Key Consistency by Double-Checking via a Semi-Trusted Proxy
draft-schwartz-ohai-consistency-doublecheck-03
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Benjamin M. Schwartz | ||
| Last updated | 2023-04-22 (Latest revision 2022-10-19) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Several recent IETF privacy protocols require clients to acquire bootstrap information for a service in a way that guarantees both authenticity and consistency, e.g., encrypting to the same key as many other users. This specification defines a procedure for transferring arbitrary HTTP resources in a manner that provides these guarantees. The procedure relies on access to a semi-trusted HTTP proxy, under the same security assumptions as an Oblivious HTTP Relay.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)