BGPSEC router key roll-over as an alternative to beaconing
draft-rogaglia-sidr-bgpsec-rollover-00
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Replaced".
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Roque Gagliano , Keyur Patel , Brian Weis | ||
| Last updated | 2012-03-05 | ||
| Replaced by | draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover, draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover, draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover | ||
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| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
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draft-rogaglia-sidr-bgpsec-rollover-00
Network Working Group R. Gagliano
Internet-Draft K. Patel
Intended status: Standards Track B. Weis
Expires: July 4, 2012 Cisco Systems
March 5, 2012
BGPSEC router key roll-over as an alternative to beaconing
draft-rogaglia-sidr-bgpsec-rollover-00
Abstract
The current BGPSEC draft documents do not specifies a key roll-over
process for routers. This document describes a possible key roll-
over process and explores its impact to mitigate replay attacks and
eliminate the need for beaconing in BGPSEC.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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This Internet-Draft will expire on July 4, 2012.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents
1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Key Roll-over in BGPSEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. A proposed process for BGPSEC key roll-over . . . . . . . 5
4. BGPSEC key rollover as a measure against replays attacks
in BGPSEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. BGPSEC beaconing challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. BGPSEC Re-play attack window requirement . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. BGPSEC key rollover as a mechanism to protect against
replay attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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1. Requirements notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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2. Introduction
In BGPSEC, a key roll-over (or re-keying) is the process of changing
the router's key pair, issuing the correspondent new End-Entity
certificates and revoke the old one. This process will need to
happen at regular intervals normally due to local policies at each
network.
During a roll-over process, a router needs to generate BGP UPDATE
messages in order to signal the new key to be used to its neighbors.
So, intuitively, a frequent key roll-over process has similar effects
as the beaconing process proposed by the BGPSEC base documents to
protect a BGPSEC attribute against a re-play attack. However, there
are a number of operational details to be considered if the expire
time field in the BGPSEC attribute is removed.
This document details a possible key roll-over process in BGPSEC and
explores the operational environment where key roll-overs could be
used as a protection against a re-play attach against BGPSEC
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3. Key Roll-over in BGPSEC
The key roll-over process in BGPSEC has not been well defined yet.
However, this will be a mandatory process due to some of the
following causes:
BGPSEC scheduled roll-over: BGPSEC certificates have an expiration
date (NotValidAfter). Although it is possible to generate a
new certificate without changing the key pair, it is normally
good practice to adopt the policy of using a new key pair in
every roll-over event.
BGPSEC certificate fields changes: A BGPSEC certificate field's
information (such as the ASN or the Subject) may need to be
changed. The normal process requires the roll-over of the old
certificate with a new key pair and the revocation of the old
certificate.
BGPSEC emergency roll-over Some special circumstances (such as a
compromised key) may require the roll-over of a BGPSEC
certificate.
It should be clear at this point that a key roll-over process is
required for BGPSEC. The next section describes how this process may
be implemented.
3.1. A proposed process for BGPSEC key roll-over
The BGPSEC key roll-over process should be very tighten to the key
provisioning mechanisms that would be in place. The key provisioning
mechanisms for BGPSEC are not yet documented. We will assume that
such an automatic provisioning mechanism will be in place (a possible
provisioning mechanism when the private key lives only inside the BGP
speaker is the Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST). This protocol
will allow BGPSEC code to include automatic re-keying scripts with
minimum development cost.
When the same private key is shared by different routers, a mechanism
to distribute the private key will need to be implemented. A
possible solution may include the transmission of the private key
over a secure channel. The PKIX WG has started work on this sense by
adopting [I-D.ietf-pkix-cmc-serverkeygeneration]
If we work under the assumption that an automatic mechanism will
exist to rollover a BGPSEC certificate, a possible process could be:
1. New Certificate Pre-Publication: The first step in the rollover
mechanism is to pre-publish the new public key. In order to
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accomplish this goal, the new key pair and certificate will need
to be generated and published on the correspondent RPKI
repository. This process will vary in every environment as it
will depend on where the keys are located (either in every router
or on a centralized server), if the RPKI CA is hosted at the ISP
or at an external party (i.e. needs to use the RPKI provisioning
protocol) and finally if the repository is also local or hosted
(i.e. will need to use the RPKI-Repository protocol.)
2. Stage Period: A stage period will be required from the time a new
certificate is published in the RPKI global repository until the
time it is fetched by RPKI caches around the globe. The exact
minimum staging time is not clear and will require experimental
results from RPKI. Design documents mention a lower limit of 24
hours. If rollovers will be done frequently and we want to avoid
the stage period in case of emergency rollover needs, an
administrator can always provision two certificate for every
router. In this case when the rollover operation is needed, the
cache servers around the globe would already have the new keys.
3. Twilight: At this moment, the BGP speaker that uses the key been
rolled-over will stop using the OLD key for signing and start
using the NEW key. Also, the router will generate appropriate
BGP UPDATES just as in the typical operation of refreshing out-
bound BGP polices.
4. CRL Publication: As part of the rollover process, a CA MAY decide
that it will publish the serial number of the OLD BGPSEC
certificate on its CRL. It may also be the case that the CA will
just let the certificate to expire and not update its CRL.
5. RPKI-Router Protocol Withdrawal: Either due to the inclusion of
the OLD certificate serial number or the expiration of the
certificate's validation, the RPKI cache servers around the globe
will need to communicate to its RTR peers that the OLD
certificate's public key is not longer valid (withdrawal
message). It is not documented yet what will be a router's
reaction to a RTR withdrawal message but it should include the
removal of any RIB entry that includes a BGPSEC attribute signed
with that key and the generation of the correspondent BGP
WITHDRAWS (either implicit or explicit).
To conclude this section, we can say that the proposed rollover
mechanism will depend on the existence of an automatic provisioning
process for BGPSEC certificates, that it will required a staging
mechanism given by RPKI propagation time of around 24hours and that
it will generate BGP UPDATES for all prefixes in the router been re-
keying.
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4. BGPSEC key rollover as a measure against replays attacks in BGPSEC
There are two typical measures to mitigate replay attacks: addition
of a timestamp or addition of a serial number. Currently BGPSEC
offers a timestamp (expiration time) as a protection against re-play
attacks of BGPSEC messages. The process requires all BGP Speakers
that originate a BGP UPDATE to beaconing the message before its
expiration time. This requirement changes a long standing BGP
operation practice and the community have been searching for
alternatives.
4.1. BGPSEC beaconing challenges
To be completed
4.2. BGPSEC Re-play attack window requirement
The BGPSEC Ops document give some ideas of requirements for the re-
play attack in BGPSEC. For the vast majority of the prefixes, the
requirement will be in the order of days or weeks. For a very small
fraction, but critical, of the prefixes, the requirement may be in
the order of hours.
4.3. BGPSEC key rollover as a mechanism to protect against replay
attacks
The question we would like to ask is: can key rollover provide us a
similar protection against re-play attacks without the need for
beaconing?
The answer is that YES when the window requirement is in the order of
days and the router re-keying is the edge router of the origin AS.
By using re-keying, you are letting the BGPSEC certificate validation
time as your timestamp against replay attacks. However, the use of
frequent key rollovers comes with an additional administrative cost
and risks if the process fails. As documented before, re-keying
should be supported by automatic tools and for the great majority of
the Internet it will be done with good lead time to correct any
inconvenient in the process.
For a transit AS that also originates its BGP UPDATES for its own
prefixes, the key rollover process may generate a large number of
UPDATE messages (even the complete DFZ). For this reason, it is
recommended that routers in this scenario been provisioned with two
certificates: one to sign BGP UPDATES in transit and a second one to
sign BGP UPDATE for prefixes originated in its AS. Only the second
certificate should be frequently rolled-over.
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Advantage of Re-keying as re-play attack protection mechanism:
1. Does not require beaconing
2. All timestamps policies are maintained in RPKI
3. Additional administrative cost is paid by the provider that wants
to protect its infrastructure
4. Can be implemented in coordination with planned topology changes
by either origin ASes or transit ASes (if I am changing
providers, I rollover)
5. Eliminates the discussion on who has the authority over the
expiration time
Disadvantage of Re-keying as re-play attack protection mechanism:
1. More administrative load due to frequent rollover, although how
frequent is still not clear.
2. Minimum window size bounded by RPKI propagation time to RPKI
caches. If pre-provisioning done ahead of time, it means 24
hours minimum in paper. However, more experimentation is needed
when RPKI and cache servers are more massively deployed.
3. Increases dynamic of RPKI repository
4. More load on RPKI caches, but they are meant to do this work.
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5. IANA Considerations
No IANA considerations
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6. Security Considerations
No security considerations.
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7. Acknowledgements
None yet
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8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
[RFC5101] Claise, B., "Specification of the IP Flow Information
Export (IPFIX) Protocol for the Exchange of IP Traffic
Flow Information", RFC 5101, January 2008.
[RFC5102] Quittek, J., Bryant, S., Claise, B., Aitken, P., and J.
Meyer, "Information Model for IP Flow Information Export",
RFC 5102, January 2008.
8.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-pkix-cmc-serverkeygeneration]
Schaad, J., Timmel, P., and S. Turner, "CMC Extensions:
Server Key Generation",
draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-serverkeygeneration-00 (work in
progress), January 2012.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]
Mohapatra, P., Patel, K., Scudder, J., Ward, D., and R.
Bush, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended
Community", draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-00
(work in progress), November 2010.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]
Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation",
draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-01 (work in progress),
February 2011.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008.
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Authors' Addresses
Roque Gagliano
Cisco Systems
Avenue des Uttins 5
Rolle, VD 1180
Switzerland
Email: rogaglia@cisco.com
Keyur Patel
Cisco Systems
170 W. Tasman Driv
San Jose, CA 95134
CA
Email: keyupate@cisco.com
Brian Weis
Cisco Systems
170 W. Tasman Driv
San Jose, CA 95134
CA
Email: bew@cisco.com
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