Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)
draft-selander-ace-cose-ecdhe-04
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Replaced".
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Göran Selander , John Preuß Mattsson , Francesca Palombini | ||
| Last updated | 2016-10-31 (Latest revision 2016-10-21) | ||
| Replaced by | draft-selander-lake-edhoc | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
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| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-selander-ace-cose-ecdhe-04
ACE Working Group G. Selander
Internet-Draft J. Mattsson
Intended status: Standards Track F. Palombini
Expires: May 4, 2017 Ericsson AB
October 31, 2016
Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)
draft-selander-ace-cose-ecdhe-04
Abstract
This document specifies authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange
with ephemeral keys, embedded in messages encoded with CBOR and using
the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) format.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on May 4, 2017.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. ECDH Public Keys using COSE_Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Asymmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Message Formatting using COSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.1. Message 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.2. Message 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1.3. Message 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2. Key Derivation with Asymmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3. Message Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.3.1. U -> message_1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.3.2. message_1 -> V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.3.3. message_2 <- V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.3.4. U <- message_2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.3.5. U -> message_3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3.6. message_3 -> V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5. Symmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.1. Message Formatting using COSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.1.1. Message 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.1.2. Message 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.1.3. Message 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.2. Key Derivation with Symmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.3. Message Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.3.1. U -> message_1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.3.2. message_1 -> V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.3.3. message_2 <- V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.3.4. U <- message_2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.3.5. U -> message_3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.3.6. message_3 -> V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6. Derive Traffic Secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
8. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
A.1. ECDH Public Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
A.2. Example with Asymmetric Keys (RPK) . . . . . . . . . . . 31
A.2.1. Message 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
A.2.2. Message 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
A.2.3. Message 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A.3. Example with Symmetric Keys (PSK) . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
A.3.1. Message 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
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A.3.2. Message 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
A.3.3. Message 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Appendix B. Implementing EDHOC with CoAP and OSCOAP . . . . . . 41
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1. Introduction
Security at the application layer provides an attractive option for
protecting Internet of Things (IoT) deployments, for example where
transport layer security is not sufficient
[I-D.hartke-core-e2e-security-reqs]. IoT devices may be constrained
in various ways, including memory, storage, processing capacity, and
energy [RFC7228]. A method for protecting individual messages at
application layer suitable for constrained devices, is provided by
COSE [I-D.ietf-cose-msg]), which builds on CBOR [RFC7049].
In order for a communication session to provide forward secrecy, the
communicating parties can run a Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange
protocol with ephemeral keys, from which shared key material can be
derived. This document specifies authenticated DH protocols using
CBOR and COSE objects. The DH key exchange messages may be
authenticated using either pre-shared keys (PSK), raw public keys
(RPK) or X.509 certificates (Cert). Authentication is based on
credentials established out of band, or from a trusted third party,
such as an Authorization Server as specified by
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. Note that this document focuses on
authentication and key establishment: for integration with
authorization of resource access, refer to
[I-D.seitz-ace-oscoap-profile]. This document also specifies the
derivation of shared key material.
The DH exchange and the key derviation follow [SIGMA], NIST SP-
800-56a [SP-800-56a] and HKDF [RFC5869], and make use of the data
structures of COSE which are aligned with these standards.
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. These
words may also appear in this document in lowercase, absent their
normative meanings.
2. Protocol Overview
This section gives an overview of EDHOC, together with Section 4.3
and Section 5.3, which explains how the messages are processed, while
Section 4.1 and Section 5.1 focus on the detailed message formats
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embedded as CBOR objects, and Section 4.2, Section 5.2, and Section 6
specify the key derivation.
EDHOC is built on the SIGMA family of protocols, with the basic
protocol specified in Section 5, here in variant (ii) as in
Section 5.4, of [SIGMA], see Figure 1.
Party U Party V
| |
| |
| E_U |
+------------------------------------------------------>|
| |
| E_V, ID_V, Sig(V; Mac(Km; E_U, E_V, ID_V)) |
|<------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| ID_U, Sig(U; Mac(Km; E_V, E_U, ID_U)) |
+------------------------------------------------------>|
| |
Figure 1: The basic SIGMA protocol
The parties exchanging messages are called "U" and "V". U and V
exchange identities and ephemeral public keys. They compute the
shared secret and derive the keying material. The messages are
signed and MAC:ed according to the SIGMA protocol (Figure 1):
o E_U and E_V are the ECDH ephemeral public keys of U and V,
respectively.
o ID_U and ID_V are used to identify U and V, respectively. In case
of public key certificate, C_U and C_V are used instead.
o Sig(U; . ) and Sig(V; . ) denote signatures made with the private
key of U and V, respectively.
o Mac(Km; . ) denote message authentication using keys derived from
the shared secret
EDHOC used with symmetric keys is based on the basic SIGMA protocol.
The underlying scheme for EDHOC using asymmetric keys is the SIGMA-I
protocol as specified in Section 5.2, with variant (ii) in
Section 5.4, of [SIGMA], see Figure 2. This protocol adds encryption
which is required for identity protection in the asymmetric key case:
o Enc(Ke; .) denote encryption using keys derived from the shared
secret
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Party U Party V
| |
| |
| E_U |
+------------------------------------------------------>|
| |
| E_V, Enc(Ke; ID_V, Sig(V; Mac(Km; E_U, E_V, ID_V))) |
|<------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| Enc(Ke; ID_U, Sig(U; Mac(Km; E_V, E_U, ID_U))) |
+------------------------------------------------------>|
| |
Figure 2: The SIGMA-I protocol
The protocols are detailed further in the following sections.
3. ECDH Public Keys using COSE_Key
This section defines the formatting of the ephemeral public keys E_U
and E_V.
The ECDH ephemeral public key SHALL be formatted as a COSE_Key with
the following fields and values (see [I-D.ietf-cose-msg]):
o kty: The value SHALL be 2 (Elliptic Curve Keys)
o crv: The value of the Curve used.
o x:
o y: The value SHOULD be boolean.
For the field 'crv', refer to Table 22 of [I-D.ietf-cose-msg]. The
value 1 MUST be supported by party V (NIST P-256 a.k.a. secp256r1
[RFC4492]).
TODO: Consider replacing P-256 with Curve25519 as mandatory
4. Asymmetric Keys
In this section we assume that the protocol messages are
authenticated with asymmetric keys. Both the scenarios where the
parties use raw public keys (RPK) and X.509 certificates (Cert) are
supported.
o Party U's public key SHALL be uniquely identified at V by ID_U.
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o Party V's public key SHALL be uniquely identified at U by ID_V.
ID_U and ID_V may be public key certificates [SIGMA], which we then
denote as C_U and C_V, respectively.
The pre-established credentials may thus be the public keys of U at
V, and of V at U. Alternatively, a pre-established public key of a
Certificate Authority (CA) may be used as trust anchor for
verification of received certificate.
The protocol is based on SIGMA-I (Section 2). As described in
Appendix B of [SIGMA], in order to create a "full-fledge" protocol
some additional protocol elements are needed:
o Explicit freshness nonces/session identifiers N_U, N_V chosen
freshly and anew with each session by U and V, respectively
o Computationally independent keys K_UE, K_UM, K_VE, K_VM derived
from the DH-shared secret and used for different directions and
operations.
EDHOC makes the following additions to this scheme (see Figure 3):
o Negotiation of algorithms used: AEAD-, signature- and MAC-
algorithm used in the protocol, and ECDH-ES w/ HKDF algorithm used
in the key derivation:
* U proposes one or more algorithms (Alg_U).
* V decides and responds with selected algorithms (Alg_V).
* Subsequent traffic is protected with the AEAD agreed in this
negotiation.
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Party U Party V
| |
| N_U, E_U, Alg_U |
+---------------------------------------------------------------> |
| message_1 |
| |
| |
| N_U, N_V, E_V, Alg_V, Enc(K_VE; ID_V, Sig(V; Mac(K_VM; prot_2)))|
| <---------------------------------------------------------------+
| message_2 |
| |
| |
| N_U, N_V, Enc(K_UE; ID_U, Sig(U; Mac(K_UM; prot_3))) |
+---------------------------------------------------------------> |
| message_3 |
| |
where prot_2 = N_U, N_V, E_V, Alg_V, ID_V
and prot_3 = N_V, N_U, E_U, Alg_U, ID_U
Figure 3: EDHOC with asymmetric keys.
4.1. Message Formatting using COSE
This section details the format for the objects used. Examples are
provided for each object in Appendix A.
Note that * identifies fields that do not exist in COSE structures
([I-D.ietf-cose-msg]), and are thus defined in this document.
4.1.1. Message 1
This section defines the formatting of message_1.
message_1 is a CBOR map object containing:
o N_U: nonce
o E_U: the ephemeral public key of Party U
o ECDH_arr: an array of proposed ECDH-ES w/ HKDF algorithms
o AEAD_arr: an array of proposed AEAD algorithms
o SIG_arr: an array of proposed Signature algorithms
o MAC_arr: an array of proposed MAC algorithms
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message_1 = {
N_U : bstr,
E_U : COSE_Key,
ALG_U : alg_arr
}
alg_arr = [
ECDH_arr : alg_array,
AEAD_arr : alg_array,
SIG_arr : alg_array,
MAC_arr : alg_array
]
alg_array = [ + alg : bstr/int ]
4.1.2. Message 2
In case of asymmetric keys, message_2 SHALL have the COSE_Encrypt
structure [I-D.ietf-cose-msg] with the following fields and values:
o Headers:
* protected:
+ alg: AEAD, the Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data
algorithm chosen by Party V from the set of proposed
algorithms AEAD_arr
* unprotected:
+ nonces*: nonce-array
o ciphertext: encrypted plaintext as defined below
o recipient:
* Headers:
+ protected: ECDH-ES + HKDF algorithm chosen by Party V from
the set of proposed algorithms ECDH_arr (table 18 in
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg])
+ unprotected:
- E_V: COSE_Key
+ ciphertext: empty
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nonce-array = [
N_U: bstr,
N_V: bstr
]
The plaintext for message_2 SHALL have the COSE_Sign1 structure
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg] with the following fields and values:
o Headers
* protected
+ alg: SIG, the Sign algorithm chosen by Party V from the set
of proposed algorithms SIG_arr
+ MAC-alg*: MAC, the MAC algorithm chosen by Party V from the
set of proposed algorithms MAC_arr
* Unprotected:
+ kid: ID_V (if raw public keys are used) or
+ x5c*: C_V (if certificates are used)
o detached payload: as defined below
o signature: computed as in Section 4.4 of [I-D.ietf-cose-msg]
The payload for COSE_Sign1 SHALL have the COSE_MAC0 structure
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg] with the following fields and values:
o Headers
* protected
+ alg: MAC (same value as MAC-alg in COSE_Sign1 structure
above)
* unprotected: empty
o payload: payl_2_rpk (resp. payl_2_cert) as defined below if raw
public keys (resp. certificates) are used
o tag
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payl_2_rpk = [
N_U: bstr,
N_V: bstr,
E_V: COSE_Key,
ID_V: bstr
]
payl_2_cert = [
N_U: bstr,
N_V: bstr,
E_V: COSE_Key,
C_V: bstr
]
4.1.3. Message 3
In case of asymmetric keys, message_3 SHALL have the COSE_Encrypt0
structure [I-D.ietf-cose-msg] with the following fields and values:
o Headers:
* protected:
+ alg: AEAD
* unprotected:
+ nonces*: nonce-array
o ciphertext: encrypted plaintext as defined below
The plaintext for message_3 SHALL have the COSE_Sign1 structure
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg] with the following fields and values:
o Headers
* protected
+ alg: SIG
+ MAC-alg*: MAC
* Unprotected:
+ kid: ID_U (if raw public keys are used) or
+ x5c*: C_U (if certificates are used)
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o detached payload: as defined below
o signature: computed as in Section 4.4 of [I-D.ietf-cose-msg]
The payload for COSE_Sign1 SHALL have the COSE_MAC0 structure
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg] with the following fields and values:
o Headers
* protected
+ alg: MAC (same value as MAC-alg in COSE_Sign1 structure
above)
* unprotected: empty
o payload: payl_3_rpk (resp. payl_3_cert) as defined below if raw
public keys (resp. certificates) are used
o tag
payl_3_rpk = [
N_V : bstr,
N_U : bstr,
E_U : COSE_Key,
ALG_U : alg_arr,
ID_V : bstr
]
payl_3_cert = [
N_V : bstr,
N_U : bstr,
E_U : COSE_Key,
ALG_U : alg_arr,
C_V : bstr
]
4.2. Key Derivation with Asymmetric Keys
It is described in this section how the keys for encryption (K_UE,
K_VE) and MAC (K_UM, K_VM) are derived.
Party U and Party V SHALL derive K_UE, K_VE, K_UM, and K_VM from the
information available in message_1 and message_2 through the key
exchange, as described in this section.
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The key derivation is identical to Section 11.1 of
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg], using HKDF [RFC5869] agreed as part of the ECDH-
ES w/ HKDF negociation during the message exchange.
o the secret SHALL be the ECDH shared secret as defined in
Section 12.4.1 of [I-D.ietf-cose-msg], where the computed secret
is specified in section 5.7.1.2 of [SP-800-56a]
o the salt SHALL be the concatenation of N_U and N_V.
o the length SHALL be the length of the key, depending on the
algorithm used.
o the context information SHALL be the serialized COSE_KDF_Context
defined in the next paragraph.
o the PRF SHALL be the one indicated in HKDF using the Table 18 of
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg] (in our examples, -27 corresponds to HMAC with
SHA-256)
The context information COSE_KDF_Context is defined as follows:
o AlgorithmID SHALL be the algorithm for which the key material will
be derived. It's value is AEAD (to derive K_UE and K_VE) or MAC
(to derive K_UM and K_VM)
o PartyUInfo SHALL contain:
* nonce SHALL be equal to N_U
o PartyVInfo SHALL contain:
* nonce SHALL be equal to N_V
o SuppPubInfo SHALL contain:
* KeyDataLength SHALL be equal to 'length'
* protected SHALL be a zero length bstr
* other SHALL contain the HMAC (as defined by the agreed HKDF) of
the concatenation of message_1, the COSE Headers of
COSE_Encrypt (message_2) and the string "PartyU" (resp.
"PartyV") to derive K_UE or K_UM (resp. K_VE or K_VM)
o SuppPrivInfo SHALL be empty
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The key derivation is done using the following context information
COSE_KDF_Context for asymmetric keys:
COSE_KDF_Context = [
AlgorithmID : AEAD / MAC,
PartyUInfo : [ PartyInfo_U ],
PartyVInfo : [ PartyInfo_V ],
SuppPubInfo : [
keyDataLength : uint, ; length
protected : bstr, ; zero length bstr
other : bstr ; Hash(message_1 ||
COSE Headers of COSE_Encrypt
(message_2) ||
"PartyU"/"PartyV")
]
]
PartyInfo_U = (
nonce : N_U
)
PartyInfo_V = (
nonce : N_V
)
Using the different combination of these parameters creates the four
keys K_UE, K_UM, K_VE and K_VM when raw public keys or certificates
are used.
For example, to derive K_UE when asymmetric keys are used, the
context MUST include:
o AEAD as Algorithm ID
o "PartyU" as the chosen string in SuppPubInfo other
4.3. Message Processing
Party U and V are assumed to have pre-established credentials as
described in Section 4.
4.3.1. U -> message_1
Party U processes message_1 for party V as follows:
o Party U SHALL generate a fresh ephemeral ECDH key pair as
specified in Section 5 of [SP-800-56a] using ECC domain parameters
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of a curve complying with security policies for communicating with
party V.
o The ephemeral public key, E_U, SHALL be formatted as a COSE_key as
specified in Section 3.
o Party U SHALL generate a pseudo-random 64-bits nonce N_U and store
it for the length of the protocol, for future verifications.
o Party U SHALL set the proposed algorithms for communicating with
party V.
o Party U SHALL format message_1 as specified in Section 4.1.1.
o Party U sends message_1 to party V.
4.3.2. message_1 -> V
Party V processes the received message_1 as follows:
o Party V SHALL verify that the nonce has not been received before.
If the verification fails, the message MUST be discarded.
Otherwise, Party V SHALL store a representation of the nonce for
future verifications.
o Party V SHALL select a set of algorithms (AEAD, SIG, MAC, and
ECDH-ES) compliant with its security policy for communicating with
U. If no compliant algorithm was proposed by Party U, Party V
SHALL stop processing the message and MAY respond with an error,
indicating that no common algorithm could be found.
4.3.3. message_2 <- V
Party V composes message_2 for party U as follows:
o Party V SHALL generate a fresh ephemeral ECDH key pair as
specified in Section 5 of [SP-800-56a] using same curve/ECC domain
parameters as used by party U.
* The ephemeral public key, E_V, SHALL be formatted as a COSE_key
as specified in Section 3.
o Party V SHALL generate a pseudo-random 64-bits nonce N_V and store
it for the length of the protocol, for future verifications.
o Party V SHALL derive K_UE, K_VE, K_UM and K_VM as defined in
Section 4.2.
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o Party V SHALL format message_2 as specified in Section 4.1.2:
o COSE_MAC0 is computed as defined in section 6.3 of
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg], with key K_VM and algorithm MAC;
o COSE_Sign1 is computed as defined in section 4.4 of
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg], using the private key of Party V and
algorithm SIG;
o COSE_Encrypt is computed as defined in section 5.3 of
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg], with key K_VE and algorithm AEAD.
o Note that the COSE_Sign1 payload is detached (as defined in
section 4.1 of [I-D.ietf-cose-msg]).
o Note that in case of certificates, the certificate of Party V,
C_V, is sent in place of ID_V
o Party V sends message_2 to party U.
4.3.4. U <- message_2
Party U processes the received message_2 as follows:
o Party U SHALL verify than the received N_U is identical to the
saved nonce N_U.
o Party U SHALL verify that the nonce has not been received before.
If the verification fails, the message MUST be discarded.
Otherwise, Party U SHALL store a representation of the nonce for
future verifications.
o Party U SHALL derive K_UE, K_VE, K_UM and K_VM as defined in
Section 4.2.
o Party U SHALL verify message_2:
* COSE_Encrypt is decrypted and verified as defined in section
5.3 of [I-D.ietf-cose-msg], with key K_VE.
* If the message contains a certificate, party U SHALL verify the
certificate using the pre-established trust anchor and the
revokation verification policies relevant for party U. If the
verification fails the message is discarded.
* COSE_MAC0 is computed as defined in section 6.3 of
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg], with key K_VM. The result is inserted as
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payload of the received COSE_Sign1 (which was sent with
detached payload);
* COSE_Sign1 is verified as defined in section 4.4 of
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg], using the public key of Party V;
* Note that Party U SHALL verify that the algorithms used in
message_2 are taken from the set of proposed algorithms in
message_1, else stop processing the message.
o If the verification of message_2 fails, the message MUST be
discarded and Party U SHALL discontinue the protocol.
4.3.5. U -> message_3
Party U composes message_3 for party V as follows:
o Party U SHALL format message_3 as specified in Section 4.1.3:
o COSE_MAC0 is computed as defined in section 6.3 of
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg], with key K_UM and algorithm MAC;
o COSE_Sign1 is computed as defined in section 4.4 of
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg], using the private key of Party U and
algorithm SIG;
o COSE_Encrypt0 is computed as defined in section 5.3 of
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg], with key K_UE and algorithm AEAD.
o Note that the COSE_Sign1 payload is detached (as defined in
section 4.1 of [I-D.ietf-cose-msg]).
o Note that in case of certificates, the certificate of Party U,
C_U, is sent in place of ID_U
o Party U sends message_3 to party V.
4.3.6. message_3 -> V
Party V processes the received message_3 as follows:
o Party V SHALL verify than the received N_U and N_V are identical
to the saved nonces N_U and N_V. If the verification fails, the
message MUST be discarded.
o Party V SHALL verify message_3:
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* COSE_Encrypt0 is decrypted and verified as defined in section
5.3 of [I-D.ietf-cose-msg], with key K_UE.
* If the message contains a certificate, party V SHALL verify the
certificate using the pre-established trust anchor and the
revokation verification policies relevant for party U. If the
verification fails the message is discarded.
* COSE_MAC0 is computed as defined in section 6.3 of
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg], with key K_UM. The result is inserted as
payload of the received COSE_Sign1 (which was sent with
detached payload);
* COSE_Sign1 is verified as defined in section 4.4 of
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg], using the public key of Party U;
* Note that Party V SHALL verify that the set of algorithms sent
in message_3 is the same as sent in message_1, else stop
processing the message.
o If the verification of message_3 fails, the message MUST be
discarded and Party V SHALL discontinue the protocol.
5. Symmetric Keys
In this section we assume that the protocol messages are
authenticated with pre-shared symmetric keys.
Parties U and V are assumed to have a pre-shared uniformly random
key, PSK. The value of the key identifier (kid_psk) SHALL be unique
for U and V.
The protocol is based on the basic SIGMA protocol (Section 2), but
the signatures Sig(U; . ), Sig(V; . ) are replaced with message
authentication codes MAC(K_UMP; . ), MAC(K_VMP; . ), respectively.
K_UMP and K_VMP are computationally independent keys, associated to U
and V, respectively, and derived from PSK. Also, party U needs to
send the key identifier in message_1 to indicate what PSK that V
should use (kid_psk). In this case identity protection is achieved
by anonymizing the kid (Section 7).
For a specific pre-shared key (and corresponding kid-psk):
o Party U SHALL be identified by ID_U.
o Party V SHALL be identified by ID_V.
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Since kid-psk is unique, only one additional pre-established bit is
needed to identify the parties.
As in the asymmetric case, some additional protocol elements are
added to the final protocol:
o Explicit freshness nonces/session identifiers N_U, N_V chosen
freshly and anew with each session by U and V, respectively
o Computationally independent keys K_UM, K_VM derived from the DH-
shared secret and used for different directions and operations.
o Negotiation of algorithms:
* MAC-algorithm used in the protocol
* HKDF with hash algorithm used in the key derivation
* AEAD-algorithm used to protect subsequent traffic
* U proposes one or more algorithms (Alg_U).
* V decides and responds with selected algorithms (Alg_V).
Party U Party V
| |
| N_U, E_U, Kid, Alg_U |
+---------------------------------------------------------------> |
| message_1 |
| |
| |
| N_U, N_V, E_V, Kid, ID_V, Alg_V, Mac(K_VMP; Mac(K_VM; prot_2)) |
| <---------------------------------------------------------------+
| message_2 |
| |
| |
| N_U, N_V, Kid, ID_U, Mac(K_UMP; Mac(K_UM; prot_3)) |
+---------------------------------------------------------------> |
| message_3 |
| |
where prot_2 = N_U, N_V, E_V, Kid, ID_V, Alg_V
and prot_3 = N_V, N_U, E_U, Kid, ID_U, Alg_U
Figure 4: EDHOC with symmetric keys.
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5.1. Message Formatting using COSE
This section details the format for the objects used. Examples are
provided for each object in Appendix A.
Note that * identifies fields that do not exist in COSE structures
([I-D.ietf-cose-msg]), and are thus defined in this document.
5.1.1. Message 1
This section defines the formatting of message_1.
message_1 is a CBOR map object containing:
o N_U: nonce
o E_U: the ephemeral public key of Party U
o KID: identifier of the pre-shared key (it's value is kid_psk)
o ECDH_arr: an array of proposed ECDH-ES w/ HKDF algorithms
o AEAD_arr: an array of proposed AEAD algorithms
o MAC_arr: an array of proposed MAC algorithms
message_1 = {
N_U : bstr,
E_U : COSE_Key,
KID: bstr,
ALG_U : alg_arr
}
alg_arr = [
ECDH_arr : alg_array,
AEAD_arr : alg_array,
MAC_arr : alg_array
]
alg_array = [
+ alg : bstr/int
]
5.1.2. Message 2
In case of pre-shared key, message_2 SHALL have the COSE_MAC
structure [I-D.ietf-cose-msg] with the following fields and values:
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o Headers:
* protected:
+ alg: MAC
* unprotected:
+ nonces*: nonce-array
+ kid: kid_psk
+ sid*: ID_V
+ AEAD-alg*: AEAD
o detached payload: defined below
o tag: calculated as in section 6.3 of [I-D.ietf-cose-msg]
o recipient:
* Headers:
+ protected: ECDH-ES + HKDF algorithm chosen by Party V from
the set of proposed algorithms ECDH_arr (table 18 in
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg])
+ unprotected:
- E_U: COSE_Key
+ ciphertext: empty
nonce-array = [
N_U: bstr,
N_V: bstr
]
The payload for message_2 SHALL have the COSE_MAC0 structure
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg] with the following fields and values:
o Headers
* protected
+ alg: MAC (same value as MAC in COSE_MAC structure above)
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* unprotected: empty
o payload: payl_2_psk as defined below
o tag: calculated as in section 6.3 of [I-D.ietf-cose-msg]
payl_2_psk = [
N_U: bstr,
N_V: bstr,
E_V: COSE_Key,
KID: bstr, ; has value kid_psk
ID_V: bstr,
ALG_V: alg_array ; (ECDH, AEAD, MAC)
]
Note that ALG_V contains the set of chosen algorithms, in order ECDH,
AEAD, MAC, selected from the list provided in ALG_U.
5.1.3. Message 3
In case of symmetric keys, message_3 SHALL have the COSE_MAC0
structure [I-D.ietf-cose-msg] with the following fields and values:
o Headers:
* protected:
+ alg: MAC
* unprotected:
+ nonces*: nonce-array
+ kid: kid_psk
+ sid*: ID_U
o detached payload: defined below
o tag: calculated as in section 6.3 of [I-D.ietf-cose-msg]
The payload for message_3 SHALL have the COSE_MAC0 structure
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg] with the following fields and values:
o Headers
* protected
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+ alg: MAC (same value as in COSE_MAC0 structure above)
* unprotected: empty
o payload: payl_3_psk as defined below
o tag: calculated as in section 6.3 of [I-D.ietf-cose-msg]
payl_3_psk = [
N_V: bstr,
N_U: bstr,
E_U: COSE_Key,
KID: bstr, ; has value kid_psk
ID_V: bstr,
ALG_U : alg_arr
]
5.2. Key Derivation with Symmetric Keys
It is described in this section how the keys for MAC (K_UM, K_VM,
K_UMP, K_VMP) are derived.
Party U and Party V SHALL derive K_UM, K_VM, K_UMP and K_VMP from the
information available in message_1 and message_2 through the key
exchange, as described in this section.
The key derivation is identical to Section 4.2, with 3 differences:
o to derive K_UM and K_VM, the secret SHALL be the ECDH shared
secret as defined in Section 12.4.1 of [I-D.ietf-cose-msg], where
the computed secret is specified in section 5.7.1.2 of
[SP-800-56a]
o to derive K_UMP and K_VMP, the secret SHALL be the pre-shared key
o The COSE_KDF_Context SHALL be the serialized COSE_KDF_Context
defined in the next paragraph.
The context information COSE_KDF_Context is defined as follows:
o AlgorithmID SHALL be the algorithm for which the key material will
be derived. It's value is MAC.
o PartyUInfo SHALL contain:
* nonce SHALL be equal to N_U
o PartyVInfo SHALL contain:
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* nonce SHALL be equal to N_V
* identity SHALL be equal to ID_V
o SuppPubInfo SHALL contain:
* KeyDataLength SHALL be equal to 'length'
* protected SHALL be a zero length bstr
* other SHALL contain the HMAC (as defined by the agreed HKDF) of
the concatenation of message_1, the COSE Headers of message_2
and the string "PartyU" (resp. "PartyV") to derive K_UM or
K_UMP (resp. K_VM or K_VMP)
o SuppPrivInfo SHALL be empty
The key derivation is done using the following context information
COSE_KDF_Context for symmetric keys:
COSE_KDF_Context = [
AlgorithmID : MAC,
PartyUInfo : [ PartyInfo_U_psk ],
PartyVInfo : [ PartyInfo_V_psk ],
SuppPubInfo : [
keyDataLength : uint, ; length
protected : bstr, ; zero length bstr
other : bstr ; Hash(message_1 ||
COSE Headers of COSE_MAC
(message_2) ||
"PartyU"/"PartyV")
]
]
PartyInfo_U_psk = (
nonce : N_U
)
PartyInfo_V_psk = (
nonce : N_V
identity: ID_V
)
In practice, the difference in deriving K_UM or K_VM is in the
SuppPubInfo string: to derive K_UM the context MUST include "PartyU",
while to derive K_VM the context MUST include "PartyV".
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5.3. Message Processing
Party U and V are assumed to have pre-established credentials as
previously described in Section 5.
5.3.1. U -> message_1
Party U processes message_1 for party V as follows:
o Party U SHALL generate a fresh ephemeral ECDH key pair as
specified in Section 5 of [SP-800-56a] using ECC domain parameters
of a curve complying with security policies for communicating with
party V.
o The ephemeral public key, E_U, SHALL be formatted as a COSE_key as
specified in Section 3.
o Party U SHALL generate a pseudo-random 64-bits nonce N_U and store
it for the length of the protocol, for future verifications.
o Party U SHALL set the proposed algorithms for communicating with
party V.
o Party U SHALL format message_1 as specified in Section 5.1.1.
o Party U sends message_1 to party V.
5.3.2. message_1 -> V
Party V processes the received message_1 as follows:
o Party V SHALL verify that the nonce has not been received before.
If the verification fails, the message MUST be discarded.
Otherwise, Party V SHALL store a representation of the nonce for
future verifications.
o Party V SHALL select a set of algorithms (AEAD, MAC, and ECDH-ES)
compliant with its security policy. If no compliant algorithm was
proposed by Party U, Party V SHALL stop processing the message and
MAY respond with an error, indicating that no common algorithm
could be found.
5.3.3. message_2 <- V
Party V composes message_2 for party U as follows:
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o Party V SHALL generate a fresh ephemeral ECDH key pair as
specified in Section 5 of [SP-800-56a] using same curve/ECC domain
parameters as used by party U.
* The ephemeral public key, E_V, SHALL be formatted as a COSE_key
as specified in Section 3.
o Party V SHALL generate a pseudo-random 64-bits nonce N_V and store
it for the length of the protocol, for future verifications.
o Party V SHALL derive K_UM, K_VM, K_UMP and K_VMP as defined in
Section 5.2.
o Party V SHALL format message_2 as specified in Section 5.1.2:
o COSE_MAC0 is computed as defined in section 6.3 of
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg], with key K_VM and algorithm MAC;
o COSE_MAC is computed as defined in section 6.3 of
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg], with key K_VMP and algorithm MAC.
o Note that the COSE_MAC payload is detached (as defined in section
6.1 of [I-D.ietf-cose-msg]).
o Party V sends message_2 to party U.
5.3.4. U <- message_2
Party U processes the received message_2 as follows:
o Party U SHALL verify than the received N_U is identical to the
saved nonce N_U.
o Party U SHALL verify that the nonce has not been received before.
If the verification fails, the message MUST be discarded.
Otherwise, Party U SHALL store a representation of the nonce for
future verifications.
o Party U SHALL derive K_UM, K_VM, K_UMP and K_VMP as defined in
Section 5.2.
o Party U SHALL verify message_2:
* COSE_MAC0 is computed as defined in section 6.3 of
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg], with key K_VM. The result is inserted as
payload of the received COSE_MAC (which was sent with detached
payload);
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* COSE_MAC is verified as defined in section 6.3 of
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg], with key K_VMP and algorithm MAC;
* Note that Party U SHALL verify that the MAC algorithm used and
the AEAD algorithm sent in message_2 are taken from the set of
proposed algorithms in message_1, else stop processing the
message.
o If the verification of message_2 fails, the message MUST be
discarded and Party U SHALL discontinue the protocol.
5.3.5. U -> message_3
Party U composes message_3 for party V as follows:
o Party U SHALL format message_3 as specified in Section 5.1.3:
o COSE_MAC0 (containing payl_3_psk) is computed as defined in
section 6.3 of [I-D.ietf-cose-msg], with key K_UM and algorithm
MAC;
o COSE_MAC0 is computed as defined in section 6.3 of
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg], with key K_UMP and algorithm MAC.
o Note that the second COSE_MAC0 payload is detached (as defined in
section 6.1 of [I-D.ietf-cose-msg]).
o Party U sends message_3 to party V.
5.3.6. message_3 -> V
Party V processes the received message_3 as follows:
o Party V SHALL verify than the received N_U and N_V are identical
to the saved nonces N_U and N_V. If the verification fails, the
message MUST be discarded.
o Party V SHALL verify message_3:
* COSE_MAC0 (containing payl_3_psk) is computed as defined in
section 6.3 of [I-D.ietf-cose-msg], with key K_UM. The result
is inserted as payload of the received COSE_MAC0 (which was
sent with detached payload);
* COSE_MAC0 is verified as defined in section 6.3 of
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg], with key K_UMP and algorithm MAC;
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* Note that by verifying message_3, Party V ensures that
message_1 was not modified in transit.
o If the verification of message_3 fails, the message MUST be
discarded and Party V SHALL discontinue the protocol.
6. Derive Traffic Secret
It is described in this section how the traffic secret for further
communication is derived, based on the messages exchanged.
Party U and Party V SHALL derive the traffic secret (base_key) from
the information available in message_1, message_2 and message_3
through the key exchange, as described in this section.
The key derivation is identical to Section 11.1 of
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg], using HKDF [RFC5869] agreed as part of the ECDH-
ES w/ HKDF negotiation during the message exchange.
o the secret SHALL be the ECDH shared secret as defined in
Section 12.4.1 of [I-D.ietf-cose-msg], where the computed secret
is specified in section 5.7.1.2 of [SP-800-56a]
o the salt SHALL be the concatenation of N_U and N_V.
o the length SHALL be the length of the key, depending on the AEAD
algorithm with which the base_key will be used.
o the context information SHALL be the serialized COSE_KDF_Context
defined in the next paragraph.
o the PRF SHALL be the one indicated in HKDF using the Table 18 of
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg] (in our examples, -27 corresponds to HMAC with
SHA-256)
The context information COSE_KDF_Context is defined as follows:
o AlgorithmID SHALL be the AEAD algorithm for which the key material
will be derived.
o PartyUInfo SHALL contain:
* nonce SHALL be equal to N_U
* identity SHALL be ID_U (resp. C_U) if raw public keys (resp.
certificates) are used
o PartyVInfo SHALL contain:
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* nonce SHALL be equal to N_V
* identity SHALL be ID_V (resp. C_V) if raw public keys (resp.
certificates) are used
o SuppPubInfo SHALL contain:
* KeyDataLength SHALL be equal to 'length'
* protected SHALL be a zero length bstr
* other SHALL contain the HMAC (as defined by the agreed HKDF) of
the concatenation of message_1, message_2 and message_3.
o SuppPrivInfo SHALL be empty
The key derivation is done using the following context information
COSE_KDF_Context:
COSE_KDF_Context = [
AlgorithmID : AEAD,
PartyUInfo : [ PartyInfo_U ],
PartyVInfo : [ PartyInfo_V ],
SuppPubInfo : [
keyDataLength : uint, ; length
protected : bstr, ; zero length bstr
other : bstr ; Hash(message_1 ||
message_2 ||
message_3)
]
]
PartyInfo_U = (
nonce : N_U,
identity: ID_U / C_U
)
PartyInfo_V = (
nonce : N_V,
identity: ID_V / C_V
)
7. Security Considerations
The referenced processing instructions in [SP-800-56a] must be
complied with, including deleting the intermediate computed values
along with any ephemeral ECDH secrets after the key derivation is
completed.
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The choice of key length used in the different algorithms needs to be
harmonized, so that right security level is maintained throughout the
calculations.
Note that, depending on the use, the key established through the
EDHOC protocol will need to be renewed, in which case the
communicating parties need to run the protocol again.
In case of symmetric keys, the key identifier for the pre-shared
secret identifies one party to the other. The kid may reveal
information about the communicating parties to others. The
communicating parties may protect against this by anonymizing the kid
either only initially or between each run of the protocol.
8. Privacy Considerations
TODO
9. IANA Considerations
10. Acknowledgments
The authors wants to thank Ilari Liusvaara, Jim Schaad and Ludwig
Seitz for reviewing previous versions of the draft.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg]
Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
draft-ietf-cose-msg-23 (work in progress), October 2016.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
October 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.
[SIGMA] Krawczyk, H., "SIGMA - The 'SIGn-and-MAc' Approach to
Authenticated Diffie-Hellman and Its Use in the IKE-
Protocols", Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2003, 23rd
Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara,
California, USA, August 17-21, 2003, Proceedings, August
2003, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45146-4_24>.
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[SP-800-56a]
Barker, E., Chen, L., Roginsky, A., and M. Smid,
"Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes
Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography", NIST Special
Publication 800-56A, May 2013,
<http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Ar2>.
11.2. Informative References
[I-D.hartke-core-e2e-security-reqs]
Selander, G., Palombini, F., and K. Hartke, "Requirements
for CoAP End-To-End Security", draft-hartke-core-e2e-
security-reqs-01 (work in progress), July 2016.
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]
Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and
H. Tschofenig, "Authentication and Authorization for
Constrained Environments (ACE)", draft-ietf-ace-oauth-
authz-04 (work in progress), October 2016.
[I-D.ietf-core-object-security]
Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Palombini, F., and L. Seitz,
"Object Security of CoAP (OSCOAP)", draft-ietf-core-
object-security-00 (work in progress), October 2016.
[I-D.seitz-ace-oscoap-profile]
Seitz, L., "OSCOAP profile of ACE", draft-seitz-ace-
oscoap-profile-00 (work in progress), July 2016.
[RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4492, May 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4492>.
[RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.
[RFC7228] Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7228, May 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7228>.
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[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.
Appendix A. Examples
In this section we give examples of messages used in the protocol for
the pre-shared key case and for the raw public keys case. Note that
the message size is not optimized, for example the labels could be
registered and thereby reducing the overhead.
A.1. ECDH Public Key
An example of COSE_Key structure, representing an ECDH public key, is
given in Figure 5, using CBOR's diagnostic notation.
/ ephemeral / -1:{
/ kty / 1:2,
/ crv / -1:1,
/ x / -2:h'98f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea56c3f5ad7590b
bfbf054e1c7b4d91d6280',
/ y / -3:true
}
Figure 5: Example of an ECDH public key formatted as a COSE_Key
The equivalent CBOR encoding is: h'a120a40102200121582098f50a4ff6c058
61c8860d13a638ea56c3f5ad7590bbfbf054e1c7b4d91d628022f5', which has a
size of 44 bytes.
A.2. Example with Asymmetric Keys (RPK)
In this example, the identifier of V is 4 bytes.
A.2.1. Message 1
An example of COSE encoding for message_1 is given in Figure 6, using
CBOR's diagnostic notation.
The message_1 is:
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{
'N_U':h'5598a57b47db7f2c',
'E_U':h'a120a40102200121582098f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea56c3f5ad7
590bbfbf054e1c7b4d91d628022f5', / COSE_Key E_U { /
/ ephemeral -1:{ /
/ kty 1:2, /
/ crv -1:1, /
/ x -2:h'98f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea56c3f5ad7590bbfb /
/ f054e1c7b4d91d6280', /
/ y -3:true /
/ } /
/ } /
'ALG_U' : h'8481381a810c81268104'
/ [ /
/ [ -27 ], ECDH-SS + HKDF-256 /
/ [ 12 ], AES-CCM-64-64-128 /
/ [ -7 ], ES256 /
/ [ 4 ] HMAC 256-64 /
/ ] /
}
Figure 6: Example of message_1
The equivalent CBOR encoding of the message_1 is: h'a3434e5f55485598a
57b47db7f2c43455f55582ca120a40102200121582098f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a6
38ea56c3f5ad7590bbfbf054e1c7b4d91d628022f545414c475f554a8481381a810c8
1268104', which has a size of 81 bytes. Note that by registering the
labels 'N_U', 'E_U' and 'ALG_U' to unsigned values the size can be
reduced to 70 bytes.
A.2.2. Message 2
An example of COSE encoding for message_2 is given in Figure 7 using
CBOR's diagnostic notation.
The payload of the COSE_MAC0 is:
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[
h'7ce4cae9c9698bac', / N_V /
h'5598a57b47db7f2c', / N_U /
h'a120a501022001215820acbee6672a28340affce41c721901eb
d7868231bd1d86e41888a07822214050022f5', / COSE_Key E_V { /
/ ephemeral -1:{ /
/ kty 1:2, /
/ crv -1:1, /
/ x -2:h'acbee6672a28340affce41c721901ebd7868231bd1d /
/ 86e41888a078222140500', /
/ y -3:true /
/ } /
/ } /
h'0f4907e1' / ID_V /
]
The equivalent CBOR encoding of the payload of the COSE_MAC0 is: h'84
485598a57b47db7f2c487ce4cae9c9698bac5832a120a401022001215820acbee6672
a28340affce41c721901ebd7868231bd1d86e41888a07822214050022f5440f4907e1
', which has a size of 70 bytes. Note that these bytes are not sent
in the message.
The COSE_MAC0 is:
[
h'a10104', / protected : {01:04} /
{}, / unprotected /
h'84485598a57b47db7f2c487ce4cae9c9698bac5832a120a401022001215820acb
ee6672a28340affce41c721901ebd7868231bd1d86e41888a07822214050022f544
0f4907e1', / payload /
MAC / truncated 8-byte MAC /
]
The equivalent CBOR encoding of the COSE_MAC0 is: h'8443a10104a058468
4485598a57b47db7f2c487ce4cae9c9698bac5832a120a401022001215820acbee667
2a28340affce41c721901ebd7868231bd1d86e41888a07822214050022f5440f4907e
148'||MAC, which has a size of 87 bytes. Note that these bytes are
not sent in the message.
The COSE_Sign1 is:
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[
h'a20126474d41432d616c6704', / protected : {1:-7, 'MAC-alg':04} /
{04:h'00'}, / unprotected /
h'', / detached payload /
SIG / 64-byte signature /
]
The equivalent CBOR encoding of the COSE_Sign1 is:
h'844ca20126474d41432d616c6704a1044100405840'||SIG, which has a size
of 85 bytes. Note that by registering the label 'MAC-alg' to
unsigned values the size can be reduced to 78 bytes.
The COSE_Encrypt is:
[
h'a1010c', / protected : {1:12} /
{'nonces':h'82485598a57b47db7f2c487ce4cae9c9698bac'},/unprotected /
/ [ /
/ h'5598a57b47db7f2c', N_U /
/ h'7ce4cae9c9698bac' N_V /
/ ] /
CIPH+TAG, / 85 bytes-cipher text + truncated 8-byte TAG /
[ / recipients /
[
h'a101381a' / protected : {1:-27} / ,
{ / unprotected /
'E_V':h'a120a401022001215820a
cbee6672a28340affce41c721901ebd7868231bd1
d86e41888a07822214050022f5' / COSE_Key E_V { /
/ ephemeral -1:{ /
/ kty 1:2, /
/ crv -1:1, /
/ x -2:h'acbee6672a28340affce41c721901ebd7868231bd1d /
/ 86e41888a078222140500', /
/ y -3:true /
/ } /
/ } /
},
h'' / ciphertext /
]
]
]
Figure 7: Example of message_2
The equivalent CBOR encoding of the COSE_Encrypt is: h'8443a1010ca146
6e6f6e6365735382485598a57b47db7f2c487ce4cae9c9698bac585b'||CIPH+TAG||
h'818344a101381aa143455f565832a120a5010202442edb61f92001215820acbee66
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72a28340affce41c721901ebd7868231bd1d86e41888a07822214050022f540',
which has a size of 187 bytes. Note that by registering the label
'MAC-alg' and 'E_V' to unsigned values the size can be reduced to 177
bytes.
A.2.3. Message 3
An example of COSE encoding for message_3 is given in Figure 8 using
CBOR's diagnostic notation.
The payload of the COSE_MAC0 is:
[
h'7ce4cae9c9698bac', / N_V /
h'5598a57b47db7f2c', / N_U /
h'a120a40102200121582098f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea56c3f5ad7590bbf
bf054e1c7b4d91d628022f5', / COSE_Key E_U /
h'8481381a810c81268104', / ALG_U /
/ [ /
/ [ -27 ], ECDH-SS + HKDF-256 /
/ [ 12 ], AES-CCM-64-64-128 /
/ [ -7 ], ES256 /
/ [ 4 ] HMAC 256-64 /
/ ] /
h'0f4907e1' / ID_V /
]
The equivalent CBOR encoding of the payload of the COSE_MAC0 is: h'85
487ce4cae9c9698bac485598a57b47db7f2c582ca120a40102200121582098f50a4ff
6c05861c8860d13a638ea56c3f5ad7590bbfbf054e1c7b4d91d628022f54a8481381a
810c81268104440f4907e1', which has a size of 81 bytes. Note that
these bytes are not sent in the message.
The COSE_MAC0 is:
[
h'a10104', / protected : {01:04} /
{}, / unprotected /
h'85487ce4cae9c9698bac485598a57b47db7f2c582ca120a40102200121582098f
50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea56c3f5ad7590bbfbf054e1c7b4d91d628022f54a
8481381a810c81268104440f4907e1', / payload /
MAC / truncated 8-byte MAC /
]
The equivalent CBOR encoding of the COSE_MAC0 is: h'8443a10104a058518
5487ce4cae9c9698bac485598a57b47db7f2c582ca120a40102200121582098f50a4f
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f6c05861c8860d13a638ea56c3f5ad7590bbfbf054e1c7b4d91d628022f54a8481381
a810c81268104440f4907e148'||MAC, which has a size of 98 bytes. Note
that these bytes are not sent in the message.
The COSE_Sign1 is:
[
h'a20126474d41432d616c6704', / protected : {1:-7, 'MAC-alg':4} /
{04:h'0f4907e1'}, / unprotected /
h'', / detached payload /
SIG / 64-byte signature /
]
The equivalent CBOR encoding of the COSE_Sign1 is:
h'844ca20126474d41432d616c6704a104440f4907e1405840'||SIG, which has a
size of 88 bytes. Note that by registering the label 'MAC-alg' to
unsigned values the size can be reduced to 81 bytes.
The COSE_Encrypt0 is:
[
h'a1010c', / protected : {01:12} /
{'nonces':h'82485598a57b47db7f2c487ce4cae9c9698bac'},/unprotected /
/ 'nonces':[ /
/ h'5598a57b47db7f2c', N_U /
/ h'7ce4cae9c9698bac' N_V /
/ ] /
CIPH+TAG / 88 bytes-cipher text + truncated 8-byte TAG /
]
Figure 8: Example of message_3
The equivalent CBOR encoding of the COSE_Encrypt0 is: h'8343a1010ca14
66e6f6e6365735382485598a57b47db7f2c487ce4cae9c9698bac5860'||CIPH+TAG,
which has a size of 131 bytes. Note that by registering the labels
'MAC-alg' and 'nonces' to unsigned values the size can be reduced to
118 bytes.
A.3. Example with Symmetric Keys (PSK)
In this example, the identifiers of U and V are 4 bytes.
A.3.1. Message 1
An example of COSE encoding for message_1 is given in Figure 9, using
CBOR's diagnostic notation.
The message_1 is:
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{
'N_U':h'5598a57b47db7f2c',
'E_U':h'a120a40102200121582098f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea56c3f5ad7
590bbfbf054e1c7b4d91d628022f5', / COSE_Key E_U { /
/ ephemeral -1:{ /
/ kty 1:2, /
/ crv -1:1, /
/ x -2:h'98f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea56c3f5ad7590bbfb /
/ f054e1c7b4d91d6280', /
/ y -3:true /
/ } /
/ } /
'KID':h'e19648b5',
'ALG_U':h'8381381a810c8104'
/ [ /
/ [ -27 ], ECDH-SS + HKDF-256 /
/ [ 12 ], AES-CCM-64-64-128 /
/ [ 4 ] HMAC 256-64 /
/ ] /
}
Figure 9: Example of message_1
The equivalent CBOR encoding of the message_1 is: h'a4434e5f55485598a
57b47db7f2c43455f55582ca120a40102200121582098f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a6
38ea56c3f5ad7590bbfbf054e1c7b4d91d628022f5434b494444e19648b545414c475
f55488381381a810c8104', which has a size of 88 bytes. Note that by
registering the labels 'N_U', 'E_U', 'KID' and 'ALG_U' to unsigned
values the size can be reduced to 74 bytes.
A.3.2. Message 2
An example of COSE encoding for message_2 is given in Figure 10 using
CBOR's diagnostic notation.
The payload of the COSE_MAC0 is:
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[
h'5598a57b47db7f2c', / N_U /
h'7ce4cae9c9698bac', / N_V /
h'a120a401022001215820acbee6672a28340affce41c721901eb
d7868231bd1d86e41888a07822214050022f5', / COSE_Key E_V { /
/ ephemeral -1:{ /
/ kty 1:2, /
/ crv -1:1, /
/ x -2:h'acbee6672a28340affce41c721901ebd7868231bd1d /
/ 86e41888a078222140500', /
/ y -3:true /
/ } /
/ } /
h'e19648b5', / KID /
h'0f4907e1', / ID_V /
h'83381a0c04' / ALG_V /
/ [ /
/-27 , ECDH-SS + HKDF-256 /
/ 12 , AES-CCM-64-64-128 /
/ 4 HMAC 256-64 /
/ ] /
]
The equivalent CBOR encoding of the payload of the COSE_MAC0 is: h'86
485598a57b47db7f2c487ce4cae9c9698bac582ca120a401022001215820acbee6672
a28340affce41c721901ebd7868231bd1d86e41888a07822214050022f544e19648b5
440f4907e14583381a0c04', which has a size of 81 bytes. Note that
these bytes are not sent in the message.
The COSE_MAC0 is:
[
h'a10104', / protected : {01:04} /
{}, / unprotected /
h'86485598a57b47db7f2c487ce4cae9c9698bac582ca120a401022001215820acb
ee6672a28340affce41c721901ebd7868231bd1d86e41888a07822214050022f544
e19648b5440f4907e14583381a0c04', / payload /
MAC / truncated 8-byte MAC /
]
The equivalent CBOR encoding of the COSE_MAC0 is: h'8443a10104a058518
6485598a57b47db7f2c487ce4cae9c9698bac582ca120a401022001215820acbee667
2a28340affce41c721901ebd7868231bd1d86e41888a07822214050022f544e19648b
5440f4907e14583381a0c0448'||MAC, which has a size of 98 bytes. Note
that these bytes are not sent in the message.
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The COSE_MAC is:
[
h'a10104', / protected : {01:04} /
{ / unprotected /
'nonces':h'82485598a57b47db7f2c487ce4cae9c9698bac', / 'nonces':[/
/ h'5598a57b47db7f2c', N_U /
/ h'7ce4cae9c9698bac' N_V /
/ ] /
04:h'e19648b5', / KID /
'sid':h'0f4907e1', / ID_V /
'AEAD-alg': 12
},
h'', / detached payload /
TAG, / 8-byte truncated tag /
[ / recipients /
[
h'a101381a' / protected : {1:-27} / ,
{ / unprotected /
'E_V':h'a120a401022001215820a
cbee6672a28340affce41c721901ebd7868231bd1
d86e41888a07822214050022f5' / COSE_Key E_V { /
/ ephemeral -1:{ /
/ kty 1:2, /
/ crv -1:1, /
/ x -2:h'acbee6672a28340affce41c721901ebd7868231bd1d /
/ 86e41888a078222140500', /
/ y -3:true /
/ } /
/ } /
},
h'' / ciphertext /
]
]
]
Figure 10: Example of message_2
The equivalent CBOR encoding of the COSE_MAC is:
h'8543a10104a4466e6f6e6365735382485598a57b47db7f2c487ce4cae9c9698bac0
444e19648b543736964440f4907e148414541442d616c670c4048||MAC||818344a10
1381aa143455f56582ca120a401022001215820acbee6672a28340affce41c721901e
bd7868231bd1d86e41888a07822214050022f540', which has a size of 127
bytes. Note that by registering the labels 'nonces', 'sid', 'AEAD-
alg' and 'E_V' to unsigned values the size can be reduced to 107
bytes.
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A.3.3. Message 3
An example of COSE encoding for message_3 is given in Figure 11 using
CBOR's diagnostic notation.
The payload of the COSE_MAC0 is:
[
h'5598a57b47db7f2c', / N_U /
h'7ce4cae9c9698bac', / N_V /
h'a120a40102200121582098f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea56c
3f5ad7590bbfbf054e1c7b4d91d628022f5', / COSE_Key E_U /
h'e19648b5', / KID /
h'0f4907e1', / ID_V /
h'8381381a810c8104'
/ [ /
/ [ -27 ], ECDH-SS + HKDF-256 /
/ [ 12 ], AES-CCM-64-64-128 /
/ [ 4 ] HMAC 256-64 /
/ ] /
]
The equivalent CBOR encoding of the payload of the COSE_MAC0 is: h'86
485598a57b47db7f2c487ce4cae9c9698bac582fa120a40102200121582098f50a4ff
6c05861c8860d13a638ea56c3f5ad7590bbfbf054e1c7b4d91d628022f544e19648b5
440f4907e1488381381a810c8104', which has a size of 84 bytes. Note
that these bytes are not sent in the message.
The COSE_MAC0 is:
[
h'a10104', / protected : {01:04} /
{}, / unprotected /
h'86485598a57b47db7f2c487ce4cae9c9698bac582fa120a401022001215
82098f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea56c3f5ad7590bbfbf054e1c7b4d91d6280
22f544e19648b5440f4907e1488381381a810c8104', / payload /
MAC / truncated 8-byte MAC /
]
The equivalent CBOR encoding of the COSE_MAC0 is: h'8444a10104a058548
6485598a57b47db7f2c487ce4cae9c9698bac582fa120a40102200121582098f50a4f
f6c05861c8860d13a638ea56c3f5ad7590bbfbf054e1c7b4d91d628022f544e19648b
5440f4907e1488381381a810c810448'||MAC, which has a size of 101 bytes.
Note that these bytes are not sent in the message.
The COSE_MAC0 is:
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[
h'a10104', / protected : {01:04} /
{ / unprotected /
'nonces':h'82485598a57b47db7f2c487ce4cae9c9698bac',
/ [ /
/ h'5598a57b47db7f2c', N_U /
/ h'7ce4cae9c9698bac' N_V /
/ ] /
04:h'e19648b5', / KID /
'sid':h'dbabb666' / ID_U /
},
h'', / detached payload /
MAC / truncated 8-byte MAC /
]
Figure 11: Example of message_3
The equivalent CBOR encoding of the COSE_MAC0 is: h'8443a10104a3466e6
f6e6365735382485598a57b47db7f2c487ce4cae9c9698bac0444e19648b543736964
44dbabb6664048'||MAC, which has a size of 58 bytes. Note that by
registering the labels 'nonces' and 'sid' to unsigned values the size
can be reduced to 49 bytes.
Appendix B. Implementing EDHOC with CoAP and OSCOAP
The DH key exchange specified in this document can be implemented as
a CoAP [RFC7252] message exchange with the CoAP client as party U and
the CoAP server as party V. EDHOC and OSCOAP
[I-D.ietf-core-object-security] could be run in sequence embedded in
a 2-round trip message exchange, where the base_key used in OSCOAP is
obtained from EDHOC.
The process to run EDHOC over CoAP, combined with and followed by
OSCOAP is described here and showed in Figure 12 and Figure 13.
Client Server
| ------------- EDHOC message_1 ------------> |
| |
| <------------ EDHOC message_2 ------------- |
| |
| ---- OSCOAP Request + EDHOC message_3 ----> |
| |
| <------------ OSCOAP Response ------------- |
| |
Figure 12: EDHOC and OSCOAP
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Client Server
| |
| |
+--------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
| POST | Uri-Path:"edhoc"
| | Content-Type: application/cbor
| | Payload: EDHOC message_1
| |
|<---------+ Header: 2.04 Changed
| | Content-Type: application/cose+cbor
| 2.05 | Payload: EDHOC message_2
| |
| |
+--------->| CoAP message including:
| OSCOAP | Object-Security option
| request | COSE_Encrypt0 includes
| | EDHOC message_3
| |
|<---------+ CoAP message including:
| OSCOAP | Object-Security option
| response |
| |
Figure 13: Detail of EDHOC and OSCOAP
The CoAP client makes the following request:
o The request method is POST
o Content-Format is "application/cose+cbor"
o The Uri-Path is "edhoc"
o The Payload is EDHOC message_1, computed as defined in this
document
The CoAP server performs the first step of the protocol as specified
in this document. Then the server provides the following response:
o The response Code is 2.04 (Changed)
o The Payload is EDHOC message_2, computed as defined in this
document
The CoAP client verifies the message_2 as specified in this document.
If successful, the client continues the protocol and generates EDHOC
message_3.
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The client derives OSCOAP Common Context (section 3.1 of
[I-D.ietf-core-object-security]) from the messages exchanged:
o base_key is the traffic secret, output of EDHOC (section 6 of this
document)
o Context Identifier is the HMAC computed over the hash of the
concatenation of EDHOC message_1, message_2, and message_3 using
the key base_key: Cid = HMAC(base_key, hash(message_1 ||
message_2 || message_3))
o the Algorithm is the AEAD algorithm negotiated during EDHOC
Additionally, we define here that:
o Sender ID for the CoAP client is set to '0'
o Recipient ID for the CoAP client is set to '1'
With these parameters, the CoAP client can derive the full security
context, following section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security].
Finally, the client generates the OSCOAP request, containing the
Object-Security option and the COSE_Encrypt0 object as defined in
[I-D.ietf-core-object-security]. EDHOC message_3 is added to the
unprotected part of the COSE_Encrypt0 Headers, with label 'edhoc_m3'.
The OSCOAP request is sent, and includes also EDHOC message_3. Note
that this may considerably increase the size of the COSE_Encrypt0
object (see {#ex-rpk3}), so in case the OSCOAP request method does
not allow payload, the Object-Security option may become large.
The server receives the message and extract the message_3 from the
unprotected part of the COSE_Encrypt0 object of the OSCOAP request.
If the object does not contain the 'edhoc_m3' label, or if the
'edhoc_m3' value does not comply with the specifications, the message
is discarded and the communication terminated. Otherwise, the server
process and verifies the EDHOC message_3 as described in this
document. If successful, the server derives OSCOAP Common Context
(section 3.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security]) from the messages
exchanged:
o base_key is the traffic secret, output of EDHOC (section 6 of this
document)
o Context Identifier is the HMAC computed over the hash of the
concatenation of EDHOC message_1, message_2, and message_3 using
the key base_key: Cid = HMAC(base_key, hash(message_1 ||
message_2 || message_3))
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o the Algorithm is the AEAD algorithm negotiated during EDHOC
Additionally, we define here that:
o Sender ID for the CoAP server is set to '1'
o Recipient ID for the CoAP server is set to '0'
With these parameters, the CoAP server can derive the full security
context, following section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security].
Finally, the client can verify the OSCOAP request using the security
context, and act according to [I-D.ietf-core-object-security].
Further communication can be protected using OSCOAP.
Authors' Addresses
Goeran Selander
Ericsson AB
Farogatan 6
Kista SE-16480 Stockholm
Sweden
Email: goran.selander@ericsson.com
John Mattsson
Ericsson AB
Farogatan 6
Kista SE-16480 Stockholm
Sweden
Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com
Francesca Palombini
Ericsson AB
Farogatan 6
Kista SE-16480 Stockholm
Sweden
Email: francesca.palombini@ericsson.com
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