Minimal Security rekeying mechanism for 6TiSCH
draft-richardson-6tisch-minimal-rekey-02

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6TiSCH Working Group                                       M. Richardson
Internet-Draft                                  Sandelman Software Works
Intended status: Standards Track                         August 28, 2017
Expires: March 1, 2018

             Minimal Security rekeying mechanism for 6TiSCH
                draft-richardson-6tisch-minimal-rekey-02

Abstract

   This draft describes a mechanism to rekey the networks used by 6TISCH
   nodes.  It leverages the security association created during an
   enrollment protocol.  The rekey mechanism permits incremental
   deployment of new sets of keys, followed by a rollover to a new key.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 1, 2018.

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   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Tree diagram notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  An approach to rekeying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  YANG models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     5.1.  Tree diagram  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.2.  YANG model for keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.3.  YANG model for short-address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Security of CoMI link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  Rekey of master connection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   8.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   12. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     12.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     12.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Appendix A.  Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Introduction

   6TiSCH networks of nodes often use a pair of keys, K1/K2 to
   authenticate beacons (K1), encrypt broadcast traffic (K1) and encrypt
   unicast traffic (K2).  These keys need to occasionally be refreshed
   for a number of reasons:

   o  cryptographic hygiene: the keys must be replaced before the ASN
      roles over or there could be repeated use of the same key.

   o  to remove nodes from the group: replacing the keys excludes any
      nodes that are suspect, or which are known to have left the
      network

   o  to recover short-addresses: if the JRC is running out of short
      (2-byte) addresses, it can rekey the network in order to garbage
      collect the set of addresses.

   This protocol uses the CoMI [I-D.ietf-core-comi] to present the set
   of 127 key pairs.

   In addition to providing for rekey, this protocol includes access to
   the allocated short-address.

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2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
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