ECDP: Elliptic Curve Data Protocol
draft-ruas-cfrg-ecdp-00
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Isak Paulo de Andrade Ruas | ||
| Last updated | 2024-11-15 | ||
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| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
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| Additional resources |
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draft-ruas-cfrg-ecdp-00
Crypto Forum I. Ruas
Internet-Draft Nrolabs
Intended status: Standards Track 15 November 2024
Expires: 19 May 2025
ECDP: Elliptic Curve Data Protocol
draft-ruas-cfrg-ecdp-00
Abstract
This document specifies the Elliptic Curve Data Protocol (ECDP), a
peer-to-peer (P2P) communication protocol tailored for decentralized
networks. ECDP utilizes elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for
encryption, employs the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA) for message authentication, and leverages the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange using elliptic curves for secure session initialization.
The protocol supports a variety of elliptic curves (e.g., secp256k1,
secp384r1) with varying key sizes, and is designed to operate over
both TCP and UDP. Additionally, it utilizes SHA-256 or SHA-512 for
cryptographic hash verification to ensure message integrity.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at
https://isakruas.github.io/ecdp/draft-ruas-cfrg-ecdp.html. Status
information for this document may be found at
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Discussion of this document takes place on the Crypto Forum Research
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Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Goals of the Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Supported Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. 4.1 Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1.1. 4.1.1 Supported Elliptic Curves . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1.2. 4.1.2 Supported Cryptographic Hash Algorithms . . . . 4
5. Protocol Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. Message Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Message Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6.1. 5.1 Base Message Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6.2. 5.2 Handshake (0x01) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.3. 5.3 Data Transfer (0x02) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.4. 5.4 Acknowledgment (Ack) (0x03) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.5. 5.5 Data Request (0x04) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.1. Additional Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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1. Introduction
P2P networks are widely used for data exchange but often face
challenges related to security and data integrity. ECDP addresses
these issues by implementing strong cryptographic measures and robust
authentication mechanisms. ECDP is designed for scalability and
security by enabling nodes to communicate indirectly through a
network pool.
To enhance the security and integrity of the messages exchanged, the
protocol employs elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) with various well-
established curves, as well as the SHA-256 and SHA-512 algorithms for
cryptographic hash functions.
The protocol dynamically supports different ECC key lengths, ensuring
flexibility and forward compatibility with future developments in
elliptic curve cryptography.
2. Terminology
The key words *"MUST"*, *"MUST NOT"*, *"REQUIRED"*, *"SHALL"*,
*"SHALL NOT"*, *"SHOULD"*, *"SHOULD NOT"*, *"RECOMMENDED"*, *"MAY"*,
and *"OPTIONAL"* in this document are to be interpreted as described
in [RFC2119].
3. Goals of the Protocol
* The protocol *MUST* facilitate secure communication between nodes
through a pool network.
* The protocol *MUST* ensure data integrity and confidentiality of
the messages transmitted.
* The protocol *MUST* authenticate messages using elliptic curve
signature schemes, ensuring their origin and integrity.
* The protocol *MUST* be extensible and support future advances in
cryptographic techniques.
* The protocol *SHOULD* be scalable, able to operate in
decentralized large-scale P2P networks.
* The protocol *MUST* support multiple key sizes for flexible
elliptic curve operations.
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4. Supported Algorithms
ECDP relies on a variety of standardized and widely used algorithms
to ensure secure, authenticated, and efficient communication.
4.1. 4.1 Cryptography
4.1.1. 4.1.1 Supported Elliptic Curves
ECDP supports the following elliptic curves for encryption, Diffie-
Hellman key exchange, and signing operations (ECDSA):
* *secp192k1*
* *secp192r1*
* *secp224k1*
* *secp224r1*
* *secp256k1*
* *secp256r1*
* *secp384r1*
* *secp521r1*
Each curve corresponds to a distinct key size. To accommodate
different security levels, the protocol includes a parameter for
indicating the key size used in message operations. Implementations
*MUST* support *secp256k1*, *secp256r1*, and *secp384r1* as a minimum
requirement. Support for other curves is *RECOMMENDED* for greater
flexibility and stronger cryptography when necessary.
4.1.2. 4.1.2 Supported Cryptographic Hash Algorithms
ECDP uses cryptographic hash functions for various integrity checks,
including *checksums* and *digital signatures*.
Supported hash functions include:
* *SHA-256* (RECOMMENDED)
* *SHA-512* (OPTIONAL for longer data integrity verification)
Implementations *MUST* support *SHA-256* as a minimum requirement.
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5. Protocol Operation
5.1. Message Types
* *0x01:* Handshake
* *0x02:* Data Transfer
* *0x03:* Acknowledgment (Ack)
* *0x04:* Data Request
6. Message Structure
6.1. 5.1 Base Message Structure
The base structure contains fields that are common across various
message types, with extensions for specific needs. Messages are
routed through a pool network to enhance scalability and security.
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+============+======================================+===========+
| Field | Description | Size |
| | | (bytes) |
+============+======================================+===========+
| Protocol | Identifies the version of the ECDP | 1 |
| Version | protocol | |
+------------+--------------------------------------+-----------+
| Message | Indicates the type of message | 1 |
| Type | | |
+------------+--------------------------------------+-----------+
| Key Size | Indicates the ECC key size used | 2 |
| | (e.g., 192, 224, 256, 384, 521 bits) | |
+------------+--------------------------------------+-----------+
| Sender ECC | Public key of the sending node | Variable |
| Public Key | | (based on |
| | | key size) |
+------------+--------------------------------------+-----------+
| Receiver | Public key of the receiving node (if | Variable |
| ECC Public | applicable) | (based on |
| Key | | key size) |
+------------+--------------------------------------+-----------+
| Nonce | Random number to prevent replay | 8 |
| | attacks | |
+------------+--------------------------------------+-----------+
| Encrypted | Content of the message encrypted | Variable |
| Data | using ECC | |
+------------+--------------------------------------+-----------+
| Signature | Digital signature of the sender | Variable |
| | (ECDSA) | (based on |
| | | key size) |
+------------+--------------------------------------+-----------+
Table 1
In this structure: - *Key Size* is a 2-byte field that indicates the
key size in bits (e.g., 192, 224, 256, 384, 521). This allows both
endpoints to use flexible key sizes as per their security
requirements.
6.2. 5.2 Handshake (0x01)
+==================+==============================+==============+
| Field | Description | Size (bytes) |
+==================+==============================+==============+
| Protocol Version | Identifies the version of | 1 |
| | the ECDP protocol | |
+------------------+------------------------------+--------------+
| Message Type | Set to Handshake (0x01) | 1 |
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+------------------+------------------------------+--------------+
| Key Size | Indicates the ECC key size | 2 |
| | used | |
+------------------+------------------------------+--------------+
| Sender ECC | Public key of the sending | Variable |
| Public Key | node | |
+------------------+------------------------------+--------------+
| Receiver ECC | Public key of the receiving | Variable |
| Public Key | node | |
+------------------+------------------------------+--------------+
| Nonce | Random number to prevent | 8 |
| | session replay | |
+------------------+------------------------------+--------------+
| Node Identifier | Unique ID of the node (e.g., | 32 |
| | hash of the public key) | |
+------------------+------------------------------+--------------+
| Node Capability | Information about bandwidth | 4 |
| | and supported data types | |
+------------------+------------------------------+--------------+
| Signature | Digital signature of the | Variable |
| | sender (ECDSA) | |
+------------------+------------------------------+--------------+
Table 2
6.3. 5.3 Data Transfer (0x02)
+==============+======================================+==========+
| Field | Description | Size |
| | | (bytes) |
+==============+======================================+==========+
| Protocol | Identifies the version of the ECDP | 1 |
| Version | protocol | |
+--------------+--------------------------------------+----------+
| Message Type | Set to Data Transfer (0x02) | 1 |
+--------------+--------------------------------------+----------+
| Key Size | Indicates the ECC key size used | 2 |
+--------------+--------------------------------------+----------+
| Sender ECC | Public key of the sending node | Variable |
| Public Key | | |
+--------------+--------------------------------------+----------+
| Receiver ECC | Public key of the receiving node | Variable |
| Public Key | | |
+--------------+--------------------------------------+----------+
| Nonce | Exclusive random number for the | 8 |
| | session | |
+--------------+--------------------------------------+----------+
| Encrypted | Message content encrypted using ECC | Variable |
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| Data | | |
+--------------+--------------------------------------+----------+
| Checksum | Cryptographic hash (SHA-256 or SHA- | 32 or 64 |
| | 512) for data integrity verification | |
+--------------+--------------------------------------+----------+
| Signature | Digital signature of the sender | Variable |
| | (ECDSA) | |
+--------------+--------------------------------------+----------+
Table 3
6.4. 5.4 Acknowledgment (Ack) (0x03)
+==================+==============================+==============+
| Field | Description | Size (bytes) |
+==================+==============================+==============+
| Protocol Version | Identifies the version of | 1 |
| | the ECDP protocol | |
+------------------+------------------------------+--------------+
| Message Type | Set to Acknowledgment (0x03) | 1 |
+------------------+------------------------------+--------------+
| Nonce | Random number corresponding | 8 |
| | to the session | |
+------------------+------------------------------+--------------+
| Message Hash | Hash of the received data | 32 or 64 |
| | message (SHA-256 or SHA-512) | |
+------------------+------------------------------+--------------+
| Status | Indicates Success (0x00) or | 1 |
| | Error (0x01) | |
+------------------+------------------------------+--------------+
Table 4
6.5. 5.5 Data Request (0x04)
+==============+====================================+==============+
| Field | Description | Size (bytes) |
+==============+====================================+==============+
| Protocol | Identifies the version of the ECDP | 1 |
| Version | protocol | |
+--------------+------------------------------------+--------------+
| Message Type | Set to Data Request (0x04) | 1 |
+--------------+------------------------------------+--------------+
| Key Size | Indicates the ECC key size used | 2 |
+--------------+------------------------------------+--------------+
| Sender ECC | Public key of the requesting node | Variable |
| Public Key | | |
+--------------+------------------------------------+--------------+
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| Receiver ECC | Public key of the data-holding | Variable |
| Public Key | node | |
+--------------+------------------------------------+--------------+
| Nonce | Random number for the session | 8 |
+--------------+------------------------------------+--------------+
| Data | Unique hash or ID of the requested | 32 or 64 |
| Identifier | data (using SHA-256, SHA-512) | |
+--------------+------------------------------------+--------------+
| Signature | Digital signature of the sender | Variable |
| | (ECDSA) | |
+--------------+------------------------------------+--------------+
Table 5
7. Security Considerations
ECDP employs ECC for secure communication between nodes, with
messages authenticated through ECDSA. The inclusion of a *Key Size*
field allows nodes to negotiate and use varying key lengths based on
the curve chosen, ensuring flexibility in security levels.
Nonces are used to prevent replay attacks. The protocol uses the
Diffie-Hellman key exchange over elliptic curves for secure session
initialization. The following elliptic curves are supported, with
corresponding key sizes:
* secp192k1 (192-bit)
* secp192r1 (192-bit)
* secp224k1 (224-bit)
* secp224r1 (224-bit)
* secp256k1 (256-bit) (*RECOMMENDED*)
* secp256r1 (256-bit) (*RECOMMENDED*)
* secp384r1 (384-bit) (*RECOMMENDED*)
* secp521r1 (521-bit)
7.1. Additional Recommendations
* Implementations *SHOULD* regularly update their cryptographic
libraries to maintain security against evolving threats.
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* Nodes *MUST* verify the signatures of incoming messages to ensure
authenticity.
* Nonce sizes *MUST* be sufficient (8 bytes at minimum) to prevent
replay attacks.
* It is *RECOMMENDED* that nodes securely store their private keys
using encryption and protected hardware when possible to prevent
unauthorized access.
8. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions directed at IANA at this time. However,
if future protocol updates require additional message types, code
points, or other attributes, a registration with IANA *MAY* be
required.
9. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4492, May 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4492>.
[RFC5639] Lochter, M. and J. Merkle, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation",
RFC 5639, DOI 10.17487/RFC5639, March 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5639>.
[RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6979>.
Acknowledgments
The authors acknowledge the valuable contributions of cryptographic
and P2P networking experts. Special thanks to those who provided
feedback on elliptic curve performance and secure key storage
recommendations.
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Author's Address
Isak Ruas
Nrolabs
Brazil
Email: isakruas@nrolabs.com
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