Requirement for the transparency of RPKI
draft-qingyuan-transparencyrpki-00

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Last updated 2019-11-05
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Interdomain Routing Working Group                                 Y. Liu
Internet-Draft
Intended status: Experimental                                   S. Zhang
Expires: May 7, 2020
                                                                   Q. Li

                                                                 S. Peng
                                                        November 4, 2019

                Requirement for the transparency of RPKI
                   draft-qingyuan-transparencyrpki-00

Abstract

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 7, 2020.

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   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Transparency Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6

1.  Introduction

   The certification authority (CA) or independent resource management
   agency in the RPKI may adversely affect the associated Internet
   Number Resource (INR) when performing authentication or actions for
   authentication, such as RFC 8211 [RFC8211].  In Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480], the operation is called "adverse
   operation" if its consequence may reduce the amount of Internet
   Number Resources (INRs) and contrary to the wishes of this INR's
   owner.  There are several forms of adverse operations on objects in
   the RPKI repository, including Deletion, Suppression, Corruption,
   Modification, Revocation, and Injection.  The adverse operation
   caused by CA's error or repository operation errors or attacks may be
   an attack on objects in the RPKI repository [RFC7132].

   According to the RPKI specification, even if the INR owner believes
   that the operation is adverse, the operation will be performed
   according to the established regulations.  For example, RPKI
   establishes a top-down authoritative architecture based on regional
   Internet registry (RIRs), which allocates IP address space to the
   lower level (the upper level allocates to the lower level and the
   lower level reallocates to the lower level).  The security benefits
   from RPKI are implemented through this architecture.  However, in the
   architecture, CA or resource management agency can unilaterally
   revoke any IP resources under its control, thus may result in an
   authority that abuses power.

   Therefore, it will cause serious security issues, once it is
   maliciously operated by some authorities.  Therefore, we propose to
   establish a mechanism to increase the transparency of RPKI to curb
   strong CA or resource management agency.

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2.  Transparency Requirements

   2.1 the transparency requirements for CA or resource management
   agencies in RPKI

   In the current RPKI architecture, any adverse actions taken by a
   malicious CA or resource management agency are difficult to detect by
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