Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Using Privacy Pass Token
draft-sawant-eap-ppt-01
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Paresh Sawant , Bart Brinckman | ||
| Last updated | 2024-10-20 | ||
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| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
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draft-sawant-eap-ppt-01
Network Working Group P. Sawant
Internet-Draft Apple Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track B. Brinckman
Expires: 24 April 2025 Cisco Systems
21 October 2024
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Using Privacy Pass Token
draft-sawant-eap-ppt-01
Abstract
This document describes Extensible Authentication Protocol using
Privacy Pass token (EAP-PPT) Version 1. The protocol specifies use
of the Privacy Pass token for client authentication within EAP as
defined in RFC3748. Privacy Pass is a privacy preserving
authentication mechanism used for authorization, as defined in
RFC9576.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 24 April 2025.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Architecture Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.2. Successful Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.3. Failed Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.4. Remediation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.5. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.6. Key Material Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.7. Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. Message Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.1. Packet Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.2. Subtypes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.3. Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.3.1. EAP-Request/PPT-Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.3.2. EAP-Response/PPT-Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.3.3. EAP-Request/PPT-Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.3.4. EAP-Response/PPT-Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.3.5. EAP-Request/PPT-Channel-Binding . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7.3.6. EAP-Response/PPT-Channel-Binding . . . . . . . . . . 22
8. Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.1. Client Failure Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.1.1. EAP-PPT peer found no valid token for token
challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.1.2. EAP-PPT peer found no token with valid extension-types
for token challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.2. Server Failure Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.2.1. EAP-PPT server found no valid token challenge for user
NAI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.2.2. EAP-PPT server is unable to validate token data . . . 23
8.2.3. EAP-PPT server token redemption failure . . . . . . . 23
8.2.4. EAP-PPT server temporary failure . . . . . . . . . . 23
8.2.5. EAP-PPT server detected double spend . . . . . . . . 23
8.2.6. EAP-PPT server undefined failure . . . . . . . . . . 24
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8.2.7. EAP-PPT server token redemption success with unexpected
extension value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8.3. Conditional Acceptance Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8.3.1. EAP-PPT server redemption, unexpected extension value,
unconditional access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8.3.2. EAP-PPT server redemption, unexpected extension value,
conditional access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9.1. PrivateToken authentication Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9.2. Integrity Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9.3. EAP Server implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9.4. Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
9.5. Token Redemption Server implementation . . . . . . . . . 26
9.6. Security Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
10. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
10.1. Recommendations for preserving privacy . . . . . . . . . 27
10.1.1. Collocating other functions with the EAP-PPT
Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
10.1.2. Protecting client identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
10.1.3. Separating Issuance and Verification over time . . . 28
10.2. Recommendations for usage in public use cases . . . . . 28
10.3. Recommendations for usage in private use cases . . . . . 29
10.4. Recommendations for usage in federated use cases
(OpenRoaming) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1. Introduction
This document specifies Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
method, EAP-PPT, which uses Privacy Pass token for EAP peer
authentication; see [RFC9576] for more information about Privacy
Pass. EAP-PPT MUST be used inside any tunnel-based EAP method that
enables secure communication between a peer and a server by using
Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol [RFC8446]. The tunnel-based
EAP method MUST guarantee a server authenticated TLS tunnel.
Privacy Pass tokens are unlinkable authenticators that can be used to
anonymously authorize a client [RFC9576]. Privacy Pass tokens are
issued to peer by token issuers using an Issuance Protocol [RFC9578].
A client possessing such a token is able to prove that it was able to
get it issued, without allowing the relying party redeeming the
client's token (the origin) to link it with the issuance flow.
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2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Much of the terminology in this document is defined in [RFC3748].
Additional terms are defined below:
NAI: Network Access Identifier [RFC7542]
EAP-PPT peer: This term is used for the entity acting as EAP peer.
This term is identical to term Client defined in Section 2 of
[RFC9576].
EAP-PPT server: This term is used for the entity acting as EAP
server. This term is identical to term Server defined in
Section 2 of [RFC9576].
Privacy Pass token: Unlinkable authenticator that can be used to
anonymously authorize a client [RFC9577]. This is produced as an
output of issuance protocol [RFC9578].
Token Challenge: An action by which a EAP-PPT Server requests EAP-
PPT peer to present Privacy Pass Token for one of the presented
challenges.
Token Redemption: An action by which a peer presents a Privacy Pass
token to a EAP-PPT Server in EAP-PPT Protocol. See Section 2.2 of
[RFC9577].
Identity provider: An entity that is responsible for authentication
of end-user devices with the prupose of granting them access to a
network resource.
3. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
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4. Motivation
EAP is predominantly used for authentication of users and devices
trying to join a network. Its security and extensibility
capabilities makes it a popular choice in implementing secure network
access. EAP is one of the most preferred authentication mechanisms
used for secure wireless LAN access using [IEEE-802.11] standard,
wired LAN access using [IEEE-802.1X] and Virtual Private Network
(VPN) access. EAP is also used for secure network access for
students and guests in academia, see [RFC7593].
One goal of privacy is to protect individual's identity and personal
information from eavesdropers, intermediaries and recipients in the
network communication. An individual's privacy may get compromized
when network access is attempted using EAP as an authentication
mechanism. The various privacy-specific threats are described in
Section 5.2 of [RFC6973].
Typical approaches for authorizing clients, such as through the use
of a permanent identity or service provider generated pseudo
identity, are not privacy-friendly since they allow servers to track
clients across sessions and interactions. This means service
providers, identity providers, employers, or school/university
administrators can track the individuals.
The goal of this specification is to protect an individual from the
Section 5.2 of [RFC6973] in public and enterprise environments. EAP-
PPT can be leveraged for authorization based on anonymous-credential
authentication mechanisms. EAP-PPT takes a different approach:
instead of carrying linkable state carrying information to servers,
such as permanent identity or pseudonym, EAP peer presents Privacy
Pass tokens that attest to this information. These tokens are
anonymous in the sense that a given token cannot be linked to the
protocol instance in which that token was initially issued.
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[RFC9577] specifies the authentication scheme using Privacy Pass
token over HTTP. [RFC9577] mainly serves use cases where access to
restricted services require anonymous client authorization. Since
[RFC9577] functions at the application layer of a networking stack,
it justifies a need of a protocol that can offer the similar
functionality for the lower layers. Since EAP was designed for use
in network access authentication, where IP layer connectivity may not
be available, EAP-PPT can be used for anonymous client authorization
for wired and wireless network access. Since EAP-PPT method provides
unilateral authentication, it qualifies to be used together with
responder authentication based on public key signatures in [RFC7296]
protocol. [RFC7296] is a component of IPsec used for performing
mutual authentication and establishing and maintaining Security
Associations. [RFC7296] is widely used to implement remote access
VPN service in public and enterprise environments.
5. Architecture Model
Figure 1 shows network architectural model for EAP-PPT.
+----------+ +----------+ +----------+ +----------+
| | | | | | | |
| Peer |<---->| Authen- |<---->| EAP |<---->| EAP- |
| | | ticator | | Server | | PPT |
| | | | | | | Server |
+----------+ +----------+ +----------+ +----------+
Figure 1: EAP-PPT Architectural Model
The entities depicted in Figure 1 are logical entities and may or may
not correspond to separate network components. For example, the EAP
Server and EAP-PPT Server might be a single entity; the authenticator
and EAP Server might be a single entity; or the functions of the
authenticator, EAP Server, and EAP-PPT Server might be combined into
a single physical device. For example, typical [IEEE-802.11]
deployments place the authenticator in an access point (AP) while a
RADIUS Server may provide the Tunneled EAP Method and EAP-PPT method
Server components. The above diagram illustrates the division of
labor among entities in a logical manner and shows how a distributed
system might be constructed; however, actual systems might be
organized differently.
6. Protocol
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6.1. Overview
A tunnel-based EAP method supports authentication in two phases after
the initial EAP Identity request/response exchange. In the first
phase, it uses a TLS [RFC8446] handshake to provide an authenticated
key exchange and to establish a protected tunnel. The EAP peer and
server that are configured to perform the peer authentication using
EAP-PPT method, MUST establish the TLS tunnel without peer
authentication. EAP server MUST NOT send CertificateRequest to the
TLS client during the TLS handshake, when peer authentication is
desired using EAP-PPT method.
The second phase of the authentication begins after the TLS tunnel is
established. Any EAP method that fulfils the requirements specified
in [RFC6678] is called tunnel-based EAP method.
A peer supporting EAP-PPT MUST NOT send its username or any other
permanent identifiers in the first and subsequent EAP-Response/
Identity messages. The EAP-Response/Identity message MUST contain
only realm portion in order to route the authentication request to
the right EAP server. It is RECOMMENDED to eliminate the identity
exchange altogether if the route is known through some other means.
EAP-PPT authentication MUST be performed inside the server
authenticated TLS tunnel established by the tunnel-based EAP method.
During the EAP-PPT authentication, the server challenges the peer to
present a Privacy Pass token, and the Peer responds with a Privacy
Pass token. Upon a successful verification of the token, the
redemption of the token is deemed successful. EAP-PPT uses
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [RFC8259] to encode the challenges,
responses, results and errors. Encapsulation of EAP-PPT method can
be supported by any tunnel- based EAP methods e.g. Protected EAP
[PEAP], Tunneled Transport Layer Security EAP (TTLS) [RFC5281], EAP
Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling (EAP-FAST) [RFC4851] and
Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol (TEAP) [RFC7170].
Optionally, the Privacy Pass token MAY also carry extensions
([I-D.draft-ietf-privacypass-auth-scheme-extensions]) with additional
metadata relevant to the EAP-PPT Server.
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6.2. Successful Authentication
Figure 2 shows an example of basic, successful authentication
exchange in EAP-PPT. At the minimum, EAP-PPT uses two roundtrips to
authenticate and authorize the Peer. As in other EAP schemes, an
identity request/response message pair is usually exchanged first.
As specified in [RFC3748] the initial identity request is not
required, and MAY be bypassed in cases where the EAP-PPT Server can
presume the identity.
After obtaining the identity, the EAP-PPT Server constructs EAP-
Request/PPT-Challenge message with a set of token Challenges and
sends it to the EAP-PPT peer. EAP-Request/PPT-Challenge message
encodes the set of token Challenges in JSON [RFC8259] format.
On receiving EAP-Request/PPT-Challenge message, the EAP-PPT peer
looks at the each token Challenge and looks up the most suitable
Privacy Pass token. If EAP-PPT Peer successfully finds the Privacy
Pass token, it constructs EAP-Response/PPT-Challenge message
containing the Privacy Pass token, and send it to the EAP-PPT server.
EAP-Response/PPT-Challenge message encodes the response data in JSON
[RFC8259] format.
The EAP-PPT server verifies the received Privacy Pass token in the
EAP-Response/PPT-Challenge message. After a successful token
Redemption, the EAP-PPT server sends EAP-Success.
EAP-PPT Server verifies the Privacy Pass token using a procedure
called token Redemption Section 2.2 of [RFC9577].
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+----------+ +----------+
| | | |
| EAP-PPT | | EAP-PPT |
| Peer | | Server |
| | | |
+----------+ +----------+
| |
| EAP-Request/Identity |
|<------------------------------------------------|
| |
| |
| EAP-Response/Identity (User's NAI) |
|------------------------------------------------>|
| |
| |
| EAP-Request/PPT-Challenge (challenges) |
|<------------------------------------------------|
| |
| |
| EAP-Response/PPT-Challenge (token) |
|------------------------------------------------>|
| |
| +----------+
| | token |
| | redeemed |
| | |
| +----------+
| EAP-Success |
|<------------------------------------------------|
| |
| |
Figure 2: EAP-PPT Successful Authentication
6.3. Failed Authentication
Figure 3 shows how EAP-PPT server rejects the peer when token
redemption fails. EAP-PPT Server sends EAP-Request/PPT-Error message
containing the error information like error code, error description
etc. The error information is encoded in JSON [RFC8259] format.
EAP-PPT peer responds to EAP-Request/PPT-Error with EAP-Response/PPT-
Error without any data.
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+----------+ +----------+
| | | |
| EAP-PPT | | EAP-PPT |
| Peer | | Server |
| | | |
+----------+ +----------+
| |
| EAP-Request/Identity |
|<-------------------------------------------------
| |
| |
| EAP-Response/Identity (User's NAI) |
|------------------------------------------------>|
| |
| |
| EAP-Request/PPT-Challenge (challenges) |
|<------------------------------------------------|
| |
| |
| EAP-Response/PPT-Challenge (token) |
|------------------------------------------------>|
| |
| +----------+
| | failed |
| | to |
| | redeem |
| | token |
| +----------+
| EAP-Request/PPT-Error (error) |
|<------------------------------------------------|
| |
| |
| EAP-Response/PPT-Error |
|------------------------------------------------>|
| |
| |
| EAP-Failure |
|<------------------------------------------------|
| |
| |
Figure 3: EAP-PPT Authentication Failure
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6.4. Remediation
An EAP-PPT server MAY successfully validate a token, but fail to
validate metadata carried in an extension. The EAP-PPT server MAY
require different or more recently generated metadata, for example.
In this case the EAP-PPT server MAY reject, or conditionally accept
an EAP-PPT Authentication.
As shown in Figure 4, after successful token redemption, the EAP-PPT
server MAY respond with a PPT error message containing error
information like an error code, error description etc. to inform the
EAP-PPT peer of the metadata validation issue. In this case, the
EAP-PPT server MAY respond with an EAP-Failure or EAP-Success
message, depending on the metadata specific policies set on the EAP-
PPT server side. Since the peer proves the authenticity of issuance
of token by providing cryptographically correct token, the EAP-PPT
server MAY decide to authorize the Peer conditionally.
The EAP-PPT server MAY optionally also include a session-timeout
value in the PPT-Error, informing the EAP-PPT peer how long the
session will be permitted in order for the EAP-Peer to remediate and
request a new token from its issuer. If the session-timeout
attribute is included in the PPT-Error then the AAA server MUST also
include a RADIUS Session- Timeout attribute (see Section 5.27 of
[RFC2865]) with the same value in the Access-Accept RADIUS message to
the authenticator (e.g., Network Access Server or IKEv2 Responder)).
The EAP-PPT peer responds to the EAP-Request/PPT-Error with EAP-
Response/PPT-Error without any data. The EAP-PPT peer MAY use the
allotted session time to fetch a new token and subsequently re-
authenticate.
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+----------+ +----------+
| | | |
| EAP-PPT | | EAP-PPT |
| Peer | | Server |
| | | |
+----------+ +----------+
| |
| EAP-Request/Identity |
|<------------------------------------------------|
| |
| |
| EAP-Response/Identity (User's NAI) |
|------------------------------------------------>|
| |
| |
| EAP-Request/PPT-Challenge (challenges) |
|<------------------------------------------------|
| |
| |
| EAP-Response/PPT-Challenge (token) |
|------------------------------------------------>|
| |
| +----------+
| | token |
| | redeemed |
| | with |
| | invalid |
| | extension|
| | metadata |
| +----------+
| EAP-Request/PPT-Error (error) |
|<------------------------------------------------|
| |
| |
| EAP-Response/PPT-Error |
|------------------------------------------------>|
| |
| |
| EAP-Success |
|<------------------------------------------------|
| |
| |
Figure 4: EAP-PPT Authentication Success with remediation
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6.5. Privacy
The fundamental building block of privacy in EAP-PPT is use of
Privacy Pass token, which is unlinkable authenticator, for
authorization of the Peer. EAP-PPT peer selects an issuer to get a
token issued from, using Issuance Protocol [RFC9578]. The Issuer
generates a token response based on the token request, which is
returned to the Client (generally via the Attester). Upon receiving
the token response, the EAP-PPT peer computes a token from the token
challenge and token response. This token can be validated by anyone
with the per-Issuer key but cannot be linked to the content of the
token request or token response.
If the EAP-PPT peer has a token, it includes it in a response to a
challenge from EAP-PPT server. This token SHOULD be sent only once
in reaction to a challenge; peers SHOULD NOT send tokens more than
once, even if they receive duplicate or redundant challenges.
The EAP-PPT server validates that the token was generated by the
expected Issuer and has not already been redeemed for the
corresponding token challenge. Mechanism to prevent double-spending
of tokens is out of scope of EAP-PPT method.
Section 4 of [RFC9576] discusses deployement models in detail. It is
RECOMMENDED to use a deployment model that guarantees EAP peer-
server, Issuer-EAP peer, and Attester-EAP server unlinkability.
Mechanisms for enforcing non-collusion are out of scope of EAP-PPT
method.
EAP-PPT peer MAY opt for token Caching by getting multiple tokens
issued from a single token challenge structure (Section 2.1.1 of
[RFC9577]). This improves privacy by separating the time of token
issuance from the time of token redemption. Optionally, the peer MAY
use a vaiant of Privacy Pass Issuance
([I-D.draft-ietf-privacypass-batched-tokens]) to get more tokens
issued and cached at a time.
EAP peer and server MUST send anonymous Network Access Identifiers
(NAIs) (Section 2.4 of [RFC7542]) in the first and subsequent EAP-
Response/Identity messages. EAP peer MUST NOT send its username (or
any other permanent identifiers) in the Identity Response. Following
[RFC7542], it is RECOMMENDED to omit the username (i.e., the NAI is
@realm), but other constructions such as a fixed username (e.g.,
anonymous@realm) is allowed. Note that the NAI MUST be a UTF-8
string as defined by the grammar in Section 2.2 of [RFC7542].
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During TLS hanshake in the first phase, EAP peer MUST send a
Certificate message containing no certificates as described in
Section 4.4.2 of [RFC8446], if CertificateRequest message is
received. Many client certificates contain an identity such as an
email address, and therefore, this document forbids client
authentication during first phase.
It is desired to support fast reconnect (Section 7.2.1 of [RFC3748])
by shortening the TLS conversation using session resumption mechanism
(Section 2.1.2 of [RFC5216]) during the first phase. EAP peer
presents an identifier that was issued previously by the server, to
attempt the session resumption. When a peer attempts to resume a TLS
session using such an identifier it allows the EAP server to detect
peer's revisit to the network. Similarly, use of Protected Access
Credential (PAC) in EAP-FAST method (Section 3.2.2 of [RFC4851]) can
potentially help the server determine peer's presence across session
resumptions. This document recommends use of session resumption to
be limited to the current association to the network. The EAP peer
MUST perform full TLS handshake durist the first phase after every
new association to the network. For example, an EAP peer can
continue to resume TLS sessions during the re-authentications as long
as the client device is associated to same access point of the secure
wireless LAN [IEEE-802.11].
6.6. Key Material Generation
The keys generated by this protocol, MSK and EMSK, are each in 64
octets in length. The protocol uses TLS exporter interface [RFC5705]
to generate the key material. The output of the exporter is intended
to be associated with the TLS session established in the first phase,
a unique label string, and a context. Type is the value of the EAP
Type field defined in Section 2 of [RFC3748], and it contributes to
the context value. For EAP-PPT, the Type value is 0x39. Context
value is constructed by concatenating Type value with Privacy Pass
token value that was sent in EAP-Response/PPT-Challenge message. Key
material MUST be generated by the EAP-PPT peer after receiving EAP
Success from the EAP-PPT server.
Type = 0x39
Context = Type || token
Key_Material = TLS_Exporter("EXPORTER_EAP_PPT_Key_Material",
Context, 128)
The MSK and EMSK are dervied from the Key_Material as described in
Section 7.10 of [RFC3748].
MSK = Key_Material(0, 63)
EMSK = Key_Material(64, 127)
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TLS_Exporter function is defined in Section 4 of [RFC5705]
6.7. Channel Binding
[RFC6677] defines channel bindings for EAP which solve the "lying
NAS" and the "lying provider" problems, using a process in which the
EAP peer gives information about the characteristics of the service
provided by the authenticator to the Authentication, Authorization,
and Accounting (AAA) server protected within the EAP authentication
method. This allows the server to verify the authenticator is
providing information to the peer that is consistent with the
information received from this authenticator as well as the
information stored about this authenticator.
EAP-PPT server can optionally request channel binding information to
the EAP- PPT peer after a successful redemption of the token sent in
EAP-Response/PPT- Challenge mesage. EAP-PPT server uses EAP-Request/
PPT-Channel-Binding message to request the channel binding
information to the peer. EAP-PPT server MUST send EAP-Request/PPT-
Channel-Binding message after a successful redemption of the token
and before sending EAP-Success message. EAP-PPT peer MUST send
channel binding information in EAP-Response/PPT-Channel-Binding
message in response to EAP-Request/PPT-Channel-Binding message. EAP-
PPT MUST send the channel-binding information as defined in
Section 5.3 of [RFC6677].
EAP-Request/PPT-Channel-Binding message is optional, and therefore
EAP-PPT server may skip it when the EAP server has already received
the information through EAP methods executed before EAP-PPT.
7. Message Format
7.1. Packet Format
EAP-PPT Packet Format is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Subtype | Data
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 5: EAP-PPT Header
Code 1 for request, 2 for response.
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Identifier The Identifier field is one octet and aids in matching
responses with requests. The Identifier field MUST be changed for
each request packet and MUST be echoed in each response packet.
Length The Length field is two octets and indicates the length of the
EAP packet including the Code, Identifier, Length, Type, Subtype, and
Data fields.
Type 57 (EAP-PPT)
Subtype Message subtypes as defined in Table 1
Data Data in JSON [RFC8259] format.
7.2. Subtypes
+=========+====================================================+
| Subtype | Description |
+=========+====================================================+
| 1 | A PPT-Challenge request or PPT-Challenge response. |
+---------+----------------------------------------------------+
| 2 | A PPT-Error request or PPT-Error response. |
+---------+----------------------------------------------------+
| 3 | A PPT-Channel-Binding request or PPT-Channel- |
| | Binding response. |
+---------+----------------------------------------------------+
Table 1: EAP-PPT Subtypes
7.3. Messages
This section specifies the messages used in EAP-PPT.
7.3.1. EAP-Request/PPT-Challenge
The Server sends this message to the peer after successfully learning
the identity of the peer. The purpose of this message is to present
multiple token challenges to the peer and receive a Privacy Pass
token for one of the challenges from the peer. This message is sent
with subtype 1 (Table 1) and data is encoded in JSON [RFC8259] format
as shown in Table 2 below -
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+============+=======+=====================================+
| Key | Type | Description |
+============+=======+=====================================+
| challenges | array | Array of one or more objects. Each |
| | | element is an object that contains |
| | | keys that are part the challenge. |
| | | This is a required parameter. |
+------------+-------+-------------------------------------+
Table 2: Token Challenges
+============+========+===========================================+
| Key | Type | Description |
+============+========+===========================================+
| challenge | string | A string that contains a base64url token |
| | | challenge value, encoded per [RFC4648]. |
| | | This document follows the default padding |
| | | behavior described in Section 3.2 of |
| | | [RFC4648], so the base64url value MUST |
| | | include padding. The token structure is |
| | | defined in Section 2.2.1 of [RFC9577]. |
| | | This key is based on the challenge |
| | | parameter defined in Section 2.1.2 of |
| | | [RFC9577]. This is a required parameter. |
+------------+--------+-------------------------------------------+
| token-key | string | AA string that contains a base64url- |
| | | encoded public key for use with the |
| | | issuance protocol indicated by the |
| | | challenge key. This key is based on the |
| | | token-key parameter defined in |
| | | Section 2.1.2 of [RFC9577]. This |
| | | parameter MAY be omitted in deployments |
| | | where peers are able to retrieve the |
| | | Issuer key using an out-of-band |
| | | mechanism. |
+------------+--------+-------------------------------------------+
| extension- | array | An array of ExtensionType that the EAP- |
| types | | PPT server is requesting the token to |
| | | bind to. ExtensionType is defined in |
| | | Section 3 of I-D.draft-ietf-privacypass- |
| | | auth-scheme-extensions. This parameter |
| | | is meaningful only if the Issuer, EAP-PPT |
| | | peer and server have an out-of-band |
| | | agreement to bind the extension to the |
| | | token. This is an optional parameter. |
+------------+--------+-------------------------------------------+
Table 3: Token Challenge Keys
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EAP-Request/PPT-Challenge Message carries JSON key "challenges" which
is a JSON array of JSON objects. Each element in "challenges" is a
JSON object that contains two keys i.e. "challenge" and "token-key",
and optionally an array of "extension-types" as well, as shown in
Table 3.
Example EAP-Request/PPT-Challenge Data -
{
"challenges":
[
{
"challenge": "AAIADmlzc3Vlci5leGFtcGxlIIo-g6M9mAB
dLzC-9Bn6a_TNXGAF42sShbu0zNQPpLODAA5vcmlnaW4uZXhh
bXBsZQ==",
"token-key": "MIIBUjA9BgkqhkiG9w0BAQowMKANMAsGCWC
GSAFlAwQCAqEaMBgGCSqGSIb3DQEBCDALBglghkgBZQMEAgKi
AwIBMAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAyxrta2qV9bHOATpM_KsluUsuZ
KIwNOQlCn6rQ8DfOowSmTrxKxEZCNS0cb7DHUtsmtnN2pBhKi
7pA1I-beWiJNawLwnlw3TQz-Adj1KcUAp4ovZ5CPpoK1orQwy
B6vGvcte155T8mKMTknaHl1fORTtSbvm_bOuZl5uEI7kPRGGi
KvN6qwz1cz91l6vkTTHHMttooYHGy75gfYwOUuBlX9mZbcWE7
KC-h6-814ozfRex26noKLvYHikTFxROf_ifVWGXCbCWy7nqR0
zq0mTCBz_kl0DAHwDhCRBgZpg9IeX4PwhuLoI8h5zUPO9wDSo
1Kpur1hLQPK0C2xNLfiJaXwIDAQAB"
},
{
"challenge": "AAEADmlzc3Vlci5leGFtcGxlIIo-g6M9mA
BdLzC-9Bn6a_TNXGAF42sShbu0zNQPpLODAA5vcmlnaW4uZXh
hbXBsZQ==",
"token-key": "67H-0zgxA2HAjQx1dpaWcSluBemaF9eSbf
wopT-r1In6wPgryoYkmmaPOlv6s3TJ"
"extension-types":
[
1,5,6
]
}
]
}
Figure 6
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7.3.2. EAP-Response/PPT-Challenge
The peer sends this message to the server in response to a valid EAP-
Request/PPT-Challenge Message. Sending this Message indicates that
the peer was able to look up a Privacy Pass token for one of the
received challenges. This message is sent with subtype 1 (Table 1)
and data is encoded in JSON [RFC8259] format as shown in Table 4.
+==========+======+================================================+
|Key |Type |Description |
+==========+======+================================================+
|token |string|A string that contains base64url-encoded token |
| | |structure value per Section 2.2.1 of [RFC9577]. |
| | |This is a required parameter. |
+----------+------+------------------------------------------------+
|extensions|string|A string that contains base64url-encoded |
| | |extension structure (Section 3 of .draft-ietf- |
| | |privacypass-auth-scheme-extensions). This is an|
| | |optional parameter. |
+----------+------+------------------------------------------------+
Table 4: Token Challenge Response Keys
The peer MUST send empty token string when it fails to find a valid
token for one of the received challenges. On receiving an empty
token string in this message, the server MUST send EAP-Failure
message to the peer.
Example EAP-Response/PPT-Challenge Data -
{
"token": "AAEADmlzc4Vlci5leGFtcGxlIIo-g6M9mABdLzC-1Bn6a_TNX
GAF52sShbu0zNQPpLODAA5vcmlnaW4uZXhhbXBsCB=="
}
Figure 7
7.3.3. EAP-Request/PPT-Error
The server sends this message to the peer when token redemption
fails. The purpose of this message is to report redemption failure
to the peer along with relevant information that may be useful to the
peer. This message is sent with subtype 2 (Table 1) and data is
encoded in JSON [RFC8259] format as shown in Table 5.
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+=================+========+====================================+
| Key | Type | Description |
+=================+========+====================================+
| code | number | An error code that describes the |
| | | reason for the redemption failure. |
| | | The range is 1-100. This key is |
| | | required. |
+-----------------+--------+------------------------------------+
| description | string | Human-readable ASCII text |
| | | providing additional information, |
| | | used to assist the user of the |
| | | client device in understanding the |
| | | error. This is an optional key. |
+-----------------+--------+------------------------------------+
| session-timeout | number | Time in second after which the |
| | | session is terminated by the |
| | | authenticator. This is an |
| | | optional key. |
+-----------------+--------+------------------------------------+
Table 5: Error Keys
Example EAP-Request/PPT-Error Data -
{
"code": 1,
"description": "invalid token format"
}
Figure 8
7.3.3.1. Error Codes
+========+========================================================+
| Code | Description |
+========+========================================================+
| 1 | This code indicates a failure in validating the token |
| | data. This may occur due to incorrect formatting or |
| | encoding of the data. |
+--------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| 2 | This code indicates redemption failure. This is a |
| | fatal error, and only way for the peer to recover from |
| | this failure is to retry the EAP-PPT authentication |
| | with new token. |
+--------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| 3 | This code means the EAP-PPT server is unable to |
| | perform the token redemption at the moment. This can |
| | be used by the client to retry spending the token |
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| | later. |
+--------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| 4 | This code indiates the server detected a double spend |
| | of the token. This is a fatal error, and only way for |
| | the peer to recover from this failure is to retry the |
| | EAP-PPT authentication with a new token. |
+--------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| 5 | This code indicates undefined failure. The client MAY |
| | choose to the spend the same oken later. |
+--------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| 6 | This code indicates token redemption success with an |
| | unexpected extension parameter value. This is a fatal |
| | error, and only way for the peer to recover from this |
| | failure is to retry the EAP-PPT authentication with a |
| | new token, binding to expected extension parameter |
| | value. |
+--------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| 7 | This code indicates token redemption success with an |
| | unexpected extension parameter value. However, the |
| | server side policy makes this a non-fatal error, and |
| | therefore, the peer is authorized unconditionally. |
+--------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| 8 | This code indicates token Redemption success with an |
| | unexpected extension parameter value. However, the |
| | server side policy makes this a non-fatal error, and |
| | therefore the peer is authorized conditionally. The |
| | condition here is - an authorization for limited time. |
| | The limited time authorization is indicated by sending |
| | session-timeout parameter along with the error code. |
+--------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| 9-80 | Reserved |
+--------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| 81-100 | Vendor Specific Errors. |
+--------+--------------------------------------------------------+
Table 6: Error Codes
7.3.4. EAP-Response/PPT-Error
The peer sends this message as an acknowledgement to the server in
response to a valid EAP-Request/PPT-Error Message. This message is
sent with subtype 2 (Table 1) and it does not carry data.
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7.3.5. EAP-Request/PPT-Channel-Binding
EAP-PPT server sends this message to the peer after a successful
redemption of the token received in EAP-Response/PPT-Challenge
message. The purpose of this message is to request channel binding
information to the peer. This message is sent with subtype 3
(Table 1) and and it does not carry data.
7.3.6. EAP-Response/PPT-Channel-Binding
The peer sends this message as an in response to a EAP-Request/ PPT-
Channel-Binding Message. This message is sent with subtype 3
(Table 1) and the data field contains channel-binding message as
defined in Section 5.3 of [RFC6677]. EAP-PPT server MAY send EAP-
Failure message if the channel-binding data is not found valid or
satisfactory, depending on the server side policy.
8. Error Handling
8.1. Client Failure Scenarios
8.1.1. EAP-PPT peer found no valid token for token challenge
If on receipt of an EAP-Request/PPT-Challenge, the EAP-PPT peer
cannot present a valid token matching for one of the received token
challenges, then the EAP-PPT peer MUST respond with an empty token
string in the EAP-Response/PPT-Challenge message. In this case, the
EAP-PPT server MUST terminate the conversation by sending an EAP
Failure packet.
8.1.2. EAP-PPT peer found no token with valid extension-types for token
challenge
If on receipt of an EAP-Request/PPT-Challenge, the EAP-PPT peer
cannot present a valid token bound to the extension-type(s) requested
by the EAP-PPT server for one of the received token challenges, then
the EAP-PPT peer MUST respond with an empty token string in the EAP-
Response/PPT-Challenge message. In this case, the EAP-PPT server
MUST terminate the conversation by sending an EAP Failure packet.
8.2. Server Failure Scenarios
8.2.1. EAP-PPT server found no valid token challenge for user NAI
If on receipt of a EAP Identity Response the EAP-PPT server does not
have a token challenge for the user's NAI, the EAP-PPT server MUST
terminate the conversation by responding with an EAP Failure packet.
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8.2.2. EAP-PPT server is unable to validate token data
If on receipt of an EAP-Response/PPT-Challenge, the EAP-PPT server is
unable to validate the token data presented by the EAP-PPT peer (due
to incorrect data, formatting or encoding), the EAP-PPT server MUST
respond with an EAP-Request/PPT-Error with error code 1 (see
Section 7.3.3.1). The EAP-PPT peer MUST subsequently acknowledge the
error with an EAP-Response/PPT-Error message, after which the EAP-PPT
server MUST respond with EAP Failure as shown in Figure 3.
8.2.3. EAP-PPT server token redemption failure
If on receipt of an EAP-Response/PPT-Challenge, the EAP-PPT server
token redemption fails, the EAP-PPT server MUST respond with an EAP-
Request/PPT-Error with error code 2 (see Section 7.3.3.1). The EAP-
PPT peer MUST subsequently acknowledge the error with an EAP-
Response/PPT-Error, after which the EAP-PPT server MUST respond with
EAP Failure as shown in Figure 3. The EAP-PPT peer MUST NOT use this
token in subsequent authentication.
8.2.4. EAP-PPT server temporary failure
If the EAP-PPT server is (temporarily) unable to perform token
redemption, and it receives an EAP-Response/PPT-Challenge, the EAP-
PPT server MUST respond with an EAP-Request/PPT-Error with error code
3 (see Section 7.3.3.1). The EAP-PPT peer MUST subsequently
acknowledge the the error with an EAP-Response/PPT-Error message,
after which the EAP-PPT server MUST respond with EAP Failure as shown
in Figure 3. The EAP-PPT peer MAY use this token in subsequent
authentication.
8.2.5. EAP-PPT server detected double spend
The EAP-PPT server MAY implement double spend detection, to ensure a
token is only used once. If the EAP-PPT server implementing double
spend detection detects double spend of a token sent in an an EAP-
Response/PPT-Challenge, the EAP-PPT server MUST respond with an EAP-
Request/PPT-Error with error code 4 (see Section 7.3.3.1). The EAP-
PPT peer MUST subsequently acknowledge the error with an EAP-
Response/PPT-Error message, after which the EAP-PPT server MUST
respond with EAP Failure as shown in Figure 3. The EAP-PPT peer MUST
NOT use this token in subsequent authentication.
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8.2.6. EAP-PPT server undefined failure
If the EAP-PPT server is experiencing an undefined failure, when
receiving an EAP-Response/PPT-Challenge, the EAP-PPT server MUST
respond with an EAP-Request/PPT-Error with error code 5 (see
Section 7.3.3.1). The EAP-PPT peer MUST subsequently acknowledge the
error with an EAP-Response/PPT-Error message, after which the EAP-PPT
server MUST respond with EAP Failure as shown in Figure 3. The EAP-
PPT peer MAY use this token in subsequent authentication.
8.2.7. EAP-PPT server token redemption success with unexpected
extension value
If on receipt of an EAP-Response/PPT-Challenge, the EAP-PPT server
finds an unexpected extension parameter value, the EAP-PPT server MAY
deem this to be a fatal error. In this case the EAP-PPT server MAY
respond with an EAP-Request/PPT-Error with error code 6 (see
Section 7.3.3.1). The EAP-PPT peer MUST subsequently acknowledge the
error with an EAP-Response/PPT-Error message, after which the EAP-PPT
server MUST respond with EAP Failure as shown in Figure 3. The EAP-
PPT peer MUST NOT use this token in subsequent authentication.
8.3. Conditional Acceptance Scenarios
8.3.1. EAP-PPT server redemption, unexpected extension value,
unconditional access
If on receipt of a EAP-Response/PPT-Challenge, the EAP-PPT server
token redemption succeeds, but the EAP-PPT server finds an unexpected
extension parameter value, The EAP-PPT server MAY deem this to be a
recoverable error and allow the session to proceed unconditionally.
In this case, the EAP-PPT server MAY respond with an EAP-Request/PPT-
Error with error code 7 (see Section 7.3.3.1). The EAP-PPT peer MUST
subsequently acknowledge the error with an EAP-Response/PPT-Error
message, after which the EAP-PPT server MUST respond with EAP Success
as shown in Figure 2.
8.3.2. EAP-PPT server redemption, unexpected extension value,
conditional access
If on receipt of a EAP-Response/PPT-Challenge, the EAP-PPT server
token redemption succeeds, but the EAP-PPT server finds an unexpected
extension parameter value, The EAP-PPT server MAY deem this to be a
recoverable error and allow the session to proceed conditionally. In
this case the EAP-PPT server MAY respond with an EAP-Request/PPT-
Error with error code 8 (see Section 7.3.3.1). The EAP-PPT server
MUST send a session-timeout value in the response message. The EAP-
PPT peer MUST subsequently acknowledge the error with an EAP-
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Response/PPT-Error message, after which the EAP-PPT server MUST
respond with EAP Success as shown in Figure 2. The EAP Server MUST
include a session-timeout attribute in the RADIUS Access-Accept
packet to the Authenticator, so it can terminate the session when the
session-timeout condition is no longer met.
9. Security Considerations
9.1. PrivateToken authentication Scheme
Security considerations applicable discussed in Section 5 of
[RFC9577] are applicable to EAP-PPT.
9.2. Integrity Protection
Since EAP-PPT method is used for anonymous authentication of EAP
peer, it is REQUIRED to execute it within a server authenticated TLS
tunnel, provided by a tunnnel-based EAP method. When EAP-PPT is used
to authenticate IKEv2 initiator to the responder, it is REQUIRED to
use it in conjunction with a public-key-signature- based
authentication of the responder to the initiator, before initiating
the EAP-PPT authentication.
9.3. EAP Server implementation
Allowing the EAP Phase 1 conversation to be terminated at a different
server than the EAP-Phase 2 conversation can introduce
vulnerabilities if there is not a proper trust relationship and
protection for the protocol between the two servers.
As EAP-PPT is an identity-free credential, it mitigates loss of
identity protection scenarios better than EAP-methods carrying
identity. Identity protection is ensured, even if the credential is
exposed to an attacker. Offline dictionary attacks are also
mitigated with EAP-PPT as the credential is a single-use
cryptograhically signed token.
Separation of Phase 1 and Phase 2 EAP server with EAP-PPT as the
inner EAP method can still introduce vulnerabilities to on-path
active attacks between these EAP Servers if there is not a proper
trust relationship between the servers, or if the protocol between
the servers is not properly secured. An attacker could intercept a
token in the PPT-Challenge response, or alter an EAP-Success or EAP-
Failure message. It is important to note however that due to the
single-use identity-free nature of the credential, the longevity of
the attack is limited.
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Therefore, separation of the EAP-Server (Phase 1) from the EAP-PPT
Server i (Phase 2) conversation is NOT RECOMMENDED.
9.4. Channel Binding
[RFC6677] defines channel bindings for EAP which solve the "lying
NAS" and the "lying provider" problems, using a process in which the
EAP peer gives information about the characteristics of the service
provided by the authenticator to the Authentication, Authorization,
and Accounting (AAA) server protected within the EAP authentication
method. This allows the server to verify the authenticator is
providing information to the peer that is consistent with the
information received from this authenticator as well as the
information stored about this authenticator.
When collocating the EAP and EAP-PPT servers, as recommended in
Section 9.3, channel binding can be implemented by leveraging a Phase
1 EAP method that supports Channel binding as defined in [RFC6677].
It is therefore RECOMMENDED to leverage a Phase 1 EAP method that
supports Channel binding with EAP-PPT, for example TEAP [RFC7170], as
described in Section 3.11.4 of [RFC7170].
9.5. Token Redemption Server implementation
EAP-PPT server MAY be implemented to perform token Redemption flow
with an external redemption service, configured with required keys
for redemption. In such scenario, a malicious EAP peers may generate
a lot of protocol requests to mount a denial-of-service attack on the
service. The EAP-PPT server implementation SHOULD take this into
account and SHOULD take steps to limit the requests it generates
towards the redemption service.
9.6. Security Claims
This section provides the security claims required by [RFC3748].
Auth. mechanism: Privacy Pass token
Ciphersuite negotiation: No
Mutual authentication: No
Integrity protection: NO. However, EAP-PPT method executed within a
tunnel-based EAP method established TLS tunnel is integrity
protected. The cleartext EAP-PPT messages outside the tunnel are not
integrity protected.
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Replay protection: NO. However, EAP-PPT method executed within a
tunnel-based EAP method established TLS tunnel is replay protected.
The cleartext EAP-PPT messages outside the tunnel are not replay
protected.
Confidentiality: No. However, EAP-PPT method executed within a
tunnel-based EAP method established TLS tunnel is encrypted.
Key derivation: Yes
Key strength: See Section 5.1 of [RFC5216]
Dictionary attack prot.: N/A
Fast reconnect: No
Cryptographic binding: N/A
Session independence: N/A
Fragmentation: No
Key Hierarchy: No
Channel binding: Yes
10. Deployment Considerations
EAP-PPT can be leveraged in a number of use cases and deployment
models. This section covers generic deployment recommendations to
ensure end-to-end privacy and unlinkability of tokens. This section
also describes some specific expected deployment models in which EAP-
PPT can be leveraged.
Although this section covers deployment of Origin, Issuer and
Attester as it relates to the EAP-PPT server, specifics on how to
deploy Issuer and Attester are not described here but can be found in
Section 4 of [RFC9576].
10.1. Recommendations for preserving privacy
10.1.1. Collocating other functions with the EAP-PPT Server
As discussed in Section 4 of [RFC9576] and in Section 6.5, it is
recommended to use a deployment model that guarantees EAP peer-
server, Issuer-EAP peer, and Attester-EAP server unlinkability. This
is especially pertinent in public use cases. In private use cases a
single entity could deploy all functions.
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It is recommended to collocate the phase 1 EAP-Server with the EAP-
PPT server, as EAP-Server separation can introduce vulnerabilities as
described in Section 9.3.
10.1.2. Protecting client identity
Please refer to the Section 6.5 section for deployment considerations
that are required to protect the client identity.
10.1.3. Separating Issuance and Verification over time
Section 3.1 of [RFC9576] describes the interaction between Privacy
Pass Issuance and Verification protocols. As described, in many
cases, when a Client interacts with an Origin, a Client will obtain a
token at the time of that interaction. In this case the time between
Issuance and Verification is short enough to allow for correlation.
In order to further reduce the probability of collusion between
actors participating in Issuance and Verification and achieve Issuer-
Client and Origin-Client unlinkability, Issuance and Verification can
be separated over time. A client can request Issuance of one or more
tokens and cache them in secure storage. This allows separation in
time between Issuance and Verification of the token, so time-based
correlation is not possible. When leveraging EAP-PPT to access
network resources, it is possible that the client does not have a
network interface available to perform Issuance over, so also for
this reason caching tokens is preferred.
10.2. Recommendations for usage in public use cases
In public use cases, a network service provider may be working with
one or more identity providers that are authenticating end-user
devices using privacy pass tokens. As described in Section 10.1.1 it
is recommended for the EAP-PPT server to be implemented by an entity
other than the Attester or Issuer, to avoid the perception of
collusion. In a public deployment scenario, the EAP-PPT server is
likely to be collocated with the network service provider, or could
be a service that the network service provider consumes from a 3rd
party service provider, other than the Attester or Issuer.
In order to verify a token, EAP-PPT Server requires key material for
the issuers specified in the TokenChallenge. In a public use case,
this information will have to be shared between the issuer and EAP-
PPT Server. The mechanism in which the Issuer shares this
information with the EAP-PPT server is out of scope of this document.
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10.3. Recommendations for usage in private use cases
It is recommended that the guidelines stipulated in Section 10.2 are
also followed for private deployments, however in use cases where the
network service provider is also the Attester, collocation of
entities may be unavoidable. When collocating entities, separating
Issuance and Verification over time as described in Section 10.1.3
provides additional privacy protection, as it becomes harder for
entities to collude.
10.4. Recommendations for usage in federated use cases (OpenRoaming)
OpenRoaming, as described in [I-D.draft-tomas-openroaming], is an
open federation of entities of different types, mainly targeted at
providing public Wi-Fi access. OpenRoaming defines distinct roles in
its federation architecture: Network Access Providers provide access
to network resources, and Identity Providers authenticate users for
those network access providers. Members of the federation are
identified by private PKI, managed by the Wireless Broadband Alliance
(WBA). The members use these certificates to mutually authenticate
each-others and secure RADIUS over TLS (RadSec) messages used to
transport EAP conversations between Network Access Providers and
Identity Providers. A Network Access Provider discovers the
authoritative Identity Provider for a client by resolving the realm
portion of the outer identity provided by the client as described in
[RFC7585].
OpenRoaming comprises of a privacy policy, and aims to protect en-
user privacy, however as it uses RADIUS attributes and EAP,
inherently, information about end-users could be shared between
Identity Provider and Network Access Provider. {Section 8 of ?I-
D.draft-tomas-openroaming}} describes RADIUS attributes OpenRoaming
supports. EAP-PPT can add additional privacy protection to a
federated use case such as OpenRoaming by separating the Issuance
from Verification, so the entity performing the Authentication is not
able to willingly or unwillingly share private information.
Where an OpenRoaming IDP both issues and verifies a credential, with
EAP-PPT these roles are separated. In order to implement EAP-PPT in
OpenRoaming, the Attester/Issuer would have to have an agreement with
the EAP-PPT server verifying or redeeming the token. Together they
are the OpenRoaming IDP. Alternatively, new roles could be defined
in the OpenRoaming federation to allow Attesters/Issuers to
interoperate with EAP-PPT servers within the OpenRoaming federation.
The EAP-PPT Server could be implemented by the Network Access
Provider directly, or by an entity in the federation.
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11. IANA Considerations
This section provides guidance to the Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA) regarding registration of values related to the EAP-
PPT protocol, in accordance with BCP 26 [RFC8126].
The EAP Method Type number 57 has been requested for EAP-PPT.
This document also calls for a registry of EAP-PPT error codes
described in Section 7.3.3.1.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[I-D.draft-ietf-privacypass-auth-scheme-extensions]
Hendrickson, S. and C. A. Wood, "The PrivateToken HTTP
Authentication Scheme Extensions Parameter", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-privacypass-auth-
scheme-extensions-00, 1 April 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
privacypass-auth-scheme-extensions-00>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
"Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
RFC 2865, DOI 10.17487/RFC2865, June 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2865>.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 3748, DOI 10.17487/RFC3748, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3748>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4648>.
[RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS
Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, DOI 10.17487/RFC5216,
March 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5216>.
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[RFC5705] Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705,
March 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5705>.
[RFC6677] Hartman, S., Ed., Clancy, T., and K. Hoeper, "Channel-
Binding Support for Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP) Methods", RFC 6677, DOI 10.17487/RFC6677, July 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6677>.
[RFC7170] Zhou, H., Cam-Winget, N., Salowey, J., and S. Hanna,
"Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol (TEAP) Version
1", RFC 7170, DOI 10.17487/RFC7170, May 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7170>.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7296>.
[RFC7542] DeKok, A., "The Network Access Identifier", RFC 7542,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7542, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7542>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8126>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8259>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.
[RFC9577] Pauly, T., Valdez, S., and C. A. Wood, "The Privacy Pass
HTTP Authentication Scheme", RFC 9577,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9577, June 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9577>.
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[RFC9578] Celi, S., Davidson, A., Valdez, S., and C. A. Wood,
"Privacy Pass Issuance Protocols", RFC 9578,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9578, June 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9578>.
12.2. Informative References
[I-D.draft-ietf-privacypass-batched-tokens]
Robert, R. and C. A. Wood, "Batched Token Issuance
Protocol", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
privacypass-batched-tokens-02, 13 October 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
privacypass-batched-tokens-02>.
[I-D.draft-tomas-openroaming]
Tomas, B., Grayson, M., Canpolat, N., Cockrell, B. A., and
S. Gundavelli, "WBA OpenRoaming Wireless Federation", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-tomas-openroaming-03,
25 July 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-tomas-openroaming-03>.
[IEEE-802.11]
IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Information technology
Telecommunications and information exchange between
systems Local and metropolitan area networks-Specific
requirements - Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control
(MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications", February
2021.
[IEEE-802.1X]
IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area
Networks--Port-Based Network Access Control", February
2020.
[PEAP] Microsoft Corporation, "Protected Extensible
Authentication Protocol (PEAP)", June 2021.
[RFC4851] Cam-Winget, N., McGrew, D., Salowey, J., and H. Zhou, "The
Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling Extensible
Authentication Protocol Method (EAP-FAST)", RFC 4851,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4851, May 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4851>.
[RFC5281] Funk, P. and S. Blake-Wilson, "Extensible Authentication
Protocol Tunneled Transport Layer Security Authenticated
Protocol Version 0 (EAP-TTLSv0)", RFC 5281,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5281, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5281>.
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[RFC6678] Hoeper, K., Hanna, S., Zhou, H., and J. Salowey, Ed.,
"Requirements for a Tunnel-Based Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP) Method", RFC 6678, DOI 10.17487/RFC6678,
July 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6678>.
[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6973>.
[RFC7585] Winter, S. and M. McCauley, "Dynamic Peer Discovery for
RADIUS/TLS and RADIUS/DTLS Based on the Network Access
Identifier (NAI)", RFC 7585, DOI 10.17487/RFC7585, October
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7585>.
[RFC7593] Wierenga, K., Winter, S., and T. Wolniewicz, "The eduroam
Architecture for Network Roaming", RFC 7593,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7593, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7593>.
[RFC9576] Davidson, A., Iyengar, J., and C. A. Wood, "The Privacy
Pass Architecture", RFC 9576, DOI 10.17487/RFC9576, June
2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9576>.
Authors' Addresses
Paresh Sawant
Apple Inc.
Email: paresh_sawant@apple.com
Bart Brinckman
Cisco Systems
Email: bbrinckm@cisco.com
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