Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Delay-Tolerant Networking (DTN) Node ID Validation Extension
draft-sipos-acme-dtnnodeid-01

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Last updated 2020-06-27 (latest revision 2020-06-26)
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Delay-Tolerant Networking                                       B. Sipos
Internet-Draft                                           RKF Engineering
Intended status: Experimental                              June 26, 2020
Expires: December 28, 2020

   Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Delay-Tolerant
             Networking (DTN) Node ID Validation Extension
                     draft-sipos-acme-dtnnodeid-01

Abstract

   This document specifies an extension to the Automated Certificate
   Management Environment (ACME) protocol which allows validating the
   Delay-Tolerant Networking (DTN) Node ID for an ACME client.  The use
   of a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) as ACME identifier is also
   specified.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 28, 2020.

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   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Sipos                   Expires December 28, 2020               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft              ACME DTN Node ID                   June 2020

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  URI Identifier  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  DTN Node ID Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  DTN Node ID Challenge Request Object  . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  DTN Node ID Challenge Response Object . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.3.  ACME Node ID Validation Challenge Bundles . . . . . . . .   8
     4.4.  ACME Node ID Validation Response Bundles  . . . . . . . .   9
     4.5.  Response Bundle Checks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.1.  Threat: Passive Leak of Bundle Data . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.2.  Threat: BP Node Impersonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.3.  Threat: Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.4.  Multiple Certificate Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     7.1.  ACME Identifier Type  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     7.2.  ACME Validation Method  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     7.3.  BP Bundle Administrative Record Types . . . . . . . . . .  13
   8.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Appendix A.  Administrative Record Types CDDL . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Appendix B.  Example Bundles  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16

1.  Introduction

   Although the original purpose of the Automatic Certificate Management
   Environment (ACME) [RFC8555] was to allow PKI certificate authorities
   to validate network domain names of clients, the same mechanism can
   be used to validate any of the subject claims supported by the PKIX
   profile [RFC5280].  In the case of this specification, the claim
   being validated is a Subject Alternative Name (SAN) of type Uniform
   Resource Identifier (URI) used to represent the Node ID of a Delay-
   Tolerant Networking (DTN) Node.

   The basic unit of data exchange in a DTN is a Bundle
   [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis], which consists of a data payload with
   accompanying metadata.  A DTN Node ID is a URI with a specific set of
   allowed schemes [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis] which determines how bundles are
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