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Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication Extension
draft-rescorla-tls-renegotiation-01

Document type: Replaced Internet-Draft (individual)
Document stream: No stream defined
Last updated: 2009-12-17 (latest revision 2009-11-17)
Intended RFC status: Unknown
Other versions: (expired, archived): plain text, pdf, html

Stream State:No stream defined
Document shepherd: No shepherd assigned

IESG State: Replaced by draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation
Responsible AD: (None)
Send notices to: No addresses provided

This Internet-Draft is no longer active. Unofficial copies of old Internet-Drafts can be found here:
http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-rescorla-tls-renegotiation

Abstract

SSL and TLS renegotiation are vulnerable to an attack in which the attacker forms a TLS connection with the target server, injects content of his choice, and then splices in a new TLS connection from a client. The server treats the client's initial TLS handshake as a renegotiation and thus believes that the initial data transmitted by the attacker is from the same entity as the subsequent client data. This draft defines a TLS extension to cryptographically tie renegotiations to the TLS connections they are being performed over, thus preventing this attack.

Authors

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Marsh Ray <marsh@extendedsubset.com>
Steve Dispensa <dispensa@phonefactor.com>
One Way <nasko.oskov@microsoft.com>

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid)