Enabling secure network join in RPL networks
draft-richardson-6tisch-roll-join-priority-00

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6lo Working Group                                          M. Richardson
Internet-Draft                                  Sandelman Software Works
Intended status: Informational                             July 18, 2017
Expires: January 19, 2018

              Enabling secure network join in RPL networks
             draft-richardson-6tisch-roll-join-priority-00

Abstract

   [I-D.richardson-6tisch-join-enhanced-beacon] defines a method by
   which a potential [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security] can announce
   itself as a available for new Pledges to Join a network.  The
   announcement includes a priority for join.  This document provides a
   mechanism by which a RPL DODAG root can disable join announcements,
   or adjust the base priority for join operation.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 19, 2018.

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   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Internet-Draft                 J-Pref DIO                      July 2017

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Protocol Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   Appendix A.  Change history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6

1.  Introduction

   [RFC7554] describes the use of the time-slotted channel hopping
   (TSCH) mode of [ieee802154].  [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security] and
   [I-D.ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-secure-join] describe mechanisms by which
   a new node (the "pledge)" can use a friendly router as a Join Proxy.
   [I-D.richardson-6tisch-join-enhanced-beacon] describes an extension
   to the 802.15.4 Enhanced Beacon that is used by a Join Proxy to
   announce its existence such that Pledges can find them.

   It has become clear that not every routing member of the mesh ought
   to announce itself as a Join Proxy.  There are a variety of local
   reasons by which a 6LR might not want to provide the Join Proxy
   function.  They include available battery power, already committed
   network bandwidth, and also total available memory available for Join
   proxy neighbor cache slots.

   There are other situations where the operator of the network would
   like to selective enable or disable the join process in a particular
   DODAG.

   As the join process involves permitting unencrypted traffic into the
   best effort part of a (TSCH) network, it would be better to have the
   join process off when no new nodes are expected.

   A network operator might also be able to recognize when certain parts
   of the network are overloaded and can not accomodate additional join
   traffic, and it would like to adjust the join priority among all
   nodes in the subtree of a congested link.

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