Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without Server-Side State
draft-salowey-tls-rfc4507bis-01
Yes
(Tim Polk)
No Objection
(Cullen Jennings)
(Dan Romascanu)
(David Ward)
(Jon Peterson)
(Lars Eggert)
(Lisa Dusseault)
(Magnus Westerlund)
(Mark Townsley)
(Ron Bonica)
(Ross Callon)
(Russ Housley)
(Sam Hartman)
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 01 and is now closed.
Jari Arkko Former IESG member
Yes
Yes
(2007-09-06)
Unknown
It seems that Appendix A does not list all the changes from RFC 4507. The diff is available here: http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/rfcdiff.pyht?url1=http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4507.txt&url2=http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-salowey-tls-rfc4507bis-01.txt And there are a number of changes, including additional requirements on including specific messages in a hash (Section 3.3), moving from SHA1 to SHA256, etc.
Tim Polk Former IESG member
Yes
Yes
()
Unknown
Chris Newman Former IESG member
(was Discuss, No Objection, Discuss)
No Objection
No Objection
(2007-09-06)
Unknown
Apps-level issue:
If an application performs user-level authentication subsequent to
initiation of the TLS tunnel (e.g. via GSSAPI or SASL), it would be
possible for the application to trigger a TLS-level renegotiation that
includes a NewSessionTicket embedding information about the app-level
authentication. Alternatively, the application could have a mechanism
to bind the user-level authentication to a given session ticket
(although this would involve server state). Then on re-connection,
the application could use app-level mechanisms to automatically resume
the user session (e.g. IMAP PREAUTH or SASL EXTERNAL). It's not clear
to me if this is a good/bad idea, what the security risks would be, or
if TLS stacks should be advised to include APIs to facilitate such use
of the mechanism. This document is silent on such interaction with
applications. Were this a first version, I'd ask for this issue to be
considered and addressed if there was consensus. But I don't want to
delay an obvious bugfix to an already published RFC.
Nits:
the server does not wish issue a new ticket and therefore does not
^^^
to
The server uses an zero-length SessionTicket extension to indicate to
^^
a
Cullen Jennings Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Dan Romascanu Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
David Ward Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Jon Peterson Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Lars Eggert Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Lisa Dusseault Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Magnus Westerlund Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Mark Townsley Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Ron Bonica Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Ross Callon Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Russ Housley Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Sam Hartman Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown