Multipath Use Case and Requirement for Security
draft-rass-panrg-mpath-usecase-00

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Internet                                                         S. Rass
Internet-Draft                                   Universitaet Klagenfurt
Intended status: Informational                                     Y. Qu
Expires: September 12, 2019                                       L. Han
                                                                  Huawei
                                                          March 11, 2019

            Multipath Use Case and Requirement for Security
                   draft-rass-panrg-mpath-usecase-00

Abstract

   This document describes a use case of multipath to achieve full CIA+
   by using symmetric cryptography and point-to-point shared secrets.

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Rass, et al.           Expires September 12, 2019               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft           Mpath security use case              March 2019

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Multipath Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Multi-path Service and User-Network Interface . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Path and Routing Reliability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  Cross Domain Path Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.4.  Cross Domain Network Connections  . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.5.  Updates upon Changing Network Topologies  . . . . . . . .   5
     3.6.  Enforced Device Pairing and De-Pairing  . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Appendix A.  Cryptographic and Graph-Theoretic Basics . . . . . .   9
     A.1.  Secret Sharing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     A.2.  Network Connectivity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Appendix B.  Multipath Transmission and Game-Theoretic Security .  10
     B.1.  End-to-end Confidentiality - Parallel Version . . . . . .  10
     B.2.  End-to-end Confidentiality - Sequential-Parallel Version   10
     B.3.  Randomized Routing to Maximize Security against Node
           (Failures)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     B.4.  Availability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     B.5.  End-to-End Authenticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       B.5.1.  Non-Repudiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     B.6.  Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Introduction

   Public-key cryptography is a convenient tool for end-to-end security,
   but in practice can be cumbersome or complicated for non-expert users
   to apply.  Certificate- and key management rely on complex
   infrastructures and to a significant extent impose monetary cost and
   human effort.

   This document describes a method of using symmetric cryptography and
   point-to-point shared secrets to establish full CIA+
   (confidentiality, integrity, availability and authenticity) end-to-
   end security.  The respective schemes rely on multipath transmission
   and threshold cryptography, and are intended to work transparently
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