An Architecture for Collaborative Security and Proactive Defence against IoT Botnets
draft-sajjad-t2trg-colsec-00

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T2TRG                                               Syed. M. Sajjad, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                 M. Yousaf
Intended status: Standards Track Riphah Institute of Systems Engineering
Expires: January 23, 2019                                  July 22, 2018

An Architecture for Collaborative Security and Proactive Defence against
                              IoT Botnets
                      draft-sajjad-t2trg-colsec-00

Abstract

   This document proposes an architecture for Collaborative Security and
   Proactive Defence against IoT Botnets.  The proposed architecture is
   based on the violation of the Manufacturer Usage Description policy.
   This architecture provides a means of sharing the attacker
   information including its Command and Control Server information with
   the peers in order to not only achieve proactive defense against
   Internet of Things botnets but also mitigate them at its source end.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 23, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must

M. Sajjad & Yousaf      Expires January 23, 2019                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft   Architecture for Collaborative Security       July 2018

   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Motivation and Use cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Usecase-01: Timely Sharing of IoT Botnets source Command
           and Control Server domain in order to proactively
           safeguard devices from its access . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Usecase-02: Timely sharing of Threat Intelligence data
           between manufacturers and Vendors . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.3.  Usecase-03: Timely Sharing of IoT Botnets source Command
           and Control Server domain with Attacker ISP for its
           Source Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Limitations of Existing Techniques  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Terminologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  Architecture  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   10. Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks is generally detected
   and mitigated at the destination end.  Companies are deploying costly
   detection appliances to safeguard themselves from DDoS so as to
   continue their routine critical business processes.  Destination end
   DDoS detection and mitigation have implementation complexities and
   cost overhead.  It is also to be noted that destination end detection
   and mitigation does not detect and mitigate the source of the DDoS
   attack.  There is a need to detect and mitigate Distributed Denial of
   Service (DDoS) attacks at its source end.  Individual Security
   Systems, deployed on the premises of different organization for the
   detection of emerging threats, works on the attack knowledge gained
   in a specific locality.  Moreover scalable and sophisticated
   techniques used by the attacker make it difficult for individual
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