Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication Extension
draft-rescorla-tls-renegotiation-01

 
Document Type Replaced Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2009-12-17 (latest revision 2009-11-17)
Replaced by draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-rescorla-tls-renegotiation-01.txt

Abstract

SSL and TLS renegotiation are vulnerable to an attack in which the attacker forms a TLS connection with the target server, injects content of his choice, and then splices in a new TLS connection from a client. The server treats the client's initial TLS handshake as a renegotiation and thus believes that the initial data transmitted by the attacker is from the same entity as the subsequent client data. This draft defines a TLS extension to cryptographically tie renegotiations to the TLS connections they are being performed over, thus preventing this attack.

Authors

Eric Rescorla (ekr@rtfm.com)
Marsh Ray (marsh@extendedsubset.com)
Steve Dispensa (dispensa@phonefactor.com)
One Way (nasko.oskov@microsoft.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)