Suite B Profile for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
draft-rescorla-tls-suiteb-11

[Ballot discuss]
I've reviewed this document earlier, but re-checking version -10
vs. RFC 5246 found couple of nits (and one errata for RFC 5246,
unfortunately -- RFC Editor errata ID #1585).

In Section 4.3, the text "While the key exchange algorithm used in
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA-collection of cipher suites require the server's
certificate to be signed with a particular signature scheme" is
true only for TLS 1.0/1.1, not TLS 1.2.

In Section 4.4, the text should probably say that a Suite B compliant
TLS version 1.2 or later server MUST select either SHA-256+ECDSA or
SHA-384+ECDSA for the signature in the ServerKeyExchange message.
(TLS 1.0/1.1 will use SHA-1+ECDSA, though.)

Section 4.3/4.4 specifies the requirements for server's signatures;
should the document have similar requirements for client's signatures?
E.g. say that Suite B compliant TLS 1.2 or later server MUST include
SHA-256+ECDSA and/or SHA-384+ECDSA in the supported_signature_algorithms
field of the CertificateRequest message, and a Suite B compliant TLS 1.2
or later client MUST select either SHA-256+ECDSA or SHA-384+ECDSA for
the signature in the CertificateVerify message?

Posted related IPR disclosure: Certicom's Statement about IPR related to RFC 4346, RFC 5246, RFC 5289, RFC 4492, RFC 2409, RFC 4306, RFC 4754, RFC 4753, RFC 4869, RFC 4253, RFC 2633, RFC 3278, RFC 4347, RFC 4366, RFC 4109, RFC 4252, RFC 3850, RFC 3851, RFC 5008, draft-ietf-tls-rfc43...

Document Shepherd Write-Up for draft-rescorla-tls-suiteb-06.txt

(1.a) Who is the Document Shepherd for this document? Has the
Document Shepherd personally reviewed this version of the document
and, in particular, does he or she believe this version is ready
for forwarding to the IESG for publication?

Russ Housley is the Document Shepherd and co-author.


(1.b) Has the document had adequate review both from key members of
the interested community and others? Does the Document Shepherd
have any concerns about the depth or breadth of the reviews that
have been performed?

The document is intended for publication as an Informational RFC.
It has been reviewed by several community members. There are
no concerns about the depth or breadth of those reviews.


(1.c) Does the Document Shepherd have concerns that the document
needs more review from a particular or broader perspective, e.g.,
security, operational complexity, someone familiar with AAA,
internationalization or XML?

No concerns.


(1.d) Does the Document Shepherd have any specific concerns or
issues with this document that the Responsible Area Director
and/or the IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he or
she is uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or has
concerns whether there really is a need for it. In any event, if
the interested community has discussed those issues and has
indicated that it still wishes to advance the document, detail
those concerns here.

No concerns.


(1.e) How solid is the consensus of the interested community behind
this document? Does it represent the strong concurrence of a few
individuals, with others being silent, or does the interested
community as a whole understand and agree with it?

This document explains the requirements for a TLS implementation
to be considered "Suite B conformant". There is strong consensus
from the people that are defining that term.


(1.f) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in
separate email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It
should be in a separate email because this questionnaire is
entered into the ID Tracker.)

No.


(1.g) Has the Document Shepherd personally verified that the
document satisfies all ID nits? (See
http://www.ietf.org/ID-Checklist.html and
http://tools.ietf.org/tools/idnits/). Boilerplate checks are not
enough; this check needs to be thorough. Has the document met all
formal review criteria it needs to, such as the MIB Doctor, media
type and URI type reviews?

Yes. ID-Checklist and ID-Nits are both satisfied. There is no
need for any formal review from the MIB Doctors or any other such
group.


(1.h) Has the document split its references into normative and
informative? Are there normative references to documents that are
not ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear state?
If such normative references exist, what is the strategy for their
completion? Are there normative references that are downward
references, as described in [RFC3967]? If so, list these downward
references to support the Area Director in the Last Call procedure
for them [RFC3967].

References are split. All referenced documents are already RFCs.


(1.i) Has the Document Shepherd verified that the document IANA
consideration section exists and is consistent with the body of
the document? If the document specifies protocol extensions, are
reservations requested in appropriate IANA registries? Are the
IANA registries clearly identified? If the document creates a new
registry, does it define the proposed initial contents of the
registry and an allocation procedure for future registrations?
Does it suggested a reasonable name for the new registry? See
[RFC5226]. If the document describes an Expert Review process has
the Shepherd conferred with the Responsible Area Director so that
the IESG can appoint the needed Expert during the IESG Evaluation?

No IANA actions are required.


(1.j) Has the Document Shepherd verified that sections of the
document that are written in a formal language, such as XML code,
BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc., validate correctly in an
automated checker?

No formal language is used.


(1.k) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document
Announcement Write-Up. Please provide such a Document
Announcement Writeup? Recent examples can be found in the
"Action" announcements for approved documents. The approval
announcement contains the following sections:

Technical Summary

The United States Government has published guidelines for
"NSA Suite B Cryptography", which defines cryptographic
algorithm policy for national security applications. This
document defines a profile of TLS which is conformant with
Suite B.

Working Group Summary

This document is not the product of any IETF working group.

Document Quality

This document explains the requirements for a TLS implementation
to be considered "Suite B conformant". There is strong consensus
from the people that are defining that term.