RPKI Multiple "All Resources" Trust Anchors Applicability Statement

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2017-09-13 (latest revision 2017-07-18)
Replaces draft-nro-rpki-ta-app-statement
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Internet Engineering Task Force                           A. Newton, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                      ARIN
Intended status: Informational                 C. Martinez-Cagnazzo, Ed.
Expires: January 19, 2018                                         LACNIC
                                                                 D. Shaw
                                                          T. Bruijnzeels
                                                                RIPE NCC
                                                             B. Ellacott
                                                           July 18, 2017

  RPKI Multiple "All Resources" Trust Anchors Applicability Statement


   This document provides an applicability statement for the use of
   multiple, over-claiming 'all resources' (0/0) RPKI certificate
   authorities (CA) certificates used as trust anchors (TAs) operated by
   the Regional Internet Registry community to help mitigate the risk of
   massive downstream invalidation in the case of transient registry

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 19, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Newton, et al.          Expires January 19, 2018                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft     RPKI 0/0 TA Applicability Statement         July 2017

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Applicability to reduce overclaiming possibilities  . . . . .   3
   4.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4

1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2.  Introduction

   The RPKI is a hierarchical cryptologic system that uses X.509
   certificates to match and validate holdership of Internet number
   resources.  This validation follows the allocation change from IANA
   to an RIR, to an NIR or LIR, and ending with end users who make use
   of the address block.  Since these allocations can be
   cryptographically validated, this can then be tied to assertions made
   by the holder of those number resources.  As an improvement of this
   system, the RPKI was updated to add validation of origin routing
   announcements via ROAs.  These ROAs can then be independently and
   cryptographically validated by third parties to assure themselves
   that the origin of the announcement as seen in the actual routing
   system is valid.

   Since this system is envisioned to be used by network operators and
   ISPs to determine their routing decisions, there is a goal to be 100%
   correct 100% of the time.  This goal could be achieved if the system
   was contained in a static environment where there is little or no
   movement of holdership changes from one organization to another of
   number resources.  Unfortunately, this state cannot be achieved
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