Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication Extension
draft-rescorla-tls-renegotiation-01
| Document | Type | Replaced Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Last updated | 2009-12-17 (latest revision 2009-11-17) | ||
| Replaced by | draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation | ||
| Stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats |
Expired & archived
pdf
htmlized
bibtex
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| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus Boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation | |
| Telechat date | |||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) | ||
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-rescorla-tls-renegotiation-01.txt
Abstract
SSL and TLS renegotiation are vulnerable to an attack in which the attacker forms a TLS connection with the target server, injects content of his choice, and then splices in a new TLS connection from a client. The server treats the client's initial TLS handshake as a renegotiation and thus believes that the initial data transmitted by the attacker is from the same entity as the subsequent client data. This draft defines a TLS extension to cryptographically tie renegotiations to the TLS connections they are being performed over, thus preventing this attack.
Authors
Eric Rescorla
(ekr@rtfm.com)
Marsh Ray
(marsh@extendedsubset.com)
Steve Dispensa
(dispensa@phonefactor.com)
One Way
(nasko.oskov@microsoft.com)
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)