Augmented Password-Authenticated Key Exchange for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
draft-shin-tls-augpake-08

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Last updated 2017-01-17
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Network Working Group                                          S.H. Shin
Internet-Draft                                                 K. Kobara
Intended status: Standards Track                                    AIST
Expires: July 21, 2017                                  January 17, 2017

   Augmented Password-Authenticated Key Exchange for Transport Layer
                             Security (TLS)
                       draft-shin-tls-augpake-08

Abstract

   This document describes an efficient augmented password-authenticated
   key exchange (AugPAKE) protocol where a user remembers a low-entropy
   password and its verifier is registered in the intended server.  In
   general, the user password is chosen from a small set of dictionary
   whose space is within the off-line dictionary attacks.  The AugPAKE
   protocol described here is secure against passive attacks, active
   attacks and off-line dictionary attacks (on the obtained messages
   with passive/active attacks), and also provides resistance to server
   compromise (in the context of augmented PAKE security).  Based on the
   AugPAKE protocol, this document also specifies a new password-only
   authentication handshake for Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 21, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

Shin & Kobara            Expires July 21, 2017                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft           Augmented PAKE for TLS             January 2017

   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Keywords  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  AugPAKE Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Underlying Group  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.2.1.  Password Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.3.  Protocol  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.3.1.  Initialization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.3.2.  Actual Protocol Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   3.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.1.  General Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.2.  Security against Passive Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.3.  Security against Active Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.3.1.  Impersonation Attacks on User U . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.3.2.  Impersonation Attacks on Server S . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.3.3.  Man-in-the-Middle Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.4.  Security against Off-line Dictionary Attacks  . . . . . .  11
     3.5.  Resistance to Server Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     3.6.  User Privacy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   4.  Implementation Consideration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.  AugPAKE for TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.1.  Specification of AugPAKE Handshake  . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.2.  Changes from the TLS Handshake Protocol . . . . . . . . .  14
       5.2.1.  Changes to Client Hello Message . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       5.2.2.  Changes to Server Key Exchange Message  . . . . . . .  15
   6.  Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
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