HQC-KEM Key Agreement for TLS 1.3
draft-preussmattsson-tls-hqckem-03
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | John Preuß Mattsson , Sini Ruohomaa , Quynh Dang | ||
| Last updated | 2026-10-20 | ||
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| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
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draft-preussmattsson-tls-hqckem-03
Transport Layer Security J. Preuß Mattsson
Internet-Draft S. Ruohomaa
Intended status: Informational Ericsson
Expires: 23 April 2027 Q. Dang
NIST
20 October 2026
HQC-KEM Key Agreement for TLS 1.3
draft-preussmattsson-tls-hqckem-03
Abstract
This document defines nine quantum-resistant TLS 1.3 key exchange
algorithms based on HQC-KEM, the code-based KEM selected by NIST for
standardization in forthcoming FIPS 207. Three use HQC-KEM
standalone, two combine it with X25519 or X448 in PQ/T hybrids, two
combine it with ML-KEM in PQ/PQ hybrids, and two combine it with ML-
KEM and X25519 or X448 in PQ/PQ/T hybrids. Because HQC-KEM relies on
hardness assumptions and constructions different from those
underlying lattice-based ML-KEM, these algorithms provide algorithmic
diversity that can mitigate the impact of future cryptanalytic
advances or implementation weaknesses in lattice-based cryptography.
The algorithms are intended for TLS 1.3, DTLS 1.3, and QUIC, and the
hybrid algorithms follow the general hybrid key exchange construction
defined for TLS 1.3.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 April 2027.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. HQC-KEM Key Exchange Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. HQCKEM128, HQCKEM192, and HQCKEM256 . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. HQCKEM192X25519 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4. HQCKEM256X448 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.5. HQCKEM192MLKEM768 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.6. HQCKEM256MLKEM1024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.7. HQCKEM192MLKEM768X25519 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.8. HQCKEM256MLKEM1024X448 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.9. Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.10. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1. Algorithmic Diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.1. HQCKEM128 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2. HQCKEM192 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.3. HQCKEM256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.4. HQCKEM192X25519 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.5. HQCKEM256X448 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.6. HQCKEM192MLKEM768 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.7. HQCKEM256MLKEM1024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.8. HQCKEM192MLKEM768X25519 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.9. HQCKEM256MLKEM1024X448 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
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1. Introduction
The transition to post-quantum cryptography requires new key exchange
mechanisms for TLS 1.3 [RFC9846]. ML-KEM [FIPS203] is the primary
post-quantum KEM and is used in TLS 1.3 both standalone
[I-D.ietf-tls-mlkem] and in hybrid key exchange algorithms such as
X25519MLKEM768 [RFC10024]. ML-KEM is lattice-based, and its security
relies on the hardness of the Module Learning With Errors (MLWE)
problem.
In March 2025, NIST selected HQC (Hamming Quasi-Cyclic) for
standardization as a second post-quantum KEM [NISTIR8545]. HQC-KEM
is code-based, and its security relies on the hardness of decoding
random quasi-cyclic codes. NIST selected HQC to provide a backup to
ML-KEM that is based on a different hardness assumption and
construction, so that a future cryptanalytic breakthrough against
lattice-based cryptography or ML-KEM does not leave deployments
without a standardized post-quantum KEM. NIST is specifying HQC-KEM
in the forthcoming [FIPS207]. In addition to NIST, European
cybersecurity agencies have high trust in HQC-KEM. For example,
ANSSI labels HQC-KEM as "higher confidence", together with ML-KEM,
ML-DSA, and FrodoKEM [ANSSI25]. HQC-KEM has larger encapsulation
keys and ciphertexts and is slower than ML-KEM [PQ-PQ].
Editor's note: At the time of writing, FIPS 207 has not been
published, not even as an Initial Public Draft. This document is
based on the HQC specification of 2026-10-12 [HQC]. All
references to [FIPS207], including section references, parameter
set names, and the sizes in Section 3.1, need to be verified and
updated once FIPS 207 is published. This note is to be removed
before publication as an RFC.
[RFC9954] specifies a general design for hybrid key exchange in TLS
1.3. This document applies that design to six hybrid key exchange
algorithms and separately defines three standalone key exchange
algorithms based on HQC-KEM.
* HQCKEM128, HQCKEM192, and HQCKEM256 use the HQC-KEM parameter sets
targeting security categories 1, 3, and 5 [SP800-57],
respectively, without any other component. They provide security
against quantum attackers as long as HQC-KEM remains secure.
Standalone code points are defined for every HQC-KEM parameter set
in [FIPS207], consistent with the standalone ML-KEM code points
[I-D.ietf-tls-mlkem].
* HQCKEM192X25519 and HQCKEM256X448 are PQ/T hybrids [RFC9794] that
combine HQC-KEM with the traditional elliptic-curve algorithms
X25519 and X448 [RFC7748]. They provide security against quantum
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attackers as long as HQC-KEM remains secure and security against
classical attackers as long as at least one of the two components
remains secure.
* HQCKEM192MLKEM768 and HQCKEM256MLKEM1024 are PQ/PQ hybrids
[RFC9794] that combine HQC-KEM with ML-KEM [FIPS203]. They
provide security against quantum attackers as long as at least one
of the code-based and lattice-based components remains secure,
mitigating the impact of future cryptanalytic advances or
implementation weaknesses against either component.
* HQCKEM192MLKEM768X25519 and HQCKEM256MLKEM1024X448 are PQ/PQ/T
hybrids that combine HQC-KEM with both ML-KEM and X25519 or X448,
respectively. They provide security against quantum attackers as
long as at least one of the post-quantum components remains
secure, and security against classical attackers as long as at
least one of the three components remains secure.
Recent developments have increased interest in algorithmic diversity
and conservative key exchange designs. In particular, a claimed
polynomial-time quantum algorithm for the Dihedral Coset Problem
(DCP) [Simon26], which was subsequently challenged [GRZ26], prompted
discussion about the security of lattice-based cryptography, while
recent advances in the cryptanalysis of Goppa codes have challenged
long-standing assumptions and led BSI to no longer recommend Classic
McEliece [ISO18033-2-AMD2] for new developments [BSI]. The
algorithms specified in this document provide algorithmic diversity,
while the PQ/PQ and PQ/PQ/T hybrids provide a conservative design,
with significantly smaller key shares and better performance [PQ-PQ]
than FrodoKEM [ISO18033-2-AMD2].
The algorithms in this document are not intended to replace ML-KEM in
latency-sensitive deployments such as the Web. The PQ/PQ and PQ/PQ/T
hybrids primarily target high-security deployments where the
protected information may need to remain confidential for decades and
handshake latency is less critical.
The algorithms defined in this document are intended for use with TLS
1.3 [RFC9846], DTLS 1.3 [RFC9147], and QUIC [RFC9001]. The hybrid
algorithms follow the hybrid key exchange construction defined in
[RFC9954], which for the PQ/PQ/T hybrids is applied with three
components. This document defines additional TLS NamedGroup values
and specifies the encoding of the associated key shares and
asymmetric shared secrets, using the terminology of [RFC9846]. It
does not modify the TLS 1.3 handshake, key schedule, or negotiation
mechanisms.
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2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This document uses the terminology of TLS 1.3 [RFC9846], hybrid key
exchange in TLS 1.3 [RFC9954], hybrid schemes [RFC9794], ML-KEM
[FIPS203], and HQC-KEM [FIPS207].
In this document, HQC-KEM-128, HQC-KEM-192, and HQC-KEM-256 denote
the HQC-KEM parameter sets targeting security categories 1, 3, and 5,
respectively. These correspond to the parameter sets named HQC-1,
HQC-3, and HQC-5 in [HQC].
Editor's note: Update the parameter set names to match those used
in [FIPS207].
This document uses three distinct terms for shared values:
Shared secret key: The 32-byte output of HQC-KEM and ML-KEM
encapsulation and decapsulation, as defined in [FIPS207] and
[FIPS203]. Shared secret keys are computationally
indistinguishable from uniformly random bit strings and can be
used directly as symmetric keys without additional key derivation.
Shared secret: The output of the X25519 and X448 functions, as
defined in [RFC7748]. Shared secrets are encodings of field
elements, are easily distinguishable from uniformly random bit
strings, and require key derivation before use as keys.
Asymmetric shared secret: The value produced by the key exchange and
used as input to HKDF-Extract in the TLS 1.3 key schedule, from
which all traffic keys are derived, see Section 7.4 of [RFC9846]
and Section 7.1 of [RFC9846]. The previous specification of TLS
1.3 [RFC8446] referred to this value as the (EC)DHE shared secret.
For the standalone algorithms in this document, the asymmetric
shared secret is the HQC-KEM shared secret key. For the hybrid
algorithms, it is the concatenation of the shared secret keys and
shared secrets of the components.
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3. HQC-KEM Key Exchange Algorithms
This document defines nine TLS NamedGroups for use with the TLS 1.3
supported_groups and key_share extensions. For the hybrid
algorithms, key shares and asymmetric shared secrets are encoded by
concatenating the component values in the order indicated by the
name. All encodings are fixed-length.
For all algorithms, the client key_exchange value contains the
encapsulation key or public key of each component, and the server
key_exchange value contains the ciphertext or public key of each
component. The HQC-KEM and ML-KEM shared secret keys are produced by
encapsulation and decapsulation as specified in [FIPS207] and
[FIPS203]. The X25519 and X448 shared secrets are produced as
specified in Section 7.4.2 of [RFC9846].
3.1. Sizes
Table 1 summarizes the security category and the sizes in bytes of
the client key share, the server key share, and the asymmetric shared
secret for each algorithm.
+=========================+==========+======+========+============+
| NamedGroup | Security |Client| Server | Asymmetric |
| | category | share| share | shared |
| | | | | secret |
+=========================+==========+======+========+============+
| HQCKEM128 | 1 | 2241| 4433 | 32 |
+-------------------------+----------+------+--------+------------+
| HQCKEM192 | 3 | 4514| 8978 | 32 |
+-------------------------+----------+------+--------+------------+
| HQCKEM256 | 5 | 7237| 14421 | 32 |
+-------------------------+----------+------+--------+------------+
| HQCKEM192X25519 | 3 | 4546| 9010 | 64 |
+-------------------------+----------+------+--------+------------+
| HQCKEM256X448 | 5 | 7293| 14477 | 88 |
+-------------------------+----------+------+--------+------------+
| HQCKEM192MLKEM768 | 3 | 5698| 10066 | 64 |
+-------------------------+----------+------+--------+------------+
| HQCKEM256MLKEM1024 | 5 | 8805| 15989 | 64 |
+-------------------------+----------+------+--------+------------+
| HQCKEM192MLKEM768X25519 | 3 | 5730| 10098 | 96 |
+-------------------------+----------+------+--------+------------+
| HQCKEM256MLKEM1024X448 | 5 | 8861| 16045 | 120 |
+-------------------------+----------+------+--------+------------+
Table 1: Security Categories and Key Share and Asymmetric
Shared Secret Sizes in Bytes
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All key share sizes are well below the maximum key_exchange length of
2^16 - 1 bytes.
3.2. HQCKEM128, HQCKEM192, and HQCKEM256
For HQCKEM128, HQCKEM192, and HQCKEM256, the client key_exchange
value contains the HQC-KEM-128, HQC-KEM-192, or HQC-KEM-256
encapsulation key, respectively:
struct {
opaque hqckem_encapsulation_key[2241];
} HQCKEM128ClientShare;
struct {
opaque hqckem_encapsulation_key[4514];
} HQCKEM192ClientShare;
struct {
opaque hqckem_encapsulation_key[7237];
} HQCKEM256ClientShare;
The server key_exchange value contains the HQC-KEM ciphertext:
struct {
opaque hqckem_ciphertext[4433];
} HQCKEM128ServerShare;
struct {
opaque hqckem_ciphertext[8978];
} HQCKEM192ServerShare;
struct {
opaque hqckem_ciphertext[14421];
} HQCKEM256ServerShare;
The 32-byte asymmetric shared secret input to the TLS 1.3 key
schedule is the HQC-KEM shared secret key.
3.3. HQCKEM192X25519
For HQCKEM192X25519, the client key_exchange value contains the HQC-
KEM-192 encapsulation key followed by the X25519 public key:
struct {
opaque hqckem_encapsulation_key[4514];
opaque x25519_public_key[32];
} HQCKEM192X25519ClientShare;
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The server key_exchange value contains the HQC-KEM-192 ciphertext
followed by the X25519 public key:
struct {
opaque hqckem_ciphertext[8978];
opaque x25519_public_key[32];
} HQCKEM192X25519ServerShare;
The 64-byte asymmetric shared secret input to the TLS 1.3 key
schedule is the concatenation of the HQC-KEM shared secret key
followed by the X25519 shared secret:
asymmetric_shared_secret =
HQCKEM192_shared_secret_key || X25519_shared_secret
3.4. HQCKEM256X448
For HQCKEM256X448, the client key_exchange value contains the HQC-
KEM-256 encapsulation key followed by the X448 public key:
struct {
opaque hqckem_encapsulation_key[7237];
opaque x448_public_key[56];
} HQCKEM256X448ClientShare;
The server key_exchange value contains the HQC-KEM-256 ciphertext
followed by the X448 public key:
struct {
opaque hqckem_ciphertext[14421];
opaque x448_public_key[56];
} HQCKEM256X448ServerShare;
The 88-byte asymmetric shared secret input to the TLS 1.3 key
schedule is the concatenation of the HQC-KEM shared secret key
followed by the X448 shared secret:
asymmetric_shared_secret =
HQCKEM256_shared_secret_key || X448_shared_secret
3.5. HQCKEM192MLKEM768
For HQCKEM192MLKEM768, the client key_exchange value contains the
HQC-KEM-192 encapsulation key followed by the ML-KEM-768
encapsulation key:
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struct {
opaque hqckem_encapsulation_key[4514];
opaque mlkem_encapsulation_key[1184];
} HQCKEM192MLKEM768ClientShare;
The server key_exchange value contains the HQC-KEM-192 ciphertext
followed by the ML-KEM-768 ciphertext:
struct {
opaque hqckem_ciphertext[8978];
opaque mlkem_ciphertext[1088];
} HQCKEM192MLKEM768ServerShare;
The 64-byte asymmetric shared secret input to the TLS 1.3 key
schedule is the concatenation of the HQC-KEM shared secret key
followed by the ML-KEM shared secret key:
asymmetric_shared_secret =
HQCKEM192_shared_secret_key || MLKEM768_shared_secret_key
3.6. HQCKEM256MLKEM1024
For HQCKEM256MLKEM1024, the client key_exchange value contains the
HQC-KEM-256 encapsulation key followed by the ML-KEM-1024
encapsulation key:
struct {
opaque hqckem_encapsulation_key[7237];
opaque mlkem_encapsulation_key[1568];
} HQCKEM256MLKEM1024ClientShare;
The server key_exchange value contains the HQC-KEM-256 ciphertext
followed by the ML-KEM-1024 ciphertext:
struct {
opaque hqckem_ciphertext[14421];
opaque mlkem_ciphertext[1568];
} HQCKEM256MLKEM1024ServerShare;
The 64-byte asymmetric shared secret input to the TLS 1.3 key
schedule is the concatenation of the HQC-KEM shared secret key
followed by the ML-KEM shared secret key:
asymmetric_shared_secret =
HQCKEM256_shared_secret_key || MLKEM1024_shared_secret_key
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3.7. HQCKEM192MLKEM768X25519
For HQCKEM192MLKEM768X25519, the client key_exchange value contains
the HQC-KEM-192 encapsulation key, followed by the ML-KEM-768
encapsulation key, followed by the X25519 public key:
struct {
opaque hqckem_encapsulation_key[4514];
opaque mlkem_encapsulation_key[1184];
opaque x25519_public_key[32];
} HQCKEM192MLKEM768X25519ClientShare;
The server key_exchange value contains the HQC-KEM-192 ciphertext,
followed by the ML-KEM-768 ciphertext, followed by the X25519 public
key:
struct {
opaque hqckem_ciphertext[8978];
opaque mlkem_ciphertext[1088];
opaque x25519_public_key[32];
} HQCKEM192MLKEM768X25519ServerShare;
The 96-byte asymmetric shared secret input to the TLS 1.3 key
schedule is the concatenation of the HQC-KEM shared secret key,
followed by the ML-KEM shared secret key, followed by the X25519
shared secret:
asymmetric_shared_secret =
HQCKEM192_shared_secret_key || MLKEM768_shared_secret_key ||
X25519_shared_secret
3.8. HQCKEM256MLKEM1024X448
For HQCKEM256MLKEM1024X448, the client key_exchange value contains
the HQC-KEM-256 encapsulation key, followed by the ML-KEM-1024
encapsulation key, followed by the X448 public key:
struct {
opaque hqckem_encapsulation_key[7237];
opaque mlkem_encapsulation_key[1568];
opaque x448_public_key[56];
} HQCKEM256MLKEM1024X448ClientShare;
The server key_exchange value contains the HQC-KEM-256 ciphertext,
followed by the ML-KEM-1024 ciphertext, followed by the X448 public
key:
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struct {
opaque hqckem_ciphertext[14421];
opaque mlkem_ciphertext[1568];
opaque x448_public_key[56];
} HQCKEM256MLKEM1024X448ServerShare;
The 120-byte asymmetric shared secret input to the TLS 1.3 key
schedule is the concatenation of the HQC-KEM shared secret key,
followed by the ML-KEM shared secret key, followed by the X448 shared
secret:
asymmetric_shared_secret =
HQCKEM256_shared_secret_key || MLKEM1024_shared_secret_key ||
X448_shared_secret
3.9. Validation
Both client and server MUST check that the received key share has the
length given in Table 1 for the negotiated group and abort with an
"illegal_parameter" alert if it fails.
The server MUST perform any encapsulation key checks specified in
[FIPS207] on the client's HQC-KEM encapsulation key and abort with an
"illegal_parameter" alert if they fail. For algorithms with an ML-
KEM component, the server MUST also perform the encapsulation key
check described in Section 7.2 of [FIPS203] on the client's ML-KEM
encapsulation key and abort with an "illegal_parameter" alert if it
fails.
Editor's note: Add a section reference to the HQC-KEM input checks
in [FIPS207], if any are specified.
If HQC-KEM or ML-KEM decapsulation fails for any reason, the client
MUST abort with an "internal_error" alert.
For algorithms with an X25519 or X448 component, both client and
server MUST calculate the X25519 or X448 shared secret as described
in Section 7.4.2 of [RFC9846], including the check that the shared
secret is not the all-zero value, and abort with an
"illegal_parameter" alert if it fails.
3.10. Implementation Considerations
The HQC-KEM decapsulation key is a 32-byte seed. Clients can avoid
expanding the seed twice by retaining the expanded key in memory from
key generation until the server's key share has been processed.
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Editor's note: The decapsulation key format follows the HQC
specification of 2026-10-12 [HQC]. Update this text if [FIPS207]
specifies a different format.
4. Security Considerations
The hybrid algorithms defined in this document use the hybrid
construction specified in [RFC9954]. Their security relies on the
TLS 1.3 transcript binding and key schedule. The security
considerations in [RFC9846], [FIPS207], [FIPS203], [SP800-227],
[RFC7748], and [RFC9954] apply to the algorithms defined in this
document. A key share, or any of its components, MUST NOT be reused
for multiple connections, as required by TLS 1.3 [RFC9846].
HQC-KEM-128, HQC-KEM-192, and HQC-KEM-256 target post-quantum
security categories 1, 3, and 5 [SP800-57], respectively. All
algorithms with HQC-KEM-256 provide security category 5, matching the
security level of cipher suites with AES-256 and ChaCha20.
HQC-KEM is designed to provide indistinguishability under adaptive
chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2) security [HQC]. The security of
HQC-KEM relies on the hardness of decoding random quasi-cyclic codes,
which is a different assumption than the module lattice assumptions
underlying ML-KEM. HQC-KEM therefore provides algorithmic diversity
for deployments concerned about future cryptanalytic advances against
lattice-based cryptography, see Section 4.1. Hybrid constructions
also protect against implementation vulnerabilities, such as side-
channel leakage or software bugs, in one of the component algorithms.
Compared with X25519MLKEM768 [RFC10024], which has the value Y in the
Recommended column of the IANA TLS Supported Groups registry [IANA],
HQCKEM192MLKEM768X25519 and HQCKEM256MLKEM1024X448 provide greater
security margin and algorithmic diversity, at the cost of larger
messages and higher computational cost. The key share sizes and the
computational cost are dominated by the HQC-KEM component.
The hybrid key exchange algorithms defined in this document are
compatible with the key combiner specified in [SP800-227] and the
CatKDF key combiner specified in [ETSI-TS-103-744]. The security
analysis of [RFC9954] applies, and all hybrid algorithms retain the
security of their strongest component.
A fundamental requirement of hybrid constructions is that their
security is at least as high as that of their strongest component;
that is, the construction preserves the cryptographic security
properties of its components [EU25], [EU26], [NCSC26], [SP800-227].
The hybrid key exchange algorithms defined in this document are
designed to meet this requirement and preserve the quantum resistance
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and IND-CCA2 security of HQC-KEM and ML-KEM. X25519 provides
approximately 128 bits of classical security and X448 approximately
224 bits of classical security [RFC7748]; neither provides quantum
resistance. Compared with P-curves and Brainpool curves offering a
comparable security level, X25519 and X448 are significantly faster
and provide greater implementation robustness.
Deployments that require a traditional component in the key exchange,
for example due to regulatory recommendations, should use the PQ/T or
PQ/PQ/T hybrids rather than the PQ/PQ hybrids or the standalone
algorithms. Note that it is uncertain whether regulators worldwide
will continue to approve cryptographic constructions such as PQ/T or
PQ/PQ/T hybrids once the traditional component has been deprecated.
The algorithms can be combined with an external pre-shared key (PSK)
using the TLS 1.3 "psk_dhe_ke" key exchange mode [RFC9846],
optionally together with certificate-based authentication [RFC9973].
This yields PQ/PSK hybrids without any additional code points.
Availability is a fundamental security property and part of the CIA
triad in information security [SP800-12]. HQC-KEM encapsulation keys
and ciphertexts are significantly larger than those of ML-KEM at the
same security category. Large client key shares are known to cause
interoperability problems with non-compliant or buggy legacy TLS
implementations, as well as with middleboxes and other network
infrastructure that impose non-compliant limitations on large TLS
ClientHello messages. Large key shares also increase bandwidth,
memory, and computational costs for constrained endpoints or
deployments operating over lossy or bandwidth-constrained networks,
potentially reducing availability. Clients may choose to advertise
the groups in this document in the supported_groups extension without
sending a corresponding key share in the initial ClientHello, at the
cost of an additional round trip if the server selects one of them
using HelloRetryRequest.
An HQC-KEM ciphertext is roughly twice the size of the encapsulation
key, making the server's first flight much larger than the
ClientHello. Each transport can pay extra round trips for this. In
QUIC, the anti-amplification limit can delay the server's first
flight until the client's address is validated. DTLS 1.3 servers
SHOULD verify return routability with a HelloRetryRequest cookie
(Section 5.1 of [RFC9147]) before sending an HQC-KEM ciphertext when
the client's address has not otherwise been validated.
Implementations MUST NOT use the algorithms defined in this document
with TLS 1.2 or DTLS 1.2, which are obsolete and should be phased out
as soon as possible. 3GPP already mandates that TLS 1.2 be disabled
by default [TS33.210].
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Editor's note: This requirement will appear in a future version of
[TS33.210]. Update the reference when published.
4.1. Algorithmic Diversity
One risk to consider is a novel algorithm that breaks most of
lattice-based cryptography, regardless of whether the underlying
lattices are structured, as in ML-KEM [FIPS203], or unstructured, as
in FrodoKEM [ISO18033-2-AMD2]. For example, a polynomial-time
quantum algorithm for the Dihedral Coset Problem (DCP) would, by
Regev's reduction [Regev04] as improved by Brakerski et al.
[BKSW18], yield a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for the Learning
With Errors (LWE) problem. The best known quantum algorithm for DCP
is Kuperberg's subexponential-time algorithm [Kuperberg05]. Claimed
polynomial-time quantum algorithms for LWE in 2024 [Chen24] and for
DCP in 2026 [Simon26] [GRZ26] were subsequently refuted or
challenged, but illustrate that this remains an active research area.
HQC-KEM relies on the hardness of decoding random quasi-cyclic codes
in the Hamming metric, and efficient algorithms for DCP or LWE are
not known to imply an efficient decoding algorithm for such codes.
Recent advances in the cryptanalysis of Goppa codes have challenged
long-standing assumptions and led BSI to no longer recommend the ISO-
standardized Classic McEliece [ISO18033-2-AMD2] for new developments
[BSI]. While HQC-KEM [FIPS207] is also code-based like Classic
McEliece, its security relies on the hardness of decoding random
quasi-cyclic codes and is not affected by advances in cryptanalysis
of Goppa codes.
The algorithms specified in this document provide algorithmic
diversity, and the PQ/PQ and PQ/PQ/T hybrids provide a conservative
design. They remain secure against quantum attackers unless both the
lattice-based and code-based components are broken. Compared with
FrodoKEM [ISO18033-2-AMD2], the combination of ML-KEM and HQC-KEM has
significantly smaller key shares and requires roughly an order of
magnitude fewer CPU cycles at the same security category [PQ-PQ].
These hybrids are particularly well suited to high-security
applications where handshake latency is not a primary concern.
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Nation-state attackers have a long history of recording high-value
encrypted traffic and decrypting it later, once better cryptanalytic
tools become available. A key exchange therefore has to be chosen at
deployment time to provide adequate confidentiality for the entire
period during which the protected information remains sensitive,
which may be decades. This cannot be fixed afterwards. Traffic
recorded before a cryptographic transition remains protected only by
the key exchange used at the time, and a single transfer of sensitive
data over an inadequately protected connection, such as a backup, can
expose all of that data.
PQ/T hybrids do not protect against quantum attackers if the post-
quantum component is broken, as a quantum attacker can break the
traditional component. Robust security against quantum attackers,
that is, security that survives the break of a single post-quantum
algorithm, requires either a PQ/PQ or PQ/PSK hybrid. Ekerå strongly
recommends PQ/PSK hybrids [Ekera], as the pre-shared key preserves
security even if the post-quantum algorithm is broken. However, PQ/
PSK hybrids require symmetric keys to be provisioned in advance,
which may be impractical in many use cases due to the challenges of
key provisioning and trust establishment.
Cryptographic agility is the capability to quickly change
cryptographic algorithms in response to evolving security
requirements or newly discovered vulnerabilities, while maintaining
interoperability and system functionality. Supporting both ML-KEM
and HQC-KEM enables a system to transition between lattice-based and
code-based key establishment. However, agility only protects
connections established after the transition, as discussed above.
This is why hybrid key establishment, particularly PQ/PQ hybrids, is
important for key exchange, but the same rationale does not generally
apply to digital signatures.
Furthermore, in environments where cryptographic updates are slow,
upgrading all legacy nodes can take a decade, so a post-quantum
algorithm found to be weak cannot be swapped out quickly. PQ/PQ and
PQ/PQ/T hybrids provide an additional security margin here: unlike
hybrids with a single post-quantum component, they keep previously
protected data confidential against quantum adversaries even if one
of the post-quantum components is later broken.
ML-KEM and HQC are both structured schemes built on polynomial rings,
so a natural concern is that an attack exploiting ring structure
might apply to both. The rings, however, differ in essential ways.
ML-KEM works over Z_q[X]/(X^256 + 1) with q = 3329. This ring splits
into 128 quadratic factors, which ML-KEM exploits for fast NTT-based
multiplication. Its secrets and errors are small in absolute value,
and its security rests on the Module-LWE problem. HQC works over
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F_2[X]/(X^n − 1), where n is a prime chosen so that X^n − 1 factors
only as (X − 1) times a single irreducible polynomial, deliberately
limiting exploitable substructure. Its secrets and errors are sparse
in Hamming weight, and its security rests on the quasi-cyclic
syndrome decoding problem. The two rings therefore differ in
characteristic, in how they factor, and in the notion of "small" on
which hardness depends. No known attack technique or reduction
establishes that an efficient solution to the underlying problem of
one scheme would yield an efficient attack on the other.
5. IANA Considerations
This document requests that IANA register nine new entries in the TLS
Supported Groups registry [IANA], according to the procedures in
Section 6 of [RFC9847].
5.1. HQCKEM128
Value: TBD1
Description: HQCKEM128
DTLS-OK: Y
Recommended: N
Reference: This document
Comment: Standalone HQC-KEM-128
5.2. HQCKEM192
Value: TBD2
Description: HQCKEM192
DTLS-OK: Y
Recommended: N
Reference: This document
Comment: Standalone HQC-KEM-192
5.3. HQCKEM256
Value: TBD3
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Description: HQCKEM256
DTLS-OK: Y
Recommended: N
Reference: This document
Comment: Standalone HQC-KEM-256
5.4. HQCKEM192X25519
Value: TBD4
Description: HQCKEM192X25519
DTLS-OK: Y
Recommended: N
Reference: This document
Comment: PQ/T hybrid combining HQC-KEM-192 with X25519
5.5. HQCKEM256X448
Value: TBD5
Description: HQCKEM256X448
DTLS-OK: Y
Recommended: N
Reference: This document
Comment: PQ/T hybrid combining HQC-KEM-256 with X448
5.6. HQCKEM192MLKEM768
Value: TBD6
Description: HQCKEM192MLKEM768
DTLS-OK: Y
Recommended: N
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Reference: This document
Comment: PQ/PQ hybrid combining HQC-KEM-192 with ML-KEM-768
5.7. HQCKEM256MLKEM1024
Value: TBD7
Description: HQCKEM256MLKEM1024
DTLS-OK: Y
Recommended: N
Reference: This document
Comment: PQ/PQ hybrid combining HQC-KEM-256 with ML-KEM-1024
5.8. HQCKEM192MLKEM768X25519
Value: TBD8
Description: HQCKEM192MLKEM768X25519
DTLS-OK: Y
Recommended: N
Reference: This document
Comment: PQ/PQ/T hybrid combining HQC-KEM-192 with ML-KEM-768 and
X25519
5.9. HQCKEM256MLKEM1024X448
Value: TBD9
Description: HQCKEM256MLKEM1024X448
DTLS-OK: Y
Recommended: N
Reference: This document
Comment: PQ/PQ/T hybrid combining HQC-KEM-256 with ML-KEM-1024 and
X448
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6. References
6.1. Normative References
[FIPS203] "Module-lattice-based key-encapsulation mechanism
standard", National Institute of Standards and Technology
(U.S.), DOI 10.6028/nist.fips.203, August 2024,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.fips.203>.
[FIPS207] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Hamming
Quasi-Cyclic Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard
(forthcoming)", FIPS 207, <https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/
post-quantum-cryptography>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC7748] Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves
for Security", RFC 7748, DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, January
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7748>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC9001] Thomson, M., Ed. and S. Turner, Ed., "Using TLS to Secure
QUIC", RFC 9001, DOI 10.17487/RFC9001, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9001>.
[RFC9147] Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
1.3", RFC 9147, DOI 10.17487/RFC9147, April 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9147>.
[RFC9846] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 9846, DOI 10.17487/RFC9846, July 2026,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9846>.
[RFC9847] Salowey, J. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for TLS
and DTLS", RFC 9847, DOI 10.17487/RFC9847, December 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9847>.
[RFC9954] Stebila, D., Fluhrer, S., and S. Gueron, "Hybrid Key
Exchange in TLS 1.3", RFC 9954, DOI 10.17487/RFC9954, July
2026, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9954>.
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[SP800-227]
Alagic, G., Barker, E., Chen, L., Moody, D., Robinson, A.,
Silberg, H., and N. Waller, "Recommendations for key-
encapsulation mechanisms", National Institute of Standards
and Technology (U.S.), DOI 10.6028/nist.sp.800-227,
September 2025, <https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.sp.800-227>.
6.2. Informative References
[ANSSI25] Martinelli, A., "ANSSI views on technical aspects of the
migration to PQC", 25 March 2025,
<https://na.eventscloud.com/file_uploads/
b635298de1c10be6d3732863e8b1beca_Day2-1600-ANSSI.pdf>.
[BKSW18] Brakerski, Z., Kirshanova, E., Stehlé, D., and W. Wen,
"Learning with Errors and Extrapolated Dihedral Cosets",
Springer International Publishing, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science pp. 702-727,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-76581-5_24, ISBN ["9783319765808",
"9783319765815"], 2018,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76581-5_24>.
[BSI] Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), "Notes on
recent developments concerning Classic McEliece", 1
October 2026,
<https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/
Crypto/Notes_Classic_McEliece.pdf>.
[Chen24] Chen, Y., "Quantum Algorithms for Lattice Problems",
Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2024/555, 2024,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/555>.
[Ekera] Ekerå, M., "On factoring integers, and computing discrete
logarithms and orders, quantumly", 2024,
<https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1902626/
FULLTEXT01.pdf>.
[ETSI-TS-103-744]
ETSI, "Quantum-safe Hybrid Key Exchanges", ETSI TS 103
744, February 2026, <https://www.etsi.org/deliver/
etsi_ts/103700_103799/103744/01.02.02_60/
ts_103744v010202p.pdf>.
[EU25] NIS Cooperation Group, "A Coordinated Implementation
Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography",
June 2025, <https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection/
document/117507>.
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[EU26] NIS Cooperation Group, "EU Roadmap on PQC – Frequently
Asked Questions", April 2026,
<https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection/
document/132120>.
[GRZ26] Gupte, A., Ragavan, S., and M. Zhandry, "The
ePrint:2026/1591 Quantum Algorithm Does Not Solve DCP",
Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2026/1693, 2026,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1693>.
[HQC] HQC Team, "Hamming Quasi-Cyclic (HQC)", 12 October 2026,
<https://pqc-hqc.org/doc/
hqc_specifications_2026_10_12.pdf>.
[I-D.ietf-tls-mlkem]
Connolly, D., "ML-KEM Post-Quantum Key Agreement for TLS
1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls-
mlkem-11, 16 September 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
mlkem-11>.
[IANA] "IANA TLS Supported Groups Registry", n.d.,
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-
parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-8>.
[ISO18033-2-AMD2]
ISO/IEC, "Information technology — Security techniques —
Encryption algorithms — Part 2: Asymmetric ciphers —
Amendment 2", ISO/IEC 18033-2:2006/Amd 2:2026, 2026.
[Kuperberg05]
Kuperberg, G., "A Subexponential-Time Quantum Algorithm
for the Dihedral Hidden Subgroup Problem", Society for
Industrial & Applied Mathematics (SIAM), SIAM Journal on
Computing vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 170-188,
DOI 10.1137/s0097539703436345, January 2005,
<https://doi.org/10.1137/s0097539703436345>.
[NCSC26] Swedish NCSC, "Nationella rekommendationer för övergången
till kvantsäker kryptografi", May 2026,
<https://www.ncsc.se/siteassets/publikationer/nationella-
rekommendationer-for-overgangen-till-kvantsaker-
kryptografi-2026_tga.pdf>.
[NISTIR8545]
Alagic, G., Bros, M., Ciadoux, P., Cooper, D., Dang, Q.,
Dang, T., Kelsey, J., Lichtinger, J., Liu, Y., Miller, C.,
Moody, D., Peralta, R., Perlner, R., Robinson, A.,
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Silberg, H., Smith-Tone, D., and N. Waller, "Status report
on the fourth round of the NIST post-quantum cryptography
standardization process", National Institute of Standards
and Technology (U.S.), DOI 10.6028/nist.ir.8545, March
2025, <https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.ir.8545>.
[PQ-PQ] Mattsson, J. P., Thormarker, E., Selander, G.,
Paavolainen, S., Ruohomaa, S., Sääskilahti, J., Hartley,
T., Mazinani, H. V., and M. Khan, "ML-KEM is Great! What's
Missing?", NIST Workshop on Guidance for KEMs, 2025,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Events/2025/workshop-on-
guidance-for-kems/documents/papers/ml-kem-is-great-
paper.pdf>.
[Regev04] Regev, O., "Quantum Computation and Lattice Problems",
Society for Industrial & Applied Mathematics (SIAM), SIAM
Journal on Computing vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 738-760,
DOI 10.1137/s0097539703440678, January 2004,
<https://doi.org/10.1137/s0097539703440678>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.
[RFC9794] Driscoll, F., Parsons, M., and B. Hale, "Terminology for
Post-Quantum Traditional Hybrid Schemes", RFC 9794,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9794, June 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9794>.
[RFC9973] Housley, R., "TLS 1.3 Extension for Using Certificates
with an External Pre-Shared Key", RFC 9973,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9973, July 2026,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9973>.
[RFC10024] Kwiatkowski, K., Kampanakis, P., Westerbaan, B. E., and D.
Stebila, "Post-Quantum Traditional (PQ/T) Hybrid Key
Agreement Mechanisms for TLS 1.3", RFC 10024,
DOI 10.17487/RFC10024, August 2026,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10024>.
[Simon26] Simon, D. R., "A Polynomial-Time Quantum Algorithm for the
Dihedral Coset Problem", Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper
2026/1591, 2026, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1591>.
[SP800-12] Nieles, M., Dempsey, K., and V. Pillitteri, "An
introduction to information security", National Institute
of Standards and Technology, DOI 10.6028/nist.sp.800-12r1,
June 2017, <https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.sp.800-12r1>.
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[SP800-57] Barker, E. and W. Barker, "Recommendation for Key
Management: Part 1 — General Initial Public Draft",
National Institute of Standards and Technology,
DOI 10.6028/nist.sp.800-57pt1r6.ipd, December 2025,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.sp.800-57pt1r6.ipd>.
[TS33.210] 3GPP, "Network Domain Security (NDS); IP network layer
security", 3GPP TS 33.210 20.0.0, 2026,
<https://www.3gpp.org/DynaReport/33210.htm>.
Acknowledgments
The authors thank the authors of previous drafts from which this
draft borrowed text. The authors thank Ciarán Mullan and Angela
Robinson for their valuable comments and feedback on this draft.
Authors' Addresses
John Preuß Mattsson
Ericsson
Sweden
Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com
Sini Ruohomaa
Ericsson
Finland
Email: sini.ruohomaa@ericsson.com
Quynh Dang
NIST
United States of America
Email: quynh.dang@nist.gov
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