BGPSEC router key rollover as an alternative to beaconing
draft-rogaglia-sidr-bgpsec-rollover-01
Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(sidr WG)
Expired & archived
|
|
---|---|---|---|
Authors | Roque Gagliano , Keyur Patel , Brian Weis | ||
Last updated | 2012-08-14 (Latest revision 2012-06-05) | ||
Replaced by | draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover | ||
RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
Stream | WG state | Adopted by a WG | |
Document shepherd | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
The current BGPSEC draft documents do not specifies a key rollover process for routers. This document describes a possible key rollover process and explores its impact to mitigate replay attacks and eliminate the need for beaconing in BGPSEC.
Authors
Roque Gagliano
Keyur Patel
Brian Weis
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)