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HQC-KEM Key Agreement for TLS 1.3
draft-preussmattsson-tls-hqckem-03

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors John Preuß Mattsson , Sini Ruohomaa , Quynh Dang
Last updated 2026-10-20
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draft-preussmattsson-tls-hqckem-03
Transport Layer Security                               J. Preuß Mattsson
Internet-Draft                                               S. Ruohomaa
Intended status: Informational                                  Ericsson
Expires: 23 April 2027                                           Q. Dang
                                                                    NIST
                                                         20 October 2026

                   HQC-KEM Key Agreement for TLS 1.3
                   draft-preussmattsson-tls-hqckem-03

Abstract

   This document defines nine quantum-resistant TLS 1.3 key exchange
   algorithms based on HQC-KEM, the code-based KEM selected by NIST for
   standardization in forthcoming FIPS 207.  Three use HQC-KEM
   standalone, two combine it with X25519 or X448 in PQ/T hybrids, two
   combine it with ML-KEM in PQ/PQ hybrids, and two combine it with ML-
   KEM and X25519 or X448 in PQ/PQ/T hybrids.  Because HQC-KEM relies on
   hardness assumptions and constructions different from those
   underlying lattice-based ML-KEM, these algorithms provide algorithmic
   diversity that can mitigate the impact of future cryptanalytic
   advances or implementation weaknesses in lattice-based cryptography.
   The algorithms are intended for TLS 1.3, DTLS 1.3, and QUIC, and the
   hybrid algorithms follow the general hybrid key exchange construction
   defined for TLS 1.3.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 April 2027.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  HQC-KEM Key Exchange Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  HQCKEM128, HQCKEM192, and HQCKEM256 . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  HQCKEM192X25519 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.4.  HQCKEM256X448 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.5.  HQCKEM192MLKEM768 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.6.  HQCKEM256MLKEM1024  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.7.  HQCKEM192MLKEM768X25519 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.8.  HQCKEM256MLKEM1024X448  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.9.  Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.10. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.1.  Algorithmic Diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     5.1.  HQCKEM128 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     5.2.  HQCKEM192 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     5.3.  HQCKEM256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     5.4.  HQCKEM192X25519 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     5.5.  HQCKEM256X448 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     5.6.  HQCKEM192MLKEM768 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     5.7.  HQCKEM256MLKEM1024  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.8.  HQCKEM192MLKEM768X25519 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.9.  HQCKEM256MLKEM1024X448  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23

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1.  Introduction

   The transition to post-quantum cryptography requires new key exchange
   mechanisms for TLS 1.3 [RFC9846].  ML-KEM [FIPS203] is the primary
   post-quantum KEM and is used in TLS 1.3 both standalone
   [I-D.ietf-tls-mlkem] and in hybrid key exchange algorithms such as
   X25519MLKEM768 [RFC10024].  ML-KEM is lattice-based, and its security
   relies on the hardness of the Module Learning With Errors (MLWE)
   problem.

   In March 2025, NIST selected HQC (Hamming Quasi-Cyclic) for
   standardization as a second post-quantum KEM [NISTIR8545].  HQC-KEM
   is code-based, and its security relies on the hardness of decoding
   random quasi-cyclic codes.  NIST selected HQC to provide a backup to
   ML-KEM that is based on a different hardness assumption and
   construction, so that a future cryptanalytic breakthrough against
   lattice-based cryptography or ML-KEM does not leave deployments
   without a standardized post-quantum KEM.  NIST is specifying HQC-KEM
   in the forthcoming [FIPS207].  In addition to NIST, European
   cybersecurity agencies have high trust in HQC-KEM.  For example,
   ANSSI labels HQC-KEM as "higher confidence", together with ML-KEM,
   ML-DSA, and FrodoKEM [ANSSI25].  HQC-KEM has larger encapsulation
   keys and ciphertexts and is slower than ML-KEM [PQ-PQ].

      Editor's note: At the time of writing, FIPS 207 has not been
      published, not even as an Initial Public Draft.  This document is
      based on the HQC specification of 2026-10-12 [HQC].  All
      references to [FIPS207], including section references, parameter
      set names, and the sizes in Section 3.1, need to be verified and
      updated once FIPS 207 is published.  This note is to be removed
      before publication as an RFC.

   [RFC9954] specifies a general design for hybrid key exchange in TLS
   1.3.  This document applies that design to six hybrid key exchange
   algorithms and separately defines three standalone key exchange
   algorithms based on HQC-KEM.

   *  HQCKEM128, HQCKEM192, and HQCKEM256 use the HQC-KEM parameter sets
      targeting security categories 1, 3, and 5 [SP800-57],
      respectively, without any other component.  They provide security
      against quantum attackers as long as HQC-KEM remains secure.
      Standalone code points are defined for every HQC-KEM parameter set
      in [FIPS207], consistent with the standalone ML-KEM code points
      [I-D.ietf-tls-mlkem].

   *  HQCKEM192X25519 and HQCKEM256X448 are PQ/T hybrids [RFC9794] that
      combine HQC-KEM with the traditional elliptic-curve algorithms
      X25519 and X448 [RFC7748].  They provide security against quantum

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      attackers as long as HQC-KEM remains secure and security against
      classical attackers as long as at least one of the two components
      remains secure.

   *  HQCKEM192MLKEM768 and HQCKEM256MLKEM1024 are PQ/PQ hybrids
      [RFC9794] that combine HQC-KEM with ML-KEM [FIPS203].  They
      provide security against quantum attackers as long as at least one
      of the code-based and lattice-based components remains secure,
      mitigating the impact of future cryptanalytic advances or
      implementation weaknesses against either component.

   *  HQCKEM192MLKEM768X25519 and HQCKEM256MLKEM1024X448 are PQ/PQ/T
      hybrids that combine HQC-KEM with both ML-KEM and X25519 or X448,
      respectively.  They provide security against quantum attackers as
      long as at least one of the post-quantum components remains
      secure, and security against classical attackers as long as at
      least one of the three components remains secure.

   Recent developments have increased interest in algorithmic diversity
   and conservative key exchange designs.  In particular, a claimed
   polynomial-time quantum algorithm for the Dihedral Coset Problem
   (DCP) [Simon26], which was subsequently challenged [GRZ26], prompted
   discussion about the security of lattice-based cryptography, while
   recent advances in the cryptanalysis of Goppa codes have challenged
   long-standing assumptions and led BSI to no longer recommend Classic
   McEliece [ISO18033-2-AMD2] for new developments [BSI].  The
   algorithms specified in this document provide algorithmic diversity,
   while the PQ/PQ and PQ/PQ/T hybrids provide a conservative design,
   with significantly smaller key shares and better performance [PQ-PQ]
   than FrodoKEM [ISO18033-2-AMD2].

   The algorithms in this document are not intended to replace ML-KEM in
   latency-sensitive deployments such as the Web. The PQ/PQ and PQ/PQ/T
   hybrids primarily target high-security deployments where the
   protected information may need to remain confidential for decades and
   handshake latency is less critical.

   The algorithms defined in this document are intended for use with TLS
   1.3 [RFC9846], DTLS 1.3 [RFC9147], and QUIC [RFC9001].  The hybrid
   algorithms follow the hybrid key exchange construction defined in
   [RFC9954], which for the PQ/PQ/T hybrids is applied with three
   components.  This document defines additional TLS NamedGroup values
   and specifies the encoding of the associated key shares and
   asymmetric shared secrets, using the terminology of [RFC9846].  It
   does not modify the TLS 1.3 handshake, key schedule, or negotiation
   mechanisms.

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2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   This document uses the terminology of TLS 1.3 [RFC9846], hybrid key
   exchange in TLS 1.3 [RFC9954], hybrid schemes [RFC9794], ML-KEM
   [FIPS203], and HQC-KEM [FIPS207].

   In this document, HQC-KEM-128, HQC-KEM-192, and HQC-KEM-256 denote
   the HQC-KEM parameter sets targeting security categories 1, 3, and 5,
   respectively.  These correspond to the parameter sets named HQC-1,
   HQC-3, and HQC-5 in [HQC].

      Editor's note: Update the parameter set names to match those used
      in [FIPS207].

   This document uses three distinct terms for shared values:

   Shared secret key:  The 32-byte output of HQC-KEM and ML-KEM
      encapsulation and decapsulation, as defined in [FIPS207] and
      [FIPS203].  Shared secret keys are computationally
      indistinguishable from uniformly random bit strings and can be
      used directly as symmetric keys without additional key derivation.

   Shared secret:  The output of the X25519 and X448 functions, as
      defined in [RFC7748].  Shared secrets are encodings of field
      elements, are easily distinguishable from uniformly random bit
      strings, and require key derivation before use as keys.

   Asymmetric shared secret:  The value produced by the key exchange and
      used as input to HKDF-Extract in the TLS 1.3 key schedule, from
      which all traffic keys are derived, see Section 7.4 of [RFC9846]
      and Section 7.1 of [RFC9846].  The previous specification of TLS
      1.3 [RFC8446] referred to this value as the (EC)DHE shared secret.
      For the standalone algorithms in this document, the asymmetric
      shared secret is the HQC-KEM shared secret key.  For the hybrid
      algorithms, it is the concatenation of the shared secret keys and
      shared secrets of the components.

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3.  HQC-KEM Key Exchange Algorithms

   This document defines nine TLS NamedGroups for use with the TLS 1.3
   supported_groups and key_share extensions.  For the hybrid
   algorithms, key shares and asymmetric shared secrets are encoded by
   concatenating the component values in the order indicated by the
   name.  All encodings are fixed-length.

   For all algorithms, the client key_exchange value contains the
   encapsulation key or public key of each component, and the server
   key_exchange value contains the ciphertext or public key of each
   component.  The HQC-KEM and ML-KEM shared secret keys are produced by
   encapsulation and decapsulation as specified in [FIPS207] and
   [FIPS203].  The X25519 and X448 shared secrets are produced as
   specified in Section 7.4.2 of [RFC9846].

3.1.  Sizes

   Table 1 summarizes the security category and the sizes in bytes of
   the client key share, the server key share, and the asymmetric shared
   secret for each algorithm.

    +=========================+==========+======+========+============+
    | NamedGroup              | Security |Client| Server | Asymmetric |
    |                         | category | share|  share |     shared |
    |                         |          |      |        |     secret |
    +=========================+==========+======+========+============+
    | HQCKEM128               |        1 |  2241|   4433 |         32 |
    +-------------------------+----------+------+--------+------------+
    | HQCKEM192               |        3 |  4514|   8978 |         32 |
    +-------------------------+----------+------+--------+------------+
    | HQCKEM256               |        5 |  7237|  14421 |         32 |
    +-------------------------+----------+------+--------+------------+
    | HQCKEM192X25519         |        3 |  4546|   9010 |         64 |
    +-------------------------+----------+------+--------+------------+
    | HQCKEM256X448           |        5 |  7293|  14477 |         88 |
    +-------------------------+----------+------+--------+------------+
    | HQCKEM192MLKEM768       |        3 |  5698|  10066 |         64 |
    +-------------------------+----------+------+--------+------------+
    | HQCKEM256MLKEM1024      |        5 |  8805|  15989 |         64 |
    +-------------------------+----------+------+--------+------------+
    | HQCKEM192MLKEM768X25519 |        3 |  5730|  10098 |         96 |
    +-------------------------+----------+------+--------+------------+
    | HQCKEM256MLKEM1024X448  |        5 |  8861|  16045 |        120 |
    +-------------------------+----------+------+--------+------------+

         Table 1: Security Categories and Key Share and Asymmetric
                        Shared Secret Sizes in Bytes

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   All key share sizes are well below the maximum key_exchange length of
   2^16 - 1 bytes.

3.2.  HQCKEM128, HQCKEM192, and HQCKEM256

   For HQCKEM128, HQCKEM192, and HQCKEM256, the client key_exchange
   value contains the HQC-KEM-128, HQC-KEM-192, or HQC-KEM-256
   encapsulation key, respectively:

   struct {
       opaque hqckem_encapsulation_key[2241];
   } HQCKEM128ClientShare;

   struct {
       opaque hqckem_encapsulation_key[4514];
   } HQCKEM192ClientShare;

   struct {
       opaque hqckem_encapsulation_key[7237];
   } HQCKEM256ClientShare;

   The server key_exchange value contains the HQC-KEM ciphertext:

   struct {
       opaque hqckem_ciphertext[4433];
   } HQCKEM128ServerShare;

   struct {
       opaque hqckem_ciphertext[8978];
   } HQCKEM192ServerShare;

   struct {
       opaque hqckem_ciphertext[14421];
   } HQCKEM256ServerShare;

   The 32-byte asymmetric shared secret input to the TLS 1.3 key
   schedule is the HQC-KEM shared secret key.

3.3.  HQCKEM192X25519

   For HQCKEM192X25519, the client key_exchange value contains the HQC-
   KEM-192 encapsulation key followed by the X25519 public key:

   struct {
       opaque hqckem_encapsulation_key[4514];
       opaque x25519_public_key[32];
   } HQCKEM192X25519ClientShare;

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   The server key_exchange value contains the HQC-KEM-192 ciphertext
   followed by the X25519 public key:

   struct {
       opaque hqckem_ciphertext[8978];
       opaque x25519_public_key[32];
   } HQCKEM192X25519ServerShare;

   The 64-byte asymmetric shared secret input to the TLS 1.3 key
   schedule is the concatenation of the HQC-KEM shared secret key
   followed by the X25519 shared secret:

   asymmetric_shared_secret =
       HQCKEM192_shared_secret_key || X25519_shared_secret

3.4.  HQCKEM256X448

   For HQCKEM256X448, the client key_exchange value contains the HQC-
   KEM-256 encapsulation key followed by the X448 public key:

   struct {
       opaque hqckem_encapsulation_key[7237];
       opaque x448_public_key[56];
   } HQCKEM256X448ClientShare;

   The server key_exchange value contains the HQC-KEM-256 ciphertext
   followed by the X448 public key:

   struct {
       opaque hqckem_ciphertext[14421];
       opaque x448_public_key[56];
   } HQCKEM256X448ServerShare;

   The 88-byte asymmetric shared secret input to the TLS 1.3 key
   schedule is the concatenation of the HQC-KEM shared secret key
   followed by the X448 shared secret:

   asymmetric_shared_secret =
       HQCKEM256_shared_secret_key || X448_shared_secret

3.5.  HQCKEM192MLKEM768

   For HQCKEM192MLKEM768, the client key_exchange value contains the
   HQC-KEM-192 encapsulation key followed by the ML-KEM-768
   encapsulation key:

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   struct {
       opaque hqckem_encapsulation_key[4514];
       opaque mlkem_encapsulation_key[1184];
   } HQCKEM192MLKEM768ClientShare;

   The server key_exchange value contains the HQC-KEM-192 ciphertext
   followed by the ML-KEM-768 ciphertext:

   struct {
       opaque hqckem_ciphertext[8978];
       opaque mlkem_ciphertext[1088];
   } HQCKEM192MLKEM768ServerShare;

   The 64-byte asymmetric shared secret input to the TLS 1.3 key
   schedule is the concatenation of the HQC-KEM shared secret key
   followed by the ML-KEM shared secret key:

   asymmetric_shared_secret =
       HQCKEM192_shared_secret_key || MLKEM768_shared_secret_key

3.6.  HQCKEM256MLKEM1024

   For HQCKEM256MLKEM1024, the client key_exchange value contains the
   HQC-KEM-256 encapsulation key followed by the ML-KEM-1024
   encapsulation key:

   struct {
       opaque hqckem_encapsulation_key[7237];
       opaque mlkem_encapsulation_key[1568];
   } HQCKEM256MLKEM1024ClientShare;

   The server key_exchange value contains the HQC-KEM-256 ciphertext
   followed by the ML-KEM-1024 ciphertext:

   struct {
       opaque hqckem_ciphertext[14421];
       opaque mlkem_ciphertext[1568];
   } HQCKEM256MLKEM1024ServerShare;

   The 64-byte asymmetric shared secret input to the TLS 1.3 key
   schedule is the concatenation of the HQC-KEM shared secret key
   followed by the ML-KEM shared secret key:

   asymmetric_shared_secret =
       HQCKEM256_shared_secret_key || MLKEM1024_shared_secret_key

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3.7.  HQCKEM192MLKEM768X25519

   For HQCKEM192MLKEM768X25519, the client key_exchange value contains
   the HQC-KEM-192 encapsulation key, followed by the ML-KEM-768
   encapsulation key, followed by the X25519 public key:

   struct {
       opaque hqckem_encapsulation_key[4514];
       opaque mlkem_encapsulation_key[1184];
       opaque x25519_public_key[32];
   } HQCKEM192MLKEM768X25519ClientShare;

   The server key_exchange value contains the HQC-KEM-192 ciphertext,
   followed by the ML-KEM-768 ciphertext, followed by the X25519 public
   key:

   struct {
       opaque hqckem_ciphertext[8978];
       opaque mlkem_ciphertext[1088];
       opaque x25519_public_key[32];
   } HQCKEM192MLKEM768X25519ServerShare;

   The 96-byte asymmetric shared secret input to the TLS 1.3 key
   schedule is the concatenation of the HQC-KEM shared secret key,
   followed by the ML-KEM shared secret key, followed by the X25519
   shared secret:

   asymmetric_shared_secret =
       HQCKEM192_shared_secret_key || MLKEM768_shared_secret_key ||
       X25519_shared_secret

3.8.  HQCKEM256MLKEM1024X448

   For HQCKEM256MLKEM1024X448, the client key_exchange value contains
   the HQC-KEM-256 encapsulation key, followed by the ML-KEM-1024
   encapsulation key, followed by the X448 public key:

   struct {
       opaque hqckem_encapsulation_key[7237];
       opaque mlkem_encapsulation_key[1568];
       opaque x448_public_key[56];
   } HQCKEM256MLKEM1024X448ClientShare;

   The server key_exchange value contains the HQC-KEM-256 ciphertext,
   followed by the ML-KEM-1024 ciphertext, followed by the X448 public
   key:

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   struct {
       opaque hqckem_ciphertext[14421];
       opaque mlkem_ciphertext[1568];
       opaque x448_public_key[56];
   } HQCKEM256MLKEM1024X448ServerShare;

   The 120-byte asymmetric shared secret input to the TLS 1.3 key
   schedule is the concatenation of the HQC-KEM shared secret key,
   followed by the ML-KEM shared secret key, followed by the X448 shared
   secret:

   asymmetric_shared_secret =
       HQCKEM256_shared_secret_key || MLKEM1024_shared_secret_key ||
       X448_shared_secret

3.9.  Validation

   Both client and server MUST check that the received key share has the
   length given in Table 1 for the negotiated group and abort with an
   "illegal_parameter" alert if it fails.

   The server MUST perform any encapsulation key checks specified in
   [FIPS207] on the client's HQC-KEM encapsulation key and abort with an
   "illegal_parameter" alert if they fail.  For algorithms with an ML-
   KEM component, the server MUST also perform the encapsulation key
   check described in Section 7.2 of [FIPS203] on the client's ML-KEM
   encapsulation key and abort with an "illegal_parameter" alert if it
   fails.

      Editor's note: Add a section reference to the HQC-KEM input checks
      in [FIPS207], if any are specified.

   If HQC-KEM or ML-KEM decapsulation fails for any reason, the client
   MUST abort with an "internal_error" alert.

   For algorithms with an X25519 or X448 component, both client and
   server MUST calculate the X25519 or X448 shared secret as described
   in Section 7.4.2 of [RFC9846], including the check that the shared
   secret is not the all-zero value, and abort with an
   "illegal_parameter" alert if it fails.

3.10.  Implementation Considerations

   The HQC-KEM decapsulation key is a 32-byte seed.  Clients can avoid
   expanding the seed twice by retaining the expanded key in memory from
   key generation until the server's key share has been processed.

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      Editor's note: The decapsulation key format follows the HQC
      specification of 2026-10-12 [HQC].  Update this text if [FIPS207]
      specifies a different format.

4.  Security Considerations

   The hybrid algorithms defined in this document use the hybrid
   construction specified in [RFC9954].  Their security relies on the
   TLS 1.3 transcript binding and key schedule.  The security
   considerations in [RFC9846], [FIPS207], [FIPS203], [SP800-227],
   [RFC7748], and [RFC9954] apply to the algorithms defined in this
   document.  A key share, or any of its components, MUST NOT be reused
   for multiple connections, as required by TLS 1.3 [RFC9846].

   HQC-KEM-128, HQC-KEM-192, and HQC-KEM-256 target post-quantum
   security categories 1, 3, and 5 [SP800-57], respectively.  All
   algorithms with HQC-KEM-256 provide security category 5, matching the
   security level of cipher suites with AES-256 and ChaCha20.

   HQC-KEM is designed to provide indistinguishability under adaptive
   chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2) security [HQC].  The security of
   HQC-KEM relies on the hardness of decoding random quasi-cyclic codes,
   which is a different assumption than the module lattice assumptions
   underlying ML-KEM.  HQC-KEM therefore provides algorithmic diversity
   for deployments concerned about future cryptanalytic advances against
   lattice-based cryptography, see Section 4.1.  Hybrid constructions
   also protect against implementation vulnerabilities, such as side-
   channel leakage or software bugs, in one of the component algorithms.

   Compared with X25519MLKEM768 [RFC10024], which has the value Y in the
   Recommended column of the IANA TLS Supported Groups registry [IANA],
   HQCKEM192MLKEM768X25519 and HQCKEM256MLKEM1024X448 provide greater
   security margin and algorithmic diversity, at the cost of larger
   messages and higher computational cost.  The key share sizes and the
   computational cost are dominated by the HQC-KEM component.

   The hybrid key exchange algorithms defined in this document are
   compatible with the key combiner specified in [SP800-227] and the
   CatKDF key combiner specified in [ETSI-TS-103-744].  The security
   analysis of [RFC9954] applies, and all hybrid algorithms retain the
   security of their strongest component.

   A fundamental requirement of hybrid constructions is that their
   security is at least as high as that of their strongest component;
   that is, the construction preserves the cryptographic security
   properties of its components [EU25], [EU26], [NCSC26], [SP800-227].
   The hybrid key exchange algorithms defined in this document are
   designed to meet this requirement and preserve the quantum resistance

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   and IND-CCA2 security of HQC-KEM and ML-KEM.  X25519 provides
   approximately 128 bits of classical security and X448 approximately
   224 bits of classical security [RFC7748]; neither provides quantum
   resistance.  Compared with P-curves and Brainpool curves offering a
   comparable security level, X25519 and X448 are significantly faster
   and provide greater implementation robustness.

   Deployments that require a traditional component in the key exchange,
   for example due to regulatory recommendations, should use the PQ/T or
   PQ/PQ/T hybrids rather than the PQ/PQ hybrids or the standalone
   algorithms.  Note that it is uncertain whether regulators worldwide
   will continue to approve cryptographic constructions such as PQ/T or
   PQ/PQ/T hybrids once the traditional component has been deprecated.

   The algorithms can be combined with an external pre-shared key (PSK)
   using the TLS 1.3 "psk_dhe_ke" key exchange mode [RFC9846],
   optionally together with certificate-based authentication [RFC9973].
   This yields PQ/PSK hybrids without any additional code points.

   Availability is a fundamental security property and part of the CIA
   triad in information security [SP800-12].  HQC-KEM encapsulation keys
   and ciphertexts are significantly larger than those of ML-KEM at the
   same security category.  Large client key shares are known to cause
   interoperability problems with non-compliant or buggy legacy TLS
   implementations, as well as with middleboxes and other network
   infrastructure that impose non-compliant limitations on large TLS
   ClientHello messages.  Large key shares also increase bandwidth,
   memory, and computational costs for constrained endpoints or
   deployments operating over lossy or bandwidth-constrained networks,
   potentially reducing availability.  Clients may choose to advertise
   the groups in this document in the supported_groups extension without
   sending a corresponding key share in the initial ClientHello, at the
   cost of an additional round trip if the server selects one of them
   using HelloRetryRequest.

   An HQC-KEM ciphertext is roughly twice the size of the encapsulation
   key, making the server's first flight much larger than the
   ClientHello.  Each transport can pay extra round trips for this.  In
   QUIC, the anti-amplification limit can delay the server's first
   flight until the client's address is validated.  DTLS 1.3 servers
   SHOULD verify return routability with a HelloRetryRequest cookie
   (Section 5.1 of [RFC9147]) before sending an HQC-KEM ciphertext when
   the client's address has not otherwise been validated.

   Implementations MUST NOT use the algorithms defined in this document
   with TLS 1.2 or DTLS 1.2, which are obsolete and should be phased out
   as soon as possible. 3GPP already mandates that TLS 1.2 be disabled
   by default [TS33.210].

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      Editor's note: This requirement will appear in a future version of
      [TS33.210].  Update the reference when published.

4.1.  Algorithmic Diversity

   One risk to consider is a novel algorithm that breaks most of
   lattice-based cryptography, regardless of whether the underlying
   lattices are structured, as in ML-KEM [FIPS203], or unstructured, as
   in FrodoKEM [ISO18033-2-AMD2].  For example, a polynomial-time
   quantum algorithm for the Dihedral Coset Problem (DCP) would, by
   Regev's reduction [Regev04] as improved by Brakerski et al.
   [BKSW18], yield a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for the Learning
   With Errors (LWE) problem.  The best known quantum algorithm for DCP
   is Kuperberg's subexponential-time algorithm [Kuperberg05].  Claimed
   polynomial-time quantum algorithms for LWE in 2024 [Chen24] and for
   DCP in 2026 [Simon26] [GRZ26] were subsequently refuted or
   challenged, but illustrate that this remains an active research area.
   HQC-KEM relies on the hardness of decoding random quasi-cyclic codes
   in the Hamming metric, and efficient algorithms for DCP or LWE are
   not known to imply an efficient decoding algorithm for such codes.

   Recent advances in the cryptanalysis of Goppa codes have challenged
   long-standing assumptions and led BSI to no longer recommend the ISO-
   standardized Classic McEliece [ISO18033-2-AMD2] for new developments
   [BSI].  While HQC-KEM [FIPS207] is also code-based like Classic
   McEliece, its security relies on the hardness of decoding random
   quasi-cyclic codes and is not affected by advances in cryptanalysis
   of Goppa codes.

   The algorithms specified in this document provide algorithmic
   diversity, and the PQ/PQ and PQ/PQ/T hybrids provide a conservative
   design.  They remain secure against quantum attackers unless both the
   lattice-based and code-based components are broken.  Compared with
   FrodoKEM [ISO18033-2-AMD2], the combination of ML-KEM and HQC-KEM has
   significantly smaller key shares and requires roughly an order of
   magnitude fewer CPU cycles at the same security category [PQ-PQ].
   These hybrids are particularly well suited to high-security
   applications where handshake latency is not a primary concern.

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   Nation-state attackers have a long history of recording high-value
   encrypted traffic and decrypting it later, once better cryptanalytic
   tools become available.  A key exchange therefore has to be chosen at
   deployment time to provide adequate confidentiality for the entire
   period during which the protected information remains sensitive,
   which may be decades.  This cannot be fixed afterwards.  Traffic
   recorded before a cryptographic transition remains protected only by
   the key exchange used at the time, and a single transfer of sensitive
   data over an inadequately protected connection, such as a backup, can
   expose all of that data.

   PQ/T hybrids do not protect against quantum attackers if the post-
   quantum component is broken, as a quantum attacker can break the
   traditional component.  Robust security against quantum attackers,
   that is, security that survives the break of a single post-quantum
   algorithm, requires either a PQ/PQ or PQ/PSK hybrid.  Ekerå strongly
   recommends PQ/PSK hybrids [Ekera], as the pre-shared key preserves
   security even if the post-quantum algorithm is broken.  However, PQ/
   PSK hybrids require symmetric keys to be provisioned in advance,
   which may be impractical in many use cases due to the challenges of
   key provisioning and trust establishment.

   Cryptographic agility is the capability to quickly change
   cryptographic algorithms in response to evolving security
   requirements or newly discovered vulnerabilities, while maintaining
   interoperability and system functionality.  Supporting both ML-KEM
   and HQC-KEM enables a system to transition between lattice-based and
   code-based key establishment.  However, agility only protects
   connections established after the transition, as discussed above.
   This is why hybrid key establishment, particularly PQ/PQ hybrids, is
   important for key exchange, but the same rationale does not generally
   apply to digital signatures.

   Furthermore, in environments where cryptographic updates are slow,
   upgrading all legacy nodes can take a decade, so a post-quantum
   algorithm found to be weak cannot be swapped out quickly.  PQ/PQ and
   PQ/PQ/T hybrids provide an additional security margin here: unlike
   hybrids with a single post-quantum component, they keep previously
   protected data confidential against quantum adversaries even if one
   of the post-quantum components is later broken.

   ML-KEM and HQC are both structured schemes built on polynomial rings,
   so a natural concern is that an attack exploiting ring structure
   might apply to both.  The rings, however, differ in essential ways.
   ML-KEM works over Z_q[X]/(X^256 + 1) with q = 3329.  This ring splits
   into 128 quadratic factors, which ML-KEM exploits for fast NTT-based
   multiplication.  Its secrets and errors are small in absolute value,
   and its security rests on the Module-LWE problem.  HQC works over

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   F_2[X]/(X^n − 1), where n is a prime chosen so that X^n − 1 factors
   only as (X − 1) times a single irreducible polynomial, deliberately
   limiting exploitable substructure.  Its secrets and errors are sparse
   in Hamming weight, and its security rests on the quasi-cyclic
   syndrome decoding problem.  The two rings therefore differ in
   characteristic, in how they factor, and in the notion of "small" on
   which hardness depends.  No known attack technique or reduction
   establishes that an efficient solution to the underlying problem of
   one scheme would yield an efficient attack on the other.

5.  IANA Considerations

   This document requests that IANA register nine new entries in the TLS
   Supported Groups registry [IANA], according to the procedures in
   Section 6 of [RFC9847].

5.1.  HQCKEM128

   Value:  TBD1

   Description:  HQCKEM128

   DTLS-OK:  Y

   Recommended:  N

   Reference:  This document

   Comment:  Standalone HQC-KEM-128

5.2.  HQCKEM192

   Value:  TBD2

   Description:  HQCKEM192

   DTLS-OK:  Y

   Recommended:  N

   Reference:  This document

   Comment:  Standalone HQC-KEM-192

5.3.  HQCKEM256

   Value:  TBD3

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   Description:  HQCKEM256

   DTLS-OK:  Y

   Recommended:  N

   Reference:  This document

   Comment:  Standalone HQC-KEM-256

5.4.  HQCKEM192X25519

   Value:  TBD4

   Description:  HQCKEM192X25519

   DTLS-OK:  Y

   Recommended:  N

   Reference:  This document

   Comment:  PQ/T hybrid combining HQC-KEM-192 with X25519

5.5.  HQCKEM256X448

   Value:  TBD5

   Description:  HQCKEM256X448

   DTLS-OK:  Y

   Recommended:  N

   Reference:  This document

   Comment:  PQ/T hybrid combining HQC-KEM-256 with X448

5.6.  HQCKEM192MLKEM768

   Value:  TBD6

   Description:  HQCKEM192MLKEM768

   DTLS-OK:  Y

   Recommended:  N

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   Reference:  This document

   Comment:  PQ/PQ hybrid combining HQC-KEM-192 with ML-KEM-768

5.7.  HQCKEM256MLKEM1024

   Value:  TBD7

   Description:  HQCKEM256MLKEM1024

   DTLS-OK:  Y

   Recommended:  N

   Reference:  This document

   Comment:  PQ/PQ hybrid combining HQC-KEM-256 with ML-KEM-1024

5.8.  HQCKEM192MLKEM768X25519

   Value:  TBD8

   Description:  HQCKEM192MLKEM768X25519

   DTLS-OK:  Y

   Recommended:  N

   Reference:  This document

   Comment:  PQ/PQ/T hybrid combining HQC-KEM-192 with ML-KEM-768 and
      X25519

5.9.  HQCKEM256MLKEM1024X448

   Value:  TBD9

   Description:  HQCKEM256MLKEM1024X448

   DTLS-OK:  Y

   Recommended:  N

   Reference:  This document

   Comment:  PQ/PQ/T hybrid combining HQC-KEM-256 with ML-KEM-1024 and
      X448

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6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

   [FIPS203]  "Module-lattice-based key-encapsulation mechanism
              standard", National Institute of Standards and Technology
              (U.S.), DOI 10.6028/nist.fips.203, August 2024,
              <https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.fips.203>.

   [FIPS207]  National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Hamming
              Quasi-Cyclic Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard
              (forthcoming)", FIPS 207, <https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/
              post-quantum-cryptography>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC7748]  Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves
              for Security", RFC 7748, DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, January
              2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7748>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC9001]  Thomson, M., Ed. and S. Turner, Ed., "Using TLS to Secure
              QUIC", RFC 9001, DOI 10.17487/RFC9001, May 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9001>.

   [RFC9147]  Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
              Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
              1.3", RFC 9147, DOI 10.17487/RFC9147, April 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9147>.

   [RFC9846]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 9846, DOI 10.17487/RFC9846, July 2026,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9846>.

   [RFC9847]  Salowey, J. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for TLS
              and DTLS", RFC 9847, DOI 10.17487/RFC9847, December 2025,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9847>.

   [RFC9954]  Stebila, D., Fluhrer, S., and S. Gueron, "Hybrid Key
              Exchange in TLS 1.3", RFC 9954, DOI 10.17487/RFC9954, July
              2026, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9954>.

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   [SP800-227]
              Alagic, G., Barker, E., Chen, L., Moody, D., Robinson, A.,
              Silberg, H., and N. Waller, "Recommendations for key-
              encapsulation mechanisms", National Institute of Standards
              and Technology (U.S.), DOI 10.6028/nist.sp.800-227,
              September 2025, <https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.sp.800-227>.

6.2.  Informative References

   [ANSSI25]  Martinelli, A., "ANSSI views on technical aspects of the
              migration to PQC", 25 March 2025,
              <https://na.eventscloud.com/file_uploads/
              b635298de1c10be6d3732863e8b1beca_Day2-1600-ANSSI.pdf>.

   [BKSW18]   Brakerski, Z., Kirshanova, E., Stehlé, D., and W. Wen,
              "Learning with Errors and Extrapolated Dihedral Cosets",
              Springer International Publishing, Lecture Notes in
              Computer Science pp. 702-727,
              DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-76581-5_24, ISBN ["9783319765808",
              "9783319765815"], 2018,
              <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76581-5_24>.

   [BSI]      Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), "Notes on
              recent developments concerning Classic McEliece", 1
              October 2026,
              <https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/
              Crypto/Notes_Classic_McEliece.pdf>.

   [Chen24]   Chen, Y., "Quantum Algorithms for Lattice Problems",
              Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2024/555, 2024,
              <https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/555>.

   [Ekera]    Ekerå, M., "On factoring integers, and computing discrete
              logarithms and orders, quantumly", 2024,
              <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1902626/
              FULLTEXT01.pdf>.

   [ETSI-TS-103-744]
              ETSI, "Quantum-safe Hybrid Key Exchanges", ETSI TS 103
              744, February 2026, <https://www.etsi.org/deliver/
              etsi_ts/103700_103799/103744/01.02.02_60/
              ts_103744v010202p.pdf>.

   [EU25]     NIS Cooperation Group, "A Coordinated Implementation
              Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography",
              June 2025, <https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection/
              document/117507>.

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   [EU26]     NIS Cooperation Group, "EU Roadmap on PQC – Frequently
              Asked Questions", April 2026,
              <https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection/
              document/132120>.

   [GRZ26]    Gupte, A., Ragavan, S., and M. Zhandry, "The
              ePrint:2026/1591 Quantum Algorithm Does Not Solve DCP",
              Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2026/1693, 2026,
              <https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1693>.

   [HQC]      HQC Team, "Hamming Quasi-Cyclic (HQC)", 12 October 2026,
              <https://pqc-hqc.org/doc/
              hqc_specifications_2026_10_12.pdf>.

   [I-D.ietf-tls-mlkem]
              Connolly, D., "ML-KEM Post-Quantum Key Agreement for TLS
              1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls-
              mlkem-11, 16 September 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
              mlkem-11>.

   [IANA]     "IANA TLS Supported Groups Registry", n.d.,
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-
              parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-8>.

   [ISO18033-2-AMD2]
              ISO/IEC, "Information technology — Security techniques —
              Encryption algorithms — Part 2: Asymmetric ciphers —
              Amendment 2", ISO/IEC 18033-2:2006/Amd 2:2026, 2026.

   [Kuperberg05]
              Kuperberg, G., "A Subexponential-Time Quantum Algorithm
              for the Dihedral Hidden Subgroup Problem", Society for
              Industrial & Applied Mathematics (SIAM), SIAM Journal on
              Computing vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 170-188,
              DOI 10.1137/s0097539703436345, January 2005,
              <https://doi.org/10.1137/s0097539703436345>.

   [NCSC26]   Swedish NCSC, "Nationella rekommendationer för övergången
              till kvantsäker kryptografi", May 2026,
              <https://www.ncsc.se/siteassets/publikationer/nationella-
              rekommendationer-for-overgangen-till-kvantsaker-
              kryptografi-2026_tga.pdf>.

   [NISTIR8545]
              Alagic, G., Bros, M., Ciadoux, P., Cooper, D., Dang, Q.,
              Dang, T., Kelsey, J., Lichtinger, J., Liu, Y., Miller, C.,
              Moody, D., Peralta, R., Perlner, R., Robinson, A.,

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              Silberg, H., Smith-Tone, D., and N. Waller, "Status report
              on the fourth round of the NIST post-quantum cryptography
              standardization process", National Institute of Standards
              and Technology (U.S.), DOI 10.6028/nist.ir.8545, March
              2025, <https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.ir.8545>.

   [PQ-PQ]    Mattsson, J. P., Thormarker, E., Selander, G.,
              Paavolainen, S., Ruohomaa, S., Sääskilahti, J., Hartley,
              T., Mazinani, H. V., and M. Khan, "ML-KEM is Great! What's
              Missing?", NIST Workshop on Guidance for KEMs, 2025,
              <https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Events/2025/workshop-on-
              guidance-for-kems/documents/papers/ml-kem-is-great-
              paper.pdf>.

   [Regev04]  Regev, O., "Quantum Computation and Lattice Problems",
              Society for Industrial & Applied Mathematics (SIAM), SIAM
              Journal on Computing vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 738-760,
              DOI 10.1137/s0097539703440678, January 2004,
              <https://doi.org/10.1137/s0097539703440678>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.

   [RFC9794]  Driscoll, F., Parsons, M., and B. Hale, "Terminology for
              Post-Quantum Traditional Hybrid Schemes", RFC 9794,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9794, June 2025,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9794>.

   [RFC9973]  Housley, R., "TLS 1.3 Extension for Using Certificates
              with an External Pre-Shared Key", RFC 9973,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9973, July 2026,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9973>.

   [RFC10024] Kwiatkowski, K., Kampanakis, P., Westerbaan, B. E., and D.
              Stebila, "Post-Quantum Traditional (PQ/T) Hybrid Key
              Agreement Mechanisms for TLS 1.3", RFC 10024,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC10024, August 2026,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10024>.

   [Simon26]  Simon, D. R., "A Polynomial-Time Quantum Algorithm for the
              Dihedral Coset Problem", Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper
              2026/1591, 2026, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1591>.

   [SP800-12] Nieles, M., Dempsey, K., and V. Pillitteri, "An
              introduction to information security", National Institute
              of Standards and Technology, DOI 10.6028/nist.sp.800-12r1,
              June 2017, <https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.sp.800-12r1>.

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   [SP800-57] Barker, E. and W. Barker, "Recommendation for Key
              Management: Part 1 — General Initial Public Draft",
              National Institute of Standards and Technology,
              DOI 10.6028/nist.sp.800-57pt1r6.ipd, December 2025,
              <https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.sp.800-57pt1r6.ipd>.

   [TS33.210] 3GPP, "Network Domain Security (NDS); IP network layer
              security", 3GPP TS 33.210 20.0.0, 2026,
              <https://www.3gpp.org/DynaReport/33210.htm>.

Acknowledgments

   The authors thank the authors of previous drafts from which this
   draft borrowed text.  The authors thank Ciarán Mullan and Angela
   Robinson for their valuable comments and feedback on this draft.

Authors' Addresses

   John Preuß Mattsson
   Ericsson
   Sweden
   Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com

   Sini Ruohomaa
   Ericsson
   Finland
   Email: sini.ruohomaa@ericsson.com

   Quynh Dang
   NIST
   United States of America
   Email: quynh.dang@nist.gov

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