Minimal Security rekeying mechanism for 6TiSCH
draft-richardson-6tisch-minimal-rekey-02
Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
---|---|---|---|
Author | Michael Richardson | ||
Last updated | 2018-04-19 (Latest revision 2017-08-28) | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This draft describes a mechanism to rekey the networks used by 6TISCH nodes. It leverages the security association created during an enrollment protocol. The rekey mechanism permits incremental deployment of new sets of keys, followed by a rollover to a new key.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)