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End-to-End Route Management in the Session Initiation Protocol
draft-schwartz-sip-routing-managment-00

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors David Schwartz , Jeremy M. Barkan
Last updated 2006-03-03
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-schwartz-sip-routing-managment-00.txt

Abstract

While much attention has been given in Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) to the process of securing caller identity end-to-end, SIP routing headers (e.g. via, route etc) have not garnered the same attention and have gone largly unchanged since RFC 3261. Since SIP promotes the routing directives to the application layer it is imperative that these decisions not be tampered with by a malicious party. Specifically, Route and Via headers are passed "in the clear" without any security mechanism to insure the integrity of the information. This draft summarizes the problems with the existing

Authors

David Schwartz
Jeremy M. Barkan

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)