, encryption with optional authentication) when communicating with authoritative servers. The motivating use case for this method is that more encryption on the Internet is better, and opportunistic encryption is better than no encryption at all. The method here is optional for both the recursive resolver and the authoritative server. Nothing in this method prevents use cases and methods that can use, or require, authenticated encryption.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)