Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)
draft-richardson-anima-brski-renamed-00
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Max Pritikin  , Michael Richardson  , Toerless Eckert  , Michael Behringer  , Kent Watsen 
Last updated 2020-08-11
Stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats plain text html xml pdf htmlized (tools) htmlized bibtex
Yang Validation ☯ 0 errors, 0 warnings.
Additional Resources
- Yang catalog entry for ietf-voucher-request@2018-02-14.yang
- Yang impact analysis for draft-richardson-anima-brski-renamed
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
Email authors IPR References Referenced by Nits 
ANIMA WG                                                     M. Pritikin
Internet-Draft                                                     Cisco
Intended status: Standards Track                           M. Richardson
Expires: 12 February 2021                                      Sandelman
                                                           T.T.E. Eckert
                                                           Futurewei USA
                                                          M.H. Behringer
                                                                        
                                                             K.W. Watsen
                                                         Watsen Networks
                                                          11 August 2020

        Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)
                draft-richardson-anima-brski-renamed-00

Abstract

   This document specifies automated bootstrapping of an Autonomic
   Control Plane.  To do this a Secure Key Infrastructure is
   bootstrapped.  This is done using manufacturer-installed X.509
   certificates, in combination with a manufacturer's authorizing
   service, both online and offline.  We call this process the
   Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI) protocol.
   Bootstrapping a new device can occur using a routable address and a
   cloud service, or using only link-local connectivity, or on limited/
   disconnected networks.  Support for deployment models with less
   stringent security requirements is included.  Bootstrapping is
   complete when the cryptographic identity of the new key
   infrastructure is successfully deployed to the device.  The
   established secure connection can be used to deploy a locally issued
   certificate to the device as well.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

Pritikin, et al.        Expires 12 February 2021                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                    BRSKI                      August 2020

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 12 February 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
   as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.1.  Prior Bootstrapping Approaches  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     1.3.  Scope of solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       1.3.1.  Support environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       1.3.2.  Constrained environments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       1.3.3.  Network Access Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       1.3.4.  Bootstrapping is not Booting  . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     1.4.  Leveraging the new key infrastructure / next steps  . . .  12
     1.5.  Requirements for Autonomic Network Infrastructure (ANI)
           devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   2.  Architectural Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     2.1.  Behavior of a Pledge  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     2.2.  Secure Imprinting using Vouchers  . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     2.3.  Initial Device Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       2.3.1.  Identification of the Pledge  . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       2.3.2.  MASA URI extension  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     2.4.  Protocol Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     2.5.  Architectural Components  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
       2.5.1.  Pledge  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
       2.5.2.  Join Proxy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
       2.5.3.  Domain Registrar  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
Show full document text
RFC Editor IASA & IETF LLC IETF Trust IRTF IETF IESG IAB IANA Privacy Statement IETF Tools