Minimal Security rekeying mechanism for 6TiSCH
draft-richardson-6tisch-minimal-rekey-02
| Document | Type | Expired Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Last updated | 2018-04-19 (latest revision 2017-08-28) | ||
| Stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats |
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| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus Boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | |||
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| Send notices to | (None) | ||
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of
the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-richardson-6tisch-minimal-rekey-02.txt
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-richardson-6tisch-minimal-rekey-02.txt
Abstract
This draft describes a mechanism to rekey the networks used by 6TISCH nodes. It leverages the security association created during an enrollment protocol. The rekey mechanism permits incremental deployment of new sets of keys, followed by a rollover to a new key.
Authors
Michael Richardson (mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca)
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)