Additional Security Modes for CoAP
draft-seitz-core-security-modes-00
| Document | Type | Expired Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Ludwig Seitz , Göran Selander | ||
| Last updated | 2014-04-24 (Latest revision 2013-10-21) | ||
| Stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats |
Expired & archived
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| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-seitz-core-security-modes-00.txt
Abstract
The CoAP draft defines how to use DTLS as security mechanism. In order to establish which nodes are trusted to initiate a DTLS session with a device, the following security modes are defined: NoSec, PreSharedKey, RawPublicKey, and Certificate. These modes require either to provision a list of keys of trusted clients, or to handle heavyweight certificates. This memo proposes two intermediate security modes involving a trusted third party that are very similar to PreSharedKey and RawPublicKey respectively, but which do not require out-of-band provisioning of client keys to the device.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)