Rooting Decentralized Identifiers in DNSSEC: A DANE-EE Key-Binding Profile
draft-ranjbar-dane-did-00
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| Document | Type |
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| Author | Kaveh Ranjbar | ||
| Last updated | 2026-07-22 | ||
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draft-ranjbar-dane-did-00
Network Working Group K. Ranjbar
Internet-Draft Whisper Security (viaGraph B.V.)
Intended status: Standards Track 22 July 2026
Expires: 23 January 2027
Rooting Decentralized Identifiers in DNSSEC: A DANE-EE Key-Binding
Profile
draft-ranjbar-dane-did-00
Abstract
Several Decentralized Identifier (DID) methods root trust in a DNS
name: did:web binds an identifier to a domain and today verifies its
keys over the Web PKI, did:dns serves DID data from DNS resource
records, and did:webvh retrieves its history from an HTTPS location
derived from a name. Each either depends on the Web PKI, treats
DNSSEC as an optional recommendation, or does not bind the
verification-method key to the name at all. This document defines a
single, normative DANE-EE key-binding profile that any DNS-anchored
DID method can point at rather than reinventing: a verification
method's public key is published as a TLSA record with certificate
usage DANE-EE(3), selector SubjectPublicKeyInfo(1), and matching type
SHA-256(1) under a DNSSEC-signed name, so that a relying party can
confirm the key from the DNS root of trust with no certificate
authority and no fetch from the subject. The profile binds a name to
a key and the key to the specific DID document it signs, and no
further; it states precisely what it does not cover, including
continuity of holding, and points to where those answers live.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 January 2027.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. The DANE-EE Key-Binding Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Certificate Usage DANE-EE(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Selector SubjectPublicKeyInfo(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Matching Type SHA-256(1), with a Fallback . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. DNSSEC Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Owner Name Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Binding a Record to a Verification Method . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Scope of the Assertion: Name to Key to Document, and No
Further . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Applicability to DID Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1. did:web . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.2. did:dns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.3. did:webvh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Key Rotation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10.1. Trust in the DNSSEC Chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10.2. Continuity of Holding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10.3. No Attestation Beyond the Key Binding . . . . . . . . . 12
11. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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1. Introduction
A recurring pattern spans the Decentralized Identifier (DID) methods
that root trust in the Domain Name System. did:web [DID-WEB] binds a
DID to a fully qualified domain name and, in current deployments,
establishes trust in the keys in its DID document through the Web PKI
certificate presented when the document is fetched over HTTPS.
did:dns [DID-DNS] assembles a DID document directly from DNS resource
records and recommends, but does not require, DNSSEC. did:webvh
[DID-WEBVH] derives an HTTPS retrieval location from a name but
deliberately relocates trust onto a self-certifying, hash-chained
history rather than onto the name. The individual "High Assurance
DIDs with DNS" draft [HIGH-ASSURANCE-DIDS] pointed the way here. It
reached for DNSSEC and DANE/TLSA to harden exactly this surface, and
it introduced the _did scoping this document reuses. As an
individual submission it expired before adoption and left the profile
to be completed: it pinned the TLSA selector but carried the
certificate usage and matching type only in its examples, kept DNSSEC
as a recommendation, and left its Security Considerations as a
placeholder. This document takes up that direction and carries it to
a complete profile, naming and defending each TLSA field, requiring
DNSSEC for trust-bearing keys, and writing the security
considerations that were left open.
Across all of these, the same primitive keeps surfacing: a public key
that ought to be bound to a DNS name in a way any party can verify
from the root, without a certificate authority in the path and
without contacting the subject. This document specifies that
primitive once, as a profile that a DNS-anchored DID method can
reference normatively instead of each method reinventing a slightly
different DNS key binding.
The profile is deliberately narrow. It defines how a verification
method's key is published in DNS and verified, and it fixes the scope
of the resulting assertion: the name controls the key, and the key
signed a specific DID document, and nothing beyond that. It is
complementary to each method's existing mechanisms rather than a
replacement for any of them, and it is the DID-facing companion to
the general DANE-anchored identity model
[I-D.ranjbar-dane-anchored-identity], sharing that document's key-
binding record while adding the DID-specific owner-name,
verification-method, and scope-ceiling rules.
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2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This document uses DNS terminology from [RFC8499] and DID terminology
from [DID-CORE], including "DID", "DID document", "verification
method", and "DID controller".
DID DNS name: The DNSSEC-signed domain name under which a DID's TLSA
records are published. For a method whose identifier is itself a
domain (for example did:web and did:dns), the DID DNS name is that
domain. For a method whose trust is not rooted in the name (for
example did:webvh), the DID DNS name is the domain from which the
DID's document is retrieved, and the binding is treated as an
OPTIONAL anchor (see Section 7).
Bound key: The public key of a verification method in a DID document
that this profile binds to the DID DNS name.
3. The DANE-EE Key-Binding Profile
A bound key is published as a TLSA record [RFC6698] with certificate
usage DANE-EE(3), selector SubjectPublicKeyInfo(1), and, by default,
matching type SHA-256(1), the combination written "3 1 1" in the
mnemonics of [RFC7218]. The record MUST be published under a DNSSEC-
signed name (see Section 4), and a relying party MUST validate the
DNSSEC chain to a trust anchor before relying on it (see
Section 3.4). Each of the three fields is chosen deliberately, and
the reasoning is given with each below, because a profile that cannot
defend a field invites that field to be renegotiated. The matching
type carries a sanctioned fallback under the robustness principle,
given in Section 3.3.
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DANE and the TLSA record are defined for authenticating TLS endpoints
[RFC6698]. This profile reuses the TLSA record as the carrier for a
DNSSEC-anchored key binding outside any TLS handshake: a relying
party confirms a verification-method key against the record rather
than authenticating a TLS peer. Publishing under the _did owner name
of Section 4, which carries no port or transport label, signals that
non-TLS use. A purpose-specific resource record, or a key carried in
a record whose type asserts nothing about transport, may be a cleaner
long-term binding; that is an open question shared with
[I-D.ranjbar-dane-anchored-identity] and is not resolved here. The
key-binding itself, a DNSSEC-signed name committing to a
SubjectPublicKeyInfo, does not depend on the record type chosen to
carry it.
3.1. Certificate Usage DANE-EE(3)
The certificate usage MUST be DANE-EE(3). Under DANE-EE, "the
binding of the server public key to its name is based entirely on the
TLSA record association" ([RFC7671], Section 5.1): there is no PKIX
certification path to validate, no issuing certificate authority to
trust, and no requirement that any name in a certificate match a
reference identity. The trust in the key chains only through the
DNSSEC delegation hierarchy to the root, not through the Web PKI.
The other certificate usages are unsuitable for this profile because
each reintroduces an issuer. Usages PKIX-TA(0) and PKIX-EE(1)
require the presented certificate to also validate through the Web
PKI, keeping a certificate authority in the trust path. Usage DANE-
TA(2) designates a domain-operated trust anchor, which is a
certificate authority that every party relying on names in the zone
must trust, together with a chain to validate. Only DANE-EE(3)
removes the issuer entirely and makes the DNSSEC-signed name the sole
authority for the key. Because cross-organization identity requires
a single globally agreed root of trust that is not a commercial
certificate authority, and the DNS root is the only such root, DANE-
EE(3) is the certificate usage that expresses this profile's trust
model rather than an incidental parameter of it.
3.2. Selector SubjectPublicKeyInfo(1)
The selector MUST be SubjectPublicKeyInfo(1). The record therefore
binds the DER-encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo [RFC5280] of the
verification-method key ([RFC6698], Section 2.1.2), not a full
certificate. Selector SPKI(1) "is compatible with raw public keys
[RFC7250] and the resulting TLSA record need not change across
certificate renewals with the same key" ([RFC7671], Section 5.1).
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A DID verification method expresses a bare public key, for example as
a publicKeyJwk or as a Multikey publicKeyMultibase value, and
typically has no X.509 certificate at all. Selector Full(0) presumes
a certificate and so cannot bind such a key; selector SPKI(1) binds
exactly the object a verification method carries. Binding the key
rather than a certificate also lets a controller present the same key
at more than one layer, so adopting this profile requires no re-
keying of already-deployed verification methods.
3.3. Matching Type SHA-256(1), with a Fallback
A publisher MUST publish the bound key with matching type SHA-256(1):
the SHA-256 digest of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo ([RFC6698],
Section 2.1.3), a fixed 32 octets whatever the size of the key.
The reason to hash is that the DID document already carries the key.
The record only has to confirm it, not to carry it, so a digest is
enough. Full(0) would republish the whole key in DNS for no gain,
and for a large post-quantum key it risks an oversized response.
SHA-256(1) is also the one matching type that is mandatory to
implement ([RFC7671], Section 2), so it is the most interoperable
choice, and SHA-512(2) buys no real strength for a key commitment of
this kind. Keeping the record to a digest keeps DNS in the role of
confirming a key the method carries, rather than holding a second
copy of it that can drift from the document.
Following the robustness principle, a relying party SHOULD also
accept a securely validated DANE-EE(3), SPKI(1), Full(0) record, that
is "3 1 0", for the same key, so that a publisher that has already
exposed the unhashed SubjectPublicKeyInfo, for example to let the key
be recovered directly from DNS or because it followed the earlier
"High Assurance DIDs with DNS" examples, still interoperates. Where
SHA-256(1) genuinely cannot be used, a publisher MAY publish "3 1 0"
instead. The exact match carries the whole key rather than its
digest, so it is larger but not weaker; this profile prefers "3 1 1"
for size and uniformity and treats "3 1 0" as a sanctioned fallback,
not a second first-class form.
A deployment that anticipates digest-algorithm agility MAY
additionally publish a record with a stronger matching type alongside
the SHA-256(1) record; verifiers process the strongest matching type
they support ([RFC7671], Section 9).
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3.4. DNSSEC Requirement
TLSA records under this profile MUST be served from a DNSSEC-signed
zone [RFC4033] [RFC9364]. A relying party MUST validate the DNSSEC
chain from a trust anchor and MUST NOT rely on a TLSA record whose
validation state is not secure. A TLSA response whose DNSSEC
validation state is bogus MUST cause the verification to fail
([RFC6698], Section 4.1). Where a referencing DID method today
expresses DNSSEC as a recommendation, adopting this profile makes
DNSSEC validation a requirement for keys carried under it.
4. Owner Name Convention
TLSA records under this profile are published under the globally
scoped underscore label _did (0x5F 0x64 0x69 0x64) prepended to the
DID DNS name, consistent with the underscored-name scoping of
[RFC8552] and with the prior _did usage in [HIGH-ASSURANCE-DIDS].
Publishing under a dedicated _did name, rather than under a transport
name such as _443._tcp, keeps the binding independent of any
assumption that the key is used for TLS.
The RRset at _did.<did-dns-name> MAY hold one TLSA record for each
verification method to be bound; a relying party selects the record
whose digest matches the verification method it is evaluating. A
method that requires per-key addressing MAY instead publish each
record under a label derived from the verification method's
identifier, as _<vm-label>._did.<did-dns-name>, where <vm-label> is
derived from the fragment of the verification method's id. A
referencing method MUST specify which of these two placements it uses
so that resolution is deterministic.
5. Binding a Record to a Verification Method
For each verification method to be bound, the controller computes the
SHA-256 digest of the DER-encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo of that
method's public key and publishes it as a 3 1 1 TLSA record under the
owner name of Section 4.
A relying party evaluating a verification method:
1. determines the DID DNS name for the DID being verified, as
specified by the referencing method;
2. retrieves the TLSA RRset under the _did owner name and validates
its DNSSEC chain to a trust anchor (Section 3.4);
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3. computes the SHA-256 digest of the DER-encoded
SubjectPublicKeyInfo of the verification-method key from the DID
document; and
4. accepts the key as bound if and only if a securely validated 3 1
1 TLSA record under that name carries a matching digest.
If no securely validated matching record is present, the key is not
bound under this profile, and the relying party MUST NOT treat the
DANE binding as established for that key. Referencing methods define
whether an unbound key is usable by other means; this profile makes
no such key bound.
6. Scope of the Assertion: Name to Key to Document, and No Further
The assertion established by this profile is bounded and MUST be
treated as such. A securely validated 3 1 1 record establishes that
the DID DNS name controls the bound key. Together with a signature
made by that key over the DID document (as defined by the referencing
method), it establishes that the name controls a key that signed that
specific document. It establishes nothing further.
In particular, this profile does not, by itself, establish the real-
world identity of the DID subject, the identity or accountability of
the DID controller, any delegated authority or scope, or any
reputation or history associated with the DID. Each of those is a
separate claim that carries its own evidence, validity interval, and
revocation, and a relying party MUST NOT infer any of them from a
valid key binding alone. Anything not asserted remains not
established, rather than being read as true or as false; a relying
party SHOULD fail closed on an unmet dependency, so that, for
example, a revoked delegation fails even while the TLSA record and
the document signature still validate.
Referencing specifications and conformance tests SHOULD include a
negative fixture that pins this ceiling: one securely validated name
and key, and two DID documents with different subjects signed such
that the key signed only one of them; a conforming verifier accepts
only the document the key actually signed and fails closed on the
other. A profile or implementation that accepts both is overreaching
the assertion this binding makes.
7. Applicability to DID Methods
This profile is a single reference that DNS-anchored DID methods can
point at. It is complementary: it changes where a key is rooted and
how a relying party confirms it, not how a method otherwise operates.
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7.1. did:web
did:web's live trust rests on the DNS-to-TLS binding of the domain in
its identifier, and its DNSSEC guidance is a non-normative
recommendation. A did:web profile that references this document
binds each DID-document verification-method key as a 3 1 1 record
under _did.<domain>, giving a DNS-rooted confirmation of the key that
does not depend on the Web PKI certificate used to retrieve the
document. A deployment MAY additionally require that the certificate
presented when retrieving the DID document validate against a DANE-EE
record for the retrieval endpoint; that transport hardening is a
separate, did:web-specific application and is not the key binding
this profile defines.
7.2. did:dns
did:dns already serves verification-method material from underscore-
scoped DNS resource records and recommends DNSSEC. A did:dns profile
that references this document tightens DNSSEC from a recommendation
to a requirement for trust-bearing keys (Section 3.4) and adds a 3 1
1 TLSA record binding each verification-method key. Consistent with
did:dns keeping DID-document keys independent of DNSSEC zone keys,
the record binds the verification-method key, never the zone-signing
or key-signing key.
7.3. did:webvh
did:webvh deliberately roots trust in a self-certifying, hash-
chained, optionally witnessed history rather than in its DNS name,
and instructs clients not to infer control from the domain. For
did:webvh this profile MUST be treated as an OPTIONAL additional
anchor, at the same level as its witnesses and watchers, and never as
a replacement for its self-certifying history. A did:webvh
deployment MAY bind the keys of an equivalent did:web representation
using this profile, giving DNS-rooted assurance to relying parties
that consume that representation, without altering did:webvh's own
trust model.
8. Key Rotation
To rotate a bound key without a verification gap, a controller
publishes the 3 1 1 record for the new key alongside the record for
the current key at least two TTLs before the new key is presented,
then removes the old record after the transition ([RFC7671],
Section 8.1). During the overlap both keys validate, and relying
parties converge on the new key as caches expire.
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Rotation under this profile changes which key the name currently
authorizes. It does not, by itself, attest that the party
controlling the name after a rotation is the same party that
controlled it before; see Section 10.
9. Revocation
A bound key is revoked by removing or replacing its TLSA record.
Because relying parties validate against live DNS, a revocation takes
effect within the record's TTL; operators SHOULD choose TTLs short
enough that revocation is timely for their threat model. This is
revocation of the key binding, effective at DNS TTL for relying
parties that validate live DNS. It is not offline or stapled
revocation, and it is not per-signature revocation; a signature made
earlier is not retroactively invalidated by withdrawing the binding,
which is why verification of a past proof is treated separately in
Section 10.
10. Security Considerations
10.1. Trust in the DNSSEC Chain
The security of a binding rests entirely on the DNSSEC validation
chain of the DID DNS name. A relying party MUST validate DNSSEC to a
trust anchor and reject any non-secure result. The operator of the
zone MUST protect its zone-signing and key-signing keys accordingly;
compromise of those keys is equivalent to compromise of every key
bound under the zone. This profile moves part of the trust onto the
DNS operator, the parent zone, and the registrar of the name;
registrar or zone compromise is the corresponding failure mode. The
profile is therefore an additional, independent root that a relying
party MAY require, not a claim to be stronger than, or a replacement
for, the mechanisms a referencing method already uses.
10.2. Continuity of Holding
This profile binds a key to a name under the name's current DNSSEC
delegation. It deliberately does not attest continuity of holding:
it carries no evidence that the party controlling the name today is
the party that controlled it when a binding was first recorded. A
legitimate key rotation by the same holder and a key change by a new
holder after a registrar transfer, a dispute-driven transfer, or a
lapse and re-registration are, to an offline verifier,
indistinguishable, because DNSSEC certifies current delegation, not
custody over time. [RFC6698] (Section 2.1.1) calls usage 3 a
"domain-issued certificate", one a domain name administrator can
issue without a third-party CA; the administrator it trusts is
whoever controls the zone at the moment of the query, which is
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exactly what a transfer changes.
For a short-lived, continuously re-validated credential such as a TLS
certificate issued under [RFC8555], this matters little, because
control is re-proven at each issuance and the credential expires on
its own. It matters for a DID, which another party may record once
and re-verify much later, where no re-proof of current control is
forced. The question therefore has an answer, and this profile
states where it lives rather than leaving it silent:
* The authoritative record of a name changing hands is not in the
DNS; it is at the registry, exposed through RDAP [RFC7480]
[RFC9082] [RFC9083] as eventAction values including registration,
transfer, and expiration ([RFC9083], Section 4.5) and as status
values such as pending transfer, client transfer prohibited,
redemption period, and pending delete ([RFC9083], Section 4.6;
[RFC8056], Section 2).
* To verify a proof as it stood at an earlier time, a relying party
cannot fetch a past TLSA or DNSKEY from live DNS, which serves
only current state. A historical DNSSEC validation chain (the
TLSA record together with its RRSIG, DNSKEY, and DS records up to
the publicly archived root trust anchor) MAY be stapled to the
proof at the time it is made, in the manner of the serialized
DNSSEC chain of [RFC9102] (an Experimental mechanism defined for
TLS, whose chain serialization is the reusable part here), so that
a later verifier can confirm which key the name published at that
time. This staple attests historical validity; it is distinct
from the live-DNS revocation of Section 9.
* Continuity MAY additionally be made self-contained, rather than
registry-observable, by recording the sequence of a name's key
bindings in a witnessed, append-only transparency log of the shape
defined for certificates in [RFC6962] and [RFC9162], in which
independent witnesses countersign the log so that a split or
forked view is detectable. This profile treats such a log as an
OPTIONAL companion and makes no claim about a specific log's
witness quorum; a deployment states the assurance its live witness
set provides and no more.
Accordingly, a relying party that relies on a binding it recorded
earlier SHOULD bound the lifetime of that cached binding and re-
resolve and re-validate the TLSA and DNSSEC chain before reuse, and
for higher-assurance or cross-organization decisions SHOULD check for
an RDAP transfer or expiration event, or a transfer or redemption
status, more recent than the binding it cached, treating any such
change as a signal to re-establish trust rather than to continue it.
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10.3. No Attestation Beyond the Key Binding
Because the binding is to a public key and not to an issued
certificate, there is no issuing authority attesting to the subject
beyond what registration data provides. Applications that require
identity, controllership, or delegation assurances MUST obtain them
by other means and MUST treat a valid binding as proof of key control
under the current delegation only, per Section 6.
11. Privacy Considerations
A binding is public by construction: the _did name, the TLSA record,
and any associated registration data are visible to anyone. This
removes the call-home privacy exposure of fetching a key from the
subject, at the cost of publishing a stable, enumerable key binding
whose activity can be correlated [RFC7626]. Deployments that publish
one binding per DID or per verification method SHOULD consider
whether such correlation is acceptable and MAY scope or rotate names
where it is not. Registration data exposed through RDAP SHOULD be
minimized to what accountability requires.
12. IANA Considerations
This document defines no new DNS resource record type and no new TLSA
field values; it profiles existing values from [RFC6698] and
[RFC7218].
The _did underscored node name used in Section 4 was introduced by
the earlier "High Assurance DIDs with DNS" work
[HIGH-ASSURANCE-DIDS], whose IANA registration lapsed when that draft
expired. This document requests that IANA register _did for the TLSA
RR type in the "Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names"
registry [RFC8552], with this document as the reference, reconciling
with any existing or pending _did entry for other RR types.
13. References
13.1. Normative References
[DID-CORE] W3C, "Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0", 2022,
<https://www.w3.org/TR/did-core/>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
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[RFC6698] Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698, August
2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6698>.
[RFC7218] Gudmundsson, O., "Adding Acronyms to Simplify
Conversations about DNS-Based Authentication of Named
Entities (DANE)", RFC 7218, DOI 10.17487/RFC7218, April
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7218>.
[RFC7250] Wouters, P., Ed., Tschofenig, H., Ed., Gilmore, J.,
Weiler, S., and T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 7250, DOI 10.17487/RFC7250,
June 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7250>.
[RFC7671] Dukhovni, V. and W. Hardaker, "The DNS-Based
Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Protocol: Updates
and Operational Guidance", RFC 7671, DOI 10.17487/RFC7671,
October 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7671>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8552] Crocker, D., "Scoped Interpretation of DNS Resource
Records through "Underscored" Naming of Attribute Leaves",
BCP 222, RFC 8552, DOI 10.17487/RFC8552, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8552>.
[RFC9364] Hoffman, P., "DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC)", BCP 237,
RFC 9364, DOI 10.17487/RFC9364, February 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9364>.
13.2. Informative References
[DID-DNS] Danube Tech, "The did:dns Method", n.d.,
<https://danubetech.github.io/did-method-dns/>.
[DID-WEB] W3C Credentials Community Group, "did:web Method
Specification", n.d.,
<https://w3c-ccg.github.io/did-method-web/>.
[DID-WEBVH]
Decentralized Identity Foundation, "did:webvh DID Method
(did:web + Verifiable History) v1.0", n.d.,
<https://identity.foundation/didwebvh/v1.0/>.
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[HIGH-ASSURANCE-DIDS]
Carter, J. and J. Latour, "High Assurance DIDs with DNS",
n.d., <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-carter-high-
assurance-dids-with-dns/>.
[I-D.ranjbar-dane-anchored-identity]
Ranjbar, K., "DANE-Anchored Identity for Network Clients,
Devices, and Autonomous Agents", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ranjbar-dane-anchored-identity-00,
21 July 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ranjbar-dane-anchored-identity-00>.
[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.
[RFC6962] Laurie, B., Langley, A., and E. Kasper, "Certificate
Transparency", RFC 6962, DOI 10.17487/RFC6962, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6962>.
[RFC7480] Newton, A., Ellacott, B., and N. Kong, "HTTP Usage in the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", STD 95,
RFC 7480, DOI 10.17487/RFC7480, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7480>.
[RFC7626] Bortzmeyer, S., "DNS Privacy Considerations", RFC 7626,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7626, August 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7626>.
[RFC8056] Gould, J., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) and
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) Status Mapping",
RFC 8056, DOI 10.17487/RFC8056, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8056>.
[RFC8499] Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
Terminology", RFC 8499, DOI 10.17487/RFC8499, January
2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8499>.
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[RFC8555] Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J.
Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
(ACME)", RFC 8555, DOI 10.17487/RFC8555, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8555>.
[RFC9082] Hollenbeck, S. and A. Newton, "Registration Data Access
Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", STD 95, RFC 9082,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9082, June 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9082>.
[RFC9083] Hollenbeck, S. and A. Newton, "JSON Responses for the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", STD 95,
RFC 9083, DOI 10.17487/RFC9083, June 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9083>.
[RFC9102] Dukhovni, V., Huque, S., Toorop, W., Wouters, P., and M.
Shore, "TLS DNSSEC Chain Extension", RFC 9102,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9102, August 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9102>.
[RFC9162] Laurie, B., Messeri, E., and R. Stradling, "Certificate
Transparency Version 2.0", RFC 9162, DOI 10.17487/RFC9162,
December 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9162>.
Acknowledgments
This profile builds on the DANE and DNSSEC deployment experience of
the operator community, on the "High Assurance DIDs with DNS" work of
Jesse Carter, Jacques Latour, Mathieu Glaude, and Tim Bouma, and on
the did:web, did:dns, and did:webvh method specifications. The
author thanks the participants of the W3C Credentials Community Group
who encouraged a single shared DANE-EE profile, and thanks Anivar
Aravind for the continuity-of-holding question that shaped
Section 10.2.
Author's Address
Kaveh Ranjbar
Whisper Security (viaGraph B.V.)
Netherlands
Email: kaveh@whisper.security
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