Skip to main content

The Incentive Consideration for Defense Against Reflection Attacks

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Expired & archived
Authors Lancheng Qin , Dan Li , Jianping Wu , Li Chen , Fang Gao
Last updated 2023-06-02 (Latest revision 2022-11-29)
RFC stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state Expired
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)

This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:


Source address spoofing remains a significant challenge in today's Internet. Although source address validation (SAV) mechanisms, such as ingress filtering [RFC2827], unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF) [RFC3704], and the Enhanced Feasible-Path Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (EFP-uRPF) [RFC8704], have been proposed for a long time, some ASes have not deployed SAV due to the problems of existing SAV mechanism, such as inaccurate validation, misaligned incentive, or other overhead concerns. This document specifically explains the misaligned incentive problem of existing SAV mechanisms and clarifies the direct incentive that a new SAV mechanism should achieve.


Lancheng Qin
Dan Li
Jianping Wu
Li Chen
Fang Gao

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)