Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)
draft-richardson-anima-brski-renamed-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
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|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Max Pritikin , Michael Richardson , Toerless Eckert , Michael H. Behringer , Kent Watsen | ||
| Last updated | 2021-02-12 (Latest revision 2020-08-11) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Yang Validation | ☯ 0 errors, 0 warnings | ||
| Additional resources |
Yang catalog entry for ietf-voucher-request@2018-02-14.yang
Yang impact analysis for draft-richardson-anima-brski-renamed |
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| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document specifies automated bootstrapping of an Autonomic Control Plane. To do this a Secure Key Infrastructure is bootstrapped. This is done using manufacturer-installed X.509 certificates, in combination with a manufacturer's authorizing service, both online and offline. We call this process the Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI) protocol. Bootstrapping a new device can occur using a routable address and a cloud service, or using only link-local connectivity, or on limited/ disconnected networks. Support for deployment models with less stringent security requirements is included. Bootstrapping is complete when the cryptographic identity of the new key infrastructure is successfully deployed to the device. The established secure connection can be used to deploy a locally issued certificate to the device as well.
Authors
Max Pritikin
Michael Richardson
Toerless Eckert
Michael H. Behringer
Kent Watsen
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)