Requirements for a Lightweight AKE for OSCORE.
draft-selander-lake-reqs-01

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Network Working Group                                        G. Selander
Internet-Draft                                               Ericsson AB
Intended status: Informational                            April 17, 2019
Expires: October 19, 2019

             Requirements for a Lightweight AKE for OSCORE.
                      draft-selander-lake-reqs-01

Abstract

   This document compiles the requirements for a lightweight
   authenticated key exchange protocol for OSCORE.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 19, 2019.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Problem description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     2.1.  Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     2.2.  Crypto Agility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.3.  AKE for OSCORE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.4.  Lightweight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Requirements Summary  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] is a lightweight communication
   security protocol providing end-to-end security for constrained IoT
   settings (cf.  [RFC7228]).  It is expected to be deployed with
   standards and platforms using CoAP such as 6TiSCH, LPWAN, OMA
   Specworks LwM2M, Fairhair Alliance and Open Connectivity Foundation.
   OSCORE lacks a matching authenticated key exchange protocol (AKE).
   This document compiles the requirements for such an AKE for the
   purpose of dispatching this work in the IETF.

2.  Problem description

2.1.  Credentials

   IoT deployments differ in terms of what credentials can be supported.
   Currently many systems use pre-shared keys (PSK) provisioned out of
   band.  PSK based provisioning has inherent weaknesses; there has been
   reports of massive breaches of PSK provisioning systems, and as many
   systems use PSK without perfect forward secrecy (PFS) they are
   vulnerable to passive pervasive monitoring.

   The security of these systems can be improved by adding PFS through
   an AKE authenticated by the provisioned PSK.  Reusing the
   provisioning scheme for raw public keys (RPK) instead of PSK,
   together with an AKE authenticated with the RPKs provides a more
   relaxed trust model since RPKs need not be secret.  By running the
   asymmetric key AKE with public key certificates instead of RPK, key
   provisioning can be omitted leading to a more automated bootstrapping
   procedure.

   These steps provide an example of a migration path in limited scoped
   steps from simple to more robust provisioning schemes where each step
   improves the overall security and/or simplicity of deployment of the

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   IoT system, although not all steps are necessarily feasible for the
   most constrained settings.  With this in mind the AKE should support
   PSK, RPK and certificate based authentication.

2.2.  Crypto Agility

   Motivated by long deployment lifetimes, the AKE is required to
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