BGPSEC router key rollover as an alternative to beaconing
draft-sidr-bgpsec-rollover-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Roque Gagliano , Keyur Patel , Brian Weis | ||
| Last updated | 2013-02-07 (Latest revision 2012-08-06) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
The current BGPSEC draft documents do not specifies a key rollover process for routers. This document describes a possible key rollover process and explores its impact to mitigate replay attacks and eliminate the need for beaconing in BGPSEC.
Authors
Roque Gagliano
Keyur Patel
Brian Weis
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)