A Threat Model for Router Backdoor
draft-song-router-backdoor-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Haibin Song , Ning Zong | ||
| Last updated | 2015-04-29 (Latest revision 2014-10-26) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document elaborates a threat model for inherent backdoor in a telecom router. We assume a malicious router can have inherent backdoor with an interest in eavesdropping or disabling the functioning of the router or the whole network. It is intended to demonstrate to the system designers and network administrators how the backdoor works, so as to assist in the security evaluation of the routers, and especially the standard design that is immune to inherent backdoors.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)