SIP endpoint security case study
draft-scholz-endpoint-security-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Hendrik Scholz | ||
| Last updated | 2009-06-09 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
SIP endpoints are subject to unwanted communication often perceived as Spam over Internet Telephony (SPIT). This document describes caveats on various layers which can be abused to send unsolicited messages. As a result users receive a degraded experience. The issues found are based on case studies of various events seen in VoIP provider networks.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)