TURN Extension for Third Party Authorization
draft-reddy-tram-turn-third-party-authz-00
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Tirumaleswar Reddy.K , Prashanth Patil , Ram R , Justin Uberti | ||
| Last updated | 2014-02-14 | ||
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draft-reddy-tram-turn-third-party-authz-00
TRAM T. Reddy
Internet-Draft P. Patil
Intended status: Standards Track R. Ravindranath
Expires: August 18, 2014 Cisco
J. Uberti
Google
February 14, 2014
TURN Extension for Third Party Authorization
draft-reddy-tram-turn-third-party-authz-00
Abstract
This document proposes the use of OAuth to obtain and validate
ephemeral tokens that can be used for TURN authentication. The usage
of ephemeral tokens ensure that access to a TURN server can be
controlled even if the tokens are compromised, as is the case in
WebRTC where TURN credentials must be specified in Javascript. It
also addresses the need for stronger authentication described in
[I-D.reddy-behave-turn-auth].
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 18, 2014.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Solution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Obtaining a Token Using OAuth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Forming a Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. TURN Server validating Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. STUN Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1. THIRD-PARTY-AUTHORIZATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.2. ACCESS-TOKEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction
TURN [RFC5766] is a protocol that is often used to improve the
connectivity of P2P applications. By providing a cloud-based relay
service, TURN ensures that a connection can be established even when
one or both sides is incapable of a direct P2P connection. However,
as a relay service, it imposes a nontrivial cost on the service
provider. Therefore, access to a TURN service is almost always
access-controlled.
TURN provides a mechanism to control access via "long-term" username/
password credentials that are provided as part of the TURN protocol.
It is expected that these credentials will be kept secret; if the
credentials are discovered, the TURN server could be used by
unauthorized users or applications. However, in web applications,
ensuring this secrecy is typically impossible. To address this
problem and the ones described in [I-D.reddy-behave-turn-auth], this
document proposes the use of third party authorization using OAuth
for TURN.
To achieve third party authorization, a resource owner e.g. WebRTC
server, authorizes a TURN client to access resources on the TURN
server.
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Using OAuth, a client obtains an ephemeral token from an
authorization server e.g. WebRTC server, and the token is presented
to the TURN server instead of the traditional mechanism of presenting
username/password credentials. The TURN server validates the
authenticity of the token and provides required services.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
o WebRTC Server: A web server that supports WebRTC
[I-D.ietf-rtcweb-overview].
o Access Token: OAuth 2.0 access token.
o mac_key: The session key generated by the authorization server.
Note that the lifetime of the session key is equal to the lifetime
of the access token.
o kid: The name of the key (key id), which is an identifier
generated by the resource owner. It is RECOMMENDED that the
authorization server generates this key id by computing a hash
over the access token, for example using SHA-1, and to encode it
in a base64 format.
3. Solution Overview
This specification uses token type 'Handle' (or artifact) described
in [RFC6819]. A handle token is a reference to some internal data
structure within the OAuth authorization server; the internal data
structure contains the attributes of the token such as mac_key,
lifetime of the access token etc. The exact mechanism used by a
client to obtain a token from the OAuth authorization server is
outside the scope of this document. For example, a client could make
an HTTP request to an authorization server to obtain a token that can
be used to avail TURN services. The TURN token is returned in JSON,
along with other OAuth Parameters like token type, mac_key, kid,
token lifetime etc. The client is oblivious to the content of the
token. The token is embedded within a TURN request sent to the TURN
server. Once the TURN server has determined the token is valid, TURN
services are offered for a determined period of time.
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+-------------------+ +--------+ +---------+
| ......... TURN | | TURN | | WebRTC |
| .WebRTC . Client | | | | |
| .Client . | | Server | | Server |
| ......... | | | | |
+-------------------+ +--------+ +---------+
| | Allocate request | |
| |------------------------------------------>| |
| | | |
| | Allocate error response | |
| |<------------------------------------------| |
| | THIRD-PARTY-AUTHORIZATION | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | HTTP Request for token | |
|------------------------------------------------------------>|
| | HTTP Response with token parameters | |
|<------------------------------------------------------------|
|OAuth | | |
Attributes | |
|-----> | | |
| | Allocate request ACCESS-TOKEN | |
| |------------------------------------------>| |
| | | |
| | Allocate success response | |
| |<------------------------------------------| |
| | TURN Messages | |
| | ////// integrity protected ////// | |
| | ////// integrity protected ////// | |
| | ////// integrity protected ////// | |
Figure 1: TURN Third Party Authorization
Note : An implementation may choose to contact the WebRTC server to
obtain a token even before it makes an allocate request, if it knows
the server details before hand. For example, once a client has
learnt that a TURN server supports Third Party authorization from a
WebRTC server, the client can obtain the token before making
subsequent allocate requests.
For example HTTP response from Authorization server:
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HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
"access_token":
"eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDK0hTMjU2In0.
kwx9txo_sKRasjlXc8RYP-evLCmT1XRXKjtY5l44Gnh0A84hGvVfMxMfCWXh38hi",
"token_type":"mac",
"expires_in":1800,
"refresh_token":"8xLOxBtZp8",
"kid":"22BIjxU93h/IgwEb4zCRu5WF37s=",
"mac_key":"adijq39jdlaska9asud"
}
Figure 2: Example
Handle token type is selected for the following reasons:
1. The Authorization server can inform the TURN server to revoke the
access token after the call is terminated. This mechanism
ensures that even if the TURN client does not delete existing
allocations, the TURN server based on the revocation notification
from the Authorization server can close the allocations.
2. Another approach, not discussed in this document, is a self-
contained token where all the information necessary to
authenticate the validity of the token is contained within the
token itself. This approach has the benefit of avoiding a
protocol between the TURN server and the OAuth authentication
server for token validation, thus reducing latency. However,
this approach has the drawback of needing a large TURN packet to
accommodate the token.
4. Obtaining a Token Using OAuth
A TURN client should know the authentication capability of the TURN
server before deciding to use third party authorization with it. A
TURN client initially makes a request without any authorization. If
the TURN server supports or mandates third party authorization, it
will return an error message indicating support for third party
authorization. The TURN server includes an ERROR-CODE attribute with
a value of 401 (Unauthorized), a nonce value in a NONCE attribute and
a SOFTWARE attribute that gives information about the TURN server's
software. The TURN servers also includes additional STUN attribute
THIRD-PARTY-AUTHORIZATION signaling the TURN client that the TURN
server supports third party authorization.
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The following mapping of OAuth concepts to WebRTC is used :
+----------------------+----------------------------+
| OAuth | WebRTC |
+======================+============================+
| Client | WebRTC client |
+----------------------+----------------------------+
| Resource owner | WebRTC server |
+----------------------+----------------------------+
| Authorization server | Authorization server |
+----------------------+----------------------------+
| Resource server | TURN Server |
+----------------------+----------------------------+
Figure 3: OAuth terminology mapped to WebRTC terminology
Using the OAuth 2.0 authorization framework, a WebRTC client (third-
party application) obtains limited access to a TURN (resource server)
on behalf of the WebRTC server (resource owner or authorization
server). The WebRTC client requests access to resources controlled
by the resource owner (WebRTC server) and hosted by the resource
server (TURN server). The WebRTC client obtains access token,
lifetime, session key (in the mac_key parameter) and key id (kid).
The TURN client conveys the access token and other OAuth parameters
learnt from the authorization server to the resource server (TURN
server). The TURN obtains the session key via the access token. The
TURN server validates the token, computes the message integrity of
the request and takes appropriate action i.e permits the TURN client
to create allocations. This is shown in an abstract way in Figure 4.
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+---------------+ Token metadata
| + (4)
+------------->| Authorization |------------+
| | Server | |
| +----------|(WebRTC Server)|<------+ |
| | | | | |
(1) | | +--------------+ | |
Access | | (2) | |
Token | | Access Token | |
Request | | + Get Token | |
| | Session Key (3) | |
| | | |
| V | V
+-------+---+ +-+----=-----+
| | (5) | |
| | TURN Request + Access | |
| WebRTC | Token | TURN |
| Client |---------------------->| Server |
| (Alice) | | |
| | | |
+-----------+ +------------+
User : Alice
Figure 4: Interactions
OAuth in [RFC6749] defines four grant types. This specification uses
the OAuth grant type "Implicit" explained in section 1.3.2 of
[RFC6749] where the WebRTC client is issued an access token directly.
The scope of the access token explained in section 3.3 of [RFC6749]
MUST be TURN.
5. Forming a Request
When a TURN server responds that third party authorization is
required, a TURN client re-attempts the request, this time including
access token and kid values in ACCESS-TOKEN and USERNAME STUN
attributes. The TURN client includes a MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute
as the last attribute in the message over the contents of the TURN
message. MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute is calculated using the long-
term credentials mechanism specified in section 10.2 of [RFC5389],
using the "kid" value from the returned JSON for its USERNAME
attribute, and the "mac_key" value for the password input to the
MESSAGE-INTEGRITY hash.
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6. TURN Server validating Request
The TURN server, on receiving a request, performs checks listed in
section 10.2.2 of [RFC5389] in addition to the following steps to
verify that the access token is valid:
o The TURN server communicates with the authorization server to
validate the token and fetches the metadata mac_key, lifetime etc
associated with the token. The communication mechanism between
Resource server and Authorization server is discussed in
[I-D.richer-oauth-introspection].
o The TURN server uses the mac_key to compute the value for the
message integrity and if the resulting value does not match the
contents of the MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute then it rejects the
request with an error response 401 (Unauthorized).
o If all the checks pass, the TURN server continues to process the
request. Any response generated by the server MUST include the
MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute, computed using the mac_key.
A TURN response is discarded by the client if the value computed for
message integrity using mac_key does not match the contents of the
MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute.
7. STUN Attributes
The following new STUN attributes are introduced by this
specification to accomplish third party authorization.
7.1. THIRD-PARTY-AUTHORIZATION
This attribute is used by the TURN server to inform the client that
it supports third party authorization. This attribute is used by the
TURN server to inform the client that it supports third party
authorization. This attribute value be a URL that the client should
contact, to obtain a token for third party authorization. The format
for the URL will be as described in [RFC3986].
7.2. ACCESS-TOKEN
The access token is issued by the authorization server. OAuth does
not impose any limitation on the length of the access token but since
STUN messages cannot exceed 548 bytes (Section 7.1 of [RFC5389]),
access token length needs to be restricted to fit within the maximum
STUN message size. The value of ACCESS-TOKEN is a variable-length
value. Its length MUST be less than 256 bytes and SHOULD be less
than 64 bytes.
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Since the access token is valid for a period of time the resource
server MUST cache it so that it does not need to be provided in every
request from the client. The ACCESS-TOKEN MUST only be included in
the first request from the client to the server but MUST NOT be
included in a subsequent request/response.
8. Security Considerations
When OAuth is used the interaction between the client and the
authorization server requires Transport Layer Security (TLS) with a
ciphersuite offering confidentiality protection. The session key
MUST NOT be transmitted in clear since this would completely destroy
the security benefits of the proposed scheme. The TURN server can
also maintain a cache of used kid as an effective countermeasure
against replay attacks.
9. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to add the following attributes to the STUN
attribute registry [iana-stun],
o THIRD-PARTY-AUTHORIZATION
o ACCESS-TOKEN
10. Acknowledgements
Authors would like to thank Dan Wing, Pal Martinsen for comments and
review.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC
3986, January 2005.
[RFC5389] Rosenberg, J., Mahy, R., Matthews, P., and D. Wing,
"Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)", RFC 5389,
October 2008.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC
6749, October 2012.
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[iana-stun]
IANA, , "IANA: STUN Attributes", April 2011,
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/stun-parameters/stun-pa
rameters.xml>.
11.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-rtcweb-overview]
Alvestrand, H., "Overview: Real Time Protocols for Brower-
based Applications", draft-ietf-rtcweb-overview-08 (work
in progress), September 2013.
[I-D.reddy-behave-turn-auth]
Reddy, T., R, R., Perumal, M., and A. Yegin, "Problems
with STUN Authentication for TURN", draft-reddy-behave-
turn-auth-04 (work in progress), September 2013.
[I-D.richer-oauth-introspection]
Richer, J., "OAuth Token Introspection", draft-richer-
oauth-introspection-04 (work in progress), May 2013.
[RFC5766] Mahy, R., Matthews, P., and J. Rosenberg, "Traversal Using
Relays around NAT (TURN): Relay Extensions to Session
Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)", RFC 5766, April 2010.
[RFC6819] Lodderstedt, T., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0
Threat Model and Security Considerations", RFC 6819,
January 2013.
Authors' Addresses
Tirumaleswar Reddy
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Cessna Business Park, Varthur Hobli
Sarjapur Marathalli Outer Ring Road
Bangalore, Karnataka 560103
India
Email: tireddy@cisco.com
Prashanth Patil
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Bangalore
India
Email: praspati@cisco.com
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Ram Mohan Ravindranath
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Cessna Business Park,
Kadabeesanahalli Village, Varthur Hobli,
Sarjapur-Marathahalli Outer Ring Road
Bangalore, Karnataka 560103
India
Email: rmohanr@cisco.com
Justin Uberti
Google
747 6th Ave S
Kirkland, WA
98033
USA
Email: justin@uberti.name
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