@techreport{reddy-rats-key-binding-01,
    number =    {draft-reddy-rats-key-binding-01},
    type =      {Internet-Draft},
    institution =   {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    publisher = {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    note =      {Work in Progress},
    url =       {https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-reddy-rats-key-binding/01/},
    author =    {Tirumaleswar Reddy.K and Hannes Tschofenig and Thomas Fossati and Ionuț Mihalcea},
    title =     {{Key Attestation for Entity Attestation Tokens (EAT)}},
    pagetotal = 22,
    year =      2026,
    month =     jun,
    day =       7,
    abstract =  {This document defines an Entity Attestation Token (EAT) profile and a new EAT claim that convey the subject public key and its protection properties within attestation evidence. Combined with protocol-level proof of possession from the surrounding protocol, this establishes a cryptographic binding between a private key and an attested execution environment. The subject public key is conveyed using the EAT cnf claim defined in {[}RFC8747{]} and {[}RFC7800{]}, and freshness uses the EAT eat\_nonce claim defined in {[}RFC9711{]}. The proof of possession of the subject key is obtained from the surrounding protocol, such as TLS certificate-based authentication or CSR signature verification. Because the EAT is signed by a hardware-backed Attestation Key (AK), successful verification of the EAT signature together with protocol-level proof of possession establishes a cryptographic binding between the private key and the attested platform state. This mechanism addresses key substitution attacks that arise when attestation evidence and the certificate private keys are validated independently.},
}