ASPA Verification in the Presence of Regionalized AS-Relationships
draft-shen-sidrops-regionalized-as-relationships-00
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
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|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Chen Shen , Shicong Zhang , Zhenbin Li , Shunwan Zhuang , Shuanglong Chen , Haibo Wang | ||
| Last updated | 2022-03-07 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
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| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
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draft-shen-sidrops-regionalized-as-relationships-00
Network Working Group C. Shen
Internet-Draft CAICT
Intended status: Standards Track S. Zhang
Expires: September 8, 2022 NNIX
Z. Li
S. Zhuang
S. Chen
H. Wang
Huawei
March 7, 2022
ASPA Verification in the Presence of Regionalized AS-Relationships
draft-shen-sidrops-regionalized-as-relationships-00
Abstract
This document proposes a method for ASPA verification in the Presence
of Regionalized AS-Relationships.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 8, 2022.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Definitions and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Regionalized AS-Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. Introduction
[RFC6811] defines a method for verifying the origin of BGP prefixes,
which can resolve the most common source AS hijacking. Autonomous
system provider authorisation (ASPA)
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification] is a methodology to validate the
entire AS path. ASPA verification procedures use a shared signed
database of customer-to-provider relationships using a new RPKI
object - Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA). This
method relies heavily on the accuracy of the shared signed database
of customer-to-provider relationships.
Currently, two ASes may have different relationships at different
interconnection points. For example:
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Europe
+----------------+
/Customer Provider \
/ \
AS1--+ +--AS2
\ /
\ Peer Peer/
+----------------+
Asia
Figure 1: Hybrid Relationship Case 1
Case 1) AS1 is AS2's customer in Europe, but AS1 and AS2 establish
P2P relationships in Asia;
Europe
+----------------+
/Customer Provider \
/ \
AS3--+ +--AS4
\ /
\ Provider Customer/
+----------------+
Asia
Figure 2: Hybrid Relationship Case 2
Case 2) AS3 is AS4's customer in Europe, on the contrary, AS4 is
AS3's customer in Asia;
There are some other examples, not fully listed in this draft.
For case 1, AS1 signs one record ASPA(AS1, AFI, [AS2, ...]) per
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification].
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Europe
+----------------+
/Customer Provider \
Route P1 / \
Origin AS11 .. AS1--+ +--AS2-- ... Check Point
---> \ / ---->
\ Peer Peer/
+---------------+
Asia
---->
Figure 3: Problematic Use Case
As shown in Figure 3, the main processing steps per
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification] are as follows:
1) Check Point receives the Route P1, AS-Path: AS2 (via Asia Link)
AS1 ... AS11;
2) Check Point uses ASPA(AS1, AFI, [AS2, ...]) to validate AS-Pair
(AS1 AS2) Per the AS_PATH verification procedure defined in
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification], it will return the result
"Valid".
Actually here should return the result "Invalid", not the result
"Valid", because the AS-Relationship between AS1 and AS2 in Asia is
P2P, not C2P.
This problem arises because of the existence of regionalized AS-
Relationships. This document proposes a method for ASPA verification
in the Presence of Regionalized AS-Relationships.
2. Definitions and Acronyms
o ASPA: Autonomous system provider authorisation
o C2P: Customer to Provider
o OV: Origin Validation
o P2C: Provider to Customer
o P2P: Peer to Peer
o RP: Relying Party
o RPKI: Resource Public Key Infrastructure
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3. Regionalized AS-Relationships
This section discusses how to obtain regionalized AS-Relationships on
routers.
Option 1: Add a Region ID field to ASPA Object
Each organization holds an AS number reports its C2P business
relationship information to the RIR where it is located. The key
information reported: the customer's AS number, the customer's
provider AS number list (one or more), the region identifier, the
region identifier is newly added by the present draft, and identifies
the customer's business relationship with the one or more of its
Providers in the same region is C2P. Each RIR maintains C2P business
relationship information like maintaining ROA related information,
when the region identifier is empty, it indicates that the business
relationship between the Customer and the one or more of its
Providers in all regions is C2P.
RP (Relying Party) obtains all the C2P business relationship
information from each RIR, and generates the ASPA Validation Database
entries.
RFC8210[RFC8210] RPKI-Router Protocol extension supports the ability
to carry region identifier when delivering the ASPA Validation
Database to routers, and delivers the enhanced ASPA Validation
Database from RP to routers.
Option 2: Local Management of the enhanced C2P business relationships
Locally, by analyzing the global Internet routing table and various
Internet public data, a regionalized C2P business relational database
is sorted out.
Option 3: TBD
By processing as above, AS1 signs one record ASPA(AS1, AFI, [AS2,
...], Europe).
4. Operations
Once we get the Regionalized AS-Relationships, the main processing
steps in section 1 (Figure 3) will be changed as follows:
1) Check Point receives the Route P1, AS-Path: AS2 (via Asia Link)
AS1 ... AS11;
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2) Check Point uses ASPA(AS1, AFI, [AS2, ...], Europe) to validate
AS-Pair (AS1 AS2) Per the AS_PATH verification procedure
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification], because the ASPA record
contains region identifier information, further confirm which region
the [AS1 AS2] connection is in (we can use various tools such as
TraceRoute etc. This needs to be described in detail in next
revision.), if we get the region identifier information of the latter
is different from the ASPA records (In current case, what we get is
Asia, not Europe), then the ASPA verification will return the result
"Invalid".
From the above processing results, we can see that the solution
proposed in this draft has worked and solved the problem described in
the second section.
5. IANA Considerations
No IANA actions are required for this document.
6. Security Considerations
This document does not change the security properties of RPKI and
ASPA.
7. Contributors
The following people made significant contributions to this document:
TBD
8. Acknowledgements
TBD.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
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[RFC7908] Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E.,
and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of
BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>.
[RFC8210] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1",
RFC 8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8210>.
9.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification]
Azimov, A., Bogomazov, E., Bush, R., Patel, K., and J.
Snijders, "Verification of AS_PATH Using the Resource
Certificate Public Key Infrastructure and Autonomous
System Provider Authorization", draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-
verification-08 (work in progress), August 2021.
Authors' Addresses
Chen Shen
CAICT
No.52, Hua Yuan Bei Road
Beijing 100191
China
Email: shenchen@caict.ac.cn
Shicong Zhang
NNIX
No. 198, Qidi Road, Xiaoshan District
Hangzhou 311200
China
Email: zsc@nnix.cn
Zhenbin Li
Huawei
156 Beiqing Road
Beijing 100095
China
Email: lizhenbin@huawei.com
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Shunwan Zhuang
Huawei
156 Beiqing Road
Beijing 100095
China
Email: zhuangshunwan@huawei.com
Shuanglong Chen
Huawei
156 Beiqing Road
Beijing 100095
China
Email: chenshuanglong@huawei.com
Haibo Wang
Huawei
156 Beiqing Road
Beijing 100095
China
Email: rainsword.wang@huawei.com
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