@techreport{schrock-ep-presentation-binding-01,
    number =    {draft-schrock-ep-presentation-binding-01},
    type =      {Internet-Draft},
    institution =   {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    publisher = {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    note =      {Work in Progress},
    url =       {https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-schrock-ep-presentation-binding/01/},
    author =    {Iman Schrock},
    title =     {{Binding Deterministic Rendering and Display Attestations to Human-Authorization Receipts}},
    pagetotal = 7,
    year =      2026,
    month =     sep,
    day =       12,
    abstract =  {A human-authorization receipt proves an enrolled key produced a user- verified signature over a digest that commits to an exact action. It does not prove the signing surface DISPLAYED that action honestly. If a signing interface shows a benign summary while committing a different action, the resulting receipt is laundered authority: cryptographically valid and semantically false, which is worse than no receipt at all. This is the presentation attack, and it is the deepest unsolved problem in authorization evidence, because a signature cannot attest to pixels. This document narrows the gap with two additive, offline-checkable pieces that touch no existing receipt format: a DETERMINISTIC RENDERER, a pure function from the canonical action to a byte-identical human-readable rendering, so a verifier RE-DERIVES the rendering from the signed bytes and rejects a claimed rendering that does not match; and a DISPLAY ATTESTATION, a signed claim by the signing client binding the rendering it showed to the action it committed. Neither eliminates the presentation attack (nothing purely digital can), but together they let a verifier check the claimed rendering against the signed action under relying-party- selected client trust inputs. They make the residual risk explicit rather than hidden.},
}