End-to-End Route Management in the Session Initiation Protocol
draft-schwartz-sip-routing-managment-00
| Document | Type | Expired Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | David Schwartz , Jeremy M. Barkan | ||
| Last updated | 2006-03-03 | ||
| Stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats |
Expired & archived
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| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-schwartz-sip-routing-managment-00.txt
Abstract
While much attention has been given in Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) to the process of securing caller identity end-to-end, SIP routing headers (e.g. via, route etc) have not garnered the same attention and have gone largly unchanged since RFC 3261. Since SIP promotes the routing directives to the application layer it is imperative that these decisions not be tampered with by a malicious party. Specifically, Route and Via headers are passed "in the clear" without any security mechanism to insure the integrity of the information. This draft summarizes the problems with the existing
Authors
David Schwartz
Jeremy M. Barkan
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)