Efficient Augmented Password-Only Authentication and Key Exchange for IKEv2
draft-shin-augmented-pake-12

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual in sec area)
Last updated 2012-02-16 (latest revision 2012-01-06)
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IESG note Paul Hoffman is the document shepherd (paul.hoffman@vpnc.org).
Send notices to seonghan.shin@aist.go.jp, draft-shin-augmented-pake@tools.ietf.org, paul.hoffman@vpnc.org
Network Working Group                                            S. Shin
Internet-Draft                                                 K. Kobara
Intended status: Experimental                                 RCIS, AIST
Expires: August 19, 2012                               February 16, 2012

 Efficient Augmented Password-Only Authentication and Key Exchange for
                                 IKEv2
                      draft-shin-augmented-pake-12

Abstract

   This document describes an efficient augmented password-only
   authentication and key exchange (AugPAKE) protocol where a user
   remembers a low-entropy password and its verifier is registered in
   the intended server.  In general, the user password is chosen from a
   small set of dictionary whose space is within the off-line dictionary
   attacks.  The AugPAKE protocol described here is secure against
   passive attacks, active attacks and off-line dictionary attacks (on
   the obtained messages with passive/active attacks), and also provides
   resistance to server compromise (in the context of augmented PAKE
   security).  In addition, this document describes how the AugPAKE
   protocol is integrated into IKEv2.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 19, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

Shin & Kobara            Expires August 19, 2012                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft   Most Efficient Augmented PAKE for IKEv2   February 2012

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Keywords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  AugPAKE Specification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.1.  Underlying Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.2.  Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.3.  Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       2.3.1.  Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       2.3.2.  Actual Protocol Execution  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   3.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.1.  General Assumptions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.2.  Security against Passive Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.3.  Security against Active Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.3.1.  Impersonation Attacks on User U  . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.3.2.  Impersonation Attacks on Server S  . . . . . . . . . . 10
       3.3.3.  Man-in-the-Middle Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     3.4.  Security against Off-line Dictionary Attacks . . . . . . . 11
     3.5.  Resistance to Server Compromise  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   4.  Implementation Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   5.  AugPAKE for IKEv2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     5.1.  Integration into IKEv2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     5.2.  Payload Formats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       5.2.1.  Notify Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       5.2.2.  Generic Secure Password Method Payload . . . . . . . . 14
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   7.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     7.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     7.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   Appendix A.  Evaluation by PAKE Selection Criteria . . . . . . . . 17
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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