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Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication Extension

Document Type Replaced Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Eric Rescorla , Marsh Ray , Steve Dispensa , One Way
Last updated 2009-12-17 (Latest revision 2009-11-17)
Replaced by RFC 5746
Stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Expired & archived
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Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state Replaced by draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at:


SSL and TLS renegotiation are vulnerable to an attack in which the attacker forms a TLS connection with the target server, injects content of his choice, and then splices in a new TLS connection from a client. The server treats the client's initial TLS handshake as a renegotiation and thus believes that the initial data transmitted by the attacker is from the same entity as the subsequent client data. This draft defines a TLS extension to cryptographically tie renegotiations to the TLS connections they are being performed over, thus preventing this attack.


Eric Rescorla
Marsh Ray
Steve Dispensa
One Way

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)