The Incentive Consideration for Defense Against Reflection Attacks
draft-qin-savnet-incentive-03
Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
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|
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Authors | Lancheng Qin , Dan Li , Jianping Wu , Li Chen , Fang Gao | ||
Last updated | 2023-06-02 (Latest revision 2022-11-29) | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Source address spoofing remains a significant challenge in today's Internet. Although source address validation (SAV) mechanisms, such as ingress filtering [RFC2827], unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF) [RFC3704], and the Enhanced Feasible-Path Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (EFP-uRPF) [RFC8704], have been proposed for a long time, some ASes have not deployed SAV due to the problems of existing SAV mechanism, such as inaccurate validation, misaligned incentive, or other overhead concerns. This document specifically explains the misaligned incentive problem of existing SAV mechanisms and clarifies the direct incentive that a new SAV mechanism should achieve.
Authors
Lancheng Qin
Dan Li
Jianping Wu
Li Chen
Fang Gao
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)